In this paper, we elucidate an alternative conception of the “end of human life” that Germain Grisez considers but never develops. We then defend this conception against two key objections. We conclude by explaining a few ways that this alternative conception of the “end of human life” is particularly important both theologically (e.g., for interfaith discourse) and philosophically (e.g., for understanding the traditional Christian conception of human nature and, hence, of natural law).

The distinction between the divine essence and energies has long been recognized as a characteristic feature of Eastern Orthodox theology, one sharply at odds with traditional Western understandings of divine simplicity. Yet attempts by Orthodox theologians to explain the distinction have sometimes exaggerated its distinctively Orthodox character by a failure to attend to its historical sources. This paper argues that the distinction was a natural and reasonable consequence of the synthesis between Greek philosophy and Biblical thought executed (...) by the Church Fathers, particularly the Cappadocians of the fourth century. (shrink)

Is the divine glory a creature, or is it God? The awkwardness of the question suggests that there is something wrong with the dichotomy in terms of which it is posed. A similar question can be asked about the divine "energies" (erzergeiai) in the New Testament. Both of these Scriptural themes challenge us to rethink our preconceptions about the nature of God and the relationship between creatures and Creator. In this paper I describe the interpretation of the (...) divine glory and divine energies given by the Cappadocian Fathers of the fourth century. I argue that their view is both philosophically cogent and Scripturally sound, and is one that Christian philosophers today would do well to recover. (shrink)

In this study, focusing our attention on Gregory Palamas’ treatise under the title Περί θείας ενώσεως και διακρίσεως, we attempt to investigate, first of all, the volitional nature and the polymorphism of the divine energies and their relation to the divine essence. We also attempt to approach the divine distinction as a good “procession” and to prove, relying exclusively on the Christian thinker’s text, the inconsistencies according to his view that arise from the positions supported by (...) Barlaam and Akindynos regarding the fact that the (divine) distinction is a creature. Regarding the matter on distinction, we conclude that it is a concept with a clearly different meaning when it comes to divine matters from the meaning that it gets when it concerns the created reality. From the gnoseological point of view, we focus our attention on the fact that the created beings are a source of knowledge for the revealed divine power-energy. (shrink)

At Yannaras and to Zizioulas there is an absolutization and idealization of otherness, which, together with freedom, are two fundamental attributes of personhood. Alterity acquires value and meaning only in relation with relational factors: love, fellowship and, also, being/nature. Due to the fact that, at Yannaras, nature denies apriori the person as otherness (the ratio between person and nature is defined under the aspect of: priority, inclusion, transcendence or conflict). S. Agouridic qualified both Zizioulas and Yannaras as “fighter against/opponent of (...) ousia” their ontology becoming personhood-ology. It may be however dangerous to submit the person to a “dictated or imposed otherness which reduces or diminishes the size of the identity (the common nature of people). In a conception about intersubjectivity Other is more important than Ego and dominate it, and “the dialogically element and reciprocity, which are being inherent to the intersubjectivity and to the communion between people, are inevitably reduced”. In reply to a “theology of the relationship” developed through ontology’s speculations of the person was the assertion of both Lossky, as well as Panagopoulos of meta-ontological and apophatic character of the person. (shrink)

Many contemporary thinkers seeking to integrate theistic belief and scientific thought reject what they regard as two extremes. They disavow deism in which God is understood simply to uphold the existence of the physical universe, and they exclude any view of divine influence that suggests the performance of physical work through an immaterial cause. Deism is viewed as theologically inadequate, and acceptance of direct immaterial causation of physical events is viewed as scientifically illegitimate. This desire to avoid both deism (...) and any positing of God as directly intervening in the physical order has led to models of divine agency that seek to defend the reality of divine causal power yet affirm the causal closure of the physical. I argue, negatively, that such models are unsuccessful in their attempts to affirm both the reality of divine causal power acting in the created world and the causal closure of the physical and, positively, that the assumption that underlies these models, namely that any genuine integration of theistic and scientific belief must posit the causal closure of the physical on pain of violating well-established conservation principles, is mistaken. (shrink)

Physical activity, and likely the motivation for it, varies throughout the day. The aim of this investigation was to create a short assessment (CRAVE: Cravings for Rest and Volitional Energy Expenditure) to measure motivation states (wants, desires, urges) for physical activity and sedentary behaviors. Five studies were conducted to develop and evaluate the construct validity and reliability of the scale, with 1,035 participants completing the scale a total of 1,697 times. In Study 1, 402 university students completed a questionnaire inquiring (...) about the want or desire to perform behaviors “at the present moment (right now).” Items related to physical activity (e.g., “move my body”) and sedentary behaviors (e.g., “do nothing active”). An exploratory structural equation model (ESEM) revealed that 10 items should be retained, loading onto two factors (5 each for Move and Rest). In Study 2, an independent sample (n= 444) confirmed these results and found that Move and Rest desires were associated with stage-of-change for exercise behavior. In Study 3, 127 community-residing participants completed the CRAVE at 6-month intervals over two years- two times each session. Across-session interclass correlations (ICC) for Move (ICC = 0.72–0.95) and Rest (ICC = 0.69–0.88) were higher than when they were measured across 24-months (Move: ICC = 0.53; Rest: ICC = 0.49), indicating wants/desires have state-like qualities. In Study 4, a maximal treadmill test was completed by 21 university students. The CRAVE was completed immediately pre and post. Move desires decreased 26% and Rest increased 74%. Changes in Move and Rest desires were moderately associated with changes in perceived physical fatigue and energy. In Study 5, 41 university students sat quietly during a 50-min lecture. They completed the CRAVE at 3 time points. Move increased 19.6% and Rest decreased 16.7%. Small correlations were detected between move and both perceived energy and tiredness, but not calmness or tension. In conclusion, the CRAVE scale has good psychometric properties. These data also support tenets of the WANT model of motivation states for movement and rest (Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2020a). Future studies need to explore how desires to move/rest relate to dynamic changes in physical activity and sedentarism. (shrink)

Evan Fales has recently argued that, although I provide the most promising approach for those concerned to defend belief in divine intervention, I nevertheless fail to show that such belief can be rational. I argue that Fales’ objections are unsuccessful.

"Catholiques et orthodoxes se revendiquent ensemble du concile Constantinople III qui affirme "une énergie divine et une énergie humaine" pour le Christ, refusant le monoénergisme théandrique. Pourtant, des catholiques (thomasiens) défendent une simplicité divine, une grâce créée et une vision de Dieu alors que des orthodoxes (palamites) soutiennent une distinction réelle entre essence et énergie en Dieu, une énergie incréée et un Dieu inconnaissable. L'examen des divergences ne permet-il de voir des convergences? Dans l'Écriture, si l'énergie se rapporte (...) souvent à une opération de Dieu, elle est aussi l'énergie de l'homme et des éléments de la nature, incréée et créée. La théologie des énergies divines n'est-elle pas aussi une théologie des énergies humaines et cosmiques? L'examen et la comparaison de l'énergie chez Aristote et de l'énergie chez Plotin permettent de saisir des divergences. Avec le Stagirite, nous avons une analogie des énergies physique, biologique, sensible, intellectuelle, éthique et théologique. L'Un plotinien conduit la foi chrétienne à toujours plus d'équivocité et d'altérité, selon une forme de monoénergisme divin. Méditer et articuler les différentes présences de Dieu (création, grâce et incarnation) peut aider à saisir les convergences. Les Latins pourraient reconnaître qu'ils ont besoin d'une théologie des énergies qui ne peut pas se réduire à l'acte et à la substance, car Pattus latin, statique, juridique et théâtral n'est pas l'energeia grec, dynamique, physique et éthique. Les Grecs peuvent saisir que cette théologie des énergies doit prendre des accents aristotéliciens, à la suite de saint Maxime le confesseur, au-delà de Plotin et du néoplatonisme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Energy concepts in theology and natural science are studied to see how they may aid the science‐theology dialogue. Relationships between divine and human energies in classical Christology and energy ideas in process theology are significant. In physics, energy has related roles as something conserved and as the generator of temporal development. We explore ways in which God and the world may interact to produce evolution of the universe. Possible connections between the double role of physical energy and the (...) bipolar character of God in process theology are noted. Energy helps to describe God's relationship with the world in both theological viewpoints and, thus, may bridge them. (shrink)

Is God dead? -- The western split : transcendent, deity, desacralised nature -- The western split : God's otherness, humanity's degradation -- The western split : gender discrimination, its origins, and its consequences -- Energy and divinity -- Divinity within -- The Christian doctrine of incarnation : restricted immanence -- Incarnation and atonement mythology -- Creativity, divine, and human -- Divinity and ethics -- Religion and science -- The problem of evil : providence -- Death and beyond.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Climate Justice: Ethics, Energy, and Public PolicyWillis JenkinsClimate Justice: Ethics, Energy, and Public Policy James Martin-Schramm Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010. 232 pp. $20.00Religious ethicists are sometimes tempted to interpret climate change as symptomatic of a civilizational corruption so deep that practical responsibility seems nearly impossible. In its considered treatment of energy options and policy responses, [End Page 198] Climate Justice works to make applied Christian ethics competent to (...) address climate change. By interpreting political possibilities with Christian commitments to justice, the book makes a distinctively practical contribution to the literature on Christianity and climate; it lifts an important theological voice in the growing subfield of climate ethics.The book begins by elaborating the general notion of ecological justice into workable criteria. Martin-Schramm describes four basic norms of ecojustice (sustainability, sufficiency, participation, and solidarity), from which he develops twelve energy policy guidelines (e.g., equity, adequacy). He then specifies those guidelines into fourteen criteria by which to assess the justice of climate action (e.g., historical responsibility, emissions verifiability).Subsequent chapters use those criteria to evaluate policy options. A chief difficulty in applying them lies in the tension between intergenerational and intragenerational claims. Global climate negotiations founder on disagreements about these undeveloped, plural dimensions of justice. Martin-Schramm therefore deploys criteria with a balancing objective: to develop obligations to the future while recognizing claims of the present poor and vulnerable, and while keeping the result within the bounds of North American political viability.For example, Martin-Schramm recognizes that the criterion of historical responsibility indicates that the United States should bear about one-third of the costs of climate transition. But he finds that the resulting figure ($331 billion) so outstrips realistic acceptance that he rejects financial transfer in favor of a “national obligation wedge” in which the nation compensates by pledging to reduce future emissions. Since those emission reductions are unlikely apart from a price on carbon, Martin-Schramm argues that justice mandates a fossil fuel tax. With an eye to political viability, he proposes beginning with a modest $5/ton (for comparison, the Stern Report estimates the social costs of carbon at $85/ton).Controversy in the details matters to the whole project because the point of Martin-Schramm’s approach is that a meaningful climate ethic should guide contextual action. Yet other accounts of climate justice will find a scandal of modesty on those contextual points. Martin-Schramm’s climate justice entails less economic transformation than the “Northern structural adjustment” demanded by the Latin American Council of Churches. It is also less ecocentric than accounts from indigenous theologians arguing that justice warrants rights for species at risk of extinction, and perhaps for Earth itself.While Climate Justice is a self-consciously North American account, the criteria it develops would be different and work more critically were the underlying account of justice dialogically constructed across economic, political, and theological borders. Were it pragmatic, in the sense of arising from projects from across those borders, rather than applied deductively, a Christian climate ethic would likely produce an account of justice with more critical demands on industrial infrastructure and on ecological consciousness. [End Page 199]In its self-limitation, however, lies the book’s practical promise. Martin-Schramm wants justice to illuminate effective ways toward real responsibility. His criteria for justice imply that advocating for impossible goals, or for objectives that would imperil other conditions of social justice, would amount to injustice. Making ethics matter for climate change, he shows, requires understanding what justice can do in context.The open question for this book’s project is how a self-limited ethic of applied justice relates to the deeper processes of social transformation obviously needed for adequate response. Martin-Schramm closes with an account of his work reforming the energy economy of Luther College, which should inspire every reader with a sense of what persistent, informed, and contextual action can accomplish.Willis JenkinsYale Divinity SchoolCopyright © 2012 The Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Despite Russell’s protestations to the contrary, it has become evident that Leibniz had more than a passing interest in a number of the problems plaguing seventeenth century philosophical theology. In published work, correspondence, and private notes, Leibniz spends significant energy sorting through numerous solutions to the standard problems. Not least among these was the perennial problem of how to reconcile divine foreknowledge and providence and human freedom. In this essay I discuss how Leibniz understands this problem against the background (...) of the scholastic tradition up to his own day, how he rejects these solutions, and how he constructs an alternative which he believes will be acceptable to the various scholastic partisans while resolving the difficulties with each alternative. I then discuss the lessons that can be learned about Leibniz’s own view of freedom in light of what he says about these matters. (shrink)

Despite Russell’s protestations to the contrary, it has become evident that Leibniz had more than a passing interest in a number of the problems plaguing seventeenth century philosophical theology. In published work, correspondence, and private notes, Leibniz spends significant energy sorting through numerous solutions to the standard problems. Not least among these was the perennial problem of how to reconcile divine foreknowledge and providence and human freedom. In this essay I discuss how Leibniz understands this problem against the background (...) of the scholastic tradition up to his own day, how he rejects these solutions, and how he constructs an alternative which he believes will be acceptable to the various scholastic partisans while resolving the difficulties with each alternative. I then discuss the lessons that can be learned about Leibniz’s own view of freedom in light of what he says about these matters. (shrink)

A distinction attributed to Gregory Palamas involves claiming that God’s essence and energies/activities are distinct, yet equally ‘uncreated.’ Traditionally, this Palamite distinction was attacked by some Latin theologians as compromising divine simplicity. A classical view holds that no properties really inhere in God, because God enters into no composition of any kind, including composition of substance and accident. God’s energies/activities seem like properties inhering in God or otherwise composing some kind of part of God. I will argue (...) that, contrary to appearances, the Palamite distinction is a consequence of commitment to a classical view of divine simplicity. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I will examine the problem of theological fatalism in St. Augustine and, specifically, whether or not Augustine was philosophically justified in his belief that his views on divine grace and human freedom could be harmonized. As is well-known, beginning with his second response To Simplician (ca. 396) and continuing through his works against the semi-Pelagians (ca. 426-429), Augustine espoused the Pauline doctrine of all-inclusive grace: that the fallen will’s ability to accomplish the good is totally a (...) function of God’s elective grace. What, then, does the fallen will do to work out its own salvation? There is the further issue of how to reconcile Augustine’s rather extreme emphasis on grace in his later works with the more balanced picture we receive in his sermones ad populum, written throughout his forty-year preaching career. In many of these sermons, even those written during the Pelagian controversy, Augustine is careful to leave space for both divine and human initiative in the process of our justification within the totus Christus, or ‘whole Christ.’ How we can understand Augustine in his role as doctor gratiae and as preacher of human freedom will be a major inquiry of this dissertation.The most serious obstacle to moving forward on these problems has been and remains the essentialist interpretation of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology by most commentators. On their interpretation, Augustine thought that there were no real distinctions within the Trinity, with each of the three divine persons and their actions sharing in the absolute unity of the divine essence. Holding this interpretation not only does away with the distinctness of each of the persons, but also requires all of God’s different powers and attributes, including willing and foreknowing, to be coalesced into one another without distinction in the divine essence. God’s foreknowledge is thereby identified with God’s will, which necessarily leads to theological fatalism: God would have to will everything that He foreknows, and God would have to foreknow everything that He wills. Since God is omniscient, He wills everything that will happen, including the future willings of the fallen human will.It cannot be denied that there are texts in the Augustinian corpus that seem to point to a reading of the Trinity as absolutely simple. But this study will endeavor to show that there are also other largely overlooked texts in On the Trinity, the Confessions, and his Commentaries on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (among others) that argue for various distinctions within the Trinity to make sense of the relation between Creator and creature, and the differences between the divine processions of generation/spiration, and the act of creation. These texts will be shown to parallel very closely the position of the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition, which consistently uses the real distinction between God’s essential being and energetic activities (also known as the essence-energy distinction) to avoid the problem of theological fatalism. This rich theological and philosophical tradition, from the time of the fourth-century Greek Fathers to the Byzantine tradition that followed, differs less with Augustine concerning the essentials of Trinitarian theology and its practical implications for solving the problem of making human freedom and divine grace compatible than has been hitherto thought. (shrink)

Contemporary debates concerning a universal theory about the praxis of love in human society and culture can benefit greatly from the works of two twentieth‐century thinkers, the French paleontologist and religious writer Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and the Russian‐American sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin. Although from very different personal and disciplinary backgrounds, they share amazingly similar views on the power of love as transformative energy for transcending the individual self and for creating radically new, collaborative, and cooperative ways of acting that (...) will transform whole societies, indeed the planet. Traditionally, ideas of love have been associated with religion, but these two thinkers advocate systematic scientific research on the production and application of “love‐energy” for the change of culture, social institutions, and human beings. The article is organized in five parts: (1) altruism, science and love: what is love energy? (2) Teilhard's understanding of the phenomenon of love; (3) Sorokin's approach to creative, altruistic love; (4) comparison of Teilhard's and Sorokin's ideas; and (5) performing works of love. As far as I am aware, this is the first article comparing the remarkable parallels as well as distinctive differences between Sorokin's and Teilhard's ideas on love as the highest form of human energy. (shrink)

This paper considers literary responses to the role of competition in the polis of the late Geometric and Archaic periods through the semantics of the word eris , with particular reference to Hesiod's account of the two Erides at Works and Days 11–26. As Homeric and Epic Cycle usage makes clear, the innovation in this passage is not the assertion that there is a positive as well as a destructive form of eris but the qualitative polarization between them. This polar (...) opposition is a reflex of, and an attempt to gain cognitive mastery over, a fundamental cultural problem: the need of the polis to project direct forms of violence externally as intercommunal warfare, to eliminate internal discord or at least limit its effect, and to use the competitive energies associated with eris positively, in the interest of social and political cohesion. Uses of eris in Herodotus, Xenophon, and Thucydides confirm the lexical argument and show the continuity of these issues in Greek culture. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the concepts ‘destination’, ‘revelation’, ‘foreknowledge’, ‘will’, ‘transmission’, ‘motion’, and ‘grace’, as they appear in Gregory Palamas’ treatise De opera-tionibus divinis. According to the Christian theologian, these terms correspond to specific ways of God’s manifestation, i.e. His natural and supernatural revelation. Since they illuminate God’s energies, but not His essence, they are participated by the beings of the natural world. The first two terms mainly refer to a general version of the revelation, while the third (...) contains epistemological elements as well and the fourth contains elements referring also to the divine will. The fifth term condenses the content of the afore-mentioned terms seen as an ad extra bestowment. By means of these concepts, Palamas preserves the ontological difference between the supernatural and the natural, while, at the same time, he defines the exact way of their communion, which excludes pantheism. He introduces into the divine realm the state of distinction, which, however, does not restrict its unity at all. He accepts the development of a metaphysical multitude, which is regulated by the divine uniqueness. What emerges is not a kind of Neoplatonic polytheism, but the infinite richness of the divine existence. Thus, Palamas steadily moves within the tradition founded by Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene, and George Pachymeres, the main characteristic of which is ontological monism. This is a tradition which formulated common places as to the content, the concepts and the relevant methodology, while the distinction between negative and affirmative theology is dominant. (shrink)

Regardless this will have the following points: if we want to solve global problems , we need to - the global ethics. The ethics can not be the last of the modern world view provided by the world view to the material - the ultimate energy as the true occasion of the universe, because the view is nihilism, the denial code of ethics is part of the universe was constructed. The ethics can not learn from the Western tradition provide nervous, (...) because the traditional occasion of neural science regarded as the ultimate truth is only one never to create the world nervous. According to this view, apart from the scientific method and with the fact that malignant evil conflict, and promote individual traditional classic can correct the flexibility to stimulate the heart, resulting in another of its special moral admonition should be universal. a global ethics of the philosophical foundation provided by Whitehead's view of the world, because the argument for God and the creation of the ultimate. I will argue the following theses: If we are to solve our global problems , we need a global ethic. Such an ethic cannot be provided by the late modern worldview, according to which matter-energy is the only ultimate reality, because this view is nihilistic, denying that moral norms belong to the fabric of the universe. Such an ethic also cannot be provided by traditional Western theism, according to which the only ultimate reality is a deity who created the world ex nihilo, because this view, besides conflicting with scientific method and the fact of evil, promotes the idea that the scriptures of one's tradition are infallibly inspired, so that its particularistic moral injunctions should be universally enforced. The philosophical foundation for a global ethic can be provided by Whitehead's worldview, with its two ultimates: God and creativity. (shrink)

The present paper situates the Western and Eastern models of divine agency within their respective ontological frameworks. I show how the Western conception of divine agency as the production of ‘created effects’ is rooted in a particular understanding of the relationship between transcendence and immanence, but also in a trinitarian ontology which understands God as pure actuality. On the other hand, the Eastern understanding of divine agency through the conceptuality of uncreated energies is similarly rooted in (...) the real distinction between God’s nature and energies. Without trying to critique the Eastern model, I demonstrate one particular strength of the Western approach, namely its ability to distinguish between divine actions, which are inseparable, and divine missions, which are proper to the triune persons. Such a distinction enables us to affirm both the inseparability of triune operations, as well as the possibility of relations to distinct triune persons. (shrink)

What does it mean to talk of the power of God in relation to the human self? The discourses generated by the Jewish and Christian tradition about the capacity for divinity have been mainly promulgated by men, and have more often than not served to exclude women cognitively, practically, and spiritually. As a result they have been made powerless in the face of God’s presence. It is possible to look to ideas developed in Hindu Tantra for comparative notions of power (...) (shakti) which can redeem the place of God for women. The path of divine consciousness is effectively illustrated by an imaginary and somatic awareness, by a devout attention to the play of light in the soul. In this paper I propose to read the assignment of energy and force within conceptions of divinity through the lens of a poststructuralist realization, using the work of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Luce Irigaray. This working paper is basically an exercise in metaphorical writing, and one reader has called it 'creative theology'. (shrink)

La distinction entre l'essence et les énergies divines a fait l'objet d'une élaboration et d'une précision remarquables dans la théologie de saint Grégoire Palamas et occupe une place considérable dans la théologie et la spiritualité de l'Eglise orthodoxe, tandis que la théologie de l'Eglise latine non seulement est restée étrangère à cette distinction mais s'est généralement montrée critique à son encontre, accusant Palamas d'innovation. Les enjeux de cette distinction sont cependant d'une grande pertinence puisqu'ils concernent notamment les questions de la (...) nature et des limites de la connaissance de Dieu, de la nature de la grâce, et des modalités de l'union de l'homme à Dieu et de sa déification. On peut donc dire que, bien que ce sujet n'y soit guère abordé, l'avenir du dialogue oecuménique en dépend aussi. La question de la représentation chrétienne de la notion d'énergie divine est importante également par rapport à des représentations parachrétiennes ou non chrétiennes de cette notion que l'on a pu observer dans certains courants philosophiques et religieux du Bassin méditerranéen, du Moyen-Orient ou de l'Extrême-Orient, de l'Antiquité et du haut Moyen Age, et qui resurgissent de nos jours dans certains courants spiritualistes qui s'en inspirent. Cette étude a pour but de préciser la place et le sens de la notion d'énergie divine et de ses corrélats dans la théologie des Pères grecs de la période patristique classique, s'étendant des origines à saint Jean Damascène, en n'omettant pas de considérer ses racines scripturaires et ses occurrences philosophiques dans l'Antiquité et durant la même période. (shrink)

The analysis, which aims at the interpretation of the three theophanies from Exodus presents—from the metaphysical and epistemological points of view—three fundamental ideas. First, the idea of the absolute unknowability of the essence of God; second, the idea of the real difference between essence and energies in God’s Being; and third, the idea of the real difference between the one essence, three persons and many uncreated divine energies of God. One must say that the absolute unknowability of (...) the essence of God means that God is forever the unknown God. (shrink)

Jeremiah Carey presents a version of panentheism which he attributes to Gregory Palamas, as well as other Greek patristic thinkers. The Greek tradition, he alleges, is more open to panentheistic metaphysics than the Latin. Palamas, for instance, hold that God’s energies are participable, even if God’s essence is not. Carey uses Palamas’ metaphysics to sketch an account on which divine energies are the forms of created substances, and argues it is open to Orthodox Christians to affirm that (...) God is in all things as their formal cause. I argue Carey’s reading is premised on a superficial examination of the patristic literature. More importantly, Palamas’ metaphysics is opposed to that of Carey, since Palamas’ distinction aims to uphold that created persons are only contingent participants in God. On this, Palamas and the Latins are in complete accord. In conclusion, I propose panentheistic metaphysics begins from a false dilemma. (shrink)

In this study, we are discussing the terms ‘idea’, ‘eidos’, and ‘logos’ in George Pachymeres’ Paraphrase of Dionysius the Areopagite’s De divinis nominibus. This is a very important topic, at least from the ontological point of view. Many questions come to the fore, such as whether the three terms are as to their meaning the same, whether their non-autonomous character is mentioned, what their relation with the divine energies is and whether and how they are connected to the (...) divine will. The structure of our study is based on the fact that the terms come from the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Patristic tradition respectively. Considering that both God and the created beings are objective realities, which the human consciousness is asked to investigate, we attempt to extrapolate ontology to the gnoseological level as well. I.e. we attempt to explain the matter of ‘universals’ relying on two questions. Specifically, from the ontological point of view: do they exist independently? And, from the gnoseological point of view: what is their relation to the human thinking? (shrink)

Moving from the problem of defining how medieval speculation conceived the aesthetic dimension of art, this essay purposes an insight into the aspects that describe the peculiarity of the Byzantine conception of beauty and art. Surpassing the noetic perspective established by Platonic thought – shared also by Western medieval philosophy – according to which beauty is an intelligible model subsisting in itself as an autonomous entity, the Byzantine proper vision conceives beauty as a divine energy. The implications of this (...) perspective lead us to investigate its connection with some of the most original achievements of Byzantine speculation, such as hypostatic ontology, theology of deification, eikonic thinking, and especially sophianic gnoseology, which permit us to overcome the dichotomy of the intelligible and the sensible domains of reality. (shrink)

This is a case study of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s De divinis nominibus, a text about God’s names and properties in which human effort to comprehend the projections of the divine energies is described. We specifically focus our attention on the Paraphrasis of George Pachymeres, who was one of the most important representatives of the Palaeologan Renaissance and a great commentator on Pseudo-Dionysius’ works. His introduction to the De divinis nominibus provides us with the opportunity to approach it in (...) two ways: from the historical point of view, we discuss the reason why the text was composed; from the systematic point of view, we discuss some general points about what names and definitions indicate. This is important for a better understanding of the rest of the treatise. (shrink)

In this study, focusing our attention on the Paraphrase of Dionysius the Areopagite’s De divinis nominibus, we investigate whether matter is in George Pachymeres a passive condition, which constantly receives the divine intervention, or expresses sensibly the productive projections of the divine energies. Raising a number of questions, we approach, on the one hand, the concept of causality as a relation between God and the creation and as a relation among the created beings and, on the other (...) hand, the meaning of the concepts of corruption and death, in the sense that all of them are related to the forms of matter. The most important conclusions of ours are that matter is for G. Pachymeres absolutely related to the concept of causality and that corruption is just a microcosmic scale fact. Regarding whether G. Pachymeres tends to adopt materialist theories, we conclude that he accepts matter as a main component of the created world, in the sense of the projection of the divine creative action, without ever ignoring metaphysics of transcendence. (shrink)

Giving justice to Maximus any philosophy wich does not include mysticism will be false as philosophy. Our metaphysics must be mystical in order to be rational. In Maximus’ doctrine, then, Christ comes not to destroy but to fulfill the metaphysics of mystery elaborated by the philosophers. For him there can be no separation between philosophy and theology, or between natural and revealed theology. Thereby, Christology and liturgical mysticism are not additional to a neoplatonic, aristotelian, and other methaphysics. Maximus concern was (...) to continue, not the philosophical tradition of the Aristotelian commentators, but the theological one of the Fathers. He was not an Aristotelian commentator himself. The union and distinction are basic logical concepts in Maximus’ thinking, but the Chalcedonian logic is the application of these concepts. Only in this way one can talk about Christianization of aristotelian logic. St. Maximus the Confessor synthesized Aristotelianism influences with those of Platonism in order to exceed the daring speculations of cosmology origeniene. He had an extraordinary ability to combine metaphysical requirements with the effort of defining the faith dogma, and the monastic experiences with the depth thinking, succeeding to propose a new conception in which converge all cultural and religious influences. This study is analyzing the relationship between logoi and energeia (the intentional or “logical” energeia and the ontology of divine energy as ontological “logic”) within the maximian cosmology, by referring to the palamite theology. The concept of logoi for St. Maximus play a role similar in many respects to that of energy (energeiai) in Cappadocian Fathers, but the functional similarity it should not lead to the identification rationales with the energies. (shrink)

The 13th and 14th centuries represented the most productive and influential period in the history of philosophy and theology in the West. A parallel and less influential (for the West) proliferation of arguments and theories took place in the East, at the same time, as a result of the defence of the Hesychastic movement offered by St Gregory Palamas and his followers. The papers brought together in this volume discuss the importance of Palamite ideas for the understanding of God in (...) terms of divine energies, and for contemporary approaches to solving perennial problems in science, metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics. Some of the contributors take a more reserved evaluation of the Palamite corpus, preferring to highlight similarities and differences between Palamas and the chief representatives of Medieval Scholasticism, such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Ockham. Other essays offer a radical re-evaluation of the Western history of philosophy and theology, preferring to bring out the reasons for Western philosophical and theological shortcomings and providing a wider critique on Western culture. Contributors to this volume include some of the top scholars on Palamite studies from the fields of philosophy, theology, aesthetics, cultural criticism, and art theory. As such, it represents a particularly useful resource for advanced undergraduate students, postgraduate students and researchers in Christian theology and philosophy, Byzantine cultural studies and aesthetics. (shrink)

Palamism has long been enormously influential within Eastern Orthodox thought, and in recent years it has been gaining increased attention in non-Orthodox philosophical and theological circles as well. Here I develop an argument for one of Palamism's core commitments (the reality of at least one uncreated divine energy distint from the divine essence) based on platonism about abstract entities.

Contemplative or "noetic" knowledge has traditionally been seen as the highest mode of understanding, a view that persists both in many non-Western cultures and in Eastern Christianity, where "theoria physike," or the illumined understanding of creation that follows the purification of the heart, is seen to provide deeper insights into nature than the discursive rationality modernity has used to dominate and conquer it. Working from texts in Eastern Orthodox philosophy and theology not widely known in the West, as well as (...) a variety of sources including mystics such as the Sufi Ibn 'Arabi, poets such as Basho, Traherne, Blake, Hölderlin, and Hopkins, and nature writers such as Muir, Thoreau, and Dillard, The Noetics of Nature challenges both the primacy of the natural sciences in environmental thought and the conventional view, first advanced by Lynn White, Jr., that Christian theology is somehow responsible for the environmental crisis. Instead, Foltz concludes that the ancient Christian view of creation as iconic its "holy beauty" manifesting the divine energies and constituting a primal mode of divine revelation offers the best prospect for the radical reversal that is needed in our relation to the natural environment. (shrink)

The analysis, which aims at the interpretation of the three theophanies from Exodus presents—from the metaphysical and epistemological points of view—three fundamental ideas. First, the idea of the absolute unknowability of the essence of God; second, the idea of the real difference between essence and energies in God’s Being; and third, the idea of the real difference between the one essence, three persons and many uncreated divine energies of God. One must say that the absolute unknowability of (...) the essence of God means that God is forever the unknown God. (shrink)

As David White explains in the Introduction to Tantra in Practice, Tantra is an Asian body of beliefs and practices that seeks to channel the divine energy that grounds the universe, in creative and liberating ways. The subsequent chapters reflect the wide geographical and temporal scope of Tantra by examining thirty-six texts from China, India, Japan, Nepal, and Tibet, ranging from the seventh century to the present day, and representing the full range of Tantric experience--Buddhist, Hindu, Jain, and even (...) Islamic. Each text has been chosen and translated, often for the first time, by an international expert in the field who also provides detailed background material. Students of Asian religions and general readers alike will find the book rich and informative. The book includes plays, transcribed interviews, poetry, parodies, inscriptions, instructional texts, scriptures, philosophical conjectures, dreams, and astronomical speculations, each text illustrating one of the diverse traditions and practices of Tantra. Thus, the nineteenth-century Indian Buddhist Garland of Gems, a series of songs, warns against the illusion of appearance by referring to bees, yogurt, and the fire of Malaya Mountain; while fourteenth-century Chinese Buddhist manuscripts detail how to prosper through the Seven Stars of the Northern Dipper by burning incense, making offerings to scriptures, and chanting incantations. In a transcribed conversation, a modern Hindu priest in Bengal candidly explains how he serves the black Goddess Kali and feeds temple skulls lentils, wine, or rice; a seventeenth-century Nepalese Hindu praise-poem hammered into the golden doors to the temple of the Goddess Taleju lists a king's faults and begs her forgiveness and grace. An introduction accompanies each text, identifying its period and genre, discussing the history and influence of the work, and identifying points of particular interest or difficulty. The first book to bring together texts from the entire range of Tantric phenomena, Tantra in Practice continues the Princeton Readings in Religions series. The breadth of work included, geographic areas spanned, and expert scholarship highlighting each piece serve to expand our understanding of what it means to practice Tantra. (shrink)

In his important work, Orthodox Spirituality, Father Dumitru Stăniloae considers that, besides the real existence of the subconscious, there exists in man another reality as well, comprising the superior divine energies found in the human heart and which he defined by using the modern notion of transconscious or supraconscious.Contribution: The present study emphasises on the origin, definitions and content of this concept in the work of Father Stăniloae and its great importance in defining a way to know God (...) and his salvation works, from the perspective of an anchorite and Christian mystic, engaged in the existential tension of communion with God. (shrink)

The essay is devoted to an analysis of aesthetic views of one of the most distinguished German Romantics, which came through with particular fullness in his fiction. Hoffmann’s aesthetic views focus around his understanding of art. He is convinced that art has an anagagogical nature. It elevates the human being from everyday life to the sphere of the divine and thereby ennobles everyday life itself. Art draws the artist away from the world and manifests to the world his prophetic (...) gift, which is often perceived as “poetic madness.” The fantastic in art, as well as the terrible and the frightening, does not contradict artistic truth. The elements of the terrible give philosophical significance to the work of art and please the recipient. Art is cognitive to a high degree, because nature itself reveals its secrets to the artist and allows him to intuit the “truth of nature.” Hoffmann is convinced about the ontological status of art. It must “be something, and not mean it.” Artistic creativity takes place fully within the inner world of the artist as he aspires for his ideal. Hoffmann allows for a certain degree of vagueness in a concrete work of art, whose purpose is additional aesthetic effort on the part of the recipient, who must be internally ready for communication with art. Creative activity is based on imagination and reason. It is based on natural foundations and is inspired by the illuminating effect of divine energy. Hoffmann considers music as the highest form of art and the ideal for all the arts. According to Hoffmann, music is the truly Romantic form of art. He sees the meaning of music in its foundation in nature, its aspiration for the heavens, the fact that it includes the world of the spirits in its orbit, and that it incites a longing for the unattainable in the listener. Hoffmann paid much attention to irony as one of the features of Romantic art. (shrink)

Focussing on the thirteenth-century endings of Byzantine writings against the Latin innovation of the Filioque, the present study aims, on the basis of the work De processione Spiritus sancti (1283), to provide the reader with an insight into the nature of the Orthodox argumentation refuting the Filioque. The work was until now attributed to Gregorios Kyprios Patriarch of Konstantinople (1283–1289). However, it is not a product of his pen, but a compiled version of his earlier work, the “Antirrheticos against Bekkos”. (...) Throughout the study the writer follows step by step Kyprios' reasoning and tries to control the validity and soundness of the arguments advanced, making at the same time specific references to the patristic and philosophical background of Kyprios' thinking. The study shows beyond any doubt that Kyprios is indebted to his predecessors, mostly to the Cappadocians and Dionysius Areopagites, and that he argues on the same line of reasoning with them in respect to the idea of the “Monarchy” of the Father, of the incommunicable of hypostatic properties, and of the possibility of beings to be in communion with God only through the divine energies. On the ground of these three fundamental ideas, a procession of the Spirit also from the Son is categorically rejected. Only the mission of the Spirit (what is implied here, are the gifts of the Spirit and not the Spirit itself) into the world through the Son is acceptable. (shrink)

Recently, I proposed a theory of ontology for the God–world relation that draws inspiration from: Deacon's emergent dynamics where absence plays a role in causal work; dispositionalism as the most suitable philosophical tradition for accommodating absence as a mode of being; and Palamism as the most suitable theological framework for articulating the absence of God as presence. Dumsday's “Palamism and Dispositionalism” in the present issue of Zygon is a cogent breakdown of that thesis, exposing philosophical and theological worries that touch (...) on pan-dispositionalism, bundle theory, Platonism, divine essence, created–uncreated distinction, God–world synergy, and more. This response article engages with the landscape of ideas that Dumsday surveys in an attempt to clarify and extend the proposed thesis that nature's powers are God's energies. (shrink)

Spiritual energy and power can be purposefully used to create structures and conditions that allow religious communities to co-exist. In the context of South Asia and particularly of India, can the very presence of Christians become a gift to the community? A useful pointer could be revisiting the concept of Jubilee Year as described in Leviticus, Isaiah and Luke that portrays the message of atonement, restoration, hospitality and renewal of the divine covenant - all of which are essential for (...) inter-religious dialogue. The following paper seeks possible answers by addressing the concerns of the Christian layman and building up a framework for inter-religious dialogue, with a focus on being faithful to the Christian Gospel. The aim is to create conditions in which different accounts of the world of human experience can flourish together. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Christ’s second love command implies not only that people’s volitions and actions be Christ-like, but also that their affective-motivational dispositions be Christ-like. More specifically, I argue that the command implies that people have aretaic obligations to strive to cultivate a merciful heart with the kind of affective depth described by St. Isaac of Syria in his 71st ascetical homily—i.e., one that is disposed to becoming inflamed, such that it is gripped by “strong and vehement (...) mercy.”. (shrink)

In his book God After Darwin John Haught provides a useful categorization of theological approaches to evolution: some theologians actively oppose Darwinian evolution, another group maintains that science and religion have nothing to say to one another, and a third seeks to engage evolution. Haught wishes to pursue the third way. But many theological attempts to talk about divine action in the world, including divine involvement in the process of evolution, run afoul of the scientific principle of the (...) conservation of matter‐energy. Haught's reliance on the now‐familiar notion that information can have causal efficacy does not in fact escape this difficulty. I suggest a fourth approach, represented by a constructive reading of Paul Tillich's theology. The central argument is that Tillich offers a way of taking Darwinian evolution up into one's ultimate concern without claiming that God has any causal relation to evolution. God provides no historical telos for evolution, but rather a “depth teleology” that springs from the manner in which God, as the depth of the structure of finite being, is the object of Christian faith. (shrink)

A philosopher‐poet‐theologian ponders the implications of the multimillion‐year biogenetic process that produced Homo sapiensand is beginning to reveal itself ever more clearly as evolution of the mind and consciousness. As meaning trappers and makers, called to actualize the divine image imprinted upon us, we are now facing biological and cultural evolution with deliberate human input as well as the evolution of evolution. As communicating animals that are becoming ever more aware of our adaptive behavior, we have the potential of (...) affecting our own destiny by listening to the spirit within and nurturing the genes and memes that give rise to physical, intellectual, creative, and moral excellence. In the matrix of cyberspace we have the opportunity to heal the two‐culture split, to reinvent ourselves, to incubate/weave the emergent religions of the future, and to create our multiple “Ways” appropriate to the dawning Age of Global Dialogue. (shrink)

The problem of divine agency and action is analogous to the problem of human agency and action: How is such agency possible in the absence of a dualistic causal interaction between disparate orders of being? This paper explores nondualistic accounts of divine agency that assert the following: (1) physical monism, (2) antireductionism, (3) physical realization, and (4) divine causal realism. I conclude that a robustly causal deity is incompatible with nonddualism's affirmation of physical monism. Specifically, I argue (...) the incoherence of nondualistic strategies that advocate divine information transfer without energy transfer or the divine downward causation of physical events. Furthermore, I claim that the principle of explanatory exclusion makes any nondualistic, noninterventionist account of divine agency highly dubious. Finally, I suggest that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam can avoid a causally inert deity only if they are willing to deny the current presumption of the causal closure of the physical. (shrink)

Leibniz devoted immense energy and thought to questions concerning moral responsibility and human freedom. This paper examines Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin in two important early texts - “Von der Allmacht Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen” and “Confessio Philosophi” - as a propaedeutic to a detailed examination of the development of Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin. In particular, my aim is to see if Leibniz’s early thinking on freedom and sin in these early writings (...) was among those metaphysical topics about which he changed his mind. My focus is on human, not divine, freedom, and the young Leibniz’s metaphysical psychology, rather than his early efforts in theodicy. I conclude that Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin are in place as early as 1672/3, and remain relatively stable thereafter. (shrink)

Leibniz devoted immense energy and thought to questions concerning moral responsibility and human freedom. This paper examines Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin in two important early texts - “Von der Allmacht Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen” and “Confessio Philosophi” - as a propaedeutic to a detailed examination of the development of Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin. In particular, my aim is to see if Leibniz’s early thinking on freedom and sin in these early writings (...) was among those metaphysical topics about which he changed his mind. My focus is on human, not divine, freedom, and the young Leibniz’s metaphysical psychology, rather than his early efforts in theodicy. I conclude that Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin are in place as early as 1672/3, and remain relatively stable thereafter. (shrink)