In the paper I explore the relations between a relatively new and quickly expanding branch of artificial intelligence –- the automated discovery systems –- and some new views advanced in the old debate over scientific realism. I focus my attention on one such system, GELL-MANN, designed in 1990 at Wichita State University. The program's task was to analyze elementary particle data available in 1964 and formulate an hypothesis (or hypotheses) about a `hidden', more simple structure of matter, or (...) to put it in contemporary terms –- the discovery of quarks. The central thesis of my paper is that systems like GELL-MANN not only discover (or rediscover) the hidden structure of matter, but also provide independent strong evidence in favor of scientific realism about entities involved in that structure. I make an attempt to show how an argument for scientific realism about sub-microscopic entities can be constructed that would parallel Ian Hacking's `argument from coincidence' presented with respect to microscopic objects in his famous book Representing and Intervening. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 2022.

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 2022.

This article provides an overview of computer based catalogue systems designed for use by library clients, seeing present day ‘discovery systems’ on the same trajectory as the older ‘online public access catalogues’ which they are gradually replacing, both in technical development and their approach to client use scenarios. It traces the history of the OPAC/discovery system from its origins in the library automation of the 1960s through to the present and discusses the main technical standards which (...) have formed its development. The article goes on to consider questions relating to the usability of electronic library catalogues and highlights semiotic and ethical issues inherent to their design. It concludes with reflections on the future of the OPAC/discovery system in an information universe apparently dominated by the internet search engine. (shrink)

New computer systems of discovery create a research program for logic and philosophy of science. These systems consist of inference rules and control knowledge that guide the discovery process. Their paths of discovery are influenced by the available data and the discovery steps coincide with the justification of results. The discovery process can be described in terms of fundamental concepts of artificial intelligence such as heuristic search, and can also be interpreted in terms (...) of logic. The traditional distinction that places studies of scientific discovery outside the philosophy of science, in psychology, sociology, or history, is no longer valid in view of the existence of computer systems of discovery. It becomes both reasonable and attractive to study the schemes of discovery in the same way as the criteria of justification were studied: empirically as facts, and logically as norms. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate the role of information machines in the scientific enterprise intended as a social activity. Our discussion is based on a powerful kind of information machines called scientific social agencies, which are multiagent systems of distributed artificial intelligence. Scientific social agency, on the one hand, can provide great benefits to the present common scientific practice but, on the other hand, its development represents a strong and still open technical challenge. This paper shows a coherent framework (...) in which scientific social agency is settled. Moreover, the double role of a scientific social agency in assisting scientists in their activity and in representing the products of their research is illustrated by means of some examples. (shrink)

In my field, animal developmental biology, and in what could be regarded as its “deep time derivative,” the evolutionary biology of the animal body plan, there exist two kinds of experimentally supported causal explanation. These can be described as “rooted” and “unrooted.” Rooted causal explanation provides logical links to and from the genomic regulatory code, extending right into the genomic sequences that control regulatory gene expression. The genomic regulatory code ultimately determines the developmental process in a direct way, since subsequent (...) developmental events all depend directly and specifically on what regulatory genes are being expressed and where in the developing organism they are being expressed.. (shrink)

We examine the relationship between systems and their users from the knowledge discovery perspective. Recently knowledge discovery in databases has made important progress, but it may also bring some potential problems to database design, such as issues related to database security, because an unauthorised user may derive highly sensitive knowledge from unclassified data. In this paper we point out that there is a need for a comprehensive study on knowledge discovery in human-computer symbiosis. Borrowing terms from (...) algorithm design and artificial intelligence literature, we propose a notion called database-user adversarial partnership. We point out that this notion is general enough to cover various knowledge discovery and security of issues related to databases and their users. Furthermore, we point out the notion of database-user adversarial partnership can be further generalised into system-user adversarial partnership. Opportunities provided by knowledge discovery techniques and potential social implications are also discussed. (shrink)

Given the very large numbers of documents involved in e-discovery investigations, lawyers face a considerable challenge of collaborative sensemaking. We report findings from three workplace studies which looked at different aspects of how this challenge was met. From a sociotechnical perspective, the studies aimed to understand how investigators collectively and individually worked with information to support sensemaking and decision making. Here, we focus on discovery-led refinement; specifically, how engaging with the materials of the investigations led to discoveries that (...) supported refinement of the problems and new strategies for addressing them. These refinements were essential for tractability. We begin with observations which show how new lines of enquiry were recursively embedded. We then analyse the conceptual structure of a line of enquiry and consider how reflecting this in e-discovery support systems might support scalability and group collaboration. We then focus on the individual activity of manual document review where refinement corresponded with the inductive identification of classes of irrelevant and relevant documents within a collection. Our observations point to the effects of priming on dealing with these efficiently and to issues of cognitive ergonomics at the human–computer interface. We use these observations to introduce visualisations that might enable reviewers to deal with such refinements more efficiently. (shrink)

What constitutes a scientific discovery? What role do discoveries play in science, its dynamics and social practices? Must every discovery be attributed to an individual discoverer (or a small number of discoverers)? The paper explores these questions by first critically examining extant philosophical explications of scientific discovery—the models of scientific discovery, propounded by Kuhn, McArthur, Hudson, and Schindler. As a simple, natural and powerful alternative, we proffer the “change-driver model”: in a nutshell, it takes discoveries to (...) be cognitive scientific results that have epistemically advanced science. The model overcomes the shortcomings of its precursors, whilst preserving their insights. We demonstrate its intensional and extensional superiority, especially with respect to the link between scientific discoveries and the dynamics of science, as well as the award system of science. Both as an illustration, and as an application to a recent scientific and political controversy, we apply the considered models of discovery to one of the most momentous discoveries of science: the expansion of the universe. We oppose the 2018 proposal of the International Astronomers’ Union as too simplistic vis-`a-vis the historical complexity of the episode. The change- driver model yields a more nuanced and circumspect verdict: (i) The redshift-distance relation shouldn’t be named the “Hubble-Lemaître Law”, but “Slipher-Lundmark-Hubble-Humason Law”; (ii) Its interpretation in terms of an expanding universe, however, Lemaître ought to be given credit for; but (iii) The establishment of the expansion of the universe, as an evidentially sufficiently warranted result, is a communal achievement, emerging in the 1950s or 1960s. (shrink)

This contribution analyzes present applications of temporal logics that are meaningfully related to Hans Reichenbach's groundbreaking work on verbal tenses and their underlying logical structure. Specifically, some formal methods in theoretical computer science will be discussed that enable one to advance empirical hypotheses and to make predictions about the temporal evolution of computing system’s behaviors.

Human participants and recurrent (“connectionist”) neural networks were both trained on a categorization system abstractly similar to natural language systems involving irregular (“strong”) classes and a default class. Both the humans and the networks exhibited staged learning and a generalization pattern reminiscent of the Elsewhere Condition (Kiparsky, 1973). Previous connectionist accounts of related phenomena have often been vague about the nature of the networks’ encoding systems. We analyzed our network using dynamical systems theory, revealing topological and geometric (...) properties that can be directly compared with the mechanisms of non-connectionist, rule-based accounts. The results reveal that the networks “contain” structures related to mechanisms posited by rule-based models, partly vindicating the insights of these models. On the other hand, they support the one mechanism (OM), as opposed to the more than one mechanism (MOM), view of symbolic abstraction by showing how the appearance of MOM behavior can arise emergently from one underlying set of principles. The key new contribution of this study is to show that dynamical systems theory can allow us to explicitly characterize the relationship between the two perspectives in implemented models. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to analyse the cognitive process of the domain theories in terms of the measurement theory to develop a computational machine learning approach for implementing it. As a result, the relational data mining approach, the authors proposed in the preceding books, was improved. We present the approach as an implementation of the cognitive process as the measurement theory perceived. We analyse the cognitive process in the first part of the paper and present the theory and (...) method of the logically most powerful empirical theory discovery in the second. The theory is based on the notion of law-like rules, which conform to all the properties of laws of nature, namely generality, simplicity, maximum refutability and minimum number of parameters. This notion is defined for deterministic and probabilistic cases. Based on the method, the discovery system is developed. The system was successfully applied to many practical tasks. (shrink)

While collaboration has always played an important role in many cases of discovery and creation, recent developments such as the web facilitate and encourage collaboration at scales never seen before, even in areas such as mathematics, where contributions by single individuals have historically been the norm. This new scenario poses a challenge at the theoretical level, as it brings out the importance of various issues which, as of yet, have not been sufficiently central to the study of problem-solving, (...) class='Hi'>discovery, and creativity. We analyze the case of collective and web-based proof events in mathematics, which share their temporal and social nature with every case of collective problem-solving. We propose that some ideas from cognitive architectures, in particular, the notion of codelet—understood as an agent engaged in one of a multitude of available tasks—can illuminate our understanding of collective problem-solving and act as a natural bridge from some of the theoretical aspects of collective, web-based discovery to the practical concern of designing cognitively inspired systems to support collective problem-solving. We use the Pythagorean Theorem and its many proofs as a case study to illustrate our approach. (shrink)

Observational and experimental discoveries of new factual entities such as objects, systems, or processes, are major contributors to some advances in the life sciences. Yet, whereas discovery of theories was extensively deliberated by philosophers of science, very little philosophical attention was paid to the discovery of factual entities. This paper examines historical and philosophical aspects of the experimental discovery by Carl Woese of archaea, prokaryotes that comprise one of the three principal domains of the phylogenetic tree. (...) Borrowing Kuhn’s terminology, this discovery of a major biological entity was made during a ‘normal science’ project of building molecular taxonomy for prokaryotes. Unexpectedly, however, an observed anomaly instigated the discovery of archaea. Substantiation of the existence of the new archaeal entity and consequent reconstruction of the phylogenetic tree prompted replacement of a long-held model of a prokarya and eukarya bipartite tree of life by a new model of a tripartite tree comprising of bacteria, archaea, and eukarya. This paper explores the history and philosophical implications of the progression of Woese’s project from normal science to anomaly-instigated model-changing discovery. It is also shown that the consequential discoveries of RNA splicing and of ribozymes were similarly prompted by unexpected irregularities during normal science activities. It is thus submitted that some discoveries of factual biological entities are triggered by unforeseen observational or experimental anomalies. (shrink)

The article retraces the social and institutional circumstances that in 1986 led two researchers at the IBM laboratory near Zurich, Müller and Bednorz, to discover high-temperature superconductivity. After confirmation of the unexpected breakthrough an unprecedented mobilization of research groups all over the world took place while simul taneously high-temperature superconductivity turned into a subject of intense media interest. The authors discuss these events under three perspectives: the closer interlinkage capacity of researchers and the relationship between the social organization of research (...) and unforeseen cases of scientific creativity. (shrink)

This book is about the work of 10 great scientists; who they were and are, their personal background and how they achieved their outstanding results and took their prominent place in science history. We follow one of physics and science history's most enigmatic phenomena, superconductivity, through 100 years, from its discovery in 1911 to the present, not as a history book in the usual sense, but through close ups of the leading characters and their role in that story, the (...) Nobel laureates, who were still among us in the years 2001-2004 when the main round of interviews was carried out. Since then two of them already passed away. For each one of the 10 laureates, the author tells their story by direct quotation from interviews in their own words. Each chapter treats one laureate. The author first gives a brief account of the laureates' scientific background and main contribution. Then each laureate tells his own story in his own words. This book is unique in its approach to science history. (shrink)

The introduction of statistical models represented by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) has proved fruitful in the construction of expert systems, in allowing efficient updating algorithms that take advantage of conditional independence relations (Pearl, 1988, Lauritzen et al. 1993), and in inferring causal structure from conditional independence relations (Spirtes and Glymour, 1991, Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 1993, Pearl and Verma, 1991, Cooper, 1992). As a framework for representing the combination of causal and statistical hypotheses, DAG models have shed light on (...) a number of issues in statistics ranging from Simpson’s Paradox to experimental design (Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 1993). The relations of DAGs with statistical constraints, and the equivalence and distinguishability properties of DAG models, are now well understood, and their characterization and computation involves three properties connecting graphical structure and probability distributions: (i) a local directed Markov property, (ii) a global directed Markov property, (iii) and factorizations of joint densities according to the structure of a graph (Lauritizen, et al., 1990). (shrink)

Self-discovery leads to the development of the ethics of self-mastery. Many ethical systems prescribe how the individual could attain self-mastery by means of critical self-examination or self-analysis. Once such critical self-examination or self-analysis is successfully carried out, the individual begins to use himself, his personal preferences, as the standard of what is right or wrong. This is the background to the Confucian, Kantian and Existentialist ethics of categorical imperatives. Even in religious ethical systems that attribute the source (...) of the moral law to divine authority, the individual still has to take a leap of faith to discover God's purpose for his existence, which he then internalizes. In the final analysis, any ethics that truly works must issue forth from the self. Hence self-mastery is the absolutely fundamental premise upon which to erect a sound moral character. (shrink)

Self-discovery leads to the development of the ethics of self-mastery. Many ethical systems prescribe how the individual could attain self-mastery by means of critical self-examination or self-analysis. Once such critical self-examination or self-analysis is successfully carried out, the individual begins to use himself, his personal preferences, as the standard of what is right or wrong. This is the background to the Confucian, Kantian and Existentialist ethics of categorical imperatives. Even in religious ethical systems that attribute the source (...) of the moral law to divine authority, the individual still has to take a leap of faith to discover God's purpose for his existence, which he then internalizes. In the final analysis, any ethics that truly works must issue forth from the self. Hence self-mastery is the absolutely fundamental premise upon which to erect a sound moral character. (shrink)

The article reports the results from the developmentof four data-driven discovery systems, operating inlinguistics. The first mimics the induction methods ofJohn Stuart Mill, the second performs componentialanalysis of kinship vocabularies, the third is ageneral multi-class discrimination program, and thefourth finds logical patterns in data. These systemsare briefly described and some arguments are offeredin favour of machine linguistic discovery. Thearguments refer to the strength of machines incomputationally complex tasks, the guaranteedconsistency of machine results, the portability ofmachine methods to (...) new tasks and domains, and thepotential machines provide for our gaining newinsights. (shrink)

This study is concerned with processes for discovering new theories in science. It considers a computational approach to scientific discovery, as applied to the discovery of theories in cognitive science. The approach combines two ideas. First, a process-based scientific theory can be represented as a computer program. Second, an evolutionary computational method, genetic programming, allows computer programs to be improved through a process of computational trialand-error. Putting these two ideas together leads to a system that can automatically generate (...) and improve scientific theories. The application of this method to the discovery of theories in cognitive science is examined. Theories are built up from primitive operators. These are contained in a theory language that defines the space of possible theories. An example of a theory generated by this method is described. These results support the idea that scientific discovery can be achieved through a heuristic search process, even for theories involving a sequence of steps. However, this computational approach to scientific discovery does not eliminate the need for human input. Human judgment is needed to make reasonable prior assumptions about the characteristics of operators used in the theory generation process, and to interpret and provide context for the computationally generated theories. (shrink)

This book examines the historical development of studies of the brain and behavior from the early work of Aristotle and Galen up to the late twentieth century. Modern neuroscience, a multidisciplinary endeavor, emerged only recently as a unified field . This book does not treat the disciplinary history of neuroscience per se but, rather, the history of attempts to understand the nervous system and its relationship to behavior from a constellation of disciplines all related to what we now call “neuroscience”: (...) anatomy, physiology, psychology, psychiatry, evolutionary theory, and anthropology.Louise H. Marshall is a neuroscientist and director of the UCLA Brain Research Institute's Neuroscience History Archives. Her coauthor, the late neuroscientist Horace W. Magoun, founded the Department of Anatomy at UCLA's Medical School in 1953. Their book grew out of a series of poster presentations put together by Magoun for several national and international neuroscience meetings during the early 1980s. Magoun wrote a twenty‐seven‐page brochure after receiving much enthusiasm from neuroscientists at these meetings—both students and those more established in the field—and many wanted a publication.Not surprisingly, given its early beginnings in poster presentations, the book is richly illustrated. The chapters are arranged only loosely chronologically; their sequence is directed more explicitly by investigative themes. The first chapter outlines three basic “postulates” that direct the organization of the rest of the book and act as conceptual threads: phylogeny , the idea of a structural and functional hierarchy in the nervous system, and the notion that function determines structure. The last chapter, by way of discussion, moves into twentieth‐century developments in the understanding of certain “integrative” systems in the brain and the recognition by neuroscientists of the need for multidisciplinary approaches that integrate anatomical, physiological, and behavioral perspectives.The third postulate, the idea that “form follows function,” receives the most emphasis in the book, and most chapters touch on the oscillating relationship between studies of form and studies of function . The book also illustrates certain historical trends: the anatomical studies of the ancient and Renaissance periods, the more physiological and clinical studies of the nineteenth century, and the instrument‐centered approaches of early twentieth‐century neurophysiology.The book has certain strengths and weaknesses related to the authors' perspective as neuroscientists. As one might expect, elements of presentism arise, as the work of some investigators is described as “anticipating” that of later scientists, and other research—for example, J. L. W. Thudichum's work on brain chemistry—is deemed “surprisingly modern” . However, the book gives wonderfully detailed, precise accounts of scientific developments related to brain and behavior. The authors demonstrate a critical mastery of both primary and secondary sources, with thorough citations, and the book comes with a comprehensive bibliography.Discoveries in the Human Brain does not place neuroscientific developments within a wider cultural or social context, but the authors had no ambitions to do so. They even point to drawbacks of such historical approaches, arguing that they “create issues where none exist and … couch ideas in such convoluted language that the events and concepts become unfamiliar and difficult to fathom” . This position reflects their intended audience: neuroscientists interested in the history of their field. While there is certainly room for professional historians of science to tackle the history of neuroscience, this book will be valuable for historians because literature in the history of neuroscience is sparse. However, it is likely to be of greater value to neuroscientists—in the authors' words, “those workers at the bench who are curious to learn how it all happened.”. (shrink)

In many domains of biology, explanation takes the form of characterizing the mechanism responsible for a particular phenomenon in a specific biological system. How are such explanations generalized? One important strategy assumes conservation of mechanisms through evolutionary descent. But conservation is seldom complete. In the case discussed, the central mechanism for circadian rhythms in animals was first identified in Drosophila and then extended to mammals. Scientists' working assumption that the clock mechanisms would be conserved both yielded important generalizations and served (...) as a heuristic for discovery, especially when significant differences between the insect and mammalian mechanism were identified. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Programs in Science Studies and Cognitive Science, 0119, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093‐0119; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

This paper is an investigation into the introduction of the term ‘system’ and its conceptual background in the writings of Bartholomew Keckermann. This includes a brief summary of the literature and evidence identifying Keckermann as the first to make significant usage of the term in logic, philosophy, and theology. Then, after a survey of his life, work and milieu, this paper will look closer at three of Keckermann’s own ‘systems’; Systema logicae (1600), Praecognitorum Logicorum (1606), and Systema SS. Theologiae (...) (1602). Finally, I will touch on the influence Keckermann’s innovation had on subsequent ideas of method in modern philosophy, especially how his innovative use of this term gives the logician the directing role as a technical expert in mining the truth of theology, philosophy, and other sciences. This, of course, flies in the face of the medieval view of the Church and its elders controlling that role, characterizing the discovery and refinement of knowledge as being a process of electing and using worthy passive subjects as conduits of divine knowledge. Thus Keckermann’s systems can be considered an important step away from this, towards the early modern epistemology requiring an active thinking subject, best characterized in Descartes’ Meditations. (shrink)

Research on computational models of scientific discovery investigates both the induction of descriptive laws and the construction of explanatory models. Although the work in law discovery centers on knowledge‐lean approaches to searching a problem space, research on deeper modeling tasks emphasizes the pivotal role of domain knowledge. As an example, our own research on inductive process modeling uses information about candidate processes to explain why variables change over time. However, our experience with IPM, an artificial intelligence system that (...) implements this approach, suggests that process knowledge is insufficient to avoid consideration of implausible models. To this end, the discovery system needs additional knowledge that constrains the model structures. We report on an extended system, SC‐IPM, that uses such information to reduce its search through the space of candidates and to produce models that human scientists find more plausible. We also argue that although people carry out less extensive search than SC‐IPM, they rely on the same forms of knowledge—processes and constraints—when constructing explanatory models. (shrink)

In this article, the role of abductive reasoning within Peirce's diagrammatic reasoning is discussed. Both abduction and diagrammatic reasoning bring in elements of discovery but it is not clear if abduction should be a part of a fully developed diagrammatic system or not for Peirce. This relates to Peirce's way of interpreting abduction in his later writings. Iconicity and perceptual elements as a basis for discoveries are analyzed, both in deductive and abductive reasoning. At the end, the role of (...) modern ideas of distributed cognition applied to the Peircean scheme is shortly delineated. (shrink)

People spontaneously discover new representations during problem solving. Discovery of a mathematical representation is of special interest, because it shows that the underlying structure of the problem has been extracted. In the current study, participants solved gear‐system problems as part of a game. Although none of the participants initially used a mathematical representation, many discovered a parity‐based, mathematical strategy during problem solving. Two accounts of the spontaneous discovery of mathematical strategies were tested. According to the automatic schema abstraction (...) hypothesis, experience with multiple, unique problem exemplars facilitates extraction of the parity relation. According to the comparison‐based abstraction hypothesis, explicitly comparing gear pathways that have different number, but the same parity, should result in extraction of parity. An event history analysis showed that accumulation of experiences with different‐number, same‐parity comparisons predicted discovery of parity; accumulation of unique exemplars did not. Results suggest that comparison‐based abstraction processes can lead to the discovery of a mathematical relation. (shrink)

Whereas most branches of neuroscience are thought to provide mechanistic explanations, systems neuroscience is not. Two reasons are traditionally cited in support of this conclusion. First, systems neuroscientists rarely, if ever, rely on the dual strategies of decomposition and localization. Second, they typically emphasize organizational properties over the properties of individual components. In this paper, I argue that neither reason is conclusive: researchers might rely on alternative strategies for mechanism discovery, and focusing on organization is often appropriate (...) and consistent with the norms of mechanistic explanation. Thus, many explanations in systems neuroscience can also be viewed as mechanistic explanations. (shrink)

We have been discussing some of the fundamental features of the classical calculus of probability. The equiprobability of rival events was seen to be a major assumption of the calculus. Moreover, it is an assumption which the pure mathematician need not bother to justify. He need only present his formal system as follows.

Philosophers of science diverge on the question what drives the growth of scientific knowledge. Most of the twentieth century was dominated by the notion that theories propel that growth whereas experiments play secondary roles of operating within the theoretical framework or testing theoretical predictions. New experimentalism, a school of thought pioneered by Ian Hacking in the early 1980s, challenged this view by arguing that theory-free exploratory experimentation may in many cases effectively probe nature and potentially spawn higher evidence-based theories. Because (...) theories are often powerless to envisage workings of complex biological systems, theory-independent experimentation is common in the life sciences. Some such experiments are triggered by compelling observation, others are prompted by innovative techniques or instruments, whereas different investigations query big data to identify regularities and underlying organizing principles. A distinct fourth type of experiments is motivated by a major question. Here I describe two question-guided experimental discoveries in biochemistry: the cyclic adenosine monophosphate mediator of hormone action and the ubiquitin-mediated system of protein degradation. Lacking underlying theories, antecedent data bases, or new techniques, the sole guides of the two discoveries were respective substantial questions. Both research projects were similarly instigated by theory-free exploratory experimentation and continued in alternating phases of results-based interim working hypotheses, their examination by experiment, provisional hypotheses again, and so on. These two cases designate theory-free, question-guided, stepwise biochemical investigations as a distinct subtype of the new experimentalism mode of scientific enquiry. (shrink)

Novel computational representations, such as simulation models of complex systems and video games for scientific discovery, are dramatically changing the way discoveries emerge in science and engineering. The cognitive roles played by such computational representations in discovery are not well understood. We present a theoretical analysis of the cognitive roles such representations play, based on an ethnographic study of the building of computational models in a systems biology laboratory. Specifically, we focus on a case of model-building (...) by an engineer that led to a remarkable discovery in basic bioscience. Accounting for such discoveries requires a distributed cognition analysis, as DC focuses on the roles played by external representations in cognitive processes. However, DC analyses by and large have not examined scientific discovery, and they mostly focus on memory offloading, particularly how the use of existing external representations changes the nature of cognitive tasks. In contrast, we study discovery processes and argue that discoveries emerge from the processes of building the computational representation. The building process integrates manipulations in imagination and in the representation, creating a coupled cognitive system of model and modeler, where the model is incorporated into the modeler's imagination. This account extends DC significantly, and we present some of the theoretical and application implications of this extended account. (shrink)

BACON.3 is a production system that discovers empirical laws. Although it does not attempt to model the human discovery process in detail, it incorporates some general heuristics that can lead to discovery in a number of domains. The main heuristics detect constancies and trends in data, and lead to the formulation of hypotheses and the definition of theoretical terms. Rather than making a hard distinction between data and hypotheses, the program represents information at varying levels of description. The (...) lowest levels correspond to direct observations, while the highest correspond to hypotheses that explain everything so for observed. To take advantage of this representation, BACON.3 has the ability to carry out and relate multiple experiments, collapse hypotheses with identical conditions, ignore differences to let similar concepts be treated as equal, and to discover and ignore irrelevant variables. BACON.3 has shown its generality by rediscovering versions of the ideal gas law, Kepler's third law of planetary motion, Coulomb's law, Ohm's law, and Galileo's laws for the pendulum and constant acceleration. (shrink)

This article attempts to outline the contours of a transcendental phenomenology that would retain the intuition of a healthy realism. In this connection it is proposed to reinterpret the Husserlian notion of constitution, presenting constitution as a discover of reality. A distinction is made between strong and weak versions of constitution. It is constitution in the weak sense that combines, in our opinion, with the realist attitude. In order to achieve the above-mentioned goal (to present constitution as discovery), the (...) Husserlian notion of object sense is clarified: it is excluded as a representative or substitute of an intentional object; object sense is seen as a mode of givenness, as а medium by means of which the object is implied or given. The idea of a meaningful discovery of reality is best matched by this treatment of object meaning. It is thus possible to combine the realist attitude with the idea of meaningful access to the real, thus avoiding, on the one hand, naive realism and, on the other hand, transcendental-idealist implications. The Husserlian notion of constitution is further related with the idea of forming interpretative schemes of understanding the world, which may include political agendas, scientific paradigms, systems of speculative metaphysics, and religious faith. It is emphasized that, although the rejection of interpretation is impossible, interpretive schemes must be reconciled with real facts and events in order to “fine-tune” reason and reality. Finally, a separation is undertaken with the conception of J.- L. Marion, which relies on the deflation of meaning in favor of the given as such, calling into question the status of man as a being who possesses reason, who discovers reality and constitutes its meaning. (shrink)

Shortly after Kurt Gödel had announced an early version of the 1st incompleteness theorem, John von Neumann wrote a letter to inform him of a remarkable discovery, i.e. that the consistency of a formal system containing arithmetic is unprovable, now known as the 2nd incompleteness theorem. Although today von Neumann’s proof of the theorem is considered lost, recent literature has explored many of the issues surrounding his discovery. Yet, one question still awaits a satisfactory answer: how did von (...) Neumann achieve his result, knowing as little as he seemingly did about the 1st incompleteness theorem? In this article, I shall advance a conjectural argument to answer this question, after having rejected the argument widely shared in the literature and having analyzed the relevant documents surrounding his discovery. The argument I shall advance strictly links two of the three letters written by von Neumann to Gödel in the late 1930 and early 1931 (i.e. respectively that of November 20, 1930 and that of January 12, 1931) and finds the key for von Neumann’s discovery in his prompt understanding of the Gödel sentence A – as the documents refer to it – as expressing consistency for a formal system that contains arithmetic. (shrink)

This article describes how empirical discoveries in the 1930s–1950s regarding population variation for chromosomal inversions affected Theodosius Dobzhansky and Richard Goldschmidt. A significant fraction of the empirical work I discuss was done by Dobzhansky and his coworkers; Goldschmidt was an astute interpreter, with strong and unusual commitments. I argue that both belong to a mechanistic tradition in genetics, concerned with the effects of chromosomal organization and systems on the inheritance patterns of species. Their different trajectories illustrate how scientists’ commitments (...) affect how they interpret new evidence and adjust to it. Dobzhansky was moved to revised views about selection, while Goldschmidt moved his attention to different genetic phenomena. However different, there are significant connections between the two that enrich our understanding of their views. I focus on two: the role of developmental considerations in Dobzhansky’s thought and the role of neutrality and drift in Goldschmidt’s evolutionary account. Dobzhansky’s struggle with chromosomal variation is not solely about competing schools of thought within the selectionist camp, as insightfully articulated by John Beatty, but also a story of competition between selectionist thinking and developmental perspectives. In contraposition, Goldschmidt emphasized the role of low penetrance mutations that spread neutrally and pointed out that drift could result from developmental canalization. This account adds to the dominant story about Goldschmidt’s resistance to the splitting of development from genetics, as told by Garland Allen and Michael Dietrich. The story I tell illustrates how developmental thinking and genetic thinking conflicted and influenced researchers with different convictions about the significance of chromosomal organization. (shrink)