Two Kinds of Knowledge in Scientific Discovery

Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (1):36-52 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Research on computational models of scientific discovery investigates both the induction of descriptive laws and the construction of explanatory models. Although the work in law discovery centers on knowledge‐lean approaches to searching a problem space, research on deeper modeling tasks emphasizes the pivotal role of domain knowledge. As an example, our own research on inductive process modeling uses information about candidate processes to explain why variables change over time. However, our experience with IPM, an artificial intelligence system that implements this approach, suggests that process knowledge is insufficient to avoid consideration of implausible models. To this end, the discovery system needs additional knowledge that constrains the model structures. We report on an extended system, SC‐IPM, that uses such information to reduce its search through the space of candidates and to produce models that human scientists find more plausible. We also argue that although people carry out less extensive search than SC‐IPM, they rely on the same forms of knowledge—processes and constraints—when constructing explanatory models.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A few words on representation and meaning. Comments on H.A. Simon's paper on scientific discovery.Roberto Cordeschi - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (1):19 – 21.
Does scientific discovery have a logic?Herbert A. Simon - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (4):471-480.
Artificial Intelligence, Psychology, and the Philosophy of Discovery.Paul Thagard - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:166 - 175.
Horizon for Scientific Practice: Scientific Discovery and Progress.James A. Marcum - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):187-215.
A.I., Scientific discovery and realism.Mario Alai - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (1):21-42.
Computational Models in the Philosophy of Science.Paul Thagard - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:329 - 335.
Machine discovery.Herbert Simon - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (2):171-200.
Instituting science: Discovery or construction of scientific knowledge?James A. Marcum - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):185 – 210.
System-problems in Kant.Zelko Loparic - 1988 - Synthese 74 (1):107 - 140.
Personal Knowledge and Human Creativity.Percy Hammond - 2003 - Tradition and Discovery 30 (2):24-34.
The epistemology of scientific evidence.Douglas Walton & Nanning Zhang - 2013 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 21 (2):173-219.
Afterword: data, knowledge, and e-discovery. [REVIEW]David D. Lewis - 2010 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 18 (4):481-486.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-01

Downloads
103 (#163,960)

6 months
2 (#1,157,335)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?