The general mission of feminist philosophy is to correct whatever male biases may exist in the mainstream philosophical traditions. Thus western feminist philosophers investigate and challenge the ways in which western traditions have so long been participating in subordinating women or in rationalizing their subordination. By questioning the gender insensitivity of ethics and philosophy, feminism attempts to reveal various forms of subjugation of women operating through laws, institutions, customs, social theories, and cultural values. Feminism aims at coming up (...) with a better design for society, based on a thorough review and rethinking of gendered positioning of human beings. (shrink)

The present paper addresses the mutual relationship between society and law in shaping women’s law in Islam from the perspective of the sociology of law. It analyzes the role of pre-Islamic social, political, and economic structures in the Arabian Peninsula in modeling women’s law and highlights some customary laws which were rejected or revived and integrated in Islamic jurisprudence. In this regard, the paper reviews issues such as polygyny, rights to inheritance, marriage, the process of testimony (...) and acceptable forms of evidence in legal matters, diyya, the exclusion of women from the judiciary and the system of issuing fatwa, natural right of guardianship of underage children after divorce, and regulations related to the veil. Finally, referring to the manner of the Prophet of Islam, the paper suggests that ʿurf can be considered as a source of Islamic legislation alongside other commonly known sources of fiqh. (shrink)

Women are more visible in economic and public life than before. This visibility has led to a change in the social perspective towards women in recent centuries. Some provisions regarding women, which are generally accepted in classical fiqh teachings, have started to be discussed again. It has also started to be seen that the existence of different perspectives has emerged within these discussions. The issue of the amount of the victim's diya, which is included in the field (...) of Islamic criminal law, is one of the issues that has been discussed on a different ground recently in this context. The view that the diya penalty of a woman is half of that of a man has been generally accepted and practiced since the early periods of Islam. However, the issue, which has come to the agenda again with the conferences and articles written recently, has formed the basis of heated disputes. Considering the importance of the legal aspect of the subject, it is aimed to deal with the issue in detail in this study. Then, the evidences of the critical view that "the diya of a woman is the same as that of a man" will be explained. Finally, the points of disagreement on the subject will be determined, and a result will be tried to be reached by considering the opinions and evidences mentioned in the general framework. (shrink)

Saudi Arabia has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, it has made general reservations to the effect that where there is a conflict between a Convention article and Islamic Law principles, Islamic Law shall have precedence. The family law rights of women and children in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been criticised for not reaching the standards set by (...) CEDAW and CRC. This article looks at the internationally set standards of these rights and compares them with the Family Law rules of Islamic Law as applied in Saudi Arabia. The applications in Saudi Arabia are then examined by looking at certain practices, case judgments and recent developments in the country in this field. Amongst these developments are the first case in which a Saudi judge annuls a child's marriage, the first death sentence declared on a father who abused his daughter causing her death, and the Saudi Divorce Initiative which aims to educate women and call for the protection of their rights during marriage and after its dissolution. The article stresses that despite the many improvements, there remains a need for codifying the Islamic Law of Personal Status in Saudi Arabia as this measure would be the basis that defines and protects the rights of women and children in Family Law. (shrink)

The NGO Forum, held in Houairou, China, in the fall of 1995, was a defining moment in the global dialogue among women on issues relating to Islam. Prior to that event, discussions of Islamic shari'ah law (law based on religious foundations), in particular, and Islam, in general, had been escalating both in the West and in Muslim countries. In the regional conferences held in preparation for the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held concurrently with the (...) NGO Forum, the intellectual fault‐lines surrounding these issues became pronounced between two radically different schools of thought. The first school of thought argued that shari'ah law was outmoded and should be discarded in favor of a modern Western secular model. The second school of thought denied any problems under existing shari'ah laws. Each group felt very strongly about its point of view. The battle was joined in Houairou. (shrink)

This research focuses on the issue of human rights violations, particularly those affecting Muslim women in Indonesian diaspora marriages in Russia. Despite the regulations set by the Family Code of the Russian Federation, there have been reports of abuse, expulsion, withholding of documents and unilateral divorce. The purpose of this qualitative research using Smith’s phenomenological approach is to analyse the root causes of these violations and provide solutions. Data were collected through in-depth interviews, observation and documentation analysis. The results (...) showed that domestic violence was caused by a lack of self-concern and lack of cultural, legal and legal administration literacy. This lack of literation contributes to the violation of the rights of married diaspora women in Russia. Self-protection can be enhanced by increasing faith-based marriage literacy and cultural and legal literacy. Contribution: This research provides insight into the factors contributing to human rights violations in Indonesian diaspora marriages in Russia and proposes solutions to prevent such violations. The findings of this study can also serve as a basis for future research in the field of human rights and diaspora. (shrink)

Historienne spécialiste de l’époque ottomane et professeur à l’Université de Georgetown, Judith Tucker fait partie des spécialistes les plus connues de la question du genre au Proche-Orient. Son premier livre, Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, 1985, attirait l’attention sur la place des femmes dans le monde du travail dans l’Égypte du XIXe siècle, tandis que le remarquable In the House of Law : Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine, 1998, mettait à jour les résultats du dépou...

Muslim women's rights have been a topic of discussion and debate over the past few decades, and with a good reason. Islamic Law is considered by many as patriarchal and particularly oppressive to women, and yet there are also others-Muslim women-who have rigorously defended their religion by claiming that Islam is the guarantor par excellence of women's rights. A big question begs to be answered: is Islam particularly oppressive to women?The Qur'an has addressed (...) class='Hi'>women's issues fourteen hundred years ago by creating certain reforms to improve the status of women; however, these reforms do not seem to be practiced in Muslim societies today.1 How is this so? I contend that Islam, as revealed to Muhammad, is not oppressive to women; rather, its interpretation, in so far as it is enacted in the family laws and everyday living, is patriarchal and hence needs to be examined.2 The goal of this work is to discuss what the Qur'an says about certain problems which gravely affect Muslim women, specifically: 1. gender equality 2. polygamy 3. divorce and the concept of nushuz. (shrink)

Verse 4:34 of the Qur'an has historically been interpreted to give husbands authority over their wives. Even today, such as in a recent case in the United Arab Emirates, Islamic courts have held that the husband has some leeway in "disciplining" wives who act in a rebellious manner to their husbands. This article challenges this interpretation through a comprehensive legal analysis, taking into account the context under which the verse came about, including the societal norms and conditions of the (...) time; the Prophet Muhammad’s profound views against violence towards women; the values of marriage emphasized in the Qur’an; the Qur’an’s incremental approach to improving social behavior and practice; and the higher objectives of Islamic law. (shrink)

Basic characteristic of Islamic heritage law, principally it has accepted the two-to-one ratio between the male and the female children/siblings in division of heritage. In Islamic inheritance law, the main/basic reason why the share of the male is twice the share of the female is no “value” judgments given to female/women in creation and gender in Islam, on the contrary, are real realities related with the roles and financial obligations that man and woman have undertaken, in other (...) words, related with “socio-economic structure/fact” in the family and society structure foreseen by Islam. As a matter of fact, “need principle” is based on in division and succession of heritageand a fair arrangement has been made in accordance with the rights and responsibilities of the husband and wife in Islamic Law. In some classical tafsīr books, the concept of “degree” in the verse “... Men have a degree (right) over women” (Al-Baqara 2/228) mentioning the mutual rights and responsibilities of women and men; and the expression of “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” in the verse –the inheritance of man is the share of two women– (Al-Nisā 4/11) mentioning the inheritance shares of boys and girls is interpreted against the woman by disregarding the intended purpose and socio-economic contexts of these verses. As a result of this interpretation, the share of men in inheritance is twice the share of women in Islamic law is ontologically (existential/creation) based on a justification that “man is superior to woman”. In this article/study, an analyticallook atthe interpretations in some classical tafsīr books on the axis of “daraja/degree” and “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” that today sheds light on the sociological-historical background of depriving the daughter from the heritage will be made. Summary: Just as there is no way to determine a person’s sex, it is not either possible by reason to have such an opportunity. - With the possibility of medical intervention nowadays - sex is determined by the discretion of the Supreme Creator rather than will. Indeed, it is mentioned in the Qur’ān: To Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth; He creates what he wills. He gives to whom He wills female [children], and He gives to whom He wills males (Al-Shūrā 42/49.)In addition to human biological sex, there is also social gender. Indeed, the term “sex” refers to being biologically female or male, while the term "gender" refers to the social and cultural identity of a woman or man, or the social roles that occur in the historical process.Accordingly, while it is not possible to determine biological sex (in normal circumstances in advance), determining gender is shaped by the cultural will of individuals and societies. As a matter of fact, gender is shaped according to the religions, customs and cultures of the societies and it shows differences according to time, culture and family structure. In this context, in the pre-Islamic Arab society, the gender of the girl or the woman was shaped by the custom of the ritual and customs. Indeed, it is a known fact that during the period of Jahiliyyah, in terms of social gender, the girl/woman has been deprived of many social and economic rights, especially heritage. The Qur’ān has brought the girls who, in the period of Jahiliyyah, were oppressed in terms of gender, deprived of many social and economical rights, treated as second class human, embarrassed of themselves and buried alive, to the same position as man. In this context, as it is in every field in the direction of social structure and social conditions of that day, also in the field of inheritance law, a number of regulations were made in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah being the main sources of Islam. The divisions of the inheritance were connected with religious and legal rules and the shares of the inheritance of the sons and daughters were determined by naṣṣ (verses and hadiths).However, in Islamic inheritance law, as a requirement of the structure of family and society accepted by Islam, in principle, “two-to-one” measures have been adopted between male and female children. As a matter of fact, in this aspect, it is mentioned in the Qur’ān: Allah instructs you concerning your children: for the male, what is equal to the share of two females (Al-Nisā 4/11.)On one hand, the principle that Islamic law brings between boys and girls; Seems to be an inequality in terms of the arrangement in which "the inheritance share of the male child is twice the share of the female child", while on the other hand, within the border of in the family foreseen by Islam, this regulation has not been seen as an injustice and inequity by Muslim societies, because in Islamic family law, a man is obliged to ensure the livelihood of the family after marriage. He is also obliged to give his wife her mahr when marrying.In Islamic inheritance law, “necessity principle” is taken as the basis of responsibility that women and man have undertaken in family and society. Therefore, even though giving nothing at all to those who are not in need and giving less to those who are in less need, giving too much to those who are in much need might seem contrary to the principle of equality, it is a necessity of the principle of justice and fairness. As a matter of fact, while "law equality, necessity in sharing" principle, law is arranged according to people's qualifications, goods and wealth sharing is divided according to the needs of people. In this context, there has been a fair division in Islamic heritage law based on the necessity, (distributive) justice and fairness principle. Indeed, the French philosopher Roger Garaudy (1913-2012), who chose /converted to Islam, evaluates the following about the proportion of male child in the Qur'an to that of female child: “When we consider that in the Arab society all the obligations of the family and of the care of the parents and of all the things that we call ‘social security’ today are put on the shoulders of the husband, the hereditary male child's share must be twice as high as the female child’s is”.As Garaudy argues, the difference in the inheritance of women and men in Islamic inheritance law is not a legal discrimination/inequality, but a form of divisiveness stemming from a need based on the role and responsibility that women and men have undertaken in the family and society. Therefore, giving nothing to those who need nothing, giving little to those who need little, and giving a lot to those who need a lot,even though may seem contradictious to the principle of equality, it becomes a necessity of equity and (distributive) justice principle. In this case, in Islamic inheritance law, the basic reason why the share of the male child is twice the share of the female child, is social and economic reasons and it is possible to rank them as follows:1) According to Islamic law, women are not obliged to make their own economic livelihoods. The woman’s economic responsibility belongs to her father or brothers before marriage, and then to her husband after marriage. 2) When a woman is married she is not responsible for herself or other family members’ livelihood. The male is obliged to make a living for himself, his wife and his children.3) While married, the male is obliged to give the wife mahr. The woman has no such responsibility.As it is understood from the above explanations, in Islamic inheritance law, the basic reason why the share of the male child is twice the share of the female child is not about the ontologically “value” based on creation and sex given to the woman (girl child) in Islam. On the contrary, it is the real facts concerning the family and society structure that Islam predicts, the roles and financial obligations that man and woman have undertaken, namely “socio-economic structure/fact”.In some commentaries in classical commentary books, the rights and responsibilities of women and men are referred to, like: the word “degree” mentioned in: …but the men have a degree over them [in responsibility and authority (Al-Baqara 2/228), and the talk about the inheritance shares of boys and girls in: for the male, what is equal to the share of two females (Al-Nisā 4/11). Eventually, the concepts “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” have been associated with the gender of the woman/girl child ontologically (based on social fact) by ignoring the referent purpose and socio-economic contexts of these verses. As a result of these interpretations, it was desired that the Islamic law principle of inheritance share of male child being twice the share of female child, ontologically, should be based on a justification that “man is superior to woman”.In this study, some of the era’s dominant culture classical interpretations grounding women's inheritances share on her gender and based on the axis of the concepts of "degree" and “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” in the related verses of the Qur'ān will be elaborated. (shrink)

Polygyny, the marriage of a man with more than one woman at the same time is a well-known practiced in human history. Islamic law accepts the institution of polygyny as a substitute provision if it fulfills the certain conditions and reasons, -and limited the maximum number of wives to four. Although polygyny is mubah (permissible) in Islamic law, it is not an absolute right that every man can use arbitrarily. Thus in Islamic law, the legitimacy of polygyny (...) has been attributed to the presence of two basic conditions: the observance of justice among co-wives and providing maintnance. However, the observance of these conditions that is left to the mercy of men leads to the exploitation of the right for practicing to polygyny and victimization of the first spouse. Therefore, inserting some restrictions for using this right has come to the agenda from time to time in Islamic legal history. The first legal arrangements concerning the restriction of the polygyny (taaddud al-zawjāt) in the history of Islamic law were indirectly made with the Family Law Decree of 1917 which was prepared in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire. Among the late Islamic jurists, the issue of the limitation of polygyny by public authority in Islamic law continues to be discussed. The civil laws of contemporary Muslim countries contain different regulations on the issue. In this article, the restriction of polygyny by the public authority in Islamic family law will be focused on.Summary: Polygyny, the marriage of a man with more than one woman at the same time is a well-known practiced in human history. Islamic law accepts the institution of polygyny as a substitute provision if it fulfills the certain conditions and reasons, and limited the maximum number of wives to four. Thus, relevant verses in the Qur’an (al-Nisa 4/3, 129) and the Prophet’s own practice (al-Ahzab 33/50, 51, 59 al-Tahrim 66 / 3-5) show that it is legitimate for a man to marry more than one woman (up to four) at the same time in Islamic law. Although polygyny is legally permissible (mubah) in Islamic law it is not an absolute right that every man can arbitrarily use. Thus in Islamic law, the legitimacy of polygyny has been attributed to the presence of two basic conditions: the observance of justice among co-wives and providing maintenance. On the other hand, there may be some exceptional circumstances permitting polygyny in Islamic law. For example, when female population is much more than male in the society and when a, woman is can not fulfill her family duties due to her cureless illness, polygyny is permitted in Islamic law.As it can be understood from the explanations above, polygyny in Islamic law is not a general and mandatory provision that should be applied by every man who has legal capacity to marry. On the contrary, it is an exceptional provision that is justified if there are certain conditions and justifications. According to this; polygyny is a moral and legal institution that is made up of mutual consent based on individual and social conditions and needs in Islamic law. Therefore, men do not have to marry a second woman on their current wives, as well as women have the right to say “no” to marry a married man as a second wife.When the conditions and rationales indicated in the relevant verses and doctrine are evaluated together, it can be said that in order to be able to legitimize the polygyny in Islamic law, there must be three basic conditions:(1) Observing justice among spouses, (2) Having sufficient financial power to provide maintenance for spouses, (3) Existence of individual or social need or necessity.Therefore, in order to prevent the exploitation of polygyny, which is justified under certain conditions and justifications in Islamic law, the above-mentioned conditions must be fulfilled. Otherwise, polygyny can cause some problems, unrest and injustice for individual, family and society. Hence, in the presence of certain conditions and justifications, polygyny accepted in Islamic law as a moral and legal institution aiming the elimination of individual and social arbitration.Although the legitimacy of polygyny in Islamic law depends on the existence of certain conditions and special circumstances, it is a known fact that they are not always observed in practice. It can be said that the right of polygyny is a subject of abuse in practice. Therefore, the limitation of polygyny by the public authority has come to the fore in Islamic legal history. Today, control of the public authority and inserting some restrictions of polygyny continue to be discussed among the Islamic jurists. In the past, it is possible to say that the control of the exercising of this right has been done relatively by society (social environment). However, nowadays, since the society cannot perform the control mechanism, it is brought up by the state (public authority) on behalf of the society.Among the contemporary Islamic jurists regarding the supervision or limitation of polygyny by the public authority; there are two approaches: “those who accept” and “those who do not accept” such restrictions.Islamic jurists, who accept that public authority is allowed to intervene in polygyny, grounded their views on two perspectives: The first is that the polygyny is legally permissible and the public authority has the authority to limit the permissible (mubah) in Islamic law. The second is that polygyny is restricted with the conditions in the Qur’anic verses such as “husband’s observation supervision of justice among his wives” and “having the power for ensuring the livelihood (nafaqa) of his wives” and it is more appropriate for the benefit of society and the purpose of the legislator (Shari’) to be subject to the control of the public authority whether these conditions are present or not. Islamic jurists, who do not agree that the public authority has the right to intervene in polygyny grounded their views on two perspectives as well: First, polygyny is a legitimate right mentioned in the verses in Islamic law and there is no definite proof that this can be prohibited or restricted by the public authority. Secondly, it is contrary to the verses to prohibit or limit the right that the Qur’an makes legitimate (free).Thus, it is possible to say that the opinion which accepts that the public authority has to limit polygyny is more accurate in terms today’s social conditions. Namely, polygyny is linked to two basic conditions: ”husband’s observance of justice among his wives and having the power to provide maintenance for his wives. Therefore, supervision of the public authority on checking the existence of these conditions is more appropriate for the purpose of the legislator (Shari legitimizing polygyny and social benefit.In fact, the Ottoman Family Law Decree of 1917 indirectly limited the right of the husband to marry more than one woman, giving the woman right to stipulate a condition in her marriage contract that her husband not to marry a second woman. In the 1924 Draft of Family Law Decree, which was prepared after the repeal of the Family Law Decree of 1917, but not enacted, it was proposed that the application of polygyny should be presented to the approval judge.In today’-s Muslim countries, there are three different practices: namely “completely prohibiting polygyny”, ”releasing polygyny” and “giving the court the right to monitor the existence of necessary conditions “. In countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Indonesia, Malaysia (and Pakistan), the validity of polygyny depends on the permission and supervision of the judiciary. Some of these countries which have accepted judicial review have given the judicial control for the requirement of justice, some of them the conditions of justice and maintenance some of them for the conditions of justice, maintenance and a legitimate justification.In sum, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant verses, polygyny in Islamic law is legitimately permissible (mubah). However, the public authority has the right and authority to limit the mubah in Islamic law in the case of the elimination of damage and the necessity of the public interest. On the other hand, the public authority has the right and authority to enact the law in Islamic law by preferring one of the existing ijtihads that meet the needs of the society and conforms to the conditions of the age.According to this, when the public authority made a statutory regulation that links the use of right of polygyny to the permission of the judge, this regulation is binding on society.Therefore, in the event of such a legal arrangement, it is possible for the public authority to allow the men who comply with the conditions and not to allow the ones who are not to comply with the conditions after conducting the necessary investigation. As a matter of fact, now Family Laws of many Muslim countries now include such legal arrangements. It is also worth mentioning here that there may be a necessity for a man to marry more than one woman (up to four) at the same time in terms of social benefits, when the population of male and female in a society is excessively disproportionate. In such circumstances, it is also possible that the public authority encourages, or even mandates, the marriage of men who have fulfilled the conditions to more than one woman. (shrink)

The subject of general utterances (al-lafdh al-āmm) being certain or presumptive in their usage as an indication to all their members is controversial amongst the methodists. Ḥanafī methodists suggest that the indication of general utterances to all of their members as certain and unless they are specified with a certain evidence, they can’t be specified with a presumptive evidence. Like the ḥanafī methodists, the ẓāhirī methodists also suggest that the general utterance is certain indicant for all of its members and (...) can be specified only with another evidence in the same rank. The main difference between the two groups focuses on whether al-khabar al-wāhid (single prophetic narration) is a certain or a presumptive evidence in terms of certitude. According to ḥanafīs, al-khabar al-wāhid is a presumptive evidence and unless the general utterances in Qur’ān are specified initially with another certain evidence, they can’t be specified with al-khabar al-wāhid. However, al-khabar al-wāhid is a certain evidence according to ẓāhirīs and it can specify general utterances in Qur’ān. In this study, the comparison of the views of the methodists of two schools regarding the indication of general utterances in Quran and their specification (takhsīs) with al-akhbar al-wāhid is made and their influence on Islamic Law regulations is studied afterwards. In this study, the two sect’s approaches are compared over the provision of reading al-Fatehah during prayer, the number of milk sucking to establish the kinship, the rights of women divorced with bain talaq and the execution of the death penalty in the Harem region.Summary: The purpose of this study is to try to demonstrate that an assertion in the Ph.D. thesis, The History and Doctrine of Ẓāhirī Madhhab, completed by Amr Osman in 2010 is incorrect. It can be summarized that in his study, Amr Osman claims that the affiliation of the schools to ahl-al-hadith and ahl-al-ra’y in conventional classification is wrong. According to him, contrary to what is known, the School of Ẓāhiriyya is closer to School of Ḥanafiyya rather than schools coming out of ahl-al-hadith. In this study, one of the arguments that he relied on to support his claim is studied in order to prove that his claim was inaccurate. Osman claims that ẓāhirīs are closer to ḥanifīs, based on the view that in both schools the general utterances embrace all of their members in their usage and they are a certain indicant to all of their members. At this stage, although the views of both schools are common, the ḥanifīs don’t accept the idea that the general statements of Qur’ān can be established with al-khabar-al-wāhid, those which they acknowledge as presumptive as of certitude. However, according to the ẓāhirīs, the certitude of al-khabar al-wāhid is as precise as the narrated report, so it can specify the general statements of Qur’ān which are in equal power. The related dispute between the schools has been reflected on many Islamic law regulations. Some of them are:1. Ḥanafīs state that the correct Quranic prayer may be performed by reading any or a few verses of the Qur’ān in prayer, which is a practice based on the verse “Read what you can read from the Qur’ān now”. On the other hand, the ẓāhirīs have established the related order based on the report “There is no prayer without reading Umm Al-Quran (Surah al-Fatehah)” and it is obligatory (fardh) to read Surah al-Fatehah in prayers.2. Because that the terms milk-mother and milk sister are in general form in the verse “It is forbidden to you to marry these people...Your milk-mothers who nursed you, your milk-sisters who nursed you” the ḥanafīs clarify that it is sufficient for a child to breastfeed only one time in order to form a milk-kinship. They do not act in accordance with the solitary report (al-khabar-al-wāhids) which indicate that the milk kinship specifying the verse shall only be formed with at least three or five breastfeeding. However, one of the ẓāhirīs, Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, has specified the verse with the report indicating that the kinship shall not be formed with less than three breastfeeding by the child, and Ibn Ḥazm has specified it with Salim hadith which indicates that the kinship shall be formed with five breastfeeding.3. According to ḥanafīs, there is an alimony and inhabiting right of the widow woman to be procured by the husband within the period of delay who divorced her either with irreversible divorce (talāq al-bāin) or reversible divorce (talāq al-ric‘ī) according to the generalization of the verse “Give shelter to them (the women you have divorced) in some part of your household within your capacity.” They did not act with the report of Fātima binti Qays, who specified the generalization of the verse. On the other hand, the ẓāhirīs recognize the abovementioned rights only for the women who got divorced with irreversible divorce or the ones who are pregnant, specifying the verse with the report indicating that His Holiness the Prophet does not grant alimony and inhabiting to the woman who was divorced with reversible divorce.4. According to ḥanafīs, the criminal who committed a crime that would require a death penalty and took refuge in the Harem region could not be executed while in Ḥarem, according to the common statement of the verse, “Whoever enters there, will be safe.” Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, one of the ẓāhirīs has specified the verse with the report indicating that His Holiness the Prophet has authorized the execution of the sentence to Ibn Khattal in Ḥarem on the day of the conquering of Mecca and he states that the death sentence can be executed wherever the criminal is caught, even if it is inside the Harem. Ibn Ḥazm shares the same view with ḥanafīs regarding the provision of this issue. However, the reason for his opinion stems from the fact that the report about Ibn Khattal was an event specific to that day. As it is seen, even though the ḥanefīs and ẓāhirīs share the same opinion about the general utterances being a certain indicant to all their members, they have disagreements upon the argument about the general utterances of Quran being specified by al-khabar al-wāhid and many Islamic Law regulations have been issued by these schools based on such disagreements. According to us, in the final analysis, Amr Osman’s claim must be met with caution. (shrink)

Non-medical or Social egg freezing (oocyte cryopreservation) is currently a controversial topic in Islam, with contradictory fatwas being issued in different Muslim countries. While Islamic authorities in Egypt permit the procedure, fatwas issued in Malaysia have banned single Muslim women from freezing their unfertilized eggs (vitrified oocytes) to be used later in marriage. The underlying principles of the Malaysian fatwas are that (i) sperm and egg cells produced before marriage, should not be used during marriage to conceive a (...) child; (ii) extraction of mature egg cells from single women being unacceptable; and (iii) fertility preservation in anticipation of late marriage is a conjecture that has not yet occurred. Ovarian tissue freezing can potentially be a more Shariah-compliant alternative to social egg freezing, because once the frozen ovarian cortical tissue sections have been re-transplanted back into the woman, mature egg cells can readily be produced, collected, and fertilized by the husband’s sperm only during the period of marriage contract (′akd al-nikāḥ). Unlike accidental mix-ups with frozen eggs, muddling of lineage (nasab) would be automatically avoided in ovarian tissue freezing due to immunological rejection. However, upon critical analysis based on Qawā’id Fiqhiyyah (Islamic Legal Maxims), Maqāṣid-al-Shariah (Higher Objectives of Islamic Law), and Maslaḥah-Mafsadah (benefits versus harmful effects on society), elective ovarian tissue freezing by healthy single women for social reasons would likely be a highly contentious and controversial issue within Muslim communities that may conflict with conservative social-religious norms. This thus needs further debate among Islamic jurists in dialogue with medical doctors and biomedical scientists. (shrink)

The Logic of Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition. By Behnam Sadeghi. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xxi + 215. $99.99, £64.99.

Agitation for women's rights in Iran is entwined with broader movements for freedom and reform that critique the Islamic Republic's shari'a law as discriminatory. Despite the foundation of these reform efforts in the social realities of contemporary Iran, anyone who critiques laws governing the rights of women is prone to the charge of insulting the sanctity and foundation of Islam and subject to harsh penalties. Reform efforts will be hamstrung until there is a foundation for open discourse (...) and debate in Iran. Thus, human rights such as the right to freedom of expression and related rights must be seen as the fundamental basis for successful political and legal reform in Iran – whether that reform is based in liberal Islam or secularism. (shrink)

Islam is a religion of vast dimensions which has inspired great civilizations and today offers many men and women comfort and ethical guidance. In this paper I suggest that the tension between the Qur'an accepted as the perfect timeless word of God and the encultured dynamic Islam of nearly a quarter of the world's population results in contending perspectives of women's role and rights. The Qur'an gives men and women spiritual parity, but there are verses in the (...) Qur'an that some feminists find difficult to reconcile with the modern rights of women. Most Islamic feminists make a clear distinction between cultural practices and the pure word of God. 1 There are profound differences in the status of women within and between predominantly Muslim countries. In some countries it is illegal for women to drive a car, or to move freely outside the home, in others women have become heads of state. The decision to wear the veil, often a sign of empowerment in Europe, is in parts of the Islamic world obligatory. Voices representing an exclusivist, literalist understanding of Islam have entered the mainstream of Muslim lives due in part to the fact that Wahhabism imposes a narrow, sectarian view of Islam, and the Saudi government with its massive oil wealth propagates this puritanical form of Islam across the world. Some traditionalist maulanas and maulvis are concerned above all with women's modesty and enforce customs that refine, purify and protect their chastity. They, like some Islamic feminists, position Islamic rights and roles for women with regard to the exoticized and eroticized `other' — in this case Western civilization, Western imperialism and the rise of Western feminism. `The West' becomes for traditional interpreters a kind of contemporary jahilya. There are also many progressive Muslim scholars who seek to articulate a historically accurate, non-idealized, now challenged, now challenging, view of Islam with an uncompromising emphasis on social justice, equality and pluralism. This paper argues that the ongoing, postcolonial battle against Western `imperialism' demands epistemological humility. Nevertheless, women are fighting for basic human rights and freedoms in parts of the Islamic world where the State, religious authorities and the patriarchal family assume the right of legal and moral surveillance. In considering the nature of violence to Muslim women in Pakistan and the UK, I hope to show that accusations of orientalism should not deter us from recognizing the courage of women activists who themselves risk imprisonment and of the struggle of women victims of rape and domestic violence to overcome feelings of shame and dishonour. I argue that both the private and public spheres need to be made safe for all Muslim women, and not just a professional elite. This can only be achieved by a fuller recognition of women's rights encapsulated in law and all aspects of public life. (shrink)

This article analyses existing biases – whether due to misinterpretation, culture or politics – in the application of women’s rights under Islamic Shari’a law. The paper argues that though in its inception, one purpose of Islamic law may have aimed at elevating the status of women in pre-Islamic Arabia, biases in interpreting such teachings have failed to free women from discrimination and have even added “divinity” to their persistent subjugation. By examining two case studies (...) – Saudi Arabia and Egypt – the article shows that interpretative biases that differ in application from one country to the other further subject women to the selective application of rights. Dictated by norms, culture and tradition rather than a unified Islamic law, the paper shows how culture and politics have contributed to such biases under the pre-text of Islamic dictate. As such, it proposes a re-examination of “personal status” laws across the region in light of international human rights norms. (shrink)

Islamic family law plays a significant role in minimizing the unpleasant effects of the family break up faced by the divorced women and their children by protecting their rights to financial support after divorce. This study undertakes to discuss the historical development of the financial rights after divorce applicable among the Muslims in the pre and post colonial periods, particularly with reference to the iddah maintenance, mut’ah, arrears of maintenance, and child maintenance. The study indicates that despite the (...) provisions were inconformity with the Islamic principles, the applications were restricted and influenced by the Shafi’i madhhab. However, the amount of iddah maintenance and mut’ah were substantial taking into account the standard of living of the Malay society in the 15th and 16th century. This means that the welfare of the divorced women was taken care of since the codification of the Islamic law and its implementation in the Malay society. (shrink)

In Canada, much media attention has recently been focused on the formation of arbitration tribunals that would use Islamic law or Sharia to settle civil matters in Ontario. In fact, the idea of private parties voluntarily agreeing to arbitration using religious principles or a foreign legal system is not new. Ontario's Arbitration Act has allowed parties to resolve disputes outside the traditional court system for some time. This issue has been complicated by the fact that Canada has a commitment (...) to upholding both a policy of multiculturalism and an international obligation towards women's rights. Although these values need not necessarily conflict, in this context, they have carried a tension that must be reconciled. This paper will examine the legal implications of faith-based arbitration tribunals in family law, with a particular emphasis on the impact that Sharia could have on Muslim women in Ontario. (shrink)

As in many parts of the world, Islam in Southern Philippines is generally seen as subjecting women to unfair treatment. The concept of gender justice is thought to be non-existent. Among the minority populations in the region are the Tausug of Sulu who practice an Islam that is heavily influenced by their pre-Islamic traditions, popularly known in the community as Adat or customary laws. This study, conducted from January to June 2004, documents and analyzes the influence of the (...) traditional Islamic practices of the Tausug in relation to women's rights and gender justice in marriage, divorce, polygamy, custody of children, inheritance, property rights and leadership; and makes recommendations regarding some reform initiatives that could improve the status of women and the general issue of gender justice in the Muslim communities in southern Philippines. The study found no violation of women's rights in the Tausug Islamic community and that gender justice actually exists. The Tausug believe that because of their strong and dynamic traditions, their practice or interpretation of Islam is more liberal and accommodating. Generally, compared with other Islamic communities in the area, the human rights situation of the women in Sulu is much better. Women were found to be enjoying considerable freedoms, including access to public office and other leadership positions. One could argue, therefore, that the Tausug community is a good example of an Islamic community where women's rights are respected and gender justice prevails. What remains to be done is to sustain this favorable environment and to safeguard it from certain sectors of the Islamic society and male chauvinists bent on undermining gender justice in the area. (shrink)

Freedom of religious expression is to many a fundamental element of their identity. Yet the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the Islamic headscarf issue does not refer to autonomy and identity rights of the individual women claimants. The case law focuses on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides a legal human right to freedom of religious expression. The way that provision is interpreted is critically contrasted here with the right (...) to personal autonomy and identity now developed by that court in interpreting Article 8 which contains a right to respect one’s private life. (shrink)

This article argues that while Islam may not be the sole factor for ensuring the realization of human rights in Muslim States, it is certainly a significant factor that can be constructively employed as a vehicle for improving the poor human rights situation in predominantly Muslim States that recognise Islam as State religion or apply Islamic law or Islamic principles as part of State law. It addresses the question of how best to realize that in light of the (...) two essential approaches (the `socio-cultural approach' and the `politico-legal approach') for promoting and protecting human rights generally, and the two divergent perspectives (the `adversarial perspective' and the `harmonistic perspective') to the discourse on Islam and human rights. The article then advances the view that the harmonistic perspective would be most helpful for employing Islam as a vehicle for the realization of human rights in the Muslim world within the context of the socio-cultural and politico-legal approaches for promoting and protecting human rights generally. Relevant academic and policy oriented examples, especially in relation to promoting women's rights in the Muslim world, are cited to substantiate this position. (shrink)

The primary aim of this article is to illustrate the dichotomy of Jordan as a progressive country, perhaps best exemplified through the engagement of the royal family in human rights matters, versus the traditional approach, sanctioning the discriminatory laws concerning women. This paper further attempts to demonstrate that Jordan is balancing between the conservative tribal interests, by pertaining to the Arab and Islamic tradition on the one hand, and the need for democratisation and further human rights development on (...) the other. It is important to note, that discriminatory laws concerning women are not the only examples illustrating this peculiar mechanism, however, they constitute the most vivid one. The author further submits that many authors, as well as international bodies such as CEDAW and the Human Rights Committee, fail to understand the dynamics and complexity of the human rights situation in Jordan. Hence, these authors and authorities’ recommendations are often misguided, as they focus mostly on amending the discriminatory legislation. This article briefly discusses cultural relativism aspects and suggests that actual progress can be achieved by developing a unique language of human rights related to the Arab culture, for instance through the newly established Jordanian Constitutional Court. (shrink)

Islamic fundamentalism (Islamic neo-traditionalism) is an important component of Islamic identity struggles in the three South Asian nations of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The contested role, status, and legal rights of women provide a focus for comparative study, and the treatment of women in the courts showcases the problematic relation of religious and civil law. The cases of Shah Bano in India and Safia Bibi in Pakistan display (1) the radically different ways fundamentalism influences judicial (...) processes; (2) the varying challenges that confront Muslims in different polities (in India, the maintenance of Islamic identity; in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the evolution of a just and democratic Islamic state); and (3) the fact that the single gravest problem confronting Muslims regardless of political frontiers and varying structures of civil government is whether piety requires that religious law formulated in premodern cultures be regarded as fixed and binding today. (shrink)

In late 2003, the Canadian media reported that the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice would start offering arbitration in family disputes in accordance with both Islamic legal principles and Ontario's Arbitration Act of 1991. A vociferous two-year debate ensued on the introduction of “Sharia law” in Ontario. This article analyzes representations of Muslim women's agency that came to the fore in this debate by examining reports in three Canadian newspapers. The debate demonstrated two notions of agency. The (...) predominant perspective conceptualized Muslim women's agency as their ability to resist domination, tying secularization to agency. A second strain of the debate portrayed agency as embedded in intersecting social forces of domination and subordination. The first perspective homogenized diverse Muslim communities, fostering the gendered racialization of these communities. Understanding agency as embedded, by contrast, enabled conceptualizations of Muslim women as agentic religious subjects. (shrink)

Protecting women and children is one of the core values of the Islamic legal tradition. In Muslim countries religious, constitutional, and legal frameworks obligate the state to take special measures to provide protection to women and children within families and in society. However, despite such provisions, post-divorce maintenance rights are not granted to women in Pakistan and Iran. Family law enacted in Pakistan and Iran still differs in form and substance from what has been mentioned in (...) the primary sources of Islamic law and from the previous articulations of early Islamic law scholars. Moreover, patriarchal notions of male authority are still sustained through law and judicial interpretations when it comes to the question of giving post-divorce maintenance to women. As a result in the absence of a welfare system divorced women are left in a vulnerable situation. Although in Iran, some financial compensation under the concept of Ujrat ul Misl is given to divorced women, but it remains unclear whether the right to Mata’at-ul-Talaq has been recognised under the family law. In Pakistan the law does not include any provision for giving women Ujrat ul Misl and Mata’at- ul -Talaq. Moreover in the absence of a welfare system, divorced Muslim women in both countries are left in a vulnerable situation. This article engages with plural normative sources and contemporary notions of human rights to make the case for family law reform and for awarding post-divorce maintenance rights to Muslim women in Pakistan and Iran. (shrink)

This article considers the four eyewitness threshold for zinā’ in Islamic criminal law. In some Muslim-majority countries where zinā’ remains an offence, judiciaries have by-passed the threshold by accepting singular confessions from male fornicators or, otherwise, inferring fornication from pregnancy outside of marriage. As a result, a disproportionate number of women have been prosecuted, convicted, and even punished for zinā’. I assert that the four-eyewitness threshold allows for an alternative way to view zinā’ that can result in a (...) different set of consequences. If the threshold is taken seriously such that it becomes the only evidentiary basis upon which a zinā’ conviction can be entered, it will create an effective or de facto exemption where alleged perpetrators can never be convicted, except in the rarest cases where four independent eyewitnesses can be corralled. If adopted, this approach would provide a principled basis to reject opportunistic confessions that deflect punishment to accused female fornicators. And as an ‘internal’ solution that arises within the framework of the sharī’a, a de facto exemption approach is more likely to be perceived as legitimate when compared with proposed solutions that find their basis in international human rights legal instruments. (shrink)

During the 1980s, Morocco became a platform for discussion of democratization projects in North Africa and the Middle East. This served as fertile ground for feminist reverberations attempting to reform the mudawanna, or shari’a based family-law in Morocco, and consequential resistance to reform by women within the political Islam or “Islamist” movement. Feminist scholarship in Morocco, as is the case with other parts of the Middle East, is inevitably political. Zakia Salime’s book Between feminism and Islam: Human Rights and (...) Sharia Law in Morocco problematizes the resulting conceptual boundaries of feminist and Islamist politics in Morocco. She became interested in the issue with her involvement with the feminist movement during the 1990s. Unlike other authors that discuss feminism in the Middle East, Salime is not interested in assuming any generalizations in discussion of marginalization of women versus political Islam. Rather, she aims to analyze in detail the dynamic relationship of feminist and Islamist movements. (shrink)

This paper seeks to examine the constitutional and legal implications of Islam in Malaysia with a focus on fundamental liberties and particular reference to freedom of religion; conversion of non-Muslim minors to Islam; Hudud law, `Islamic dress,' offenses against precepts of Islam; and, women, Heads of State and Islam. These areas are chosen as a result of cases in civil courts contesting fundamental liberties, and debate in the public domain. The problems which have surfaced revolve around the following (...) concerns: subjecting non-Muslims to Islamic law or principles; subjecting Muslims and non-Muslims to an Islamic fiqh principle contrary to humanistic principles; the problems of a dual legal system with attempts to demarcate jurisdiction but at the cost of fundamental liberties; and, the relevance of the ``Islamic state" vs. ``secular state" issue in rights adjudication. The courts appear to be in a conundrum when dealing with these cases, and this suggests a conflict in the application of Islamic and civil laws. These issues are not new; they have persisted for a long time. Recently court decisions have aroused a public perception that the problem is one of Islam versus the non-Muslim. This tends to be perceived in ethnic terms as well, specifically as a contest between the Malays, who are mostly Muslims, and other races. The author calls for increased secularization in Malaysia as a way to resolve these issues. (shrink)

A concise and authoritative introduction to Islamic political ideas In sixteen concise chapters on key topics, this book provides a rich, authoritative, and up-to-date introduction to Islamic political thought from the birth of Islam to today, presenting essential background and context for understanding contemporary politics in the Islamic world and beyond. Selected from the acclaimed Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, and focusing on the origins, development, and contemporary importance of Islamic political ideas and related (...) subjects, each chapter offers a sophisticated yet accessible introduction to its topic. Written by leading specialists and incorporating the latest scholarship, the alphabetically arranged chapters cover the topics of authority, the caliphate, fundamentalism, government, jihad, knowledge, minorities, modernity, Muhammad, pluralism and tolerance, the Qur'an, revival and reform, shariʿa (sacred law), traditional political thought, ‘ulama' (religious scholars), and women. Read separately or together, these chapters provide an indispensable resource for students, journalists, policymakers, and anyone else seeking an informed perspective on the complex intersection of Islam and politics. The contributors are Gerhard Bowering, Ayesha S. Chaudhry, Patricia Crone, Roxanne Euben, Yohanan Friedmann, Paul L. Heck, Roy Jackson, Wadad Kadi, John Kelsay, Gudrun Krämer, Ebrahim Moosa, Armando Salvatore, Aram A. Shahin, Emad El-Din Shahin, Devin J. Stewart, SherAli Tareen, and Muhammad Qasim Zaman. A new afterword discusses the essays in relation to contemporary political developments. (shrink)

In most countries where Islam is acknowledged as a, or the, source of legislation, abortion is permitted under certain conditions and at certain stages of pregnancy. This article examines some of these laws and argue that they represent a continuation of the logic that governed the views of pre-modern Muslim jurists on abortion, that is, harm aversion. However, these laws also add a ‘modernist’ twist to that logic – rather than repealing that logic altogether, modernist views on ‘rights’ and the (...) advancement of medical knowledge and technology have influenced the priorities of Muslim jurists and lawmakers as far as abortion and the issues associated with it are concerned. This influence has furthermore been possible by a conscious selection and blending of pre-modern views to serve modern concerns. In all this, however, harm aversion remains the centrifugal principle, even when the abortion discourse in Muslim countries appears couched in the modernist discourse of rights. (shrink)

In recent years, Islamic feminism has become a prevalent and controversial topic among scholars from Muslim countries and Western feminists. While respecting the efforts of Muslim activists, this paper argues that because Islamic perspective is inherently anti-pluralist, it is not conducive to feminism and even at odds with it. Since it is impossible to make any generalizations about Muslim countries, this paper focuses on the debate of Islam and feminism as it relates to Iran. Islamic laws that (...) are the ground for constitutions in many Muslim countries treat men and women unequally. In countries with a theocracy, Islam becomes a political system where the power of the ruling elite, which are the clerics, becomes an important obstacle on the way of reforms. As a worldview, Islam provides a fixed identity of women and men that is irreconcilable with any liberating theory. The significance of this discussion lies in the potential of celebration of “Islamic feminism” for reinforcing the fusion of religion and politics in a country such as Iran, which has a religious state. (shrink)

Women in the Crossfire seeks to understand the practice of honor killing from a variety of cultural and disciplinary perspectives and analyzes empirical research on honor killing, including a large original study published here for the first time. The book examines the root causes of honor killing both in human psychology and cultural evolution, and it recommends specific measures for protecting potential victims and ending honor killing altogether.

The object of this paper is to explore the possibility of defending women's rights within a framework of Islamic concepts and ideas. This is to be accomplished by introducing a number of methodological principles that can, and for feminists should, govern the practice of " religious interpretation" (ijtihad) which Muslims have used throughout the centuries to adapt Qur)anic and Islamic teachings to changing realities and circumstances. The main goal is to explore the meaning and possibility of " (...) class='Hi'>Islamic feminism". (shrink)

This article examines women’s rights to property in marriage, upon divorce, and upon the death of a spouse in Uganda, highlighting the problematic aspects in both the state-made (statutory) and non-state-made (customary and religious) laws. It argues that, with the exception of the 1995 Constitution, the subordinate laws that regulate the distribution, management, and ownership of property during marriage, upon divorce, and death of a spouse are discriminatory of women. It is shown that even where the relevant statutory (...) laws are protective of women’s rights to property, their implementation is hindered by customary law practices, socialization, and the generally weak economic capacity of many women in the country. The article delves into the even weaker position of women’s rights to matrimonial property at customary and religious laws. In many homes, wives provide labor to support their husbands without having a stake in the use or monetary benefit from it. Under Islamic law regulating intestate succession to property, the entitlements for widows fall short of the constitutional standards on equality and non-discrimination. Polygyny is widely practiced by Muslims implying that the widows share the one eighth whenever there are children or one fourth in cases when there are no children. Radical reforms such as adopting an immediate community property regime instead of the present separate property regime are inevitable if women’s rights to property are to advance. (shrink)

Mansour Fahmy, one of the dramatic figures in modern Arab philosophical and social thought. He was the reformist and enlightenment figure in modern Arab history. He is also the owner of a notable current that was subjected to a violent attack that silenced him for a long time and forced him to "hide" physically. However, this did not eliminate the new opinions and positions that came at the beginning of the twentieth century towards the issue of women. He is (...) the first to write with a scientific methodology - from the point of view of sociology - on Islamic discourse and its dealings with women. he sought to differentiate between religion and the religious establishment, between the personality of the Prophet Muhammad and what later prevailed in the books of jurisprudence and others. When he discussed the headscarf issue, he concluded that it was the product of traditions and customs that the Hijab is not from the Islamic religion. Islamic law has nothing to do with the Hijab. Mansour Fahmy's creativity was at one of the sensitive stages in Egypt's modern history in which the political, social, national, cultural, and revolution clashed in each one. All this, in turn, identified the problem of Mansour Fahmy's intellectual personality in the battles of thought and politics. This research's main task is to redraw the features of his actual personality and the reality of his intellectual, social, and political positions. Besides, this study seeks to uncover the effect of philosophy on crystallizing Mansour Fahmy's critical personality and its role in laying the foundations of the critical vision with its practical, reformist, and enlightening dimensions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Islam: Religion, History, and CivilizationZain AliIslam: Religion, History, and Civilization. By Seyyed Hossein Nasr. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2003. Pp. 224. Paper $9.71."Islam," writes Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "is like a vast tapestry," and in his book Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization he aims to survey the masterpiece that is Islam. The present work is part of a trilogy including Ideal and Realities of Islam and The Heart (...) of Islam. Nasr states that the common theme in the trilogy "is the universalist perspective and respect for other religions" (p. xxiv). In addition, Nasr clarifies that his approach, as with all of his Islamic writings, is to write from an Islamic perspective, which he terms "traditional Islam" (p. xxiii). Nasr stands opposed to either the secular modernist or fundamentalist perspectives, both of which he regards as forms of extremism.This book, initially published as part of Our Religions, edited by A. Sharma, is significantly revised and includes a new introduction and bibliography. It can best be described as a primer on Islam, consisting of eight chapters that focus on a variety of pertinent themes.Chapter 1 deals with the self-understanding of Islam and the Islamic world. Islam, Nasr notes, sees itself as a return to the primordial faith of humanity, a faith that affirms the unity and oneness of God. This chapter also presents an overview [End Page 495] of the various ethnic and cultural groupings within the Muslim world, and charts the spread and demographic growth of Islam.Chapter 2 introduces the notion of al-din, an Arabic term that corresponds closely to the word "religion." Nasr contrasts the two words, where religion means "to bind" while al-din means "debt" (p. 25). Thus, religion, as framed by Islam, involves the notion of debt, in particular humanity's debt to the Divine. The chapter also discusses the significance of the Qur'an and Muhammad as the messenger of God.Chapter 3 begins with an exposition of the nature of Divinity, which is at the heart of Islamic doctrine. As Nasr explains, the Divine is understood as being "at once the Absolute, the Infinite, and the Perfect Good" (p. 59). The remainder of the chapter deals with various Islamic doctrines and beliefs, including prophecy and revelation, human nature, the Qura'nic view of men and women, and eschatology.Chapter 4 deals with the content, codification, and schools of Shariah, the Divine Law of Islam. There is also an interesting discussion of Sufism, which Nasr claims "is like the heart of the body of Islam" (p. 81). Controversially, Nasr claims that "the spread of Islam outside of the Arab and Persian worlds up to the present day has been mostly through Sufism" (p. 87).Chapter 5 delves into the central pillars of Islam, which accompany the belief in God and in Muhammad as the messenger of God. The pillars are salah (canonical prayer), sawn (fasting), hajj (pilgrimage), and zakah (religious tax or charity). Associated with these pillars is the notion of jihad, and here Nasr writes, "jihad... is usually mistranslated into English as 'holy war,' but literally means 'exertion' or 'effort' in the path of God" (p. 91). Also covered are the topics of family, ethics, and economic and political institutions.Chapter 6 presents the historical evolution of Islam beginning with the migration of Muhammad to Medina, and the events leading to the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.Chapter 7 discusses the early Islamic community, who found themselves in the "throes of disputes over such issues as whether human beings are saved by faith or works, whether there is freewill or determinism, and questions concerning the sacred text as the Word of God" (p. 154). Nasr then explores the various schools of theology and philosophy that arose in order to address these questions of faith.Chapter 8, the final chapter of the book, attempts to evaluate the place of Islam in the contemporary world. Nasr concludes by noting that despite the challenges of secular modernism and fundamentalism the vast majority of Muslims remain committed to the truth of Islam, and bear witness to the Oneness of God and the Oneness of humanity.The one quibble... (shrink)

Major changes have taken place in Muslim societies in general during the last decades. Traditional family and social organizational structures have come into conflict with the perceptions and needs of development and modern state-building. Moreover, the international context of globalization, as well as changes in intercommunity relations through immigration, have also deeply affected social and cultural mutations by facilitating contact between different cultures and civilizations. Of the dilemmas arising from these changes, those concerning women’s and men’s roles were the (...) most conflictive issues because of different interpretations and evaluations of historical, religious and/or cultural heritages. In the case of Morocco, for over 30 years, women’s and human rights NGOs have acted and advocated to promote women’s rights. The main disputes have concerned the distinction between what is within the requirements of Islam and what is the consequence of traditional social beliefs and practices. This ended nevertheless with the adoption by the Parliament of a new Family Law proclaimed in February 2004. This law was the result of a process of consultation and national debate, which made possible substantial progress in terms of proclaimed values of equality of rights between men and women, with the support of most national political and social leaders. Several lessons can be learned from the Moroccan experience. The crucial role of civil society, the political support of the state at its highest level, the working methodology of the Royal Advisory Commission and the final process for the adoption of the new code were from the most determinant parameters. In light of recent developments in some majority-Muslim countries, the future of women’s rights is a key issue of the so-called Arab spring. Muslim women’s challenges and struggles are not only ideological and legal battles, but they are also social and political struggles for which one of the major conditions is to prevent and prohibit the use of Islam as a political instrument. Muslim societies need to educate people properly and change their traditional representations and patterns of thought. To promote justice, equity and equality in general, as well as to protect women’s economic rights, they need appropriate economic and social policies. Then women can really promote, protect and benefit from the advances of their legal status. (shrink)

This article argues that women’s human rights were and are being violated in Afghanistan regardless of who governs the country: Kings, secular rulers, Mujahideen or Taliban, or the incumbent internationally backed government of Karzai. The provisions of the new constitution regarding women’s rights are analysed under three categories: neutral, protective and discriminatory. It is argued that the current constitution is a step in the right direction but, far from protecting women’s rights effectively, it requires substantial revamping. The (...) constitutional commitment to international human rights standards seems to be a hallow slogan as the constitution declares Islam as a state religion which clearly conflicts with women’s human rights standards in certain areas. The Constitution has empowered the Supreme Court to review whether human rights instruments are compatible with Islamic legal norms and, in case of conflict, precedence will be given to Islamic law. Keeping this in view, it is argued that Afghanistan’s ratification of the Women’s Convention without reservations has no real significance unless Islamic law dealing with women’s rights is reformed and reconciled with international women’s rights standards. (shrink)

The ethical and legal challenges posed by assisted reproduction techniques are both profound and breathtaking, with most societies unable to fully comprehend one technique before another one, even more daring, emerges. The wrongful implantation of embryos in two women undergoing in vitro fertilisation treatments at two separate clinics in the UK seriously vitiates the traditional concept of who is a parent. In one case, a patient’s embryos were wrongly implanted into another woman seeking similar treatment, and in the second, (...) a woman’s eggs were fertilised using sperm from a man other than her husband.In the first mix-up, neither member of the recipient couple was the genetic parent of the child, while in the second case, the recipient mother was the genetic mother and her husband was not the genetic father. The mix-ups resulted in litigation to determine who the rightful parents were. First, I will show in this paper that, although the outcome of the application of English law in both cases was in agreement with the outcome prescribed by basic principles of Islamic law and bioethics, that agreement is based on different reasoning in the two traditions. Next, I will show that the profound ethical implications of reproductive technologies begs for a more pluralistic bioethical discourse than the one-dimensional analysis applied by secular Western societies that currently dominates the enquiry, particularly as most Western societies are more or less multicultural and multireligious. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Islam: Religion, History, and CivilizationZain AliIslam: Religion, History, and Civilization. By Seyyed Hossein Nasr. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2003. Pp. 224. Paper $9.71."Islam," writes Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "is like a vast tapestry," and in his book Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization he aims to survey the masterpiece that is Islam. The present work is part of a trilogy including Ideal and Realities of Islam and The Heart (...) of Islam. Nasr states that the common theme in the trilogy "is the universalist perspective and respect for other religions" (p. xxiv). In addition, Nasr clarifies that his approach, as with all of his Islamic writings, is to write from an Islamic perspective, which he terms "traditional Islam" (p. xxiii). Nasr stands opposed to either the secular modernist or fundamentalist perspectives, both of which he regards as forms of extremism.This book, initially published as part of Our Religions, edited by A. Sharma, is significantly revised and includes a new introduction and bibliography. It can best be described as a primer on Islam, consisting of eight chapters that focus on a variety of pertinent themes.Chapter 1 deals with the self-understanding of Islam and the Islamic world. Islam, Nasr notes, sees itself as a return to the primordial faith of humanity, a faith that affirms the unity and oneness of God. This chapter also presents an overview [End Page 495] of the various ethnic and cultural groupings within the Muslim world, and charts the spread and demographic growth of Islam.Chapter 2 introduces the notion of al-din, an Arabic term that corresponds closely to the word "religion." Nasr contrasts the two words, where religion means "to bind" while al-din means "debt" (p. 25). Thus, religion, as framed by Islam, involves the notion of debt, in particular humanity's debt to the Divine. The chapter also discusses the significance of the Qur'an and Muhammad as the messenger of God.Chapter 3 begins with an exposition of the nature of Divinity, which is at the heart of Islamic doctrine. As Nasr explains, the Divine is understood as being "at once the Absolute, the Infinite, and the Perfect Good" (p. 59). The remainder of the chapter deals with various Islamic doctrines and beliefs, including prophecy and revelation, human nature, the Qura'nic view of men and women, and eschatology.Chapter 4 deals with the content, codification, and schools of Shariah, the Divine Law of Islam. There is also an interesting discussion of Sufism, which Nasr claims "is like the heart of the body of Islam" (p. 81). Controversially, Nasr claims that "the spread of Islam outside of the Arab and Persian worlds up to the present day has been mostly through Sufism" (p. 87).Chapter 5 delves into the central pillars of Islam, which accompany the belief in God and in Muhammad as the messenger of God. The pillars are salah (canonical prayer), sawn (fasting), hajj (pilgrimage), and zakah (religious tax or charity). Associated with these pillars is the notion of jihad, and here Nasr writes, "jihad... is usually mistranslated into English as 'holy war,' but literally means 'exertion' or 'effort' in the path of God" (p. 91). Also covered are the topics of family, ethics, and economic and political institutions.Chapter 6 presents the historical evolution of Islam beginning with the migration of Muhammad to Medina, and the events leading to the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.Chapter 7 discusses the early Islamic community, who found themselves in the "throes of disputes over such issues as whether human beings are saved by faith or works, whether there is freewill or determinism, and questions concerning the sacred text as the Word of God" (p. 154). Nasr then explores the various schools of theology and philosophy that arose in order to address these questions of faith.Chapter 8, the final chapter of the book, attempts to evaluate the place of Islam in the contemporary world. Nasr concludes by noting that despite the challenges of secular modernism and fundamentalism the vast majority of Muslims remain committed to the truth of Islam, and bear witness to the Oneness of God and the Oneness of humanity.The one quibble... (shrink)

Artificial womb technology for extracorporeal gestation of human offspring (ectogenesis or ectogestation) has profound ethical, sociological and religious implications for Muslim communities. In this article we examine the usage of the technology through the lens of Islamic ethico-legal frameworks specifically the legal maxims (al-Qawaid al-Fiqhiyyah) and higher objectives of Islamic law (Maqaṣid al-Shariah). Our analysis suggests that its application may be contingently permissible (halal) in situations of dire need such as sustaining life and development of extremely premature newborns, (...) for advancing fetal medicine and avoiding maternal co-morbidities during fetal treatment, and for enabling motherhood for women without functional wombs, or who face grave medical risks in pregnancy. However, its application may be proscribed (haram) for enabling healthy women to avoid pregnancy and childbirth, or to achieve parenthood equity. Specification of these views to particular policy, legal contexts and Fatwa will require multidisciplinary Shariah-based bioethical deliberations between jurists, policymakers, and scientists. (shrink)

The ethical and legal challenges posed by assisted reproduction techniques are both profound and breathtaking, with most societies unable to fully comprehend one technique before another one, even more daring, emerges. The wrongful implantation of embryos in two women undergoing in vitro fertilisation treatments at two separate clinics in the UK seriously vitiates the traditional concept of who is a parent. In one case, a patient’s embryos were wrongly implanted into another woman seeking similar treatment, and in the second, (...) a woman’s eggs were fertilised using sperm from a man other than her husband.In the first mix-up, neither member of the recipient couple was the genetic parent of the child, while in the second case, the recipient mother was the genetic mother and her husband was not the genetic father. The mix-ups resulted in litigation to determine who the rightful parents were. First, I will show in this paper that, although the outcome of the application of English law in both cases was in agreement with the outcome prescribed by basic principles of Islamic law and bioethics, that agreement is based on different reasoning in the two traditions. Next, I will show that the profound ethical implications of reproductive technologies begs for a more pluralistic bioethical discourse than the one-dimensional analysis applied by secular Western societies that currently dominates the enquiry, particularly as most Western societies are more or less multicultural and multireligious. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Newly Veiled Woman: Irigaray, Specularity, and the Islamic VeilAnne-Emmanuelle Berger (bio)In 1995, in a piece published in a special issue of Les temps modernes devoted to the Algerian “Guerre des frères,” the late Monique Gadant, a sociologist of postcolonial Algeria, called for a dispassionate reflection on the reasons why a sizable number of Algerian women, in Algeria but also in France, decided to wear the hijab, (...) or “Islamic veil,” without, she said, being coerced into doing it. Warning against a naive French ethnocentrism which may have led people to mistake the hijab too quickly for a sign of women’s oppression, she wrote:C’est s’aveugler que de ne pas voir qu’il y a de très nombreuses femmes qui portent le hidjab sans y être forcées par personne.... Avant de se dresser contre le hidjab, réduit à un symbole d’oppression (les femmes qui le portent étant jugées en contradiction avec ce qui est censé être leurs intérêts et la vérité sur elles-mêmes dites par d’autres), on devrait prendre un peu de temps pour réfléchir aux motivations de ces femmes.[”Femmes alibi” 228][One would be blind not to see that numerous women are wearing the hijab without being forced to do it by anybody.... Before denouncing the hijab, reductively conceived as a symbol of oppression—the women wearing it being found to contradict what are supposed to be their interests and the truth about themselves as told by others—one should take some time to reflect on these women’s motivation.]Indeed, a growing number of women have adopted the hijab in the past decade, in Muslim or predominantly Muslim countries where the “Islamic veil” has not yet been made state law, as is the case in Iran. One thinks of Egypt or Indonesia, for instance, as two other examples where—against weak attempts by the governments in place to curb the powerful development of Islamism, after they helped foster it—the hijab has enjoyed considerable though unequal success. One should not underestimate coercion as a factor, especially within the last few years, when terrorism directed against civilians in Algeria and ever-growing intimidation stemming from Islamism’s social success in Egypt have undeniably led tens of thousands of scared, weary, or energetically “persuaded” women to wear the veil. Nonetheless, I want to take up Monique Gadant’s suggestion that we seriously try to think through at least some of the stakes of the phenomenon she identifies: an impressive number of women today affirm that they want to wear the hijab, and they do it. This raises at least two series of questions: (1) if the hijab fulfills a wish, rather than indicating a state of oppression or alienation, one has to reflect on the nature and structure of this wish or desire, and perhaps ask what the relation might be between desire and the veil, or rather this veil. For the hijab, as it is called in Arabic, is indeed a new kind of veil, or rather a new way of using an old Koranic precept, one intended to replace traditional modes of dressing and veiling. (2) If the hijab, and sometimes even the nikab and the jelbab, which cover women’s faces and bodies entirely, are willingly worn, should one [End Page 93] take this as a particularly blatant testimony to the radical relativity of cultures, which would in turn preclude any “Westerner” or non-Muslim individuals or groups, beginning with women, from making any assumptions concerning the condition of women or the hermeneutics of gender relations across cultures? This is indeed what Gadant hints at when she denounces the “naive [French] ethnocentrism” [228] at work in the negative response to the hijab. 1 One encounters here, as we know, a most divisive, philosophically crucial, and politically decisive issue, one that not only pitches non-Westerners against Westerners, but sometimes equally forcefully, as in this case, “Westerners” against “Westerners.” Ethnocentrism, as a tendency to (mis)understand a different culture in terms of one’s own, hence as a veiled form of cultural imperialism, should be uncovered and indeed denounced... (shrink)

It would be an anachronism to search for modern democracy in the Qur’an that is the first among the other sources of Islam, i.e. Sunnah, ijma and the qiyas. To deduce the definition of Islam merely on the basis of the primary and secondary textual sources rather than the application of them as Muslim praxis would be an incomplete hermeneutic process in understanding it. We can see that the state and the religious society, which was represented by ulama, were separated (...) from each other in an early stage of Islamic history. The members of ulama were in charge of the intellectual and social life, the law and its application. The values of the modern democracy such as law and order, separation of state authority from the public sphere, observing the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals such as women and religious minorities as the inseparables of democracy were upgraded in Muslim societies. This structure of Muslim society, however, was spoiled by colonialist interventions and the adoption of the modern nation-state concept. (shrink)

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has had the opportunity to address the sensitive matter of the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in the workplace in two preliminary rulings. The result of these decisions implies that the wearing of this veil at work is, in general, neither proscribed nor always justified as a legitimate expression of religious beliefs. However, the law studied and applied deals exclusively with discrimination in the workplace on religious grounds. Nonetheless, the (...) class='Hi'>Islamic headscarf is only worn by (some) Muslim women (never by men). This article reviews the EU legislation and policy on equality, intersectionality and multiple discrimination to verify that gender mainstreaming does not reach the work of the Court. Only the inclusion of a feminist perspective to the application of justice, with a clear methodology, can guarantee that gender does not disappear in cases of complex discrimination. (shrink)