The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective. The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We (...) also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment, confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn’t find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems. (shrink)

With increasing influence of illiberalism, freedom should not be considered or interpreted lightly. Post-truth contexts provide grounds for alt-right movements to capture and pervert notions of freedom of speech, making universities battlefields of politicised emotions and expressions. In societies facing these pressures around the world, academic freedom has never been challenged as much as it is today. As Peters and colleagues note, conceptualisations of ‘facts’ and ‘evidences’ are politically, socially, and epistemically reconstructed in post-truth contexts. At the same time, with (...) intelligence commodified, reified or marginalised, freedom of speech and of mobility can entail fights for entitlements, or escapes from local responsibilities. The decline and corruptions of democratic free speech and academic freedom, or the absence of forces to defend them, are thus serious challenges. These challenges grow as the competition of ideas, sometimes under the rubric of academic freedom, often implies the power struggle and questioning of statuses in the so-called ‘marketplace of ideas’. Competition as a value invoked in some conceptualisations of freedom, becomes more important than human dignity, which was originally supposed to expand and strengthen under democratic conceptions of freedom in higher education. What had been happening to freedoms, of speech, teaching, and learning, across different subject positions and cultures of higher education, remains largely underexplored, as alt-right movements, neoliberalism and illiberalism, and post-truthism values and orientations expand. (shrink)

Previous research showed that sensorimotor information affects the perception of properties associated with implied perceptual context during language comprehension. Three experiments addressed a novel question of whether perceptual context may contribute to a simulation of information about such out‐of‐sight objects as cast shadows. In Experiment 1, participants read a sentence that implied a particular shadow cast on a target (blinds vs. an open window) and then verified the picture of the object onto which a shadow was cast. Responses were faster (...) when the shadow of blinds cast on the object matched that implied by the sentence. However, the data did not show the same matching effect for pictures with cast shadows from an open window. In Experiments 2 and 3, we found that verification times for pictures with no cast shadows were faster when preceded by an “open window” sentence, thus suggesting that reading the sentence does not elicit a visual simulation of any specific shadow. Experiment 3 showed that the objects superimposed with a cast shadow of the blinds and blinds themselves were verified faster after reading a “blinds” sentence. However, the results of an order analysis showed the temporal stability of the “blinds shadows” effect, but the disappearance of the “blinds” effect in the second half of the data. We conclude that the results are compatible, to a lesser or greater extent, with multiple accounts, and discuss our findings in the context of a mental imagery view, a mental simulation view, and an amodal representation view. (shrink)

Over the past several years, there has been a significant increase in the number of scientific articles with two or more authors claiming “Equal Co-First Authorship”. This study provides a critical background to ECFA designations, discusses likely causes of its increased use, and explores arguments for and against the practice. Subsequently, it presents the results of a qualitative study that sought the opinion of 19 authors listed among equal first authors of recent publications in leading scientific journals about ECFA designations. (...) Results show that circumstances leading to ECFA designations vary significantly from each other. While the development of policies for these situations would not be easy, participants suggested that the lack of clear and consistent policies regarding the attribution and evaluation of ECFA contributes to tensions amongst ECFA authors and obscures their preferred attributions of credit. (shrink)

Moral conflicts are the situations which emerge as a response to deal with conflicting obligations or duties. An interesting case arises when an agent thinks that two obligations A and B are equally important, but yet fails to choose one obligation over the other. Despite the fact that the systematic study and the resolution of moral conflicts finds prominence in our linguistic discourse, standard deontic logic when used to represent moral conflicts, implies the impossibility of moral conflicts. This presents a (...) conundrum for appropriate logic to address these moral conflicts. We frequently believe that there is a close connection between tolerating inconsistencies and conflicting moral obligations. In paraconsistent logics, we tolerate inconsistencies by treating them to be both true and false. In this paper, we analyze Graham Priest’s paraconsistent logic LP, and extend our examination to the deontic extension of LP known as DLP. We illustrate our work, with a classic example from the famous Indian epic Mahabharata, where the protagonist Arjuna faces a moral conflict in the battlefield of Kurukshetra. The paper aims to avoid deontic explosion and allows to accommodate Arjuna’s moral conflict in paraconsistent deontic logics. Our analysis is expected to provide novel tools towards the logical representation of moral conflicts and to shed some light on the context-sensitive paraconsistent deontic logic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Opining the articuli fidei:Thomas Aquinas on the Heretic’s Assent to the Articles of FaithM. V. DoughertyTHOMAS AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT of the infused virtue (habitus) of faith presupposes that some intrinsically intelligible truths are beyond the range of the natural cognitive abilities of human beings. The possession of the virtue of faith allows the believer to transcend certain natural epistemic limitations so that he can assent to truths that are necessary (...) for salvation. Consonant with the Catholic theological tradition, Aquinas refers to such truths as the articles of faith (articuli fidei), and stock examples include propositions concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation.1In light of the many and well-known texts from the Corpus Thomisticum that highlight the disproportion or incommensurability between the articles of faith and the natural cognitive abilities of human beings, it would not be unreasonable for one to assume that faith is required to assent to such articles of faith [End Page 1] in this life. Such an interpretive assumption could be expressed as:A1: A human being can assent to the articles of faith in this life if and only if the human being is fortified with the infused virtue of faith.One might be led to ascribe A1 to Aquinas when one considers that he criticizes the Pelagians precisely for maintaining that the assent to matters of faith is caused by nothing other than free will.2 Still further, one might think that strong evidence for A1 is Aquinas’s claim that “free will does not suffice for believing, since those things that are of faith are above reason.”3I argue, however, that A1’s identification of the virtue of faith as a necessary condition for the assent to the articles of faith does not adequately reflect Aquinas’s position, despite the many texts that may suggest such a view.4 That Aquinas does not endorse A1 can be made evident by examining his largely overlooked account of the epistemic state of the heretic (haereticus). To be sure, most commentators who explore the Thomistic treatment of heresy focus on the psychology of error underlying the heretic’s denial of one or more of the articles of faith.5 In the present paper I take an alternate path, however, focusing on those epistemic acts whereby the heretic gets its [End Page 2] right, so to speak, by correctly assenting to some of the articles of faith. Aquinas maintains that the heretic does not possess the infused virtue of faith yet still assents to all the articles of faith except for the one or more articles that he denies. Bereft of faith, the heretic “holds those things that are of faith by another mode than through faith.”6 This seemingly anomalous epistemic condition deserves consideration.7I. Intellects without FaithThe heretic appears to be cognitively privileged, since without faith he assents to the things that are of faith, seemingly overcoming without divine assistance the aforementioned disproportion between the limited range of reason and the articles of faith. Aquinas is aware of the apparent difficulty; in the Summa theologiae he defuses the rather unusual objection that heretics appear to have greater cognitive capacities than the faithful, since heretics routinely and unassistedly assent to those higher truths without possessing the virtue of faith.8 Aquinas concludes that the heretic holds the articles of faith by opinion (opinio), not faith.What makes one a heretic? Frequently Aquinas identifies obstinacy (pertinacia, instantia) as a necessary condition for heresy.9 The cause of heresy is at times identified with pride [End Page 3] (superbia).10 On Aquinas’s account, heresy is a species of unbelief (infidelitas) and every heretic is a schismatic.11 But the heretic does get many things right. If one were to deny all of the articles of faith, one would not qualify as a heretic, but would simply be a nonbeliever or an apostate. So, apart from the denial of an article (or a few articles) that specifies heretics as the distinct kind of heretic they happen to be, heretics for the most part succeed in assenting to most—but not all—of the articles of faith.Although the... (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to propose a method for analyzing the ideo­logical content of video games while taking into account the agency of the players. The interactivity of video games as a medium has been attracting the attention of researchers for many years, raising, in particular, the ques­tion of how this unique property serves to broadcast certain ideologies. The ability of games to make ideological statements was discussed by Bogost, Frasca, Aarseth, and many other pioneers of game studies. (...) Video games were analyzed both in the context of older media forms that promoted certain ideas through plots, visuals, and other traditional means, and as unique types of objects that can make statements through rules. I aim to introduce the player — as a subject who is able to transform and conceptual­ize the game based on their own cultural background — to this discussion. Using James Gibson’s theory of affordances, I want to acknowledge the player’s freedom of interpretation, the potential to assign one or another ideology to the game in each playthrough. On the one hand, the player acts as a consumer of content; on the other hand, they are a co-author who will use the tools offered by the video game to produce their own state­ments, to be interpreted independently. This leaves the final decision about the ideology of the game to the consumer; thus, game studies need an ap­proach that allows the analysis of the ideological content of specific games. It is especially important in the light of more and more games prioritizing player freedom and not providing any clear plot or even victory conditions. Of course, research can still proclaim, and rightfully so, that the specific rules in such games bear traces of certain ideological systems — capitalism or secularism, for example. But individual players could undermine such interpretations both at the level of reading the game as a “text”, and at the level of interactive actions inspired by those readings. (shrink)

The article considers Max Weber’s model of plebiscitary leadership and historical examples of plebiscitary democracy. It is argued that there is no clear distinction between plebiscitary democracy and dictatorship inWeber’s writings. As Stefan Breuer demonstrates, such a distinction allows us to broaden the application of Weberian concepts. Plebiscitary elements can be seen in the political life of non-Western states, which have been discussed from the multiple modernities perspective. However, while that perspective develops the Weberian sociological tradition, its representatives mostly do (...) not use the concept of plebiscitary leadership. Thus, Shmuel Eisenstadt draws primarily on Weber’s sociology of religion in his analysis of different types of modernity. Specifically, Eisenstadt considers the impact of civilizational legacies on political processes in India and Latin America. Peter Wagner discusses the relevance of Weber’s rationalization thesis and theory of capitalism rather than the concepts of Weberian political sociology. In his study of democratization in Brazil and South Africa, Wagner emphasizes the progressive character of political changes but does not consider the possibility of a reversal of these processes. The article argues that the contemporary reconstruction of Weber’s model of plebiscitary leadership can complement the analyses of democratization in non-Western societies from the multiple modernities perspective. (shrink)

Sensory and tracking technologies are being introduced into workplaces in ways Taylor and the Gilbreths could only have imagined. New work design experiments merge wellness with productivity to measure and modulate the affective and emotional labour of resilience that is necessary to survive the turbulence of the widespread incorporation of agile management systems, in which workers are expected to take symbolic direction from machines. The Quantified Workplace project was carried out by one company that fitted sensory algorithmic devices to workers’ (...) computers and bodies, which, this article argues, identify workers’ so-called agility and reveal management practices that track affective and emotional labour, categorized in the project as stress, subjective productivity and wellbeing. Capital’s accelerated attempts to capture more areas of work and workers’ capacities facilitate the conversion of labour power into a source of value but also results in alienation and abstraction. Participants’ resistance to participation in the Quantified Workplace reveals tensions in the labour process when affect is measured in processes of corporate change. (shrink)

This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well‐trodden Screening‐off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive‐ realist‐friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual (...) anomaly—arising from a secondary mode of perceptual processing. (shrink)

In recent years, global corporations and national governments have been enacting a growing number of codes of conduct and public regulations to combat dangerous and degrading work conditions in global supply chains. At the receiving end of this activity, local producers must contend with multiple regulatory regimes, but it is unclear how these regimes interact and what results, if any, they produce. This article examines this dynamic in the sugar sector in Brazil. It finds that although private and public agents (...) rarely communicate, let alone coordinate with one another, they nevertheless reinforce each other’s actions. Public regulators use their legal powers to outlaw extreme forms of outsourcing. Private auditors use the trust they command as company insiders to instigate a process of workplace transformation that facilitates compliance. Together, their parallel actions block the low road and guide targeted firms to a higher road in which improved labor standards are not only possible but even desirable. (shrink)

‘Borders’ will be in the twenty-first century what ‘frontiers’ where in the nineteenth. Frontiers were conceived as the line indicating the last point in the relentless march of civilization. On the one side of the frontiers was civilization; on the other, nothing; just barbarism or emptiness. The march of civilization and the idea of the frontiers created a geographic and bodygraphic divide. Certain areas of the planet were designated as the location of the barbarians, and since the eighteenth century, of (...) the primitives. In one stroke, bodies were classified and assigned a given place on the planet. But who had the authority to enact such a classification, and what was the logic of that classification? Furthermore, the classification of the world by region, and the link established between regions and people inhabiting them, was parallel to the march of civilization and companions of it: on the other side of the epistemic frontiers, people do not think or theorize; hence, one of the reasons they were considered barbarians. (shrink)

The article discusses a key issue for Russian and international Max Weber Studies: the epistemological possibilities and place of Weberian sociology in modern social theory. Discussion articles by well-known Russian scientists — who sharply criticized the actualizing direction of Weberian studies in general, and the religious, cultural, and sociological orientation in particular — are contrasted with the re-actualization and rethinking of key Weberian themes in the “New Critical Theory” of the influential German sociologist Hartmut Rosa. Such a projection will make (...) it possible, on the one hand, to thematize the axiomatic assertion about the heuristic rather than concrete-content relevance of the classics; on the other hand, it will provide an opportunity to read Weber as a macrosociologist. In the original, criticized, and often rejected sociology of Rosa, Weber appears not only as a predecessor whose mention enhances the relevance of the new theoretical framework, but, above all, as an analyst and diagnostician of early modernity. Weber’s main ideas and theoretical constructions are organically built into Rosa’s methodological framework: analysis-diagnosis-praxis. The analysis of rationalization as a universal historical process of modernity in Weber’s sociology is rethought by Rosa as expansion and acceleration; disenchantment becomes a diagnosis of modernity and is recoded into alienation, while the concept of charisma is transformed into the key concept of resonance. (shrink)

t. 1. O Russkoĭ filosofii i literature : statʹi, ocherki i ret︠s︡enzii, 1912-1961 -- t. 2. O pravoslavii i religioznoĭ kulture : statʹi i ocherki, 1916-1957 --.

Vítima, quer do contexto, quer da sua recepção, a obra de Eric Weil (1904-1977), editada entre os anos 50 e 70 do século passado, não tem obtido o devido acolhimento pela comunidade filosófica. Se as interpretações magistrais de Kant (Problèmes kantiens. Paris: Vrin, 1970) e de Hegel (Hegel et l’état. Paris; Vrin, 1950) constituem referências cada vez mais frequentes nos trabalhos da especialidade (os quais persistem, contudo, em ignorar os importantes artigos sobre a filosofia dos dois autor...

Posty do druziv (cherez saĭt "Filosofii︠a︡ v Ukraïni) z sela Shevchenkovoho -- Buty i prahnuty -- Asymetrii︠a︡ butti︠a︡ -- Karl I︠A︡spers "Prosvitlenni︠a︡ ekzystent︠s︡iï. Dosvid prochytanni︠a︡ -- Peremyslyty vse.

The philosophical disposition of the mind of Vladimir Bibikhin is deeply related to the thought of Martin Heidegger, but at the same time his existential character is almost directly opposite. What is common to them is the understanding of thought as the docile attention to the event of being. The text outlines three aspects of this disposition of mind, which all are disputed by the author. (1) Consciousness is not only the Carthesian ruler, but also the subject of the ethical (...) reflexion, conscience. (2) In the “seizedness” as the basic frame of mind of the docile attention the turn of the possessedness is concealed. (3) In the political turn of the seizing historical event the totalitarian power is hidden. (shrink)

The article considers modern transformations of the ideas concerning subject’s cognitive abilities towards object because of the emergence and development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The developments of scientists and engineers from National Research University of Electronic Technology (Moscow, Russia) in the field of artificial intelligence have been taken as a foundation and material of this research. Their analysis allows making a conclusion that the humanity is rather far from the realization of ‘strong artificial intelligence’. We need a qualitative breakthrough (...) in AI material and technological basis for it. Applying ‘model-dependent realism’ by S. Hawking in the course of the speculations in the article, the author concludes that the purpose of cognition in modern science is not to describe an objective reality, but to organize its subjective perception by some definite way. So, the purpose of cognition is the perfection of cognition models permitting a subject ‘to capture’ the reality. This idea is completely confirmed by Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis theory and von Foerster’s ‘second-order cybernetics’. The article drafts some prospects of moving away from post-nonclassical scientific thinking in its current understanding, because the development of AI technologies results in ‘blurring’ borders of subjectivity in the cognition process. The author concludes that the modern world is moving in another epistemological paradigm where a new scientific revolution is inevitable. (shrink)

The paper suggests a straight solution to the problem of meaning skepticism presented in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The solution is based on Ladov’s moderate solution to the problem. Ladov’s solution is to the effect that the total skepticism cannot be a theory because it cannot be stated without performative contradiction. This entails that only a limited skepticism is possible as a theory. I argue that the limited skepticism is compatible with the view that meaning can be (...) known provided the knowledge of meaning is construed as an internal part of a speech act, not as a result of interpretation of behavioral facts. (shrink)

The paper presents a holistic notion of speech act and demonstrates its relevance for the straight solution to Kripke’s problem. Besides, the author replies to some comments and objections presented by the participants of the discussion.

One defining element of life in any Catholic educational institution, whether it be primary, secondary, or tertiary, is the focus on pastoral care for staff and students. This paper provides a distinctly Catholic definition of the term ‘pastoral care’ and briefly examines the theological foundations that underpin this concept, particularly, in relation to its application in the Catholic university. The paper traces the motif of pastoral care through the Scriptures and, building on insights from St. Pope John Paul II’s Apostolic (...) Constitution on Catholic Universities, Ex Corde Ecclesiae (1990) and the broader theological anthropology of the Vatican II Council. The paper highlights that pastoral care is not something of an extrinsically added offering to students in a Catholic educational institution, but rather something intrinsically built into its fabric. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 375 7he Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics. Edited by JAMES F. CHILDRESS and J mrn MACQUARRIE. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986. Pp. xvii + 678. $29.95. This is a second, revised edition of The Dictionary of Christian Ethics, prepared by John Macquarrie and published in 1967. This new edition follows Macquarrie's conception of a dictionary, but expands it. It includes several subject areas, basic ethical concepts, biblical (...) ethics, theological ethics, philosophical ethics, non-Cbistian ethics; psychological, 8ociological, political, and other relevant concepts; and articles on substantial issues such as war and abortion. The criterion for selection, as stated by the editor, was the importance of the topic for Christian ethical reflection. The aim was to indicate both what is agr.eed upon and what is controversial. About 40% of the entries from the first edition have been included. These are generally updated so as to include recent developments. The selection of subjects, the way in which they are treated and the list of contributors, reflect the ecumenical character of contemporary Christian ethics. The dictionary includes a host of valuable contributions. Readers who consults the work will no doubt evaluate the entries in terms of their particular purposes. This reviewer found most useful the entries which expla~ned particular basic concepts, for example Autonomy; those dealing with schools of thought, for example, Platonic Ethics, Marxist Ethics, or the contribution of particular traditions, for example, Jewish Ethics, Puritan Ethics, Official Roman Catholic Social Teaching, Eastern Orthodox Christian Ethics, and the many entries dealing with Biomedical Ethics and peace issues. 'rhere are a number of articles on topics which are most important, but for which it is often difficult to find a succinct and comprehensive treatment; such are the contributions on "Embodiment," and " Feminist Ethics." There are a number of useful entries on urg.ent contemporary questions such as Energy and Environmental Ethics. Practical questions such as the care of the aged and the ethics of counseling are also addressed. Each article has a short bibliography appended. Numerous cross-references to other relevant entries are most helpful in providing complementary information. There is a thorough index of names. The dictionary is not conceived as a compendium of the accepted or " official " ethical teachings of churches or religious traditions. Mention could be made, however, of the entry on " Official Roman Catholic Social Teaching." '¥here such teachings exist, they am usually indicated. There are some cases where the churches and/or traditions clearly differ. The approach which is most helpful to ethical debate is to acknowledge such differences clearly, with an appropriate statement of the relevant teaching. The editor himself (James F. Childress), in his own contributions, fol- 376 BOOK REVIEWS lows this p1'0cedure. Some Roman Catholic readers may find the articles on Abortion and Contraception, while excellent in other ways, less satisfactory in this respect. The general focus seems intended to be " middle of the road "; more conservative or radical groups may find their views insufficiently represented. No doubt some of the positions presented would be disputed by Christian ethicists. But the treatment of difficult points is balanced and fair. There are, unfortunately, some inaccuracies. The following examples deserve mention. In the article on Nullity, the Roman Catholic annulment is wrongly equated with papal dissolution of the marriage bond. In the article on Virtue, it is said that St. Thomas held that along with the infused supernatural virtues there are "infused natural virtues." St. Thomas spoke ratht>r of infused theological virtues and infused moral virtues (I. II, Q.63, 3.) In the article on deterrence, it is stated that the strategy of "mutual assured destruction ", dating from the 1960s, still provides the framework of American deterrence strategy. This point would be challenged by some representat.ives of the military, who claim that M.A.D. has not been policy for some years. The same article interprets the U.S. Bishops' Pastoral Letter, The Challenge of Peace. as basing its (conditional) acceptance of nuclear deterrence on the distinction between threatening to do an immoral aet without intending to do it, and threat coupled with the intent. That is, deterrence is aceepted as a "bluff." This is not a correct reading... (shrink)

In his article Evgeny Borisov offers an original solution to Kripke’s sceptical problem of meaning. Its conceptual core is the point of view of the participant of speech acts. He believes that first-person statements of speech act participants like “I know for certain that the expression ‘e’ is used by me in the meaning of m” cannot carry any epistemic fallacies. As a criticism, I propose to point out that non-factual Cartesian semantics have serious epistemic flaws that make it vulnerable (...) to sceptical attacks and accusations of petitio principii. (shrink)

The paper deals with the questions of whether naturalization of ethical theory is possible and how radical it should be. The answer to these questions depends largely on the scientific explanations of the process of moral evaluation. The author concentrates on a moderate version of naturalization, which involves merely correcting the conclusions of normative ethics by appealing to scientific evidence. A good example of moderate naturalization is the project of debunking deontological moral principles of J. Green. From J. Green’s point (...) of view, the most important of such principles (“it is impermissible to harm other people as a means of achieving a utilitarian goal, but it is permissible to cause such harm as a side-effect of its achievement”) reflects the functioning of the emotional alarm system, which in the early ages of human history protected small groups from internal violence using contact means of harm. The means of harm have since expanded, but the inflexible emotional part of our psyche still dictates the limits of permissibility. This dictate has no reasonable grounds, and the abovementioned principle cannot claim to be objective and universal. The author shows that the data used by J. Green is different from the results of studies by Yu.I. Aleksandrov and K.R. Arutyunova on the impact of alcohol intoxication on making deontological and utilitarian moral evaluations. These results indicate that both the deontological and the utilitarian principles are partly based on the emotional subsystem. Accordingly, a normative ethicist is forced to choose as the scientific basis of his or her research some of the opposing scientific models that explain the process of making moral evaluations. Some of the models are consistent with the moderate naturalization project, others are not. The choice between models depends exclusively on already taken metaethical and normative preferences. (shrink)

The article shows that Borisov’s direct solution to the problem of skepticism about meaning using a special type of introspection is associated with the assumption of the agent’s direct access to their own consciousness. This assumption has two complicating consequences: the analogy with Moore’s paradox and the Platonic concept of meaning. It is also shown that direct access to meaning as a way of Borisov’s direct solution of the skeptical paradox significantly uses the performativity of the speech act, narrowing the (...) scope of analysis of the original problem. The little-studied problem of distinction in the analysis of the skeptical paradox of meaningful and formalized mathematics is noted. (shrink)