On the dust jacket of The Subject's Point of View there is a detail from Vilhelm Hammershoi's Interior with Sitting Woman. It is hard to think of a painter who better captures the inner in his work. From the monochrome colour, to the back that faces us, to the door swung open to reveal yet another doorway, we are led to interiority – to the inner. This is a perfect image for a book whose author wants to persuade us to (...) return to the interior – a Cartesian interior.The Cartesian interior has come in for quite a drubbing in philosophy for some considerable time. In the mid-to-late 1970s, a style of argument emerged, designed to challenge this conception of mind and establish in its place an externalist conception of language and of mind. One version of the argument was due to Hilary Putnam and emerged in the context of considerations concerning linguistic meaning; another was due to Tyler Burge and emerged first in the context of considerations concerning the individual in relation to his/her social environment. In his earliest paper, on this topic, Burge wrote of ‘the elderly Cartesian tradition’ where ‘the spotlight is on what exists or transpires “in” the individual – his secret cognition, his innate cognitive structures, his private perceptions and introspections, his grasping of ideas, concepts or forms’. Farkas wants to defend this ‘elderly tradition’, but she does add to it some interesting twists. First and foremost, she places to one side ideas of privacy, of incorrigibility and infallibility. She also wishes to place the issue of dualism to one side. What Farkas concentrates on is privileged access and argues that this is …. (shrink)

Shoot From The Hip - Professional Intuition In Decision-Making -/- Why do eighty percent of decision-makers say that they use intuition often or very often in their decision-making? What is intuition? How does it function? How can we achieve becoming more intuitive? How can we apply it in understanding the world and making more ethical decisions?

My paper is on the republican version of patriotism and its justification, as developed most systematically by Philip Pettit and Maurizio Viroli. The essence of the justification is as follows: patriotism is to be viewed as valuable insofar as it is an indispensable instrument for the upholding of the central republican ideal, namely freedom understood as non-domination. My primary aim is to evaluate the normative force of this justification. In the first section, I introduce minimal descriptive definitions of the concepts (...) of patriotism and the patria. Second, I reconstruct the republican patria-ideal to which patriotism is linked to. In the third section, I reconstruct the republican justification of patriotism. Finally, I ask what we justify when we justify republican patriotism. Two views are prevalent in this regard. According to the first, republican patriotic motivation, similarly to its justification, ought to be instrumental itself too. I argue that this view is untenable, since it is in tension with the minimal definition of patriotism. The conclusion is that the other view – according to which the patriotic motivation ought to be of intrinsic character – possesses greater normative force. (shrink)

In the realm of medical ethics, the foundational principle of respecting patient autonomy holds significant importance, often emerging as a central concern in numerous ethically complex cases, as authorizing medical assistance in dying or healthy limb amputation on patient request. Even though advocates for either alternative regularly utilize prima facie principles to resolve ethical dilemmas, the interplay between these principles is often the core of the theoretical frameworks. As the ramifications of the sustainability crisis become increasingly evident, there is a (...) growing need to integrate awareness for sustainability into medical decision-making, thus reintroducing potential conflict with patient autonomy. The contention of this study is that the ethical standards established in the 20th century may not adequately address the challenges that have arisen in the 21st century. The author suggests an advanced perception of patient autonomy that prioritizes fostering patients’ knowledge, self-awareness, and sense of responsibility, going beyond a sole focus on their intrinsic values. Empowering patients could serve as a tool to align patient autonomy, beneficence, and the aim to reduce resource consumption. (shrink)

Contemporary medicine views health as the individual’s physical, mental, and social well-being. Oral health plays a crucial role in one’s well-being, as the oral cavity and its surrounding regions execute essential functions in verbal and nonverbal communication, sensing, digestion, and significantly contribute to aesthetic appearance. The multifaceted nature of the notion of oral health, as well as the patient’s needs and autonomous will result in various treatment options for the same oral state, favouring often contrasting ethical values and different aspects (...) of oral health. The objective of this article is to suggest alternative treatment strategies in dentistry with respect to the following factors: extent of rehabilitation, preserving one’s anatomical structures, aesthetic outcome, number of sessions, patient autonomy. Additionally, this article describes the suggested treatment strategies in an ethical context and determines the conditions of their employment. The suggested treatment strategies are divided in two categories, extensive treatment strategies focusing on the patient’s entire craniofacial complex, while specific treatment strategies focus on specific paramount issues. (shrink)

Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...) the Cartesian view defended here is not dualism--which is not adopted--but internalism. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted externalist thesis, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on certain features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view, which holds that the mind is autonomous, and though it is obviously affected by the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. Defenders of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; Katalin Farkas offers a defence of an uncompromising internalist Cartesian conception. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 203 Seiten: 9-37.

In this paper, we study the distribution and interpretation of a non-temporal use of the future tense in Italian, called ‘presumptive’ or ‘epistemic’, which we label here PF. We first distinguish PF from its closest modal relatives, namely epistemic necessity/possibility/likelihood modals, as well as weak necessity modals. We then propose an account of PF in declaratives and interrogatives that treats it as a special comparative subjective likelihood modal, and test its empirical predictions. A theoretical lesson drawn from this detailed study (...) of the semantics of PF is that semantics needs sharpened theoretical tools to be able to capture the fine-grained distinctions languages make when it comes to signaling modulated epistemic commitment to a proposition. (shrink)

1 The notion of specicity has played a signicant role in linguistic theory both in the elds of semantics and, increasingly, in work on syntax/semantics interface., Abbott, Kripke, Fodor and Sag, Higginbotham and Enc among many others; see also Pesetsky, Szabolcsi and Zwarts, Diesing, Dobrovie- Sorin, E. Kiss, Mahajan, and Chung for work where specicity is discussed in connection with syntactic matters.) Specicity is interesting for the student of semantics because it is crucially relevant to establishing varieties of reference. For (...) the syntactician, the notion of specicity comes up when attempting to account for the use of various case markers on DOs in languages as diverse as Romanian, Turkish, and Hindi, or when attempting to account for the full spectrum of judgments concerning weak island violations and the interpretation of multiple wh-questions. The rst point I will argue for is that there are several distinct notions of specicity that should be kept apart. More specically, I will argue that there are at least three. The discussion inevitably leads to Fodor and Sag's ambiguity claim, which in turn leads to the issue of the possible scopes of indenite noun phrases versus the possible scope of quanticational noun phrases. Section 3 will establish the relevant empirical generalizations concerning simple indenites and distributives, and Section 4 captures them within a non-congurational theory of scope proposed in Farkas and Farkas. (shrink)

We continue investigating variants of the splitting and reaping numbers introduced in [4]. In particular, answering a question raised there, we prove the consistency of and of. Moreover, we discuss their natural generalisations $\mathfrak {s}_{\rho }$ and $\mathfrak {r}_{\rho }$ for $\rho \in (0,1)$, and show that $\mathfrak {r}_{\rho }$ does not depend on $\rho $.

In this article, I discuss the concepts of social position and social status, the types of social position, as well as the determinedness of social statuses by the given positions in a new approach. In the first, introductory part of the article, I emphasize that the institutional sociological conception of social position in my approach is relatively closest to the structuralist position conception. In the second part, I introduce two different concepts, labelled social position and social status, and briefly review (...) the social determinedness of social status. In the third part, social positions are typified from the point of view of the two components of social position: on the one hand, from that of social power relations and on the other from that of interest relations. I point out that the different social positions promote the realization of interests to different degrees, that is, they make it possible to attain different social statuses. In a related article, I illustrate the concepts and connections in question with a case study carried out on an industrial shop floor. (shrink)

In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...) We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow. (shrink)

In the extensive literature on the semantics of noun phrases, the most commonly encountered paramters of classification concern the semantic type of their denotation, the distinction between familiarity and novelty, meant primarily to differentiate definites from indefinites, the strong/weak distinction, or that between quantificational and non−quantificational noun phrases, as well as, most recently, that between choice−functional and non−choice−functional DPs (Reinhart 1997, Kratzer 1998, Matthewson 1999).

One of the main driving forces in the era of cyber-physical systems is the introduction of massive sensor networks into manufacturing processes, connected cars, precision agriculture, and so on. Therefore, large amounts of sensor data have to be ingested at the server side in order to generate and make the “twin digital model” or virtual factory of the existing physical processes for predictive simulation and scheduling purposes usable. In this paper, we focus on our ultimate goal, a novel software container-based (...) approach with cloud agnostic orchestration facilities that enable the system operators in the industry to create and manage scalable, virtual IT platforms on-demand for these two typical major pillars of CPS: server-side framework for sensor networks and configurable simulation tool for predicting the behavior of manufacturing systems. The paper discusses the scalability of the applied discrete-event simulation tool and the layered back-end framework starting from simple virtual machine-level to sophisticated multilevel autoscaling use case scenario. The presented achievements and evaluations leverage on the synergy of the existing EasySim simulator, our new CQueue software container manager, the continuously developed Occopus cloud orchestrator tool, and the latest version of the evolving MiCADO framework for integrating such tools into a unified platform. (shrink)

Know -wh ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know -wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge- that of (...) an answer, for example in the cases familiar from arguments for the Extended Mind hypothesis. (shrink)

It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...) and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed. (shrink)

Hallucinations occur in a wide range of organic and psychological disorders, as well as in a small percentage of the normal population According to usual definitions in psychology and psychiatry, hallucinations are sensory experiences which present things that are not there, but are nonetheless accompanied by a powerful sense of reality. As Richard Bentall puts it, “the illusion of reality ... is the sine qua non of all hallucinatory experiences” (Bentall 1990: 82). The aim of this paper is to find (...) out what lends an experience ‘a sense of reality’: what features are required for an experience to feel ‘real’, in the relevant sense? I will investigate the claim that phenomenological features are largely responsible for a sense of reality, and will find this claim wanting. My suggestion is that a sense of reality is created and sustained by the larger nexus of the subject's beliefs. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that besides knowledge of facts or truths, there is also knowledge of things–for example, we say that we know people or know places. We could call this "objectual knowledge". In this paper, I raise doubts about the idea that there is a sui generis objectual knowledge that is distinct from knowledge of truths.

The aim of this series is to make exploratory work that employs new linguistic data, extending the scope or domain of current theoretical proposals, available to a wide audience. These monographs will provide an insightful generalization..

The immediate aim of this paper is to account for the use and interpretation of polarity particles in general, and of the Romanian polarity particles da/nu/ba in particular. We exemplify the uses of da and nu in (1) and (3) respectively.

The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...) and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh. (shrink)

Languages that have determiners often have a rich inventory of them. In English, indefinite determiners include a(n), some, a certain, this, one, another, cardinals, partitives, the zero determiner of bare plurals (in some analyses), and, according to Horn 1999 and Giannakidou 2001, any. Despite the attention indefinites have received in the literature, characterizing what is common to all of them and what is specific to each is still an elusive task. This paper investigates the first three determiners in this list, (...) attempting to provide a semantic characterization that accounts for their distribution. (For pertinent discussion of issues that overlap to some extent with those taken up below, see Kamp and Bende-Farkas 2002, and for a discussion of the French versions of some and a certain, see Jayez and Tovena (this volume).) The Ds that concern us here share two characteristics: (i) they are indefinite, and (ii) they are existential when not in the scope of any operator or quantifier. As seen in [1], they may occur as pivots in existential there constructions, and therefore all three form weak DPs. (shrink)

According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we (...) accept that the mind depends on physical events to some extent, this thesis, though not obvious, is compatible with a large variety of views on the mind. The second version applies to standing states only, and has to do with how we conceive the nature of such states. This second version is much more interesting, because it points to a potential tension in our conception of minds or selves. However, without properly distinguishing between the two theses, the significance of the second is obscured by the comparative triviality of the first. (shrink)

On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just (...) for the effect that they have on us. (shrink)

The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...) access. (shrink)

Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.

Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.

Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...) about the phenomenal sorites. (shrink)

We investigate ideals of the form {A⊆ω: Σn∈Axnis unconditionally convergent} where n∈ωis a sequence in a Polish group or in a Banach space. If an ideal onωcan be seen in this form for some sequence inX, then we say that it is representable inX.After numerous examples we show the following theorems: An ideal is representable in a Polish Abelian group iff it is an analytic P-ideal. An ideal is representable in a Banach space iff it is a nonpathological analytic P-ideal.We (...) focus on the family of ideals representable inc0. We characterize this property via the defining sequence of measures. We prove that the trace of the null ideal, Farah’s ideal, and Tsirelson ideals are not representable inc0, and that a tallFσP-ideal is representable inc0iff it is a summable ideal. Also, we provide an example of a peculiar ideal which is representable inℓ1but not in ℝ.Finally, we summarize some open problems of this topic. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis research examines how fake identities on social media create and sustain antagonistic and racist discourses. It does so by analysing 11 Danish Facebook pages, disguised as Muslim extremists living in Denmark, conspiring to kill and rape Danish citizens. It explores how anonymous content producers utilise Facebook’s socio-technical characteristics to construct, what we propose to term as, platformed antagonism. This term refers to socio-technical and discursive practices that produce new modes of antagonistic relations on social media platforms. Through a discourse-theoretical (...) analysis of posts, images, ‘about’ sections and user comments on the studied Facebook pages, the article highlights how antagonism between ethno-cultural identities is produced on social media through fictitious social media accounts, prompting thousands of user reactions. These findings enhance our current understanding of how antagonism and racism are constructed and amplified within social media environments. (shrink)

In this chapter, I revisit the issue of the explanatory gap that is supposed to open when considering identity statements between physical and mental phenomena. I show that the question asked in the original formulation of the explanatory gap was this: ʻwhy this phenomenal character, rather than any other, is attached to this physiological process?ʼ I argue that this question can be answered, because there is a natural fit between the phenomenal character of experiences and their functional roles. For example, (...) pains feel inherently unpleasant, and that explains why they cause avoidance behaviour, and the felt location and intensity of pain indicates the location and extent of damage to the body. I discuss some other possible gaps in our understanding the relationship between the mental and the physical, and conclude that the fit between functional role and phenomenal character goes a long way, though probably not the whole way, to closing the explanatory gap. (shrink)

SummaryWe present a systematic discussion of the structural and conceptual simplifications of proofs of standard theorems afforded by nonstandard methods and examine to what extent the resulting nonstandard proofs satisfy the informal criterion of “plausibility”. We introduce the concept of a “standard detour” and show that all nonstandard proofs considered avoid such detours. Among the proofs examined are proofs of the Intermediate Value Theorem, the Riemann Integration Theorem, the Spectral Theorem for compact Hermitian operators, and the Arzela‐Ascoli Theorem.RésuméNous discutons systématiquement (...) les simplifications structurelles et conceptuelles apportées par des méthodes non standard aux démonstrations de théorèmes standard et examinons jusQuà quel point de telles démonstrations non standard satisfont à un critère informel de plausibilityé. Nous introduisons la notion de détour standard et montrons que toutes les démonstrations non standard considérées évitent de tels détours. Parmi les démonstrations examinées: celles du théoréme de la valeur intermédiate, du théorème ?on;intégration de Riemann, du théorème spectral pour les opérateurs hermitiques compacts et du théorème ?on;Arzelà‐Arcoli.ZusammenfassungWir stellen eine systematische Betrachtung der durch die Nichtstandard‐Methoden gegebe‐nen strukturellen und begrifflichen Vereinfachungen von Beweisen von Standardsätzen an, und untersuchen, wie weit die entstandenen Nichtstandard‐Beweise das informelle Kriterium der Plausibilität erfüllen. Wir führen den Begriff eines Standard‐Umweges ein, und zeigen, dass alle betrachteten Nichtstandard‐Beweise solche Umwege vermeiden. Unter den betrachteten Beweisen befinden sich Beweise des Zwischenwertsatzes, des Riemannschen lntegralsatzes, des Spektralsatzes für kompakte, hermitische Operatoren, und des Theorems von Arzelà‐Ascoli. (shrink)

Drosophila melanogaster is one of the most popular and powerful model organisms that helpour understanding of mammalian (human) life processes at the molecular level. Calpains are Ca2+‐activated cytoplasmic proteases thought to play multiple roles in intracellular signal processing by limited proteolysis of target substrate proteins, thereby changing their function. The calpain superfamily consists of 14 genes in mammals, but only 4 genes in Drosophila. One may assume that the calpain system, i.e. recognizing calpain‐dependent life processes and identifying the substrates cleaved (...) while exerting their functions, would prove easier to solve in Drosophila than in mammals. Recently, major progress has been made in characterizing Drosophila Calpain A, Calpain B and Calpain C. The fourth member, Calpain D (or SOL), was analyzed earlier. At this juncture, it seems justifiable to summarize our knowledge about the Drosophila enzymes, in comparison to the ubiquitous mammalian ones, as regards structure–function relations, mode of activation by Ca2+ and other factors, inhibition, potential targeting, expression pattern in vivo, etc. Equipped with all this information, we may now embark on the genetic modification of family members, interpreting mutant phenotypes in terms of the cell biology of calpains. BioEssays 26:1088–1096, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The notion of specificity in linguistics is notoriously non-specific. We consider here various distinctions within the realm of noun phrase semantics that are relevant to specificity. The common thread uniting these distinctions is the notion of variation in value assignments for the variable introduced by the noun phrase. The distinctions concern the nature of the variation involved. The first part of the paper (Section 2) is devoted to the definite/indefinite divide and proposes a dynamic parameter of 'determinacy of reference' which (...) attempts to capture what is common to uniqueness and.. (shrink)

The focus of the original argument for the Extended Mind thesis was the case of beliefs. It may be asked what other types of mental features can be extended. Andy Clark has always held that consciousness cannot be extended. This paper revisits the question of extending consciousness.

This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality.