Know-wh does not reduce to know that

American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):109-122 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Know -wh ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know -wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge- that of an answer, for example in the cases familiar from arguments for the Extended Mind hypothesis

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
Extended Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):259-273.
“The extended mind”— extended.Joseph S. Fulda - 1998 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 28 (3):33-34.
Dispositional Knowledge-how versus Propositional Knowledge-that.Gregor Damschen - 2009 - In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. pp. 278-295.
Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.
A probabilistic theory of knowledge.Igal Kvart - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):1–43.
Questions and Answers.Henry Hiz - 1962 - The Classical Review 59 (10):253-265.
Knowing How Without Knowing That.Yuri Cath - 2011 - In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 113.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-05

Downloads
1,436 (#7,344)

6 months
96 (#42,008)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Katalin Farkas
Central European University

Citations of this work

Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Knowing What It is Like and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):105-120.
Knowledge by constraint.Ben Holguín - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):1-28.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.

View all 17 references / Add more references