Substance Dualism

Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):501-513 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Events are the instantiations of properties in substances at times. A full history of the world must include, as well as physical events, mental events (ones to which the substance involved has privileged access) and mental substances (ones to the existence of which the substance has privileged access), and, among the latter, pure mental substances (ones which do not include a physical substance as an essential part). Humans are pure mental substances. An argument for this is that it seems conceivable that I could exist without my body. An objection to this argument is that ‘I’ refers to my body, and so what seems conceivable is not metaphysically possible. My response to this objection is that ‘I’ is an informative designator and so necessarily we know to what it refers, and it does not refer to my body.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
225 (#86,429)

6 months
13 (#182,749)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Identity and necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1971 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and individuation. New York,: New York University Press. pp. 135-164.
Introspection and the self.Sydney Shoemaker - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):101-120.
Introspection and the Self.Sydney Shoemaker - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):101-120.

Add more references