Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?

Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,446

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Vs. a new a priorist argument for dualism.William G. Lycan - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):130-47.
Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Property Dualism and Substance Dualism.Penelope Mackie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199.
Should property-dualists be substance-hylomorphists?Gordon Barnes - 2001 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:285-299.
Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence.Nicholas Everitt - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.
Property dualism without substance dualism?Robert Francescotti - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-01-17

Downloads
771 (#17,229)

6 months
28 (#93,094)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Theism and Secular Modality.Noah Gordon - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Southern California

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

View all 60 references / Add more references