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Steven Rappaport [21]Steven Dodson Rappaport [1]
  1. Inference to the Best Explanation: Is It Really Different from Mill’s Methods?Steven Rappaport - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (1):65-80.
    Peter Lipton has attempted to flesh out a model of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) by clarifying explanation in terms of a causal model. But Lipton's account of explanation makes an adequate explanation depend on a principle which is virtually identical to Mill's Method of Difference. This has the result of collapsing IBE on Lipton's account of it into causal inference as conceived by the Causal-Inference model of induction. According to this model, many of our inductions are inferences from (...)
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  2.  51
    The Modal View of Economic Models.Steven Rappaport - 1989 - Philosophica 44:61-80.
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  3.  39
    Economic Methodology.Steven Rappaport - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (1):110.
  4. What's Really Wrong with Milton Friedman's Methodology of Economics.Steven Rappaport - 1986 - Reason Papers 11:33-62.
     
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  5.  57
    Economic models and historical explanation.Steven Rappaport - 1995 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (4):421-441.
    In investigating their models, economists do not appear to engage much in the activities many philosophers take to be essential to scientific understanding of the world, activities such as testing hypotheses and establishing laws. How, then, can economic models explain anything about the real world? Borrowing from William Dray, an explanation of what something really is, as opposed to an explanation of why something happens, is the subsumption of the explanandum under a suitable concept. One way economic models explain real-world (...)
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  6. Must a metaphysical relativist be a truth relativist?Steven Rappaport - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):75-85.
  7.  61
    A mistake about foundationalism.Steven Rappaport - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):111-125.
  8.  38
    Aune's Wittgenstein on the empiricist thesis.Steven Rappaport - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (4):258 - 263.
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  9.  47
    Basic beliefs and the regress of justification: A reply to Yalcin.Steven Rappaport - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):527-533.
    In a previous paper "A Mistake About Foundationalism" [_The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1992) Vol. 30:111-125] I try to show that the conception of foundationalism used by critics like Sellars and Lehrer distort the foundationalist's idea of a basic belief. Foundationalists view basic beliefs as ones that do not depend on other beliefs. The Sellars-Lehrer conception misrepresents the way the foundationalist's basic beliefs are independent of other beliefs. In a reply to my paper, Yalcin criticizes my line or argument, trying (...)
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  10.  75
    Bonjour's Objection to Traditional Foundationalism.Steven Rappaport - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (3):433-.
    Empirical foundationalism affirms that some empirical beliefs a person holds have a degree of justification or warrant that does not derive from their being inferable from other empirical beliefs the person holds. Such beliefs are basic for the person. In his recent book Laurence Bonjour claims that foundationalism faces the following problem:The basic problem confronting empirical foundationalism … is how the basic or foundational empirical beliefs to which it appeals are themselves justified or warranted or in some way given positive (...)
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  11.  14
    (1 other version)Is Economics Empirical Knowledge?Steven Rappaport - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (2):137-158.
    Alexander Rosenberg has played a large role in creating the philosophy of economics as a distinct area of philosophy. But since the publication of Microeconomic Laws in 1976, Professor Rosenberg's thinking about economics has been casting the subject in an increasingly uncomplimentary light. This development is reflected in Rosenberg's new book Economics–Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? In this stimulating work Rosenberg endorses the view that economics does not constitute scientific empirical knowledge. He says.
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  12.  14
    No Title available: Reviews.Steven Rappaport - 1990 - Economics and Philosophy 6 (2):332-339.
  13.  26
    Quine's Behaviorism.Steven Rappaport - 1978 - Philosophy Research Archives 4:162-183.
    Some charge W.V. Quine with being a behaviorist. Others attempt to clear him of the charge. In replying to Harman in Words and Objections, Quine himself says he is as behavioristic as anyone in his right mind could be, but nowhere does he give us a satisfactory account of how behavioristic that is. It is worthwhile trying to clear up this confusing situation. Two kinds of behaviorism are often distinguished, logical behaviorism and the thesis about the science of psychology known (...)
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  14.  59
    Relativism and truth: A rejoinder to Lynch.Steven Rappaport - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):423-428.
    In a previous article appearing in _Philosophia, I claimed that metaphysical relativism (the world does not come presorted but rather symbol users impose taxonomies on it) does not entail truth relativism (statements are true only relative to a framework). Michael Lynch has said that the _argument I gave for this claim is defective. My argument uses the premise that truth relativism is inconsistent with the deflationary theory of truth. Lynch argues that this premise is false. However, I show that Lynch's (...)
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  15.  62
    Relativism and truth: A reply to davson-Galle.Steven Rappaport - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):519-524.
    In a previous article in _Philosophia, I claim that one can be a metaphysical relativist without being a truth relativist. One premise my argument for this claim relies on is (R2) truth relativism is inconsistent with the deflationary theory of truth. Peter Davson-Galle criticizes my argument for (R2), and also argues directly for the falsity of (R2). I try to show that Davson-Galle's effort to undermine (R2) founders due to his blurring the distinction between a taxonomy or classification system on (...)
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  16.  20
    (1 other version)The Modal View and Defending Microeconomics.Steven Rappaport - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:289 - 297.
    What Daniel Hausman has called 'the simple criticism of economic theory' affirms that neoclassical microeconomic models include false statements, and therefore economists cannot rationally accept such models. Hausman considers, but rejects, the modal view of economic models as a defense of neoclassical theory against the simple criticism. I attempt to show that, on the contrary, the modal view can be used to defend neoclassical micro theory. The modal view distinguishes theoretical from applied economic models. Theoretical models afford true descriptions of (...)
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  17.  31
    Arguments, Truth, and Economic Methodology.Steven Rappaport - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (1):170.
  18.  25
    Jonathan Bennett, "Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes". [REVIEW]Steven Rappaport - 1974 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (1):117.
  19.  36
    Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry, Subroto Roy. London: Routledge, 1989, ix + 236 pages. [REVIEW]Steven Rappaport - 1990 - Economics and Philosophy 6 (2):332.