Basic Beliefs and the Regress of Justification: A Reply to Yalcin

Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):527-533 (1993)
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Abstract

In a previous paper "A Mistake About Foundationalism" [_The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1992) Vol. 30:111-125] I try to show that the conception of foundationalism used by critics like Sellars and Lehrer distort the foundationalist's idea of a basic belief. Foundationalists view basic beliefs as ones that do not depend on other beliefs. The Sellars-Lehrer conception misrepresents the way the foundationalist's basic beliefs are independent of other beliefs. In a reply to my paper, Yalcin criticizes my line or argument, trying to show that my own conception of foundationalism is inadequate. I show that Yalcin's criticism fails to establish this conclusion

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00384283

DOI

10.1111/j.2041-6962.1993.tb00690.x

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