The propositions that the senses are separate and that the global array may be sufficient for adequate perception are questioned. There is evidence that certain tasks may be primarily but these are a special case along the behavioral continuum. Many tasks involve sensory information that is ambiguous, and other sources of information may be required for adequate perception.

Aratus’ Phaenomena calls upon its reader to scrutinize the letters of the text as carefully as the stars and constellations that form its subject matter. The poem abounds with clever letter-play and wordplay, and its reception too is characterized by verbal cleverness, as later authors vie with Aratus and one another to create ingenious textual effects. Among the best-known examples is the word ἄρρητον at Phaen. 2, a witty hidden sphragis for Aratus, who nowhere in his work directly names himself. (...) Later poets picked up on this pun: Callimachus speaks of the λεπταὶ ῥήσιες Ἀρήτου, repeating the verbal root of ἄρρητον in ῥήσιες and its sound in Ἀρήτου. Leonidas of Tarentum meanwhile rates Aratus ‘second after Zeus’, acknowledging the hidden sphragis, which follows directly after the invocation of Zeus in line 1 of the Phaenomena. (shrink)

Pierre Trémaux’s 1865 ideas on speciation have been unjustly derided following his acceptance by Marx and rejection by Engels, and almost nobody has read his ideas in a charitable light. Here we offer an interpretation based on translating the term sol as “habitat”, in order to show that Trémaux proposed a theory of allopatric speciation before Wagner and a punctuated equilibrium theory before Gould and Eldredge, and translate the relevant discussion from the French. We believe he may have influenced Darwin’s (...) revision to the third edition of the Origin on rates of evolution, and suggest that Gould’s dismissal of Trémaux is motivated by concern that others might think punctuated equilibrium theory was tainted by a connection with Trémaux. (shrink)

Summary The Copernican system was condemned as heretical by a decree of the Roman Inquisition in 1633. This decree was effectively, though not officially, withdrawn in 1757, after which date Catholic astronomers felt themselves free to accept and propagate the system without reserve. Between these dates their attitudes varied greatly. In France the decree was never promulgated and was legally unenforceable. Astronomers could be Copernican without any fear of consequences and most of them were, though some, out of respect for (...) the Church, refrained from declaring themselves publicly. In Italy the possible risks were greater, but a few Copernican or near-Copernican works were published without hostile reactions. The ecclesiastical authorities were tolerant and made little positive effort to enforce conformity. By 1744, the system was being freely propagated in Rome itself. (shrink)

Dr. Toynbee is the author of A Study of History in ten volumes, on which he spent twenty-five years, and which has received very high praise from competent critics as well as much criticism. Of the present two books the first is based on the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in 1952–3, the second on the Hewett Lectures given in the United States in the Fall of 1955. As the two treat almost identical topics, the first more (...) fully than the second, it is intended here to give a summary of the doctrine contained in the two—mostly in the author’s own words—and then to add a few criticisms. (shrink)

IN Plato’s eyes, unity was a prime requisite of civil society: “there is no greater good than whatsoever binds the State together into one”. Plato carried his conception of unity to an extreme; for his organic conception has the defect of postulating members who are means to the life of the rest, and do not share in that life. And yet Plato argues from his organic conception of the state to the conclusion, that as in an organism part must be (...) proportioned to suit part, and all to suit the whole—as no part must grow unduly, lest every part should suffer—so in a State class must be proportioned to class, and all classes be adjusted to the good of the whole. (shrink)

The present study is the result of two questions which arose in dealing with the Critique of Pure Reason. What is the relationship of the “Doctrine of Method” to the “Doctrine of Elements?” Does the “Doctrine of Method” tell us anything important about Kant and his philosophy? It will be the contention of this paper that the second half of the Critique relies heavily on the “Doctrine of Elements,” and is a natural expansion of the first half of the Critique. (...) In effect, this is a tentative denial of Norman Kemp Smith’s patchwork thesis. With respect to the second question mentioned above, we shall see that Kant does have a very special place for methodology in his philosophy. This methodology of philosophy has implications for a theory of the division of the sciences and the method proper to each of them. (shrink)