In the still highly politicized question of rupture or continuity between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, elements of continuity are not hard to find, nor should this be a surprise, since a new state arose in the same geographical space and made use of the economic, intellectual, and demographic resources inherited from the Russian Empire. At the same time, the Soviet Union could not have been more different than the Russian Empire. It (...) rejected a number of key elements of the sociopolitical project that underlay the nationalizing tsarist empire and introduced radically new political and social principles for organizing that space. In particular, the Bolsheviks purposefully engaged in dismantling the tsarist efforts to build a great ethnic-Russian nation to stand at the center of the Russian Empire’s nationalities policy. The irreversible disintegration of post-Soviet space into separate nationalizing states became possible only toward the end of the twentieth century. At the same time, the imperial nature of the modern post-Soviet Russian core permits us to say that the imperial logic has survived. This is where we can find an element of inescapable continuity. We present studies of “continuities” and “ruptures” in modern academic discourse and in an updated format, gravitating toward “empirically nuanced” tools for analyzing multiple historical temporalities. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to identify and investigate the first attempts to institutionalize non-state communities of engineers and technicians in the Russian Empire, and to determine whether the Russian Technical Society was the first center to unify the engineering community. The period covered in this study (1850s–1860s) refers to the initial period of the emergence of scientific and technical societies in the Russian Empire, which are considered as a new type of a structural (...) organization of science and technology. The article reveals that the first attempts to institutionalize non-state engineering and technical communities were successful in Livland and Kherson provinces. It has been confirmed that the preferred hypothesis in the matter of the Russian Technical Society does not correspond to historical reality. Two scientific and technical societies of Livland and Kherson provinces were analyzed in the article: the Society of Technicians in Riga and Odessa Society of Engineers and Architects. It was found that the mentioned societies, established in Riga and Odessa, can be considered almost the first scientific and technical societies in the Russian Empire, created even before the Russian Technical Society commenced its activities. For the first time, a detailed study of the process of their organization and activity was carried out. The article also highlights the legislative principles of the activities of the mentioned societies. A comparative analysis of their statutes was carried out, identifying the common and distinctive features. The study proved the polytechnic nature of their activity and determined its priorities. Despite the fact that the Russian Technical Society turned out to be the most powerful scientific and technical society of the Russian Empire, attention is focused on the fact that the Society of Technicians in Riga continued its activities as an independent scientific and technical association. The article highlights the inaccuracies and some false statements about the studied societies. The attempt of marine engineers in the city of Mykolaiv to establish an independent public scientific and technical society in 1864 is also discussed. (shrink)

This article is based on archival sources and examines the role of Hryhorii Poletyka in the creation of the Naval Corps in St. Petersburg, the highest marine educational institution in Russia. The authors consider his role in the development of the teaching system of the Naval Cadet Corps and the way in which he introduced methods of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, including the study of languages, the establishment of a library, an own publishing house and the like. This study shows the (...) importance of Ukrainian educational culture and its impact on the development of the Russian Empire. (shrink)

In this paper, private gardens are portrayed as spaces and implements of aristocratic passion for plant collecting, of competition within the gentry, as well as of scientific professionalisation for botanists. This paper traces the early history of botanical collections in the Russian Empire from the 18th to the early 19th century as part of an elite culture which encouraged amateur patrons to invest in expeditions, gardens, and, consequently, in professionals to manage such projects. Young graduates of European universities (...) who began their careers working at private botanical institutions could later successfully apply for academic positions. The circulation of specimens had developed as a key element of botanical collection and an important basis for the networking of professionals and amateurs around the world. This paper argues that collecting plant specimens became an important means for engaging in “power games” and even “plant diplomacy.” These new responsibilities significantly increased botanists' status as experts. A diverse group of personalities, such as the Empress Catherine II, King George III of England, the industrialist Prokophy Demidov, aristocrat Alexei Razumovsky, Joseph Banks, President of the Royal Society, the academician Peter Simon Pallas—all shared a passion for botanical collecting and were engaged in power games at different levels, using botany as an instrument of influence. (shrink)

Historiography of the development of probability and statistics in the Russian Empire focusses on the contributions of the central figure Pafnutiy Lvovich Chebyshev and his successors. The purpose of this article is to concentrate on an earlier period which culminates with Chebyshev, and specifically on two less-than-well-explored aspects.

A prevailing belief among Russia’s cultural elite in the early twentieth century was that the music of composers such as Sergei Rachmaninoff, Aleksandr Scriabin, and Nikolai Medtner could forge a shared identity for the Russian people across social and economic divides. In this illuminating study of competing artistic and ideological visions at the close of Russia’s “Silver Age,” author Rebecca Mitchell interweaves cultural history, music, and philosophy to explore how “Nietzsche’s orphans” strove to find in music a means to (...) overcome the disunity of modern life in the final tumultuous years before World War I and the Communist Revolution. (shrink)

Britain in the fin de siècle was home to many significant communities of political émigrés. Among Russian revolutionaries who made London their home were Sergei Stepniak and Feliks Volkhovskii, forced to flee Russia as a result of their revolutionary activities in the 1870s. Britain became a symbol of liberty in their writings as a source of comparison with tsarist rule. These comparisons also supported their justifications of the use of terrorism by Russian revolutionaries when writing for audiences with (...) concerns about the use of terrorism in Britain. The emphasis on Russian otherness in these comparisons also helped to justify their opposition to Russian imperialism, while at the same time praising a benevolent imperialism rooted in social and cultural activism. Their thought represents a blending of liberal and socialist ideas employed to place the Russian experience beyond the scope of modernity and liberal political understanding. (shrink)

Summary: The article explores deployment of the Darwinian narrative of the “natural history of humanity” in Russian physical anthropology in the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. It traces two narratives developed by the leading Russian school of physical anthropology: one narrative advanced a universalist vision of collective scholarly enterprise working toward clarifying the missing links in the a priori accepted developmental evolutionary model. The other constructed a new language that undermined the idea of species/subspecies/races/nations/ as stable, (...) externally bounded, and internally homogeneous units and attempted to rationalize imperial hybridity. The article's main focus is on the latter classificatory narrative, its relational methodology, and the protostructuralist units of comparison that it produced. (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 5, Page 714-715, August 2012.

ABSTRACT This article surveys recent work on oracular prophecies and their role in Greek perceptions of Russia in the early modern period. Drawing on this survey, the article provides a critical assessment of the historiographical paradigm of the ‘Russian Expectation’ offered by Paschalis Kitromilides for the analysis of Greek-Russian relations. Finally, the article proposes that scholars should focus on the concept of protection as an aspect of political language, this providing an explanation for particular Greek and also (...) class='Hi'>Russian interpretations of the Treaty of Kuçuk-Kaynardja of 1774. (shrink)

Leibniz’s philosophy enjoyed a Russian fandom that endured from the eighteenth century to the death of the last exiled Russian philosophers in the twentieth century. There was, to begin with, Leibniz’s direct impact on Peter the Great and on the scientific development of Saint Petersburg. Then there was, still in the eighteenth century, Mikhail Lomonosov, who was sent to study with Christian Wolff in Marburg, and who came back to Saint Petersburg with a watered-down Leibnizian worldview, which he (...) applied to the study of chemistry and physics. Another eighteenth century philosopher, Alexander Radishchev, who studied in Leipzig, displayed acquiescence with a number of key elements from Leibniz’s philosophy. Russian Lebnizianism as a continuous philosophical movement was considerably reinvigorated in the 1870s when the Leibnizian German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller took a position at the University of Dorpat (nowadays Tartu, Estonia), which was then located within the Russian Empire. Teichmüller influenced a number of Russian philosophers into adopting a “Teichmüllerian” version of Leibnizianism. Among these philosophers were Evgeny Bobrov and Alexei Kozlov. In Saint Petersburg, Kozlov influenced his own son, Askoldov, and the latter’s friend — Nikolai Lossky. In the meanwhile, in Moscow Lev Lopatin, Nikolai Bugaev, and Petr Astafiev developed their own Leibnizianism in seemingly relative independence from Teichmüller’s influence and presumably, in some cases, under the partial influence of Vladimir Solovyov. Despite this relative independence, however, the fact remains that there was in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia a network of more or less loosely interconnected Leibnizian philosophers who read each other and wrote about each other, who exchanged ideas, and who constituted a movement that we might characterize as “Russian Leibnizianism” or “Russian Neo-Leibnizianism.” In this chapter, I tell the story of the intellectual lineage of Russian Leibnizianism. (shrink)

The task of this article is to clarify the appropriateness and adequacy of peace-making (confessional) rhetoric in the situation of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular, the meaningful correspondence of the concept of «peace» in its application or reading by the bearers of different worldview paradigms. The «russkii mir» cannot be translated either as «Russian peace» or as «Russian world». This is because the scope and content of these concepts are different. (...) Rus (Kyiv`s Rus) — a thousand-year-old princely state with its center in Kyiv, where the ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived, baptized by Prince Volodymyr in 988. Rus is not Russia. But Muscovy adopted the name Russia to derive its historiography from Rus. «Russkii mir» actually refutes the axiological principles laid down by ancient Rus’s civilization (freedom, dignity, partnership, co-creation, mutual responsibility). «Russkii mir» destroys peace in global or any local images, trying to grab the territory it decided to own. «Russkii mir» encroaches on world domination and therefore tries to impose its rules of the game on the world, which would reshape the world structure according to the wishes of the Russian dictators. For this, «russkii mir» uses any means and institutions as a tool: the army, weapons of mass destruction, atrocities, terror, lies, propaganda, the church and peace-making rhetoric. The goal is not to restore peace, but to establish the world domination of the Russian Empire in any of its variants (Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Orthodox Civilization). Russian Orthodox Church plays a leading role in this — it uses religious rhetoric to formu- late a worldview model of the «russkii mir», consolidates the Russian population for a war of aggression, and justifies the atrocities of the Russian military with the sacred mission of restoring the Holy Rus’. Russian Orthodox Church justifies the «civilizing mission» of the Russian troops, actually calls to protect «our Common Russian Fatherland» by killing Ukrainians on the territo- ry of Ukraine. False messianism, manichaeism, paternalism, hatred of the civilized world that lives by democratic standards and respects the dignity and freedom of the individual, Russian arrogance, conceit, supremacy and egomania — this is what Russian Orthodoxy promotes with its religious rhetoric. Therefore, if we hear calls for «peace» from the bearer of the «russkii mir»’s worldview, it actually means a demand to come to terms with all their whims, to give up one’s own identity, one’s own world, one’s own life, if they do not fit into the concept of «russkii mir». (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to study the use of “UP–DOWN” metaphors in Russian and French material. A list of 10 conceptual metaphors expressing up–down movement was proposed by CitationLakoff and Johnson (1980), and this list has been reproduced many times since. However, this analysis shows that the list is not fully accurate. In addition to the conceptual metaphors proposed by Lakoff and Johnson, the authors find it important to include 5 more metaphorical models expressing vertical movement. On (...) the other hand, 5 of the conceptual metaphors in Lakoff and Johnson's list turned out not to be relevant to this analysis. The authors also attempt to describe the connections between different metaphoric models and observe that not all metaphoric models are equally important in their evidential and conceptual power. (shrink)

Devetnaesti vek za Rusku i Tursku carevinu predstavlja period donosenja reformskih zakona sa ciljem da se drzave modernizuju i, koliko mogu, odgovore duhu vremena. Premda su u Rusiji reforme kocene rezimom arakcejevstine i reakcionarnom politikom Nikolaja I, drzava je nacinila ozbiljan korak u borbi protiv sistemske korupcije donosenjem Krivicnog zakonika 1845. godine. Sa druge strane, Turska je bila pod nesumnjivo vecim stranim pritiskom kada je proces modernizacije bio u pitanju. Period tanzimata oznacava krupno razdoblje u kome se Turska, izmedju ostalog, (...) suocila sa sveprisutnom korupcijom. Krunu turskog reformatorskog rada na ovom polju predstavlja donosenje Krivicnog zakonika 1856. godine. U radu se analiziraju konkretni zakoni kojima je korupcija sankcionisana u ove dve carevine. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss a relatively recent development of Russian interest in Kyiv as a place with symbolic and historical significance for Russian history, which makes it a desirable target in an ongoing war. I trace the changing attitude of Russian travelers towards Kyiv’s history from the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. Earlier generations of visitors came to Kyiv primarily to visit holy places, with no knowledge of the city’s historical significance, and because it was (...) a more affordable alternative to travel abroad. However, at the end of the eighteenth century, after Catherine II’s royal visit, the publication of guidebooks, and the ascend of history as a discipline, and interest among Russian educated elites, Kyiv’s past became an obsession for many Russian travelers. Their travel accounts were motivated by a search for the past glory of Kyiv. For Russian travelers and authorities, history became one of the key means of appropriation of Kyiv, with a new generation of travelers searching for material evidence connecting Kyivan Rus to the Russian past. However, they were unable to find much material evidence and often used their imagination to present Kyiv as a site of Kyivan Rus history, ignoring the city’s non[1]Russian heritage. (shrink)

Path dependency is a most valuable tool for understanding Russian history since 1480, which coincides with the ending of the “Mongol yoke,” Moscow’s annexation of northwest Russia, formerly controlled by Novgorod, and the introduction of a new method for financing the cavalry—the core of a new service class. The cavalry had to hold off formidable adversaries for Muscovy to retain its independence. Russia in 1480 was a poor country lacking subsurface mineral resources and with a very poor climate and (...) soil for the support of agriculture. These basic problems inspired autocratic power and by 1515 an ideology was in place justifying it. Religion, literature, and law were employed to support the autocracy. A variant of a caste society was created to support the army. This made up the substance of the first service-class revolution in which all resources were mobilized to support a garrison state. After 1667 the external threats to Muscovy diminished, but the service class kept its privileges, especially the land fund and the peasant-serfs. Russia faced major foreign threats again in 1700 and in the 1920s and 1930s. Those threats precipitated the second and third service-class revolutions. The second and third service-class revolutions broadly paralleled the first. Reinvigorated service classes were created with state institutions to support them. As society became more complex, so did the service classes and their privileges. Ideologies were converted into devices to support the infallible autocratic ruler and his elites. Almost the entire population was bound to state service, either directly, working to support the service state, or paying taxes. The church and clergy were harnessed first by Peter’s Holy Synod and then Stalin’s Department 5 of the Secret Police after he revived the church during World War II. Writers and artists were also put into uniform, until they finally rebelled—but the arts retained their civic functions, first supporting the regime, and then criticizing it. Finally, law retained its traditional programmatic functions in regimes themselves beholden to no law. As the foreign threats diminished, the service classes lost their function, but the elite servicemen kept their privileges as the service states disintegrated and the service classes lost their collective élan. Both the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Empire collapsed almost without a whimper. (shrink)

1. Russian thought is a collective and symbolic concept. The intellect of any people on the planet Earth is great in its own way; nor can its contribution to the common planetary home of mankind be assessed on the basis of the generally accepted events of history. First, because these events in the history of mankind are overestimated; second, because many of them are still beyond the bounds of knowledge and understanding. The true mechanisms of the evolution of mankind (...) are still awaiting their Columbuses. The histories of the utilization of nature by social organisms, economics, natural science, culture, and religions are becoming increasingly disassociated; mankind, as the only cosmoplanetary system, remains in the world of hypotheses; pragmatic aspirations supplant strategies of development and survival. The established priority of scientific and technical thought rejects empirical and a priori indicators. The experience of mankind's survival is condescendingly received or arrogantly ignored if it does not accord with the contemporary paradigms of science. This total, hidden scientific-cognitive actualism as regards how we see the world was established as the highest level for the evaluation of national cultures in history and in modern times. The formula of civilized countries —"STP + Nature + Man"—is accepted as an ideal model for the world of the planet. Thus, for most Asian, African, and South American cultures, the contemporary civilizations of the developed countries are becoming a kind of sole ideal, the paths along which all the nations of the globe should move. The measure of this evaluation is the measure of STP, that is, of modern established science. (shrink)

The relationship between construal and redundancy has not been previously explored empirically. Russian aspect allows speakers to construe situations as either Perfective or Imperfective, but it is not clear to what extent aspect is determined by context and therefore redundant. We investigate the relationship between redundancy and open construal by surveying 501 native Russian speakers who rated the acceptability of both Perfective and Imperfective verb forms in complete extensive authentic contexts. We find that aspect is largely redundant in (...) 81% of uses, and in 17% of contexts aspect is relatively open to construal. We contend that anchoring in redundant contexts likely facilitates the independence of construal in contexts with less redundancy. However further research is needed to discover what makes contexts redundant since known cues for aspect are absent in the majority of such contexts. Native speakers are fairly consistent in giving the original aspect high ratings, but less consistent in rating the non-original aspect, indicating potential problems in testing the reactions of speakers to non-authentic data. (shrink)

Despite the fact that there is now a general public agreement in Ukraine regarding the need to oppose the “russian world”, there are quite diverse and sometimes contradictory proposals among Ukrainian citizens regarding the ways to implement such an opposition. In state policy, the main line of implementing such countermeasures is gradually beginning to emerge, however, it is necessary to logically and organizationally substantiate the main stages of its implementation. The essence of opposition to the “russian world” lies (...) in the consistent implementation of decolonization in Ukraine, since it was russia that for centuries carried out the largest and for a long time quite successful project of colonization of Ukraine. The purpose of the article is to clarify the post-colonial situation for Ukraine, and, accordingly, the tasks of decolonization for it as a key direction of counteraction to the “russian world” in Ukraine. The degree of colonization of Ukraine is analyzed on the basis of a comparative analysis with other known histories of colonization in the world. Thanks to this, the degree of applicability of postcolonial studies and the theory of decolonization to modern Ukraine has been clarified. Ukraine repeats many classic features of a post-colonial country, but has every chance to make a significant new contribution to the theory of decolonization – thanks to its success in confronting the russian empire, which is now the russian federation, in its expansionist militarist foreign policy. Decolonization in Ukraine is carried out in three stages, during each of which the necessary institutional changes are successively implemented, each of which makes it impossible to return to the previous stage. Thus, the mirror opposition to russian colonization, the adoption of the best world experience of decolonization, and finally, the development of a self-sufficient Ukrainian world are three stages of successful decolonization in Ukraine, which can become a model for other former colonies. (shrink)

Liberalism in Russia is one of the most complex, multifaced and, indeed, controversial phenomena in the history of political thought. Values and practices traditionally associated with Western liberalism—such as individual freedom, property rights, or the rule of law—have often emerged ambiguously in the Russian historical experience through different dimensions and combinations. Economic and political liberalism have often appeared disjointed, and liberal projects have been shaped by local circumstances, evolved in response to secular challenges and developed within often rapidly-changing institutional (...) and international settings. This third volume of the Reset DOC “Russia Workshop” collects a selection of the Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism conference proceedings, providing a broad set of insights into the Russian liberal experience through a dialogue between past and present, and intellectual and empirical contextualization, involving historians, jurists, political scientists and theorists. The first part focuses on the Imperial period, analyzing the political philosophy and peculiarities of pre-revolutionary Russian liberalism, its relations with the rule of law, and its institutionalization within the Constitutional Democratic Party. The second part focuses on Soviet times, when liberal undercurrents emerged under the surface of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. After Stalin’s death, the “thaw intelligentsia” of Soviet dissidents and human rights defenders represented a new liberal dimension in late Soviet history, while the reforms of Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” became a substitute for liberalism in the final decade of the USSR. The third part focuses on the “time of troubles” under the Yeltsin presidency, and assesses the impact of liberal values and ethics, the bureaucratic difficulties in adapting to change, and the paradoxes of liberal reforms during the transition to post-Soviet Russia. Despite Russian liberals having begun to draw lessons from previous failures, their project was severely challenged by the rise of Vladimir Putin. Hence, the fourth part focuses on the 2000s, when the liberal alternative in Russian politics confronted the ascendance of Putin, surviving in parts of Russian culture and in the mindset of technocrats and “system liberals”. Today, however, the Russian liberal project faces the limits of reform cycles of public administration, suffers from a lack of federalist attitude in politics and is externally challenged from an illiberal world order. All this asks us to consider: what is the likelihood of a “reboot” of Russian liberalism? (shrink)

The article examines the question of the correlation of the phenomena “Russian philoso­phy” and “philosophy in Russia”. The author believes that these phenomena are not iden­tical to each other, and Russian philosophy, being an important fragment of intellectual subculture, was often created outside of Russia. This phenomenon became especially prominent in the twentieth century, when Russian dissidents who were exiled abroad, working in the West, continued to be the largest Russian philosophers. On the other hand, within (...) Russia itself (the Moscow Kingdom, the Russian Empire, the short “democratic republic”, the USSR, post-Soviet Russia), not only Russians in language and culture phi­losophized and continue to philosophize. The author notes that Russian literature and philosophical journalism played an exceptional role in domestic philosophizing. It was they who most often made philosophy, as knowledge objectively tending to universality, a nationally colored Russian philosophy. (shrink)

L’article étudie comment les idées de la France des Lumières et de la France révolutionnaire ont contribué au changement de la langue sociopolitique russe, comment elles ont interféré avec le processus littéraire du romantisme en Russie et ont finalement contribué au changement du paradigme intellectuel en Russie dans la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle. L’histoire des concepts de citoyen, de société, d’opposition politique est retracée de la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle – à travers des documents officiels (Instructions, par Catherine (...) II), des textes littéraires (A. Radichtchev) – jusqu’au premier tiers du XIXe siècle – à travers les écrits politiques des décembristes. En conclusion, il est soutenu que l’échec du républicanisme des décembristes inspiré par la France des Lumières a orienté, dans la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle, la pensée russe vers la problématique de la diversité humaine et de la nationalisation de l’Empire. Les principes universels du siècle des Lumières sont remplacés par l’intérêt porté à la diversité humaine de l’Empire russe, ce qui nécessitera, à son tour, l’élaboration d’un langage spécifique et de ses concepts. Cependant, ce tournant serait une conséquence du processus de réception des idées et des concepts de la France des Lumières et aurait été accéléré par la Révolution française. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the history of development of Russian entrepreneurship in the second half of the 19th century. Sergei Ivanovich Maltsov was a well-known Russian industrialist. In the territory of the Kaluga region in the second half of the 19th century, S. I. Maltsov created a large industrial zone. The factories of the Maltsov industrial region produced railways, steam engines, steamships, locomotives, wagons, agricultural machines. In the town Dyatkovo, Maltsov’s plant produced unique crystal goods. In 1871 (...) Maltsov built the first personal telegraph line in Russia. In two years a narrow-gauge railroad with a length of more than 300 km was constructed, which connected all the factories of the Maltsovsky industrial region. All the Maltsov’s products and machines were of excellent quality. At the Moscow Polytechnic Fair in 1872, S. I. Maltsov was awarded a gold medal and a certificate of the first degree for demonstrating the process of manufacturing a locomotive. In the 1870s, Maltsov carried out a large order from the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire. He produced 150 locomotives and about 3 thousands wagons. However, the new minister did not pay for the order. The government of the Russian Empire turned out to be an unreliable trading partner. Bureaucratic arbitrariness led to the collapse of Maltsov’s enterprise. In 1893 S. I. Maltsov died. Many of his machines and industrial products were unique and some of them were made for the first time in Russia. Therefore, we call S. I. Maltsov a pioneer of Russian industry. (shrink)

The article analyzes the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war in terms of a colonial seizure undertaken by a fading but aggressive Russian empire. This highly political adventure is translated into more abstract terms, that is, an irresolvable conflict between existence, which is always the experience of coexistence devoid of any essence whatsoever, and imperial expansion, which is an infinite conquest of space indifferent to all forms of life. The dualism in question is backed up by the writings of two (...) important scholars, namely, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy and the Russian scientist and revolutionary Peter Kropotkin. Nancy’s philosophy of being-in-common is the development of Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein, where the meaning of Mit- (co-, with) is existential and not categorical. Nancy’s philosophy challenges all forms of communal essence, of which empire is one blatant example. For Kropotkin, existence is even more all-embracing, implying a continuity of different life forms. His doctrine of mutual aid is a law that governs both society and nature, as well as evolution itself. Even morality springs from “solidarity” and the joys of social life, while sympathy or love are too narrow a basis for human ethics. Viewed from this perspective, a colonial war would not only be the greatest waste of human lives and natural resources—it would contradict the very order of things. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.2 (2001) 335-358 [Access article in PDF] Between East and West: Hegel and the Origins of the Russian Dilemma Ana Siljak Nikolai Berdiaev, the eminent twentieth-century Russian philosopher, wrote that the "problem of East and West" was an "eternal" one for Russia. 1 Attempting to make sense of the violent upheavals that shook Russia in 1917, Berdiaev believed that the source (...) of Russian troubles lay in the "inconsistency of the Russian spirit" due to the "conflict of the Eastern and Western elements in her." 2 Russia, he argued, always contained within its wide territory an invisible and shifting border between two continents, and thus Russian society was forever torn between two cultures. Berdiaev insisted that Russia could not discover its true calling or its place in the world until it resolved its internal conflict between East and West. 3Berdiaev was contemplating the course of the nineteenth century, when Russia's geographical destiny had deeply troubled Russian intellectuals. In the late 1830s Russian thinkers began their minute analyses of cultural and historical sources, hoping to determine the essential character of their nation and believing that their research would enable them to predict Russia's future. Often, diverse questions of progress and stagnation, tradition and innovation, and the individual and society were all framed within this overarching problem of East versus West.It is tempting to see this Russian dilemma as longstanding and natural, given Russia's position between two continents. Indeed, many recent scholars have argued that Russian encounters with Asia, taking place within the framework of Russia's territorial expansion eastward, forced Russians to examine their relationships [End Page 335] with the Eastern, Asian world. 4 It is true that European geographers and historians have debated the location of the border between Asia and Europe since the Middle Ages. But before the nineteenth century this ambiguity hardly troubled Russian minds. The Muscovite state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for example, was well acquainted with cultures and lands to its East, engaging in trade and diplomatic relations with Muslim Tatars and others. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that Muscovy was concerned about its position between Eastern and Western countries. 5 Even Peter the Great, whom historians have credited for bringing European customs into Russia, was little concerned with the European/Asian divide in Russian culture. For him the most important geographical question was Russia's place among the northern states, and he was particularly obsessed with Sweden as Russia's primary military rival. 6After Peter's reign, educated Russians, as they became increasingly acquainted with Western European culture, experienced their first pangs of envy and self-doubt in the face of perceived European superiority. Nonetheless, throughout the eighteenth century few cultured Russians had trouble embracing a diverse historical legacy and national character--German, Slavic, Asian. After all, Europeans themselves were proud of their barbarian past. Peter the Great's chief historian, V. N. Tatishchev, wrote with full confidence and little concern that the Russian empire was located "in both Europe and Asia," noting that though more Russian people lived in Europe, Russia had more territory in Asia. In passing he mentioned that "where the border between these two large and most important cultures is located, no one has as yet determined for certain." 7 According to him, the Slavic people as a whole could be divided into Asian and European branches, thus both cultures were of importance in Russian history. 8The first of the great nineteenth-century Russian historians, Nikolai Karamzin, was proud of Russia's diverse heritage. Russia, he wrote, [End Page 336] raising its head between the Asiatic and European kingdoms, represented within its civic life the characteristics of these two parts of the world: a mixture of old Eastern customs, brought by the Slavs into Europe and renewed, so to speak, by our long connection with the Mongols; Byzantine customs borrowed by the Russians along with the Christian religion, and some German customs imparted by the Varangians.... 9This cultural "mixture... (shrink)

In this article we apply one of the key concepts in cognitive linguistics, the radial category, to inflectional morphology. We advance the Paradigm Structure Hypothesis, arguing that inflectional paradigms are radial categories with internal structure primarily motivated by semantic relationships of markedness and prototypicality. It is possible to construct an expected structure for a verbal paradigm, facilitating an empirical test for our hypothesis. Data tracking an on-going morphological change in Russian documents the distribution of conservative vs. innovative forms across (...) the cells of the verbal paradigm. A logistic regression model that takes into account the sources of variation (the frequencies of individual verbs and paradigm slots, and individual verb preferences) shows that the language change is implemented differently across the paradigm forms, confirming the expected structure. In addition to markedness and prototypicality, we investigate the impact of frequency and show that there is a good, albeit not perfect match between the expected hierarchy and frequency. We conclude that the diachronic change analyzed in this article gives evidence for the structure of paradigms modeled on the radial category. (shrink)

The paper discusses the philosophical and historical doctrine of the Russian philosopher and historian George Petrovich Fedotov. The author focuses on the analysis of imperial issues in the works of G.P. Fedotov, especially of his views on the cultural history of the Russian empire and the essence of imperial project in Russia. Fedotov reconsiders the historical experience and revolutionary catastrophe of Russia and searches for the foundations of the social and cultural processes determining the events of (...) class='Hi'>Russian history. Fedotov’s works offer a variety of interpretations of the political and cultural phenomenon of empire. This reflects his evolution as a philosopher of history: the focus of his vision shifts from the Medieval Rus to the Empire of Peter the Great, then to the collapsed empire of Nicholas II and finally to the USSR. Fedotov’s concept of Empire evolves into a timeless cultural-philosophical phenomenon but originates from the historical description of the centralization of power in the feudal monarchy of Ivan the Terrible. The evolution of the philosophical and historical views of Fedotov is influenced by the changes of his attitude to the historical conception of Klyuchevsky. In the 1940s Fedotov considers the empire as a universal idea. The concept of empire proposed by Fedotov gives an understanding of the Russian historical development, especially the causes of the decline and fall of the Russian Empire. Fedotov associates the cause of the salvation of Russia with the study of ancient Russian culture, in which he founds a moral and political ideal of the “Republic of Saint Sophia.” The paper shows heuristic potential of Fedotov’s cultural and philosophical ideas on the vocation of spiritual elite and the creative role of personality in the process of nation-building. (shrink)

In this article, the author analyzes the concept of religious foundations of culture and power as a problem of Russian political consciousness. The paper reveals the patterns of interaction between the religious and political traditions of the Russian Empire in the early 20th century. The author provides Bargradsky project case as a unique example of such influence, identifying its mean in the later Russian Empire’s political history. Philosophical-political case that is analyzed in the article makes (...) it possible to trace the inner links between religious attitudes and political imagination of Russian monarchical circles and to identify the peculiarities of religious and political self-awareness of Russian power, its mechanisms for the selecting the ideas, symbols, images of the national political, religious and artistic culture in the last period of the Russian Empire. From our point of view, it would be most effective to combine the cultural-historical and the philosophical and historical approaches both in the reconstruction of Bargradsky project and in studies of Russian political culture. The article examines both the political conditions of activities and spiritual-cultural goals of Bargradsky Committee on Bargradsky project in Italian Bari as well as in Saint Petersburg in the 1910s. The author discusses the religious concept of Russian political culture, applying philosophical-historical method for the analyses Bargradsky Committee activity and its attempt to slow down the degradation of the Russian autocracy. The major emphasis is placed on the political and philosophical way of analysis as well as on the possibility of introducing the results of philosophical-historical research into current debates on the issue of alternatives to Russian history. (shrink)

The phenomenon of nationalism, which emerged as a result of modernization and industrialization in Western Europe, soon began to threaten the multi-lingual multinational feudal state structure of the Tsarist administration. Tsarist Russia, which wanted to preserve its borders and the existing state structure that expanded to the Caucasus and Turkestan, followed the assimilation and missionary policies towards the middle of the 19th century to Russify and Christianize non-Russian (Nerusky) and non-Christian (Inoverets) ethnic groups. At the beginning of this cultural (...) nationalist policy, which was carried out by Nikolai Ivanovich Ilminsky, who worked on theology and Turkish dialects in Kazan Spiritual Academy, in order to have Russian as a language of education and communication within the Tsarist borders. The education method of Ilminsky, supported by Tsar Alexander II, enabled the Russian language and Christianity to become widespread and more systematically applied as a reflection of the rising Russian nationalism. In line with this training method, it was aimed to carry out missionary activities, to teach Russian and Cyrillic alphabet alongside local languages, to divide these languages with accents and dialects and to make Russian a common language within Tsarist borders. Thus, the religious and ethnically different groups were wanted to be assimilated within the Russian and Orthodox Christian identities. This study examines the process of cultural assimilation policy carried out by the Russian nationalism through the education system of Ilminsky, the factors affecting this process, the structure and applications of this education system. Although the education system of Ilminsky did not reach its target within the boundaries of the empire, it was seen to be quite effective in Christianization of Tatar Turks, in spreading Russian among other ethnic groups and in terms of laying the ground for the subsequent Russification policies. The Ilminsky education system, which caused the start of a new phase in Russian nationalism, led to the emergence of nationalist ideas and intelligentsia among the ethnic groups exposed to this system The nationalist ideas spread among the ethnic groups exposed to the policy of Russification have enabled the establishment of new educational systems and the emergence of national liberation movements. (shrink)