Thus the texts attempt to answer the fundamental questions - of whether there are meanings, and, if there are, of what they are and of the form a serious ...

In this collection of original papers, leading international authorities turn their attention to one of the most important questions in theoretical philosophy: ...

The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that (...) there is given element in experience which is independent of thought and which is possessed of a distinctive nonpropositional and nonconceptual content. Further, I will argue that this given element is indeed fit to play a significant evidential role in the justification of our beliefs about the world. (shrink)

This volume comprises original articles by leading authors – from philosophy as well as sociology – in the debate around relativism in the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. Its aim has been to bring together several threads from the relevant disciplines and to cover the discussion from historical and systematic points of view. Among the contributors are Maria Baghramian, Barry Barnes, Martin Endreß, Hubert Knoblauch, Richard Schantz and Harvey Siegel.

Original papers by leading international authors address the most important problem in the philosophy of language, the question of how to assess the prospects of developing a tenable theory of meaning, given the influential sceptical attacks mounted against the concept of meaning by Willard Van Quine and Saul Kripke and their adherents in particular. Thus the texts attempt to answer the fundamental questions of whether there are meanings, and, if there are, of what they are and of the form a (...) serious philosophical theory of meaning should take.". (shrink)

The article defends a modern version of the correspondence theory of truth, one which explains the truth of a statement in terms of referential relations between its parts and aspects of the world. Davidson's views on truth are discussed in detail and, in particular, a critical eye is cast over his degradation of the concept of reference which, if successful, would preclude the possibility of developing a full-blooded correspondence theory.

The article explores the relationship between Tarski’s theory oftruth and modern deflationary or minimalist accounts of truth. The authornotes many similarites, but he also identifies an important difference betweenTarski’s theory and the various approaches of his modern followers: Tarskithought of his theory of truth as an elaboration of the classical correspondence notion. The heart of his theory is the definition of truth in terms ofsatisfaction. Truth is explicated in terms of a relation between language andaspects of external reality. It is (...) just this central component of his theorywhich is rejected by modern deflationism and minimalism. (shrink)

In the Paralogisms of Pure Reason Kant casts a critical glance at that doctrine of the soul which was called "rational psychology" by the classical metaphysics of his time, and which can best be understood as a systematic reconstruction of Descartes' theory of mind. Kant agrees with the proponents of rational psychology that our representation of a subject of experience is necessarily the representation of a simple, unitary and persisting subject. But Kant's decisive objection to his opponents is that from (...) these necessary truths about how a subject must represent itself no conclusions about the ontological constitution of the subject in itself can be derived. Despite the brilliance and profundity of his criticism, however, Kant himself remains, in a certain sense, trapped in the methodological solipsism of his predecessors. (shrink)

Die Studie arbeitet eine Spannung zwischen verifikationistischen und realistischen Elementen in der Philosophie des Pragmatismus heraus. Im Mittelpunkt der Debatte stehen C.S. Peirce und W. James. Die Arbeit hebt die wichtigen, epistemologischen Einsichten des Pragmatismus hervor, der in seiner Kritik am Fundamentalismus und Individualismus der cartesianischen Tradition ein neues Bild der menschlichen Erkenntnis entworfen hat, das uns dazu zwingt, unsere Auffassungen des Wissens im Lichte der modernen Wissenschaften zu überdenken. Die Studie sympathisiert zwar mit dem pragmatistischen Versuch, die Theorie der (...) Wahrheit und die Theorie der Erkenntnis in einen engeren Zusammenhang zu bringen. als dies im Rahmen der klassischen Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit geschehen ist. Aber das darüber hinausgehende Unterfangen, die Wahrheit selbst in einen epistemischen Begriff zu verwandeln, die Kriterien der Wahrheit mit der Definition der Wahrheit zu identifizieren, wird nachdrücklich zurückgewiesen. (shrink)

The article investigates and defends central elements of Quine’s naturalized epistemology. Davidson’s coherentist attacks on Quine’s empiricismare dismissed. The view is advocated that sensory experience plays an essential epistemic role, and that, therefore, the study of perception must be taken seriously in the theory of knowledge. The author rejects, however, Quine’s behavioristic conception of experience as stimulation of sensory receptors and instead argues for a richer conception, according to which an experience is a sensory state of things appearing in certain (...) ways to us. Finally, it is shown that this standpoint allows us to acknowledge a given element in experience without falling victim to a myth. (shrink)

Dieser Band ist eine Sammlung von Vortragen, die auf einer Tagung mit dem Titel "Aktuelle Probleme der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung" gehalten wurden, die im Sommer 2007 an der Universitat Siegen stattfand. Der Band verfolgt das Ziel, den Reichtum und die Lebendigkeit von wichtigen gegenwartigen Debatten in der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung zu dokumentieren. Die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung spielt in verschiedenen philosophischen Kerndisziplinen-in der Metaphysik, in der Erkenntnistheorie, in der Philosophie des Geistes-eine ganz wesentliche Rolle. Die in diesem Band versammelten Aufsatze beschaftigen (...) sich mit zentralen Aspekten grundlegender philosophischer Fragestellungen dieser Kerndisziplinen.". (shrink)

The author argues that coherence views of justification, in spite of their crucial insight into the interpenetration of our beliefs, neglect a key constraint on justification: they are unable to accommodate the epistemic significance of experience. Epistemic justification is not just a function of our beliefs and their interrelations. Both, beliefs and experiences, are relevant to the justification of an empirical belief. Experience is not itself a form of belief or disposition to believe; it cannot be analyzed in doxastic terms. (...) And, yet, nondoxastic experiences play a justificatory role, not merely a causal role. The positive epistemic status of a perceptual belief depends upon being appeared to in appropriate ways. It is important that, for an ordinary perceptual belief to be justified, one does not have to believe that one is appeared to in these ways. It is the experiences themselves, the ways of being appeared to, not our beliefs about them, that are required for justification. (shrink)