Vorwort.--Einleitung.--Francis Bacon.--John Locke.--George Berkeley.--David Hume.

The aim of this paper is to exhibit the core of Paul Natorp's criticisms of psychologism. We expose the arguments that lead Natorp to conclude that knowledge cannot have a subjective foundation but must have an objective grounding. We argue that, according to Natorp, the problem of psychologism is fundamentally methodological. Psychologism confuses the study of the laws of knowledge with the study of the legality of psychical life. Thus, the problem of the genesis is confused with the problem of (...) validity. (shrink)

Vorwort.--Einleitung.--Francis Bacon.--John Locke.--George Berkeley.--David Hume.

Since Quine has claimed that there is no absolute distinction between analytical and synthetical sentences the question whether logical laws might not be high order empirical laws about the ways humans actually think has become once more relevant. The affirmative answer was defended in the nineteenth century as the doctrine of psychologism. Frege and Husserl were vehemently opposed to this doctrine and many believe that they have destroyed it once and for all. This essay restates the doctrine of psychologism and (...) critically examines the counter arguments of Frege and Husserl. The conclusions reached are as follows: 1. Psychologism is a hard doctrine to state, because at its heart lies both a sceptical claim concerning the possibility of knowledge, in the strong sense of the word and a tendency towards idealism; 2. Frege defends the possibility of knowledge in the strong sense and ridicules the idealistic tendencies of psychologism but he cannot and does not refute the sceptical claims involved in any other than a polemical fashion; 3. Husserl tries to refute psychologism by attacking its roots: scepticism, but his sustained attempts are not successful; 4. Psychologism stands therefore unharmed by Frege and Husserl and is a viable, though perhaps unattractive philosophical option. The laws of logic might not be empirical claims about how humans think but they might be nevertheless empirical claims about how the world as a whole is cemented together. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Aufsatz prüft, unter welchen Bedingungen ein Psychologismus für motivierende Gründe der gegenwärtig wachsenden Kritik standhalten kann. Zwei zentrale antipsychologistische Argumente, das „Spezialfallargument“ und das „Idealfallargument“, werden rekonstruiert und zurückgewiesen. Sie werfen dem Psychologismus vor, unsere praktische Überlegung lediglich in Spezialfällen adäquat zu beschreiben und damit unvereinbar zu sein, dass Personen im Idealfall aus normativen Gründen handeln. Der Aufsatz zeigt auf, dass diese Argumente voraussetzen, dass der motivierende Grund identisch ist mit demjenigen, was aus der Sicht des (...) Handelnden als normativer Grund erscheint. Diese Voraussetzung wird zurückgewiesen, so dass ein Psychologismus zum Vorschein kommt, der von den antipsychologistischen Argumenten unberührt bleibt. Stattdessen wird eine Konzeption motivierender Gründe vertreten, welche die Handlungserklärung und die Rationalisierung von Handlungen als zentrale Funktion motivierender Gründe betrachtet. (shrink)

Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at first (...) appears to make the idea of the necessity of logical laws even less plausible, but eventually turns out to speak in favor of this view. (shrink)