Why propensities cannot be probabilities

In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge (2011)
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Paul Humphreys
University of Virginia

Citations of this work

Chance versus Randomness.Antony Eagle - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Carl Hempel.James Fetzer - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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