Si la réforme projetée du droit de la responsabilité civile dans son dernier état n’innove guère en maintenant l’opposition de principe entre les responsabilités civiles contractuelle et extracontractuelle, elle rompt toutefois avec le droit positif en consacrant non seulement une option de responsabilité pour la victime d’un dommage corporel mais aussi une action subsidiaire pour les tiers au contrat victimes de sa mauvaise exécution, ce qui conduit, dans les faits, à limiter considérablement l’intérêt de la distinction entre les deux ordres (...) de responsabilité. L’édiction de règles communes aux deux modèles de responsabilité semble corroborer plus encore l’affaiblissement du principe de la distinction qui est pourtant loin d’avoir dit son dernier mot, comme en atteste une analyse minutieuse des textes proposés par les réformateurs. (shrink)

Dans cette these publiee en 1989, Olivier Chedin propose une lecture originale de la troisieme Critique de Kant, qui retrace la genese transcendantale des facultes theoriques dans le jugement esthetique. Il s'agit avant tout d'eclaircir le rapport d'un pouvoir theorique de representation avec une faculte esthetique de juger: d'exhiber, dans l'exercice du jugement de gout, l'inauguration d'un pouvoir de connaitre. On comprendra alors comment le sentiment esthetique surgit d'une harmonie originaire des facultes. Mais la Critique du jugement, qui (...) opere d'abord une critique du sentiment, propose aussi une critique de la liberte pure: du beau, je suis en effet seul juge, sans loi ni imperatif, en face d'une promesse de bonheur qui fait, en moi-meme, acte de liberte. Sensible a l'apparition d'une presence ou s'inaugure l'exercice d'un pouvoir de representation, l'auteur applique enfin la these kantienne a l'elucidation des oeuvres d'art - tant celles de l'art classique que celles de l'art non-figuratif le plus contemporain -, suggerant que l'esthetique de Kant n'aurait peut-etre pas trouve en son temps l'art qu'elle meritait? (shrink)

Dans les nations industrialisées, les goûts des individus sont désormais employés à doper la consommation. L'industrialisation de la jouissance privilégie le superflu au nécessaire, la sensibilité à la raison, la séduction à la faculté de juger. Pourtant, avec l'exploitation du goût, le capitalisme est loin d'avoir découvert une terre inconnue. A l'âge classique, la noblesse de cour cultivait un style de vie commandé par les loisirs et le goût, tout en faisant du bon goût un critère de distinction et de (...) promotion individuelle. Ces relations de compétition entre courtisans ont-elles été les premières notes en prélude au libéralisme? Si l'improductivité, au sens économique, a pu constituer une valeur fondatrice du goût, comment l'industrie a-t-elle pu transformer le goût en moteur économique de la consommation? Le devenir esthétique du capitalisme repose sur la captation et la conversion de ce qu'il aurait de plus individuel en valeurs mesurables, échangeables et massifiables, susceptibles de coloniser les moindres recoins de l'existence et de al culture. L'ouvrage montre que les enjeux du capitalisme esthétique excèdent le territoire angélique des agréments : les batailles esthétiques sont au cœur d'une guerre économique pour le contrôle des émotions et des affections. (shrink)

A l'aune de la philosophie marginalisant le goût et la cuisine, Jean-Jacques Rousseau parait occuper une place à part et novatrice. Tout en condamnant l'hybris des facéties gastronomiques, il valorise le goût par son lien étroit avec les besoins, avec l'amour de soi, sens utile à juguler les faux désirs et déjouer l'amour-propre. Toutefois, dans l'Emile, ce sens tend à souffrir de la préséance de l'appétit, notion essentielle car utile en société à reconditionner la faim, réorganiser les besoins jusqu'aux moyens (...) de les satisfaire, afin de récréer, par le truchement de la dépense physique, la mesure du plaisir faisant défaut à l'homme civil. En outre, jusqu'à quel point ce schéma de subjectivation par l'appétit est-il compatible avec le dessein politique? (shrink)

Cette monumentale etude d'Olivier Brunet reste assurement la reference majeure concernant la philosophie esthetique de David Hume (1711-1776). Les questions et les problemes relatifs au "beau", au "jugement de gout" ne se presentent pas, dans l'oeuvre du penseur ecossais, de maniere detachee, isolee du reste de sa philosophie. C'est l'un des merites d'Olivier Brunet d'avoir montre que les reflexions de Hume sur l'esthetique sont inseparables de ses concepts essentiels. Ainsi, lorsque l'on recherche les racines conceptuelles de la (...) definition du "jugement de gout" chez Hume, on retrouve les memes jalons qui structurent son ethique. En morale comme en esthetique, les "passions" jouent un role central et sont liees - chacune a leur facon - a l'"utile"; celui-ci participe a la cause du "plaisir esthetique" qui est lui-meme etroitement lie a la fameuse "sympathie", sentiment desinteresse reglant le comportement moral tel que definit par Hume. La boucle est-elle bouclee? Loin de la, car l'esthetique humienne serait encore impossible a saisir, sans y considerer l'usage que le fondateur de l'empirisme moderne fait de ses concepts-phares : la croyance, le scepticisme, l'experience, l'habitude. Olivier Brunet, enfin, ne borne pas son etude a la philosophie esthetique de Hume. De tres belles pages sont consacrees a la relation personnelle que ce dernier entretenait avec l'art, ainsi qu'aux vertus sociales, psychologiques et morales que l'auteur du Traite de la nature humaine deduisait de la contemplation du Beau. (shrink)

Le sens commun distingue le corps de l’esprit. Il considère par exemple que les désirs et les souvenirs sont des phénomènes mentaux alors que les sons et les courants d’air sont des phénomènes physiques. Au sein de l’esprit, il distingue diverses facultés mentales : il considère par exemple que l’imagination est distincte de la volonté, qui est elle-même distincte de la perception. Au sein de la faculté perceptive, il distingue cinq sens : l’odorat, le goût, la vue, le toucher et (...) l’ouïe. Cette distinction entre différentes modalités perceptives s’avère tout à fait opératoire : nous n’avons le plus souvent aucun mal à répondre à la question « comment avez- vous perçu X : l’avez-vous vu, entendu, touché, ... ? ». En outre, cette distinction semble robuste : elle résiste par exemple à la co-occurrence d’expériences de modalités distinctes. Ainsi pouvons-nous voir et entendre un planeur à la fois. Enfin, nous semblons convaincus, en ce qui concerne les humains, du caractère exhaustif de cette distinction : il nous arrive certes de parler de l’intuition comme d’un sixième sens, ou de parler du sens de l’humour ou des affaires, mais ces expressions sont entendues en un sens figuré. (shrink)

Un essai sur l'avant-garde des années 1990 (un recueil des textes les plus significatifs d'Olivier Zahm – co-fondateur et directeur du magazine Purple, concepteur de plus d'une cinquantaine d'expositions dans le monde –, écrits sur les trente dernières années, qui offre une lecture radicale de l'art, des années 1990 à nos jours).

Si le concept husserlien de passivité a fasciné toute une génération de philosophes (Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe, Levinas, Henry), il a rarement fait l'objet d'une étude qui adopte la perspective du fondateur de la phénoménologie. Sa célébrité a comme masqué sa spécificité, créant une sorte de doctrine officielle de la passivité qui a, en fin de compte, peu de choses à voir avec la pensée et les intentions de Husserl. En effet, là où les phénoménologues contemporains voient dans la passivité la zone (...) d'ombre où le programme d'une phénoménologie transcendantale et subjective s'effondrerait, Husserl considère, de son côté, qu'elle appartient sans reste à la sphère de la constitution et qu'elle consolide par conséquent son transcendantalisme. Loin d'être un domaine de sens irréductible à la rationalité, elle représente même le fondement des opérations de la pensée catégoriale. C'est en son sein que doivent être cherchées les « sources » des formes supérieures de la logique. Toute passive et préconsciente qu'elle soit, l'expérience antéprédicative appartient sans reste pour Husserl au sujet transcendantal et ne le destitue donc pas de sa position centrale et primordiale. Ce travail s'attache ainsi à suivre cette genèse du catégorial à partir de l'expérience passive et à montrer qu'elle entre dans le projet général, qui a été toujours celui de Husserl, d'asseoir la phénoménologie transcendantale sur le socle originaire de l'expérience du monde. Remerciements Avant-propos Remarques Chapitre premier. Le sens phénoménologique de la passivité Chapitre II. La refondation méthodologique de la phénoménologie Chapitre premier. La formation du concept husserlien de « synthèse passive » Chapitre II. La constitution passive de l'expérience dans les Analysen zur passiven Synthesis Chapitre III. Le rôle de l'affection dans la formation de l'unité sensible Chapitre IV. La phénoménologie de l'inconscient Chapitre premier. Les présupposés fondamentaux de la généalogie de la logique Chapitre II. L'analyse généalogique du jugement prédicatif Chapitre III. L'origine de l'erreur dans la passivité Conclusion.Le conflit des fondements Bibliographie Index nominum. (shrink)

Of all the things we do and say, most will never be repeated or reproduced. Once in a while, however, an idea or a practice generates a chain of transmission that covers more distance through space and time than any individual person ever could. What makes such transmission chains possible? For two centuries, the dominant view was that humans owe their cultural prosperity to their powers of imitation. In this view, modern cultures exist because the people who carry them are (...) gifted at remembering, storing and reproducing information. How Traditions Live and Die proposes an alternative to this standard view. What makes traditions live is not a general-purpose imitation capacity. Cultural transmission is partial, selective, often unfaithful. Some traditions live on in spite of this, because they tap into widespread and basic cognitive preferences. These attractive traditions spread, not by being better retained or more accurately transferred, but because they are transmitted over and over. This theory is used to shed light on various puzzles of cultural change and to explain the special relation that links the human species to its cultures. Morin combines recent work in cognitive anthropology with new advances in quantitative cultural history, to map and predict the diffusion of traditions. This book is both an introduction and an accessible alternative to contemporary theories of cultural evolution. (shrink)

The main contention of this article is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to emergence. In this article, I devise an alternative perspective on ontological emergence called ‘flat emergence’, which is free of such a bias. The motivation is twofold: not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense (...) of some emergence ascriptions that traditional accounts are unable to accommodate. (shrink)

In positive theories, we have an axiom scheme of comprehension for positive formulas. We study here the “generalized positive” theory GPK∞+. Natural models of this theory are hyperuniverses. The author has shown in [2] that GPK∞+ interprets the Kelley Morse class theory. Here we prove that GPK∞+ + ACWF and the Kelley-Morse class theory with the axiom of global choice and the axiom “On is ramifiable” are mutually interpretable. This shows that GPK∞+ + ACWF is a “strong” theory since “On (...) is ramifiable” implies the existence of a proper class of inaccessible cardinals. (shrink)

The rise of blockchain as a techno-solution in the development sector underscores the critical imbalances of data power under ‘computational capitalism’. This article will consider the political economy of techno-solutionist and blockchain discourses in the developing world, using as its object of study blockchain projects in Pacific Island nations. Backed by US State Department soft power initiatives such as Tech Camp, these projects inculcate tech-driven notions of economic and political development, or ICT4D, while opening up new terrains for data accumulation (...) and platform control. Blockchain developers in search of proof of concept have found the development sector a fecund space for tech experimentation as they leverage a desire for tech-development and exploit regulatory weakness. The material implications of blockchain projects and discourse have been to create governance solutions which bypass the developing world state as a largely corrupting intermediary. In the Pacific, this has meant blockchain supply-chain management systems, proprietary financial innovation in humanitarian relief and an Asian Development Bank project to manage indigenous Fijian lands exclusively on the blockchain. In all these instances, discourses of solutionism, innovation and data empowerment have been deployed in aid of blockchain cartographies of control. (shrink)

t. 2. Le phénoménone et son ombre--aprés Husserl.

Sixteen years after Kim’s seminal paper offering a welcomed analysis of the emergence concept, I propose in this paper a needed extension of Kim’s work that does more justice to the actual diversity of emergentism. Rather than defining emergence as a monolithic third way between reductive physicalism and substance pluralism, and this through a conjunction of supervenience and irreducibility, I develop a comprehensive taxonomy of the possible varieties of emergence in which each taxon—theoretical, explanatory and causal emergence—is properly identified and (...) defined. This taxonomy has two advantages. First, it is unificatory in the sense that the taxa it contains derive from a common unity principle, which consequently constitutes the very hallmark of emergentism. Second, it can be shown that the emergence taxa it contains are able to meet the challenges that are commonly considered as being the hot topics on the emergentists’ agenda, namely the positivity, the consistency and the triviality/liberality challenges. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that it is not a conceptual truth about laws of nature that they are immutable (though we are happy to leave it as an open empirical question whether they do actually change once in a while). In order to do so, we survey three popular accounts of lawhood—(Armstrong-style) necessitarianism, (Bird-style) dispositionalism and (Lewis-style) ‘best system analysis’—and expose the extent, as well as the philosophical cost, of the amendments that should be enforced in order to leave (...) room for the possibility of changing laws. (shrink)

Generic stereotypes are generically formulated generalizations that express a stereotype, like “Mexican immigrants are rapists” and “Muslims are terrorists.” Stereotypes like these are offensive and should not be asserted by anyone. Yet when someone does assert a sentence like this in a conversation, it is surprisingly difficult to successfully rebut it. The meaning of generic sentences is such that they can be true in several different ways. As a result, a speaker who is challenged after asserting a generic stereotype can (...) often simply dismiss the objection and maintain that the stereotype is true in a way that is compatible with the challenger’s objection. In this paper, a semantic theory for generics is presented that accounts for this type of defensive shifting in upholding generic stereotypes. This theory is then used to develop two strategies to object more efficiently. The first strategy is to immediately deny that either of the two possible ways in which a generic can be true obtains. The second strategy is to deny the satisfaction of an additional condition that is necessary for a generic sentence to be true. (shrink)

An interesting positive theory is the GPK theory. The models of this theory include all hyperuniverses (see [5] for a definition of these ones). Here we add a form of the axiom of infinity and a new scheme to obtain GPK∞+. We show that in these conditions, we can interprete the Kelley‐Morse theory (KM) in GPK∞+ (Theorem 3.7). This needs a preliminary property which give an interpretation of the Zermelo‐Fraenkel set theory (ZF) in GPK∞+. We also see what happens in (...) the original GPK theory. Before doing this, we first need to study the basic properties of the theory. This is done in the first two sections. (shrink)

Some generic generalizations have both a descriptive and a normative reading. The generic sentence “Philosophers care about the truth”, for instance, can be read as describing what philosophers in fact care about, but can also be read as prescribing philosophers to care about the truth. On Leslie’s account, this generic sentence has two readings due to the polysemy of the kind term “philosopher”. In this paper, I first argue against this polysemy account of descriptive/normative generics. In response, a contextualist semantic (...) theory for generic sentences is introduced. Based on this theory, I argue that descriptive/normative generics are contextually underspecified. (shrink)

We present a theoretical framework bearing on the evolution of written communication. We analyze writing as a special kind of graphic code. Like languages, graphic codes consist of stable, conventional mappings between symbols and meanings, but (unlike spoken or signed languages) their symbols consist of enduring images. This gives them the unique capacity to transmit information in one go across time and space. Yet this capacity usually remains quite unexploited, because most graphic codes are insufficiently informative. They may only be (...) used for mnemonic purposes or as props for oral communication in real-time encounters. Writing systems, unlike other graphic codes, work by encoding a natural language. This allows them to support asynchronous communication in a more powerful and versatile way than any other graphic code. Yet, writing systems will not automatically unlock the capacity to communicate asynchronously. We argue that this capacity is a rarity in non-literate societies, and not so frequent even in literate ones. Asynchronous communication is intrinsically inefficient because asynchrony constrains the amount of information that the interlocutors share and limits possibilities for repair. This would explain why synchronous, face-to-face communication always fosters the development of sophisticated codes (natural languages), but similar codes for asynchronous communication evolve with more difficulties. It also implies that writing cannot have evolved, at first, for supporting asynchronous communication. (shrink)

In this paper, I put forward a benchmark account of emergence in terms of non-explainability and explicate the relationship that exists between its synchronic and diachronic declinations. I develop an argument whose conclusion is that emergence is essentially a “two-faceted” notion, i.e. it always encapsulates both synchronic and diachronic dimensions. I then compare this account with alternative recent accounts of emergence that define the concept through the notion of unpredictability or topological non-equivalence.

Against a backdrop of transformations in the employment market, career changes are on the rise. This paper explores the subject’s experience of this transition, seen as an « in-between » situation. It highlights the need for support during this transition. The professional position adopted by support workers who use the biographical narrative is presented here as that of a craftsman, working alongside the person receiving support to construct the meaning of their life story.

This discussion paper responds to two recent articles in Biology and Philosophy that raise similar objections to cultural attraction theory, a research trend in cultural evolution putting special emphasis on the fact that human minds create and transform their culture. Both papers are sympathetic to this idea, yet both also regret a lack of consilience with Boyd, Richerson and Henrich’s models of cultural evolution. I explain why cultural attraction theorists propose a different view on three points of concern for our (...) critics. I start by detailing the claim that cultural transmission relies not chiefly on imitation or teaching, but on cognitive mechanisms like argumentation, ostensive communication, or selective trust, whose evolved or habitual function may not be the faithful reproduction of ideas or behaviours. Second, I explain why the distinction between context biases and content biases might not always be the best way to capture the interactions between culture and cognition. Lastly, I show that cultural attraction models cannot be reduced to a model of guided variation, which posits a clear separation between individual and social learning processes. With cultural attraction, the same cognitive mechanisms underlie both innovation and the preservation of traditions. (shrink)

Emergentism is often misleadingly described as a monolithic “third way” between radical monism and pluralism. In the particular case of biology, for example, emergentism is perceived as a middle course between mechanicism and vitalism. In the present paper I propose to show that the conceptual landscape between monism and pluralism is more complex than this classical picture suggests. On the basis of two successive analyses—distinguishing three forms of tension between monism and pluralism and a distinction between derivational and functional reduction—I (...) define three different versions of emergentism that can be considered as consistent middle courses between monism and pluralism . I then emphasise the advantage of this taxonomy of the concepts of emergence by applying the results of my analysis to the historical controversy that pertains to the relationship between life and matter. (shrink)

Several philosophers have recently tried to define natural kinds in epistemic terms only. Given the persistent problems with finding a successful metaphysical theory, these philosophers argue that we would do better to describe natural kinds solely in terms of their epistemic usefulness, such as their role in supporting inductive inferences. In this paper, I argue against these epistemology-only theories of natural kinds and in favor of, at least partly, metaphysical theories. I do so in three steps. In the first section (...) of the paper, I propose two desiderata for a theory of natural kinds. In the second section, I discuss one example of a ‘general’ epistemology-only theory, proposed by Marc Ereshefsky and Thomas Reydon, and argue that theories like theirs fail to provide adequate criteria of natural kinds. In the third section, I focus on one example of a ‘specific’ epistemology-only theory, proposed by P. D. Magnus, and use it to show why such theories cannot justify the claim that the proposed epistemic criteria account for the naturalness of kinds. (shrink)

The amount of information conveyed by linguistic conventions depends on their precision, yet the codes that humans and other animals use to communicate are quite ambiguous: they may map several vague meanings to the same symbol. How does semantic precision evolve, and what are the constraints that limit it? We address this question using a multiplayer gaming app, where individuals communicate with one another in a scaled-up referential game. Here, the goal is for a sender to use black and white (...) symbols to communicate colors. We expected that the players’ mappings between symbols and colors would grow more specific over time, through a selection process whereby precise mappings are preferentially copied. We found that players become increasingly more precise in their use of symbols over the course of their interactions. This trend did not, however, result from selective copying of precise mappings. We explore the implications of this result for the study of lexical ambiguity, Zipf's Law of Meaning, and disagreements over semantic conventions. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2022.

Dans cet article, je me propose de réfléchir, à partir de certains travaux de Thomas Nagel, sur la nature de la réflexion métaphysique. Nous qualifions certains problèmes de métaphysiques et leur attribuons par là une certaine unité. Il est cependant difficile de caractériser cette unité, et l’ensemble de ces problèmes peut apparaître comme une simple rhapsodie : quel rapport existe-t-il entre des questions comme « sommes-nous libres? », « quelle est la place de l’esprit dans la nature? » ou « (...) pouvons-nous connaître la réalité extérieure? ». J’avance une hypothèse à propos de l’origine, de la nature et de l’unité de ces problèmes, ainsi que de la fonction de leur examen à l’intérieur de la métaphysique, du moins à propos de certains d’entre eux, ceux qui portent sur ce qui est et non sur ce en quoi consiste le fait d’être. J’essaie également de dégager de cette hypothèse une compréhension plus précise de la nature d’une part centrale de l’enquête métaphysique. (shrink)

Cultural forms are constrained by cognitive biases, and writing is thought to have evolved to fit basic visual preferences, but little is known about the history and mechanisms of that evolution. Cognitive constraints have been documented for the topology of script features, but not for their orientation. Orientation anisotropy in human vision, as revealed by the oblique effect, suggests that cardinal orientations, being easier to process, should be overrepresented in letters. As this study of 116 scripts shows, the orientation of (...) strokes inside written characters massively favors cardinal directions, and it is organized in such a way as to make letter recognition easier: Cardinal and oblique strokes tend not to mix, and mirror symmetry is anisotropic, favoring vertical over horizontal symmetry. Phylogenetic analyses and recently invented scripts show that cultural evolution over the last three millennia cannot be the sole cause of these effects. (shrink)

Three experimental studies are reported in which we tested the prediction that negative emotion elicits the social sharing of the emotional experience. In two experiments, participants arrived at the laboratory with a friend and then viewed one of three film excerpts (nonemotional, moderate emotion, or intense emotion) alone. Afterwards, the participants who saw the film had an opportunity to interact with the friend and their conversation was recorded. In both experiments participants who had seen the intense emotion excerpt engaged in (...) significantly more social sharing than did participants in the other two conditions. A third experiment extended the investigation to social sharing in everyday life and replicated the previous results. Nonemotional explanations of the effects observed were also ruled out. Results are discussed in the context of the relation between emotional intensity and amount of social sharing. (shrink)

This study examines to what extent different types of CEOs in family firms influence external and internal stakeholder-related CSP as compared to CEOs in nonfamily firms. Linking family CEO and nonfamily CEO with CSR outcomes, we provide evidence that family CEOs are positively associated with both external and internal CSR, whereas nonfamily CEOs within family firms tend to be negatively associated with both external and internal CSR. We show that the incumbent CEO’s age moderates the above relationships, indicating the existence (...) of shifting family priorities and suggesting a tendency toward CSR conformity as the salience of succession concerns increases. (shrink)

M. Forti and F. Honsell showed in [4] that the hyperuniverses defined in [2] satisfy the anti-foundation axiom X1 introduced in [3]. So it is interesting to study the axiom AFA, which is equivalent to X1 in ZF, introduced by P. Aczel in [1]. We show in this paper that AFA is inconsistent with the theory GPK. This theory, which is first order, is defined by E. Weydert in [6] and later by M. Forti and R. Hinnion in [2]. It (...) includes all general hyperuniverses as defined in [5]. In order to achieve our aim, we need to define ordinals in GPK and to study some of their properties. (shrink)

Cognitive gadgets puts forward an ambitious claim: language, mindreading, and imitation evolved by cultural group selection. Defending this claim requires more than Heyes' spirited and effective critique of nativist claims. The latest human “cognitive gadgets,” such as literacy, did not spread through cultural group selection. Why should social cognition be different? The book leaves this question pending. It also makes strong assumptions regarding cultural evolution: it is moved by selection rather than transformation; it relies on high‐fidelity imitation; it requires specific (...) cognitive adaptations to cultural learning. Each of these assumptions raises crucial yet unaddressed difficulties. (shrink)

Depuis 70 ans, les avocats peuvent créer des structures d’exercice pour exercer en commun la profession d’avocats. Depuis 1990, la grande innovation réside dans la possibilité pour les avocats de structurer leur activité au moyen de sociétés commerciales particulières, les sociétés d’exercice libéral (SEL), dont l’objectif est la préservation de l’indépendance et de la déontologie des professionnels qui exercent en son sein. En 2015, les avocats sont autorisés à avoir recours aux sociétés commerciales de droit commun (SA, SAS, SARL), sauf (...) celles qui confèrent à leur associé la qualité de commerçant (SNC et SCA). Ce dispositif vient d’être réformé par la très récente ordonnance no 2023-77 du 8 février 2023 qui soulève la difficile distinction entre les SEL et les sociétés de droit commun. L’étude de cette distinction met en lumière la caractéristique de ces sociétés, l’exercice en commun d’une profession libérale réglementée, dont le régime juridique est posé par des règles professionnelles d’ordre public. (shrink)

Scientists often communicate using generic generalizations, which are unquantified generalizations such as ‘Americans overestimate social class mobility’ or ‘sound waves carry gravitational mass’. In this paper, I explain the role of such generic generalizations in science, based on a novel theory about their characteristic meaning. According to this theory, a scientific generalization of the form ‘Ks are F’ says that F is one property based on which category K qualifies as a scientific kind. Because what it takes to qualify as (...) a scientific kind varies depending on the discipline, what a generic sentence entails also varies. Based on this semantic theory, I discuss the benefits and drawbacks of using generic language in science. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe presence of emotional words and content in stories has been shown to enhance a story’s memorability, and its cultural success. Yet, recent cultural trends run in the opposite direction. Using the Google Books corpus, coupled with two metadata-rich corpora of Anglophone fiction books, we show a decrease in emotionality in English-speaking literature starting plausibly in the nineteenth century. We show that this decrease cannot be explained by changes unrelated to emotionality, and that, in our three corpora, the decrease is (...) driven almost entirely by a decline in the proportion of positive emotion-related words, while the frequency of negative emotion-related words shows little if any decline. Consistently with previous studies, we also find a link between ageing and negative emotionality at the individual level. (shrink)

The current metaphysical race debate is very much focused on the realism question whether races exist. In this paper I argue against the importance of this question. Philosophers, biologists and anthropologists expect that answering this question will tell them something substantive about the metaphysics of racial classifications, and will help them to decide whether it is justified to use racial categories in scientific research and public policy. I argue that there are two reasons why these expectations are not fulfilled. First (...) of all, the realism question about race leads to a very broad philosophical debate about the semantics of general terms and the criteria for real kinds, rather than to a debate about the metaphysics of racial categories specifically. Secondly, there is a type of race realism that is so toothless that it is almost completely uninformative about the metaphysics of race. In response to these worries, I argue that the metaphysical race debate should rather be focused on the question in what way and to what extent ‘racial’ distinctions can ground the epistemic practices of various scientific disciplines. I spell out what I mean by this and go on to demonstrate that trying to answer this question leads to a more fruitful metaphysical debate. (shrink)