Index to the Digha-nikaya. Compiled by M. Yamazaki, Y. Ousaka, K. R. Norman and M. Cone. Pali Text Society, Oxford 1997. vii, 357 pp. £19.75. ISBN 0 86013 355 9.

The Digha Nikaya and its Commentaries. Dhammagiri-Pali-Ganthamala, Volumes 1-11. Vipassana Research Institute, Igatpuri 1993-95.

The Nikāyas contain several apophatic descriptions of a state of cessation that occurs during the life of an individual. Furthermore, some texts suggest that this cessation paradoxically coincides with liberating insight. This article attempts to draw out philosophical implications of these passages and to reconstruct the ideas serving as their basis. To make better sense of these ideas, the article compares early Buddhist views with certain developments in modern philosophy of mind. It argues that cessation of khandha-s and saḷāyatana-s may (...) be viewed as suspension of various aspects of globally available phenomenal consciousness. It hypothesizes that this suspension is necessary due to the latter's processed character, which precludes direct cognition of reality. It attempts to account for a cognitive nature of cessation by suggesting the possibility of the mind (citta) working independently of phenomenal consciousness. It also considers the issue of cognitive content of cessation and of its expressibility. (shrink)

What does it mean to ‘know’ in the Nik?yas such that simply ‘knowing’ certain things ‘as they really are’ has the power to liberate one from sa?s?ra? In an effort to characterize such ‘knowing’ while minimizing the pr ojection of modern-western pr esupp ositions, the pr esent paper expl ores parallels between concepts of transformational and liberating knowledge in the Nik?yas and the early Upani?ads in an effort to identify epistemological pr esupp ositions curr ent in ancient India. The characterization (...) is contrasted with modern-western common sense notions of factual knowledge in order to highlight features that we may tend to miss or to overl ook. It is arg ued that for the authors of both sets of literature, ordinary opinion is deluded while genuine knowledge holds directly effective power, and that transformative knowledge is a reflexive mode of comportment towards the known, concerned as much with relations as with the entities related. This understanding help s to acc ount for the transformative power of ‘knowledge’ and may have impl ications for the ways we interpr et central doctrines. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to situate the early Indian (Nikāya) Buddhist notion of karmic causation within the mental causation discourse in the Western analytic tradition, which concerns causal transactions involving mental events, such as desires, beliefs, and intentions, whether the transactions are between mental events, or between mental events and physical events. Karmic causation involves actional causes, in concert with non-actional causes, and their experiential effects on the actor, in concert with non-experiential effects. The problems generated by karmic (...) causation in Buddhism overlap with those generated by mental causation in the Western analytic tradition. They include how the mental aspects relate to the physical aspects of the self, sense perception, and action, as well as how the mental and physical aspects of an actional cause relate to the experiential and non-experiential aspects of an effect on the actor. -/- To make sense of mental causation, it is crucial to understand a cluster of associated concepts such as causation, the self, sense perception, and action. Similarly, to make sense of karmic causation, it is crucial to understand a cluster of associated concepts such as dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda), the fivefold laws of nature (pañca-niyāma), the five aggregates (pañca-khandha), the six sense bases (Saḷayatana), action (karma), and results (vipāka). I shall discuss these concepts under the headings of causation, the self, sense perception, and action before I move on to address karmic causation in the context of the mental causation debate. (shrink)

The "Khandha Passages" in the Vinayapitaka and the four main Nikayas. Tilmann Vetter. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vienna 2000. 357 pp. ASch. 774. ISBN 3-7001-2932-7.

In this paper, I discuss some philosophical problems connected with the notion of regarding the aggregates (_khandha_) as self in the Nikāyas. In particular, I focus on the attitude represented by the formula “I am this” (_esohamasmi_) which may be labeled as that of identifying with the aggregates. In the first part of the paper, I point out and analyze certain similes contained in the Nikāyas which may be read as implying the existence of a distinction between the aggregates and (...) the individual who regards them as self. Then, I consider a hypothesis that the aggregates are not objective constituents of a human being but subjectively experienced representational phenomena. I argue that several Nikāya texts imply the existence of important aspects of a human being, in particular cognitive ones, which are not conceptualized in the terms of the five aggregates. I also discuss the possibility of interpreting _khandha_s as not active in character but as resultant of other cognitive processes. In the last part of the paper I offer a hypothesis that one of the key aspects of regarding the aggregates as self lies in the identification of a human individual with one’s own phenomenal self-representation which results in a mistaken projection of the notions of agency, identity and subjectivity onto something that is inherently devoid of it. I also consider certain parallels between the ideas present in the Nikāyas and the concepts of the modern philosophy of mind. (shrink)

According to Buddhist soteriology, fear is a direct cause of suffering and one of the main obstacles in the path to liberation. Pāli Suttas and Abhidhamma present a number of sophisticated strategies to deal with fear and to overcome it. Nevertheless, in the Nikāyas and in the Abhidhamma there are also consistent instructions about implementing fear in meditative practices and considering it as a valuable ally in the pursuit of nibbāna By means of a lexicographical study of selected passages and (...) especially of two compounds (bhayūparata and abhayūparata), this paper demonstrates that fear may have the crucial function of stimulating the meditator: through reiterated admonishments and reflections that evoke a feeling of dread, the meditator gets weary of unwholesome patterns and is prompted to put effort in his/her own practice. Evidence proves that this set of instructions is ultimately consistent with the several teachings that emphasize the importance of counteracting fear and fostering fearlessness, which is described as a quality of liberation as well as an attitude to be cultivated. In fact, a close analysis of the dynamics involved in bhaya (fear) and abhaya (fearlessness) as graphically depicted in the Nikāyas and in the Abhidhamma texts, reveals that stirring fear and letting go of fear are two essential steps of the same process. (shrink)

The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha - A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya. Translated by Bhikkhu Ñanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi. Wisdom Publication, Boston, Mass., 1995. 1412 pp.. US$75.00. ISBN 0-86171-072-X.

An Analytical Study of Four Nikayas. Dipak Kumar Barua. Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta 1971. xviii + 626 pp.

The meaning of its title, ‘Section with Verses’, may appear sufficient to explain why the Sagatha-vagga was identified as a discrete entity within the Samyuttanikaya. However, this article looks beyond that simple explanation, to discover whether some other rationale may underlie this grouping of samyuttas. It examines evidence that the compiling of the Sagatha-vagga was probably based on a familiar, although doctrinally marginal, piece of Buddhist teaching, namely the ‘eight Assemblies’.

Abstract: This article shows how in the Pāli Nikāyas, after having defined Eternalism and Nihilism as two opposed positions, Gotama makes a dialectical use of Eternalism as means to eliminate Nihilism, upheld to be the worst point of view because of its denial of kammic maturation in terms of puñña and pāpa. Assuming, from an Eternalist perspective, that actions have effects also beyond the present life, Gotama underlines the necessity of betting on the validity of moral kammic retribution. Having thus (...) demonstrated the central ethical error of Nihilism, he subtly introduces peculiar Buddhist moral concepts (kusala/akusala) to purify the Eternalist vision from the doctrine of a real existing self (attāvāda) and from the puñña/pāpa dichotomy. We can summarize this dialectical course as follows: Nihilism is pāpa/akusala because it denies kamman, Eternalism is puñña/not-akusala because it upholds kamman from a non-Buddhist perspective, Buddhism is kusala because it admits the law of kamman not centred on a theory of a real existing self (anattāvāda). (shrink)

General opinion holds that the Abhidhamma treats the Buddha’s teachings in terms of ultimate realities, i.e. dhammas, and that conventional constructs such as persons fall outside the primary concern of the Abhidhamma. The present paper re-examines this ultimate-conventional dichotomy drawn between dhammas and persons and argues that this dichotomy does not hold true for the canonical Abhidhamma in Pali. This study explores how various types of persons are interpreted and approached by the Abhidhamma material, including Abhidhamma texts such as the (...) Puggalapaññatti and a number of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that are identified in this paper as proto- Abhidhamma. (shrink)

The Long Discourses of the Buddha. Fr P. Anatriello. Anchor Publications, Bognor Regis 1986. viii, 128pp. £6.95.

Als wahrscheinlich älteste vollständige Überlieferung des Buddhismus reflektiert der Pali-Kanon in literarisch-narrativer Form die Auseinandersetzung mit religiös,Anderen' aus emischer Perspektive. Die Suttas berichten nicht nur, wie der Buddha Mitglieder seines Ordens belehrt, sondern auch, wie er Vertretern anderer religiöser Gruppierungen begegnet und mit ihnen diskutiert haben soll. Caroline Widmer untersucht, inwiefern in diesen Begegnungen religiöse Abgrenzung im Sinne eines Otherings literarisch dargestellt wird, und behandelt diese religionswissenschaftliche Fragestellung im Bereich des Buddhismus erstmals durch eine literaturwissenschaftlich angelegte Analyse der narrativen Gestaltung (...) der Pali-Suttas. Die Texte spiegeln jedoch nicht wie oftmals angenommen in erster Linie Toleranz oder Offenheit gegenüber anderen religiösen Ansichten wider; vielmehr sind durch einen hohen Grad an Selbstdarstellung und einem exklusiven Anspruch auf Wahrheitsbesitz geprägt. Erzählerisch wird diese Spannung so aufgelöst, dass der,Andere' das,Eigene' annimmt und dadurch seine,Andersheit' verliert. Die Untersuchung eröffnet einen neuen Zugang zu religionsgeschichtlichen Quellen, erlaubt detaillierte Einblicke in diesen systemspezifischen Prozess des Selfings und erläutert seine Funktion innerhalb der buddhistischen Überlieferung. (shrink)

To explain the khandhas as the Buddhist analysis of man, as has been the tendency of contemporary scholars, may not be incorrect as far as it goes, yet it is to fix upon one facet of the treatment of the khandhas at the expense of others. Thus A. B. Keith could write, “By a division which ... has certainly no merit, logical or psychological, the individual is divided into five aggregates or groups.” However, the five khandhas, as treated in the (...) nikāyas and early abhidhamma, do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level rūpa, vedanā, sañña, and are presented as five aspects of an individual being's experience of the world; each khandha is seen as representing a complex class of phenomena that is continuously arising and falling away in response to processes of consciousness based on the six spheres of sense. They thus become the five upādānakkhandhas, encompassing both grasping and all that is grasped. As the upādānakkhandhas these five classes of states acquire a momentum, and continue to manifest and come together at the level of individual being from one existence to the next. For any given individual there are, then, only these five upādānakkhandhas — they define the limits of his world, they are his world. This subjective orientation of the khandhas seems to arise out of the simple fact that, for the nikāyas, this is how the world is experienced; that is to say, it is not seen primarily as having metaphysical significance.Accounts of experience and the phenomena of existence are complex in the early Buddhist texts; the subject is one that is tackled from different angles and perspectives. The treatment of rūpa, vedanā, saññā, and represents one perspective, the treatment of the six spheres of sense is another. As we have seen, in the nikāya formulae the two merge, complementing each other in the task of exposing the complex network of conditions that is, for the nikāyas, existence. In the early abhidhamma texts khandha, āyatana and dhātu equally become complementary methods of analysing, in detail, the nature of conditioned existence.The approach adopted above has been to consider the treatment of the five khandhas in the nikāyas and early abhidhamma texts as a more or less coherent whole. This has incidentally revealed something of the underlying structure and dynamic of early Buddhist teaching — an aspect of the texts that has not, it seems, either been clearly appreciated or properly understood, and one that warrants further consideration. (shrink)

Index to the Majjhima-nikaya, by M. Yamazaki & Y. Ousaka, pp. xi + 473, £35.50. ISBN 0 86013 421 0.

Routinization is a term invented by Max Weber to describe events after the death of a charismatic religious leader. It has become widely used in the humanities in a variety of contexts. The death of the historical Buddha produced the first known instance of extreme routinization, in which the charisma of the founder is transmuted into a system of teachings that are themselves invested with authority, quite separate from the charisma of any individual within that tradition. This article examines the (...) Sāmagāmasutta and the Gopaka-Mogallānasutta, two texts from the Majjhima Nikāya. These texts, when read together, show us just how the Buddha prepared the way for the extreme routinization that would take place in the community, and how the early Buddhist monks reacted to this. In the Sāmagāmasutta, the Buddha prepares for the power vacuum after his own death by setting up procedures by which the monks will be able to govern themselves without relying on a single charismatic leader. The Gopaka-Mogallānasutta describes events after the Buddha’s death and indicates that the Buddha’s instructions had been followed faithfully. Taken together, these two obscure texts frame the far more famous Mahāparinibbānasutta and provide it with valuable context. This discussion is followed by a consideration of how Buddhism ended up reverting to more conventional patterns of routinization as it expanded. (shrink)

이 글은 초기불교의 무아설(無我說)에 근거하여 갈등 문제의 대처를 위한 소통 담론을 모색하는 데 목적을 둔다. 초기불교의 니까야(Nikāya) 문헌에는 다양한 유형의 무아설이 나타난다. 필자는 그들 중 ‘동일시의 부정(disidentification)’을 내용으로 하는 무아 유형 들이야말로 협력적 삶을 위한 소통의 지침이 될 수 있다고 본다. ‘동일시의 부정’ 방식으로 제시되는 무아란 스스로의 주장과 견해에 대한 반성적 태도를 본질로 한다. 이것은 자신의 경험을 구성하는 물질현상(色, rūpa)이나 느낌(受, vedanā) 따위에 대해 ‘나의 것 (mama)’이 아니며 ‘나의 자아(me attā)’가 아니라고 부정하는 방식으로 이루어진다. 이와 같은 부정은 스스로의 정체성을 이루는 (...) 요인들에 대한 거부로서, 자신의 신념이나 사고에 매몰되는 것을 막아줄 수 있다. 필자는 이와 같은 반성적 태도가 결여된 상태에서는 스스 로의 느낌이나 생각에 대한 과도한 확신과 함께 타인과의 소통 부재 상황이 초래될 수 있 다고 본다. 동일시 부정의 무아는 ‘나’ 혹은 자아에 대한 존재론적 부정으로 볼 수 없으며, 다만 자신을 구성하는 요인들과의 ‘거리두기’로 바꾸어 말할 수 있다. 이러한 ‘거리두기’는 자신에 대해 거리를 두는 정도만큼 타자를 위한 여유 공간의 확보를 가능하게 해줄 수 있 다. 이 점에서 무아란 ‘나’ 혹은 자아에 대한 전면적인 거부가 아니며 타자에 대한 맹목적 인 수용도 아니어야 한다. 무아의 실천에는 자신과 타자 모두에게 얽매이지 않는 유연성과 균형감이 요구된다고 할 수 있다. 이 글은 무아의 실천적 측면을 규명하기 위해 원효의 화 쟁(和諍) 사상과 현대의 체험주의(Experientialism) 담론을 활용한다. 자신의 신념이나 확 신조차도 다른 사람에 의한 검토와 비판에 개방되어야 한다는 화쟁 해석은 무아의 실천적 측면을 이해하는 데 참고가 될 수 있다. 한편 체험주의 담론은 절대주의적 사고방식의 폐해를 지적하는 동시에 몸으로 경험되는 ‘나쁜 것’에 대한 체험적 인식으로부터 공감과 소통 의 실마리를 찾아나갈 것을 제안한다. 체험주의의 시선은 무아설 및 사성제(四聖諦)가 사변 의 산물이 아니며 생생한 삶의 현실에 대처하기 위한 것임을 드러내는 데 유용하다. (shrink)

Drawn from the Anguttara Nikaya, Numerical Discourses of the Buddha brings together teachings of the Buddha ranging from basic ethical observances recommended to the busy man or woman of the world, to the more rigorous instructions on mental training prescribed for the monks and nuns. The Anguttara Nikaya is a part of the Pali Canon, the authorized recension of the Buddha's Word for followers of Theravada Buddhism, the form of Buddhism prevailing in the Buddhist countries of southern Asia. (...) These discourses are called numerical because they retain the structure of the original Anguttara Nikaya. Sayings are organized not by topic, but by numbers mentioned in the texts. This organizational scheme, common in ancient Indian literature, can give the reader a haphazard view of the Buddha's teachings. To balance this tendency, Bhikku Bodhi provides a systematic introduction to the Buddha's teachings. To balance this tendency, Bhikku Bodhi provides a systematic introduction to the Buddha's Teaching in the Anguttara Nikaya. The translators also provide notes, a glossary, and another introduction placing the Anguttara Nikaya in the context of the larger Theravada Buddhist Canon. This readable butt precise translation will be welcomed by both students of Theravada Buddhism as well as anyone wishing to learn from the Buddha's teachings. (shrink)

The Buddhist Nikāya Suttas frequently mention the concept of fear (bhaya) and related synonyms. This concept does not receive much scholarly attention by subsequent Buddhist philosophers. Recent scholars identify a ‘paradox of fear’ in several traditions of classical Indian Buddhism (Brekke 1999, Finnigan 2019, Giustarini 2012). Each scholar points out, in their respective textual contexts, that fear is evaluated in two ways; one positive and the other negative. Brekke calls this the “double role” of fear (1999: 443). Each also identify (...) fear as purposely elicited to motivate acts aimed at achieving fearlessness, where freedom from fear is characteristic of nibbāna. They all find this puzzling. Finnigan asks: “Why would one purposefully incite fear if one’s goal is its elimination?” (2019: 221). Giustarini says that fear has a “contradictory nature” (2012: 513); Brekke calls it “the paradox of fear” (1999: 442). This article introduces the ‘paradox of fear’ as it appears in the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva and the Nikāya suttas. It then critically examines Brekke and Giustarini’s proposed solutions. It argues that they get some things right in ways that are both supported by the Nikāyas and relevant to Śāntideva but that they leave some important questions unanswered. The article contends that these questions are best answered if fear is analysed as appropriate when its objects are related to karma and rebirth. (shrink)

The _play of formulas_ is a new theory designed to explain the manner in which discourses (Suttas, Sūtras) were composed in the early Buddhist tradition, focusing at present mainly on the _Dīgha-_ and _Majjhima- Nikāyas_ (the collections of the Buddha’s Long and Middle-length discourses). This theory combats the commonly accepted views that texts are mainly an attempt to record and preserve the Buddha’s teachings and life events, and that the best way to understand their history is to compare parallel versions (...) of them. By identifying the creative, mainly the literary, vectors alive in the shaping of the texts, the theory explains how discourses are the products of formulas, which themselves are the primary texts of early Buddhism. Formulas combine in order to produce meaningful textual patterns, with little account of historical context and with much interest in aesthetic appeal and emotive potency. Formulas connect according to set narrative designs, in which different types of audiences are represented not only through unique formulas, but also with their specific narrative trajectories and complementing doctrinal emphases. It is not that the early authors were not at all interested in safeguarding the tradition. It is only that there was much more going on, and that thinking about the texts in this way misses their entertaining faces and ignores their beauty. These probably tell us more about what the early discourses actually were for the people that first produced and studied them than dry philosophical doctrine. (shrink)

This article announces the discovery of a Sinhalese version of the traditional meditation ( borān yogāvacara kammaṭṭhāna ) text in which the Consciousness or Mind, personified as a Princess living in a five-branched tree (the body), must understand the nature of death and seek the four gems that are the four noble truths. To do this she must overcome the cravings of the five senses, represented as five birds in the tree. Only in this way will she permanently avoid the (...) attentions of Death, Māra, and his three female servants, Birth, Sickness and Old Age. In this version of the text, when the Princess manages not to succumb to these three, Māra comes and snatches her from her tree and rapes her. The Buddha then appears to her to explain the path to liberation. The text provides a commentary, padārtha , which explains the details of the symbolism of the fruit in terms of rebirth and being born, the tree in terms of the body, etc. The text also offers interpretations of signs of impending death and prognostications regarding the next rebirth. Previously the existence of Khmer and Lānnā versions of this text have been recorded by Francois Bizot and Francois Lagirarde, the former publishing the text as Le Figuier a cinq branches (Le figuier à cinq branches, 1976). The Sinhalese version was redacted for one of the wives of King Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṅha of Kandy by the monk Varañāṇa Mahāthera of Ayutthayā. This confirms earlier speculation that this form of borān/dhammakāya meditation was brought to Sri Lanka with the introduction of the Siyam Nikāya in the mid-eighteenth century. It also shows that in Sri Lanka, as in Ayutthayā, this form of meditation—which in the modern period was to be rejected as ‘unorthodox’—was promoted at the highest levels of court and Saṅgha. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nāgārjuna's Affective Account of MisknowingRoshni PatelIt is maintained that all beings and (their) qualitiesAre the fuel for the fire of awareness.Having been incinerated by brilliantTrue analysis, they are (all) pacified.—Ratnāvalī (RV)1.971In Nāgārjuna's formulation, ignorance about the nature of existents is scorching and thereby needs the alleviation that true analysis offers. This article explores what ignorance feels like from the subjective side of a knower in the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition (...) through an analysis of epistemic affect. I borrow two affective concepts—"epistemic emotion" and "epistemic feeling"—from theorists in Anglo-American analytic epistemology to discuss affectively charged misknowing.2 In this literature, epistemic emotions are affective experiences that participate in a knower's epistemic activity in positive or negative ways, but are not necessary for that activity to proceed. In contrast, epistemic feelings are affectively qualitative experiences that are integral to a knower's activity. With a focus on texts by Nāgārjuna, I present fear as a paradoxical epistemic emotion that correlates with a similarly pathogenic and instigative function in Buddhist moral psychology. I then present determinacy as a more subtly operating epistemic feeling in reificatory ignorance. In addition to expanding epistemologically oriented discussions within Buddhist philosophy, this article also contributes to scholarly discussion of epistemic affect by introducing determinacy as a new epistemic feeling. [End Page 44]Diffuse and Complex IgnoranceThe central role of ignorance in formulating the problem of suffering and its cessation implies that in many ways all of Buddhism is interested in how we know and understand. This centrality is evident in the Avijja Sutta when the Buddha states:Bhikkhus, ignorance is the forerunner in the entry upon unwholesome states, with shamelessness and fearlessness of wrongdoing following along. For an unwise person immersed in ignorance, wrong view springs up. For one of wrong view, wrong intention springs up. For one of wrong intention, wrong speech springs up. For one of wrong speech, wrong action springs up. For one of wrong action, wrong livelihood springs up. For one of wrong livelihood, wrong effort springs up. For one of wrong effort, wrong mindfulness springs up. For one of wrong mindfulness, wrong concentration springs up.(Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN) 45.1)Here we see that avijjā, or ignorance, impedes the path of removing suffering. Similarly, in the twelve links of dependent origination, ignorance is at the start of the chain conditioning the other links that culminate in suffering (SN 12.2). Nāgārjuna also positions ignorance as a potential gatekeeper when he says that ignorance (ajñāna) causes some people to be intolerant of the wisdom of the Mahāyāna path taught by the Buddhas (RV 4.83).3 While we have ample exposition on the role of ignorance in various causal chains, what remains elusive is how to recognize our own ignorance as such in the experiential folds of seeing, feeling, and knowing. This is especially the case in the early works of the critical project of Madhyamaka ("Middle Way") philosophy by Nāgārjuna. The bulk of these works presents arguments against any ignorant metaphysics that essentializes existents in efforts to claim epistemic access to an objective ultimate reality. This article argues that through a certain way of reading Madhyamaka philosophical texts, we find helpful information for recognizing what ignorance feels like. I develop the phenomenology of epistemic emotions and feelings that coincide with the ignorant practices centrally targeted by Madhyamaka critical analysis.The encompassing scope of ignorance motivates us to conceive of it as entangled with a range of elements, including the affective components of knowing. While the terms avijjā or avidyā, are most often translated as "ignorance" this term can be problematically imprecise in philosophical contexts. In the subfield of ignorance studies within current Western philosophy, ignorance is often classified according to the object of which a subject lacks knowledge. By this paradigm, ignorance can be (1) factual in [End Page 45] the case of not knowing a particular fact, (2) erotetic when a subject does not know the answer to a question, or (3) practical when a subject does... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:How Things Are: An Introduction to Buddhist Metaphysics by Mark SideritsRick Repetti (bio)How Things Are: An Introduction to Buddhist Metaphysics. By Mark Siderits. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. vi + 204. Paperback $29.95, ISBN 978-0-19-760691-9.How Things Are: An Introduction to Buddhist Metaphysics, by Mark Siderits, presents ten chapters on Buddhist metaphysics that will appeal to readers from any number of backgrounds, e.g. Western philosophers concerned with (...) analytic metaphysics, but also philosophers of mind, epistemologists, phenomenologists, philosophers of meditation, comparative philosophers, non-Buddhist Indian philosophers, and Buddhist philosophers. The book includes an introductory chapter and chapters on the self, the person, fundamental ontology, causation, Buddhist nominalism, time, the external world, the internal world, and anti-realism. This book is a must-read for anyone who wishes to have a robust understanding of Buddhist metaphysics. If nothing else, the reader will appreciate the richness, complexity, and analytic rigor of Buddhist metaphysics that parallels its Western counterparts.This book is an "introduction" to "Buddhist" metaphysics, but much more, as each chapter comprehensively assesses the dialectical progression of arguments, theories, objections, rebuttals, and refinements throughout the history within and between the various schools and traditions of Buddhist metaphysics and their non-Buddhist interlocutors in Indian philosophy, and their analogues in Western philosophy. That comprehensiveness is an obvious feature, but possibly also a bug, as "Introduction to Buddhist Metaphysics" is an understatement. For readers to fully follow any "introduction," they must be able to do so on the basis of the information provided. This is largely but not entirely the case here, for, as someone fairly well-versed in Western and Indian philosophy, I think readers of How Things Are would only be able to fully follow its many abstract, complex, eloquent arguments and assertions if they were already quite well-versed in the history of both. I found it occasionally difficult to follow Siderits' reasoning, despite knowing what he means by certain unexplained terms he relies on, such as "qualia-philes," "cognitively impenetrable," and "the refrigerator illusion."The introductory chapter begins by noting that, contextually, older philosophical systems, e.g. Sāṃkhya and Nyāya, were extant when Buddhism [End Page 1] arose in India, systems which agree that liberation is about disidentifying consciousness with matter, while Buddhism is about disidentifying with anything. Siderits here sketches the eightfold path and its meditative core, noting that "the careful observation of mental states cultivated in some types of meditational practice is said to provide empirical evidence in support of key philosophical theses" (p. 11). As keen as Siderits is elsewhere to uncover problems, however, this description glosses over the fact that Buddhist meditative instructions are formulated precisely to "confirm" the "key philosophical theses" of momentariness, impersonality, and causal interdependence, in which case practitioners are looking for these things in ways that generate their perception; thus the claim that meditative experiences count as "empirical evidence of key Buddhist ideological theses" is circular (Struhl 2022).Siderits then sketches the three main stages in Buddhist development, namely, the early sūtras (the Indian Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas), the subsequent philosophical analyses of these (the Abhidharma), and the later developments (the Mahāyāna: both Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka), and what they all agree on: the unreality of the self, momentariness, mereological nihilism, and non-substantialism. Siderits brilliantly explains arguments for and against each, and maps out four general stances: two dualist realisms (Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika), one external world anti-realism (Yogācāra), and one global anti-realism (Mādhyamaka). He then explains Vaibhāṣika's direct realism (we perceive external, mind-independent objects directly, akin to naïve realism) and eternalism (each moment exists in all three times: past, present, future). He goes on to explain Sautrāntika's representationalism (we are aware only of mental representations of perceptual objects, akin to sense data) and presentism (only the present moment exists). Siderits here notes that representationalism leads to idealism (as it did in the modern West), and that Yogācāra espouses non-duality between representation and reality--a non-duality that entails local anti-realism about the physical... (shrink)

In this article I share some of my experiences of practising Korean Zen meditation and how, without ever mentioning the word ‘mindfulness,’ this practice helps us to become mindful. This leads me to suggest that the main ingredients of Buddhist meditation are samatha (which I will translate here as ‘concentration’) and vipassanā (which I will call ‘experiential enquiry’). No matter which Buddhist tradition one follows, the practice of samatha and vipassanā will lead to the cultivation of mindfulness. I also intend (...) to show how the traditional doctrine of the ‘four great efforts’ is very close to therapeutic methods advocated in MBCT. I will also propose that the Buddha's five methods of dealing with difficult thoughts as presented in the Vitakkhasa hāna Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya 20) are examples of an early Buddhist cognitive behavioural strategy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Buddha through Christian EyesElizabeth J. HarrisIt was in Sri Lanka in 1984 that I had my first ‘encounter’ with the Buddha. When at the ancient city of Anuradhapura, I stole away from the group I was with to return for a few minutes to the shrine room adjacent to the sacred bo tree, the one believed to have grown from a cutting of the original tree under which (...) the Buddha gained enlightenment. Devotees dressed in white were sitting or prostrating silently. I joined them and looked toward the image, which showed the Buddha sitting in meditation against a painted scene of pale blue sky, white clouds, and mountains. Suddenly the image became more than mere plaster. All I can say is that it communicated. It beckoned. Against the blue of the sky, the serene head became suffused with cosmic significance. I know that there was unfinished business between me and the Buddha.The moment was prophetic. Two years later, I returned to Sri Lanka to study Buddhism and stayed over seven years. ‘Study’ is not quite the right word because, together with the academic, I also sought to immerse myself in Buddhism with the wish to see it through the eyes of Buddhists. I practiced meditation under Buddhist teachers, participated in temple devotion, and joined pilgrimages. It was a process that meant temporarily letting go of much that was dear to me as a Christian. But the rewards were inestimable. Never again has the image at Anuradhapura ‘spoken’ to me. In fact, on return visits it has appeared artistically poor, certainly no match for the older stone images, open to the air, in other parts of the city. But then, around and inside that very shrine room in May 1985, Tamil guerrillas gunned down 146 innocent devotees, rupturing centuries of devotion with pools of blood.My seven and a half years in Sri Lanka make it almost impossible for me to write about the Buddha as a complete outsider. I remain a Christian, but the Buddha has become part of me. An exquisitely carved wooden image of the Buddha in meditation is now part of my home. The peace that emanates from it gives me strength. In complete honesty, I can say that I revere the Buddha.But what Buddha do I revere? Do I revere the Buddha in the same way as Buddhists? To reflect on how my appreciation of the Buddha may be different from that [End Page 101] of Buddhists is not easy, for Buddhism contains within itself so many faces of the Buddha. There is the historical Buddha of the earlier parts of the Pali canon, the Buddha of the later hagiographic biographies, the Buddha of popular devotion, Mahayana Buddhism’s vision of multiple Buddhas and cosmic buddhahood, the Buddha of what has been termed Protestant Buddhism. Yet I sense that there is a common thread within all of these faces—namely, the Lord Buddha as the supreme embodiment of compassion and wisdom, the one who has seen into the nature of reality and the human predicament and has taught the path of liberation.All that I know of Buddhism tells me that the person of the Buddha is central. The devotion shown to the image is more than would be given to a human teacher and more than would be given to a god. Acchariya manussa is one phrase used in the Pali texts—“wonderful man.” He is human, yet more than human in that he was enlightened and worked toward this enlightenment without outside aid through countless lives of self-sacrifice and virtue. This I believe all Buddhists would agree to, and such a being is supremely worthy of reverence.How does my appreciation tally with this? It is the Theravada tradition that has nurtured my own understanding, and it has done so in three ways. First, there has been my reading of the Sutta Pitaka of the Pali canon. In the first two years of my time in Sri Lanka, I read through most of the nikaya of the Sutta Pitaka, albeit in translation, and I found myself encountering again and again a teacher I could respect and revere. “How... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction:Spiritual Friends in a Multifaith and Multisuffering WorldKyeongil JungAnanda said to the Buddha. “Master, spiritual friendship is half of the spiritual life.” The Buddha told him. “Not so, Ananda. It’s the whole of the spiritual life.”—Samyutta Nikaya, Volume 1If one friend suffers, all the friends suffer together with her; if one friend is honoured, all rejoice together with him.—1 Corinthians 12:26This year’s Buddhist-Christian Studies includes selected articles presented (...) at the International Buddhist-Christian Conference titled “Enlightenment and Liberation: Engaged Buddhists and Liberation Theologians in Dialogue,” which took place at Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York April 17–20, 2013. The conference was a historic gathering of socially engaged Buddhists and liberationist Christians from many corners of the world.There have been many Buddhist-Christian dialogues during the last century. Yet there have not been many dialogues between socially engaged Buddhists and liberationist Christians. Although many Buddhist and Christian activists and scholars have responded to the reality of social suffering, which is a universal experience across religions, cultures, and countries, most of them have not, because of the sheer fact of physical and geographical separation, had the opportunity to met each other and spend time together. This is precisely what happened at this Union conference. And it was amazing to see how quickly strangers became friends, almost as if they had long known one another. Such bonds of friendship grew spontaneously out of the one essential thing they all had in common: a selfless love and compassion for the poor and oppressed. All of them loved their suffering neighbors as they loved their own selves. Thus, engaged Buddhists and liberationist Christians immediately recognized one another as friends working for the same goal: liberation. In this way, the conference [End Page 3] confirmed that their spiritual friendship transcended religious boundaries in the face of social and political suffering. In a multifaith and multisuffering world, being friends cannot and should not be limited by the boundaries of a faith tradition.As the title of the conference indicates, the conferees shared their experiences of spiritual and social engagement in a multifaith and multisuffering world. For four days they exchanged their ideas and experiences of responding to the five faces of eco-human suffering in today’s world: economic injustice, war and violence, sexism, racism, and ecological crisis. These five issues were discussed comparatively and interreligiously. In each session, two participants, one Buddhist and one Christian, presented their ideas followed by discussion among their fellow participants. Along with those five topics, there was also a special session on spirituality and liberation in which Buddhist and Christian participants talked about how their spirituality supported and strengthened their social action for liberation. Every night there was a public presentation in which distinguished scholars and activists from the two spiritual traditions spoke about listening to the world and to the heart. In addition, the conference offered various smaller workshops, seminars, and informal conversations between the conferees and with general participants, such as “Buddhist and Christian Grassroots Organizing,” “Socially Engaged Buddhism: East-West Dialogue,” “Occupy Society and Religion: A Buddhist-Christian Conversation,” and “Buddhist and Christian Nuns Compare Notes.” In all this, dialoguers spoke to and listened to one another as openly and accurately as they could.Another mutually enlightening and empowering experience at the conference was that it created an interspiritual space. Every morning during the conference two conferees, one Buddhist and one Christian, co-celebrated interfaith meditation. It was initially designed as a spiritual exchange between Buddhism and Christianity. Yet, interestingly, that exchange took place not between but within each of the participants. In other words, it was not a Buddhist and Christian practice, but rather a Buddhist-Christian practice. In addition, the conference offered various opportunities for interspiritual interaction, such as “Ecological Worship Service,” “Compassion Meditation for Social Activists,” “Question-and-Answer Dharma Talk,” and “Buddhist-Christian Communion,” in which Buddhist and Christian participants shared their spiritual practices and techniques respectfully and mindfully. Such spiritual components of the conference proved that silence could be a wide door through which Buddhists and Christians can meet one another deeply and perceptively. Paraphrasing interreligiously the... (shrink)

This article first briefly examines the textual structure of the Vangisathera Samyutta of the Pali Samyutta-nikaya in conjunction with two other versions preserved in Chinese translation in Taisho vol. 2, nos. 99 and 100. Then it compares the main teachings contained in the three versions. These three versions of this collection on the subject of the venerable Vangisa represent three different early Buddhist schools within the Sthavira branch. This comparative study of these three different versions focuses on three major (...) topics: Arhants at the pravarana ceremony; sensual desire and the way to extinguish it; and the Buddha’s teachings to Vangisa. It reveals similarities and significant differences in structure and doctrinal content, thus advancing the historical/critical study of early Buddhist doctrine in this area. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 189-193 [Access article in PDF] Buddhist Learning and Textual Practice in Eighteenth-Century Lankan Monastic Culture. By Anne M. Blackburn. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. x + 241 pp. Buddhist Learning is an important study of the emergence of the Siyam Nikaya (monastic order) in eighteenth-century Kandy, Sri Lanka's last Buddhist kingdom (which fell to the British only in 1815). Blackburn focuses on educational (...) institutions in her account, but frames it also to address larger issues in the study of Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts and history.An introductory chapter sets forth Blackburn's three central arguments (4): colonial and postcolonial scholarly constructions of Sri Lankan Buddhist "tradition" obscure the eighteenth-century phenomena that she reconstructs; the idea of "textual communities," developed in dialogue with contemporary scholarship on medieval European Christianity, provides a useful tool for analyzing those phenomena; [End Page 189] thus analyzed, the early Siyam Nikaya turns out to represent an innovative "reformulation" of Sri Lankan Buddhism, made possible by the establishment of the order itself, its systematization of monastic education, and the development of a bilingual commentarial genre for use within that system.Chapter 2 provides nonspecialists "at least a glimpse of the larger social context in which the emerging Siyam Nikaya participated" (23), with brief sketches of Sri Lankan Buddhist history, the structure and politics of the Kandyan court, the organization of monasticism prior to the rise of the Siyam Nikaya, and the presence of non-Buddhist religious leaders in Kandyan society. Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of Sri Lankan monastic education prior to 1730, then analyzes three stages in the emergence of distinctive Siyam Nikaya educational institutions (the early career of founder Valivita Saranamkara [1698-1778]; the late 1730s creation of a prototypical educational institution at Niyamakanda; and the 1753 importation of higher ordination [ upasampada ] from Thailand/formal establishment of the Siyam Nikaya, respectively), the history of royal patronage of these institutions, their new curriculum, its implementation and administration, its impact on monastic identity and lay-monastic relations, and the relationship of monastic erudition to prestige and patronage.Chapter 4 surveys Siyam Nikaya histories to argue that the order's rise was attended by "an innovative discourse on monasticism" that bolstered its authority by depicting its education-based interpretation of monastic virtue as "natural and desirable Buddhist practice" (105). Though these histories employed the rhetorical trope of decline and revival, their emphasis on Buddhist learning "signals a moment of profound change in Lankan Buddhism" (76-77), because they provided a charter for the new Nikaya while creating a perception that Siyam Nikaya monks practiced the best form of Buddhist monasticism. When imbibed by members of the royal court, this assured these monks steady patronage and prestige over their rivals, called ganinnanses, whom they directly and indirectly attacked. Chapter 5 zeroes in on Saranamkara and his Sararthadipani, a bilingual (Sinhala and Pali) commentary on the "four recitation sections" (catubhanavara) of protective (paritta) texts in Pali. This monumental work and the genre of bilingual commentaries (called sutra sannayas ) that it inspired, Blackburn maintains, were central to Saranamkara's claim to authority and created a distinctive monastic identity for Siyam Nikaya monks. Through close analysis of selected passages from Sararthadipani, Blackburn reveals the inner workings of bilingual commentary, particularly insofar as it allowed Saranamkara and his disciples to demonstrate their proper command of the classic Pali texts.In chapter 6 Blackburn argues that the sutra sannayas produced "a new Buddhist textual community" united in its reading and/or hearing of them. Exploring the ways in which Sararthadipani and the other sutra sannayas "constrained" readers to accept Saranamkara's vision of proper monasticism (such as direct instructions to readers and rhetorical structures), but recognizing that they also left open (in their use of simile, metaphor, and illustrative stories) the possibility of "less constrained" and "resistant" readings, Blackburn suggests that the genre extended the Siyam Nikaya's program beyond the small circle of Saranamkara's disciples to transform Sri Lankan monasticism [End Page 190] more generally. Moreover, she argues that given... (shrink)

Scholars debate whether the Buddha’s teachings preserved in the Pāli Canon can be considered philosophy, and whether the Buddha himself can be considered a philosopher. The existence of a philosophically tractable Buddhist soteriology is not in doubt; however, there is debate over the point at which this structure emerges in the tradition. In this essay we put forth several prominent objections to reading the Buddha as a philosopher, then offer responses to these objections based in part on the work of (...) Pierre Hadot. While we cannot claim to capture the definitive reading of the Buddha, we suggest that close attention to the Nikāyas gives reason to read him as a philosopher.1Paul.. (shrink)

This essay attempts to clarify the position of Nāgārjuna in the history of Buddhist philosophy by comparing the concept of emptiness in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. It is argued that the identity of samsāra with nirvāna, the emptiness of svabhāva of all dharmas, and the equating of emptiness and dependent arising are not revolutionary innovations of Nāgārjuna or the second turning of the wheel of Dharma, but orthodox philosophical moves entailed by the teachings of early Buddhism.

In Buddhism, Meditation and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom , Rick Repetti explains how the dynamics of Buddhist meditation can result in a kind of metacognition and metavolitional control that exceeds what is required for free will and defeats the most powerful forms of free will skepticism. This article argues that although the Buddhist path requires and enhances the kind of mental and volitional control Repetti describes, the central dynamic of the path and meditation is better understood as (...) a process of habituation. This not only involves the dis‐identification from mental and emotional content that Repetti discusses—and is commonly emphasized in modern presentations of mindfulness or insight (vipassanā ) meditation—but also a transformation of the heart that is effected through the complementary psychological and somatic qualities associated with calm abiding (samatha ) and concentration (samādhi ) and emphasized in the Pali Nikāyas and commentaries. (shrink)

Recently, some contradictory statements have been made concerning whether or not the Buddha taught free will. Here, a comparative method is used to examine what exactly is meant by free will, and to determine to what extent this meaning is applicable to early Buddhist thought as recorded in the Pāli Nikāyas. The comparative method reveals parallels between contemporary criticisms of Cartesian philosophy and Buddhist criticisms of Brahmanical and Jain doctrines. Although in Cartesian terms Buddhism promotes no recognizable theory of free (...) will, it does promote a primitive theory of compatibilism which shares some keyfeatures with Daniel Dennett's position on this issue. It is argued that the implicit Buddhist stance on freedom of the will allows the existence of choice and responsibility without calling upon an ultimate controlling agency that transcends the causal nexus of mind and body. (shrink)