_Winner of the 1974 National Book Award_ The product of many years of reflection on phenomenology, this book is a comprehensive and creative introduction to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Natanson uses Husserl's later work as a clue to the meaning of his entire intellectual career, showing how his earlier methodological work evolved into the search for transcendental roots and developed into a philosophy of the life-world. Phenomenology, for Natanson, emerges as a philosophy of origin, a transcendental discipline concerned with (...) consciousness, history, and world rather than with introspection and traditional metaphysical warfare. (shrink)

Twelve years after his Origin of Species, Charles Darwin published his Descent of Man. If the first book brought the gases of philosophi cal controversy to fever heat, the second exploded them in fiery roars. The issue was the nature, the condition, and the destiny of genus humanum. According to the prevailing Genteel Tradition mankind was a congregation of embodied immortal souls, each with its fixed identity, rights and duties, living together with its immortal neigh bors under conditions imposed by (...) "the laws of nature and of nature's God." Obedience or disobedience of these laws destined all to eternal bliss or eternal damnation. What had come to be called "evolution" was assimilated to the Tradition in diverse interpretations such as John Fiske's, Henry Drummond's and Charles Pierce's. Their common ten dency was to establish "evolution" as somehow the method whereby divine providence ordains the conditions under which man accom plishes his destiny. The most productive competitor of the Genteel Tradition went by various names, with positivism, materialism and naturalism the most telling. Its success as competitor was not due to its theological or metaphysical import. Its success flowed from its mode of observing how effects or results, those undesired as well as those desired, got produced. Unified and generalized, these observations were taken for notations of causal sequences always and everywhere the same, thus for laws of "nature" to whose workings "the providence of God" added nothing productive and could be and was dispensed with. (shrink)

Values and the scope of scientific inquiry, by M. Farber.--The phenomenology of epistemic claims: and its bearing on the essence of philosophy, by R. M. Zaner.--Problems of the Life-World, by A. Gurwitsch.--The Life-World and the particular sub-worlds, by W. Marx.--On the boundaries of the social world, by T. Luckmann.--Alfred Schutz on social reality and social science, by M. Natanson.--Homo oeconomicus and his class mates, by F. Machlup.--Toward a science of political economics, by A. Lowe.--Some notes on reality-orientation in contemporary societies, (...) by A. Brodersen.--The eclipse of reality, by E. Voegelin.--Alienation in Marx's Political economy and philosophy, by P. Merlan.--The problem of multiple realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil, by P. L. Berger.--Phenomenology, history, myth, by F. Kersten.--The role of music in Leonardo's Paragone, by E. Winternitz.--Alfred Schutz bibliography (p. [297]-306). (shrink)

This is a basic work for students specializing in philosophy & for any scholar studying the works of Sartre.

Fifteen years ago, Dorion Cairns concluded an article on phenome nology with a cautious appraisal of its influence in America. "Thus far," he wrote, "it continues to be an exotic." The situation today has changed: translations of the writings of Husserl, Heidegger, Marcel, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty have appeared, and commentaries on these and related thinkers are not uncommon. Moreover, discussion of phenomenological problems is increasingly becoming part of the American (if not the British) philosophical scene. Phenomenology is in danger of (...) domestication! Signs of its accommodation include a willingness to pay tribute to HusserI's Logical Investigations by those who find relatively little to interest them in his later work, a location of what are taken to be common themes and underlying convergences of emphasis in Continental phenomenology and Anglo-American philosophy of the more nearly Wittgensteinian and Austinian varieties, and a growing impatience (shared by some phenomenologists) with expositions, explications, and interpretations of Husserl's work at the expense of original applications of phenomenology. Most bluntly put, the attitude is: Don't talk about it; do it! It would seem that we have arrived at a point where introductions to phenomenology are of doubt ful value, if not superfluous. The present collection of essays is based on different assumptions and points to an alternative conception of the role of both methodology and originality in phenomenological work. (shrink)

This volume contains sOOeen essays written by his students and colleagues in honor of Maurice Natanson. The essays explore some of the diverse themes Professor Natanson has pursued through forty years of teaching and philosophizing in the tradition of existential phenomenology. Because it also includes a lengthy biographical and philosophical interview where one can find an absorbing account of Natanson's Lebens/au/in his own words, there is no need to detail that polypragmatic career here. Suffice to say that even passing acquaintance (...) with the man and the work will reveal that Edmund Husserl's self-description holds equally of his distinguished interpreter: "I seek not to instruct but only to lead, to point out and describe what I see. I claim no other right than that of speaking according to my best lights, principally before myself but in the same manner also before others, as one who has lived in all its seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence. "l For Natanson, as the diversity of the contributions to this volume attest, such seriousness involves something other than that narrow technical vision for which a topic is the more philosophical the less it has to do with anything else. In Natanson's pages-to say nothing of his teaching and conversation-there are no men of straw but living, breathing human beings; with hirn philosophy's tentacles are ubiquitous. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 115 and on a "philosophie de 1'esprit." But he became increasingly interested also in a secular, but non-political, philosophy of religion, which might serve to unite his Platonic idealism and his theory of values. This he formulated in terms of a course of lectures on theodicy, a theodicy closer to Kant than to Leibniz (p. 204). He explained: Notre Th6odic& n'aura pour but ni d'&ablir, ni de (...) r6futer le panth6isme, mais de prouver qu'il exprime fid61ement le contenu de la conscience, et de nous faire sentir par 1~le besoin d'une croyance qui le ddpasse (p. 195). Without cosmology, without ecclesiasticism, it was God's own being that concerned him. "Au fond, comme le voulait Malebranche, nous voyons peut-&re Dieu en lui-m~me" (p. 196). "Dam le peu que j'ai fait, j'ai voulu rester fidble aux grandes pens&s de la philosophie &ernelle qui est la philosophie de l'esprit" (p. 216). HERBERTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont, Calilornia The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. By Herbert Spiegelberg. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff [Phaenomenologica 5 and 6], 1960. 2 vols. Pp. xxxii + 735.) Professor Spiegelberg's historical introduction to the phenomenological movement is a critical as well as expository effort to trace the development of phenomenological philosophy, taking the work of Edmund Husserl as central to the entire enterprise but also giving serious consideration to his predecessors, associates, and successors. The result is not only an account of phenomenology but an introduction to phenomenological philosophizing. The reader is swiftly caught up in two currents: he may study the history of phenomenology through the chapters devoted to its major representatives, but he may also concern himself with the systematic problems which phenomenologists have encountered and articulated in their careers. The two, of course, are integral, and they are treated that way here. The emphasis, however, is on the phenomena. Even where the discussion is directed toward reporting the reports of others, the stress is still on the "things themselves." In this sense, the history presented here is not merely "about" phenomenology but itself within the horizon of phenomenological procedure. As history, it tells the story of phenomenology; as phenomenology, it reflects upon the phenomena which history recounts. This double stress is evident throughout the two volumes and underlies the purpose of the undertaking as described by the author: 116 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (I) to give a conspectus of the whole range of the Phenomenological Movement, not only of Husserl's part in it; (2) to help understand the background and the reasons for the phenomenological "teachings" in terms related to today's AngloAmerican philosophizing; (3) to take account of, and wherever possible to clarify or answer, the more significant misunderstandings and criticisms of phenomenology (p. xxvi). A quick survey of the contents of the work may be helpful before turning to critical considerations. In his introduction of Volume I, Professor Spiegelberg attempts to state the criteria in terms of which a philosopher is to be considered a "phenomenologist " and his contributions to be taken as part of the subject matter of a history of the phenomenological movement. First, there must be "explicit or implicit adoption by the would-be phenomenologist" of the methods of "direct intuition... as the source and final test of all knowledge, to be incorporated as faithfully as possible in descriptions" and "insight into essential structures as a genuine possibility and a need of philosophical knowledge." Second, there must be "conscious adherence, however qualified, to the Movement as such in full awareness of these methodical principles" (p. 6). The Movement itself is conceived of as a dynamic development from a commonly shared point of departure toward interrelated ends. Movement in this sense does not mean School. The operative criteria are selective enough, however, to enable the author to decide between genuine and pseudo phenomenologies. There then results the inclusion of those figures in the history of philosophy who have either prepared the way for phenomenology or who have carried out genuine phenomenological work. The first volume includes major chapters on Brentano and Stumpf, some ninety pages on Husserl himself, a sizeable section entitled "The Older Phenomenological Movement" which treats the G6ttingen Circle and the Munich Circle (including... (shrink)