According to Marx one of the primary evils of capitalism is that it is exploitative-and necessarily so. Socialist and communist societies will not be exploitative and this is one of the reasons why they will in some sense be better. To understand such claims we have to determine exactly what Marx means by “exploitation” and what it is about exploitation that Marx finds to be bad. Neither of these questions is as simple as it might seem.A common misunderstanding of Marx (...) is this: exploitation consists simply in an unequal distribution of social wealth. Workers are exploited because they get so much less of the pie than do capitalists. Another interpretation of Marx's concept is that exploitation consists in the fact that workers to not get the whole pie. They produce all value and, therefore, deserve to get it all back. I will show that both of these interpretations are inadequate or simply mistaken. An error common to both is an overemphasis on distribution. (shrink)

Political philosophy and feminist theory have rarely examined in detail how capitalism affects the lives of women. Ann Cudd and Nancy Holmstrom take up opposing sides of the issue, debating whether capitalism is valuable as an ideal and whether as an actually existing economic system it is good for women. In a discussion covering a broad range of social and economic issues, including unequal pay, industrial reforms and sweatshops, they examine how these and other issues relate to women and how (...) effectively to analyze what constitutes 'capitalism' and 'women's interests'. Each author also responds to the opposing arguments, providing a thorough debate of the topics covered. The resulting volume will interest a wide range of readers in philosophy, political theory, women's studies and global affairs. (shrink)

In the first two chapters, Cohen deals with justice, freedom, and equality without mention of self-ownership, offering a devastating critique of the libertarian claim that despite great economic inequality, laissez-faire capitalism is the most just society because it is the most free. The assumption, made by liberals as well as libertarians, that we have to choose between liberty and equality fails to acknowledge that a system based on large-scale private property entails the unfreedom of the majority without property. Cohen shows (...) the libertarian claims to rest on circularity and on abuse of the ordinary language of freedom. (shrink)

Gerald A. Cohen, in ?The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation?, argues that, contrary to the traditional assumption, Marx's charge of exploitation against capitalism does not require the labor theory of value. However, there is a related but simpler basis for the charge. Hence Marx's criticism can stand even if the labor theory of value falls. Furthermore, he argues that the labor theory of value is false. It is argued here that Cohen is mistaken; the charge Marx (...) makes against capitalism does require the labor theory of value. Cohen's conception of exploitation is weaker than Marx's both theoretically and morally. It is also argued that Cohen's criticisms of the labor theory of value rest on misunderstandings of the theory and Marx's methodology. (shrink)

The question of an action's rationality has two aspects: 1) the ‘appropriateness’ of the action given the beliefs held and 2) the ‘reasonableness’ of the beliefs themselves or of holding those beliefs. The former involves questions of motivation, the latter epistemology. This paper will concentrate on the former aspect of the question.One way of understanding rational motivation is so widely accepted as to seem incontrovertible to many of its proponents. This is the sense of rationality as maximization of utility. Although (...) individual action is motivated by many things, the claim is that when behavior is rational it can be understood as an attempt to maximize utility. Rationality in this view has solely to do with means, not ends. The only restriction on an agent's ends is that they form a coherent set and whatever the content of the utility at which the agent aims, it is presumed to be open-ended. The theory is descriptive in that it says that people act this way most of the time and also normative in that behavior which does not fit the model is Judged irrational. (shrink)

Toward a New Socialism offers a critical analysis of capitalism's failings and the imminent need for socialism as an alternative form of government. Dr. Richard Schmitt joins with Dr. Anatole Anton to compile a volume of essays exploring the benefits and consequences of a socialist system as an avenue of increased human solidarity and ethical principle.

Are women human? A puzzling, even bizarre, question, yet one raised by many philosophical theories regarding human nature and women. Human beings are a species, and species are defined, albeit in a very complicated way, by their biological attributes. Women, of all groups that have ever been oppressed, are most clearly and undeniably differentiated by their bodies. Since men have always been taken as the norm, the question was posed as to the implications of women's differences from this norm. Although (...) few philosophers seriously questioned whether women were a distinct species from men, many explicitly denied that women had the properties they defined as human, or else they designated traits historically more true of men as characteristically human. Aristotle referred to the female character as “a sort of natural deficiency.”. (shrink)

Just as the differentiation of human beings from other species has traditionally been thought to be based on some common essence or nature, so has the division of humankind into certain groups, in particular, men and women and races, been thought to be based on their distinct natures. There are many similarities between the concepts of human nature, ‘women’s nature’ and race, and how these concepts have functioned ideologically: For all three, the traditional idea was that there were fixed, natural (...) essences determining the cognitive, moral, and emotional traits and abilities of the group in question. Some, e.g., Plato, and Herrnstein in recent years, have applied the idea to different social classes as well. I will call this view essentialism, and note that it is compatible with various metaphysical analyses. One could be opposed to metaphysical essentialism, but accept essences in this sense, as, for example, Hume did. (shrink)

Instead of understanding property and rationality individualistically as in capitalism, the ecological crisis makes it imperative that we change the priority to the social/collective point of view. Public goods/commonstock should be the default, and private property should have to be justified. Rationality should be understood not primarily from an individual perspective, but from a social/collective point of view. This does not entail the sacrifice of individual rights and freedom to the collective, but rather the synthesis of the two. Planning and (...) freedom coincide if the planning is democratic, which can only happen in a more egalitarian society. (shrink)

Instead of understanding property and rationality individualistically as in capitalism, the ecological crisis makes it imperative that we change the priority to the social/collective point of view. Public goods/commonstock should be the default, and private property should have to be justified. Rationality should be understood not primarily from an individual perspective, but from a social/collective point of view. This does not entail the sacrifice of individual rights and freedom to the collective, but rather the synthesis of the two. Planning and (...) freedom coincide if the planning is democratic, which can only happen in a more egalitarian society. (shrink)

This ambitious and sweeping book presents a powerful argument against moral relativism and in favor of the objectivity of a theory of democratic individuality. Unlike much recent work in this field, the book does not simply adumbrate such a view. Rather, it develops the parallels between various versions of scientific and moral realism, and then reinterprets the history and internal logic of democratic theory, maintaining, for example, that the abolition of slavery represents genuine moral progress. The book also recasts the (...) clashes between Marxist and Weberian, radical and liberal sociologies in the light of these moral claims, and sketches the institutions of a radical democracy. (shrink)