In this paper, I ask whether mishpat ivri (Jewish Law) is appropriately conceived as a “legal system”. I review Menachem Elon’s use of a “Sources” Theory of Law (based on Salmond) in his account of Mishpat Ivri; the status of religious law from the viewpoint of jurisprudence itself (Bentham, Austin and Kelsen); then the use of sources (and the approach to “dogmatic error”) by halakhic authorities in discussing the problems of the agunah (“chained wife”), which I (...) suggest points to a theory more radical than the “sources” theory of law, one more akin to the ultimate phase of the thought of Kelsen (the “non-logical” Kelsen) or indeed to some form of Legal Realism (with which that phase of Kelsen’s thought has indeed been compared)? I finally juxtapose an account based on internal theological resources (a “Jurisprudence of Revelation”). Downloadable at at http://www.biu.ac.il/JS/JSIJ/jsij1.html. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 271-272 [Access article in PDF] Lenn E. Goodman. Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classic Age. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999. Pp. xv + 256. Cloth, $55.00. This book is a bold if not audacious survey of select themes in Jewish and Islamic philosophy. The "crosspollinations" to which the subtitle refers carry the author back to classical Greece, (...) and forward to Spinoza, Kant, Bergson, Darwin, and beyond. Medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophers are placed as the centerpieces of a humanistic tradition rooted in the past and still resonating in the present.This is a view of medieval philosophy to which many a medievalist would like to subscribe, but which few would dare describe with such brio and eloquent assurance as Lenn Goodman, who is both a historian of philosophy and a philosopher. This confidence waylays Goodman, though, in that he regularly substitutes pronouncements for patient explanation and argument. The reader who is not already familiar with the issues discussed and positions advanced will have a hard time following him. More informed readers may well question many of his summary judgments and piquant observations.The ideal reader of this work is one who has read Goodman's other studies, to which the notes frequently refer. The arguments adumbrated here are presumably laid out in detail in these earlier essays and books. The text before us is thus for the most part more a statement of faith, the author's summary credo, than a reasoned exposition of Jewish and Islamic philosophy. To Goodman, "the approach is synthetic rather than descriptive" (ix).The book deals with "issues of abiding philosophical interest: freedom and determinism, the nature and meaning of history, the basis of ethical values, the foundations and social implications of friendship, the viability and relevance of the idea of God." These admirable themes are pursued in separate yet complementing chapters that compare the tenth-century free-thinker and physician Muhammad ibn Zakariyâ al-Râzî and Epicurus; the tenth-century pietist Bahya ibn Paquda and Kant; and the fourteenth-century Maghribi historian Ibn Khaldûn and Thucydides. Three other chapters compare, respectively, Maimonides and such major Islamic philosophers as Avicenna, Al-Ghazâlî, and Ibn Bâjjah; Maimonides, Al-Ghazâlî, and the Persian ethicist Miskawayh (tenth/eleventh centuries); and Maimonides, Aristotle, and Spinoza.It is at once obvious that Maimonides (twelfth century) is at the heart of this work, reflecting Goodman's longstanding interest in this towering figure of medieval Jewish philosophy. Less obvious is Goodman's contention that Maimonides is to be seen not only in relation to Avicenna, Al-Ghazâlî, and Ibn Bâjjah, but also to Râzî, Bahya, and Miskawayh. Goodman has constructed a narrative of persons and ideas, abstracting from their contexts common concerns and purposes. While there is much to admire in these constructions—patently erudite and challenging as they are—the direct filiations Goodman assumes are often conjectural at best.Take, for example, Goodman's chapter on "Maimonides and the Philosophers of Islam," with its subtitles of "Creation" and "Theophany." These terms are shorthand for Maimonides' treatment of the science of physics and metaphysics, both in their normative and extraordinary appearances. Goodman correctly notes that Maimonides is deeply indebted to Muslim philosophers (and their Greek predecessors) for his knowledge of these fields, though he does stretch matters in singling out the importance of Al-Kindî and Râzî as influences upon Maimonides' thought.Goodman does this in part because he believes Maimonides shared, in varying degrees, a creationist position with them. Goodman accepts at face value Maimonides' assertion that only a creationist thesis allows for voluntarism, a (theologically) meaningful Divine Will. "Only voluntarism," Goodman asserts in the name of Maimonides, "can break the stranglehold of necessity, making emanation itself possible, allowing change, and crucially, allowing change in the natures of things, that is, evolution, as a means of bringing creation to 'maturity'"(98). This statement, besides its anachronistic introduction of evolution into medieval notions of change, misinterprets Maimonides' view... (shrink)

Herbert Davidson's critique of my thesis regarding the relation between Averroes' Middle and Long commentaries on De anima contrasts my reading and translation of Middle Commentary passages with his own. I leave it to the informed reader to judge whether one translation is more “neutral” than the other, excluding the specific denotation which I give to sharh, which is the point at issue.

In two experiments, Brookshire, Ivry, and Casasanto showed that words with positive and negative emotional valence can activate spatial representations with a high degree of automaticity, but also that this activation is highly context dependent. Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall, and Barsalou reported that they “aimed to replicate” our study but found only null results in the “Brookshire et al. replication” conditions. Here we express concerns about three aspects of this paper. First, the study was not an attempt to replicate ours; it was (...) a different study that adapted our method. Second, Lebois et al. did not accurately represent our theoretical position. Third, Lebois et al.’s main conclusion, that spatial congruity effects depend on the task context, was not supported by their data. Despite these concerns, we agree with Lebois et al.'s overall message that spatial aspects of words' meanings are activated differently in different contexts. This was a main conclusion of our study as well. (shrink)

First Published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Herbert Davidson's critique of my thesis regarding the relation between Averroes' Middle and Long commentaries on De anima contrasts my reading and translation of Middle Commentary passages with his own. I leave it to the informed reader to judge whether one translation is more “neutral” than the other, excluding the specific denotation which I give to sharh, which is the point at issue.

We review evidence from neuropsychological studies of patients with damage to the cerebellum that suggests cerebellar involvement in four general categories of cognition: (1) speech and language; (2) temporal processing; (3) implicit learning and memory; (4) visuospatial processing and attention. A relatively strong case can be made for cerebellar contributions to language (including speech perception, lexical retrieval, and working memory) and to temporal processing. However, the evidence concerning cerebellar involvement in non-motor implicit learning and visuospatial processing is more equivocal. We (...) argue that cerebellar contributions to cognition are computationally plausible, given its reciprocal connectivity with the cerebral cortex, and suggest that this function of the cerebellum may be an example of an evolutionary process by which mechanisms originally evolved for one function (in this case, motor control) are adapted to other functions (cognition). (shrink)

On se propose d'établir dans cet article qu'Averroès a rédigé sonMoyen commentairesur le DeAnimaaprès sonÉpitoméet sonGrand commentaire. Une comparaison minutieuse des deux textes montre qu'il avait sous les yeux sonGrand commentairelorsqu'il composait sonMoyen commentaire. Ceci est de grande conséquence tant pour notre appréciation du développement de la doctrine de l'intellect chez Averroès que pour notre compréhension du mode de composition de ses commentaires.

Nella prima parte dello studio l'A. esamina i tre tipi di commentari averroisti ad Aristotele: i cosiddetti «brevi», «medi» e «lunghi», evidenziandone le specifiche caratteristiche. Viene poi brevemente esaminato il rapporto fra il commento medio e quello lungo al De anima, sottolineando la dipendenza del primo dal secondo. La seconda parte dello studio tratta del commentario breve al De anima. L'A. sottolinea gli elementi di peculiarità di questo testo, in particolare l'interesse per l'aspetto fisiologico dell'anima e le relazioni anima-corpo. Lo (...) studio dei sensi, della sensibilità, del medium, dell'immaginazione, della ragione, dell'intelletto, dell'Intelletto Agente e il problema dell'intelletto materiale sono i principali argomenti su cui verte il commentario. (shrink)

In a small literary gem full of sardonic wit, brilliant insights, and provocative criticism Witold Gombrowicz discusses Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger in six "one-hour" essays—and addresses Marxism in a "fifteen-minute" piece. "Who hasn't wished for a painless way to find out what the big shots of philosophy—Hegel and Kant, Nietzsche and Sartre—thought of the human condition? It has never been easy reading such formidable thinkers, and most explainers and textbooks either get it wrong or massacre the language. (...) So imagine my pleasure in opening Witold Gombrowicz's _Guide to Philosophy in Six Hours and Fifteen Minutes_, an exceptional effort at summarizing concepts in bold, declarative sentences.... [This book] is like the course in philosophy you wish you had taken."—David Lehman, _Bloomberg News_ "A must for every reader of Gombrowicz."—Denis Hollier, New York University. (shrink)

Witold Gombrowicz, novelist, essayist, and playwright, was one of the most important Polish writers of the twentieth century. A candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1968, he was described by Milan Kundera as “one of the great novelists of our century” and by John Updike as “one of the profoundest of the late moderns.” Gombrowicz’s works were considered scandalous and subversive by the ruling powers in Poland and were banned for nearly forty years. He spent his last years (...) in France teaching philosophy; this book is a series of reflections based on his lectures. Gombrowicz discusses Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger in six “one-hour” essays and addresses Marxism in a shorter “fifteen-minute” piece. The text—a small literary gem full of sardonic wit, brilliant insights, and provocative criticism—constructs the philosophical lineage of his work. (shrink)

Witold Gombrowicz, novelist, essayist, and playwright, was one of the most important Polish writers of the twentieth century. A candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1968, he was described by Milan Kundera as “one of the great novelists of our century” and by John Updike as “one of the profoundest of the late moderns.” Gombrowicz’s works were considered scandalous and subversive by the ruling powers in Poland and were banned for nearly forty years. He spent his last years (...) in France teaching philosophy; this book is a series of reflections based on his lectures. Gombrowicz discusses Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger in six “one-hour” essays and addresses Marxism in a shorter “fifteen-minute” piece. The text—a small literary gem full of sardonic wit, brilliant insights, and provocative criticism—constructs the philosophical lineage of his work. (shrink)

A translation and commentary on al-Kindi's “On First Philosophy,” a seminal work of early Islamic thought.

Averroës, the greatest Aristotelian of the Islamic philosophical tradition, composed some thirty-eight commentaries on the "First Teacher's" corpus, including three separate treatments of _De Anima_ : the works commonly referred to as the Short, Middle, and Long Commentaries. The Middle Commentary—actually Averroës's last writing on the text-remains one of his most refined and politically discreet treatments of Aristotle, offering modern readers Averroës's final statement on the material intellect and conjunction as well as an accessible historical window on Aristotle's work as (...) it was interpreted and transmitted in the medieval period. (shrink)

A concise biography -- The Mishneh Torah -- Maimonides' graeco-islamic philosophical heritage -- The guide of the perplexed: paraphrases and analyses -- Wrestling with language (guide I, introduction and chapters 1-68) -- Paraphrase -- Analysis -- Kalm claims and counterclaims (guide I, chapters 69-76) -- Paraphrase -- Analysis -- Philosophy affirmed and qualified; creation (guide II, introduction -- And chapters 1-31) -- Paraphrase -- Analysis -- Prophecy (guide II, chapters 32-48) -- Paraphrase -- Analysis -- The metaphysics of the Chariot (...) (guide III, introduction and chapters -- 1-7) -- Paraphrase -- Analysis -- Providence and (apparent) evil (guide III, chapters 8-25) -- Paraphrase -- Analysis -- Rationalizing the law (guide III, chapters 26-50) -- Paraphrase -- Analysis -- True knowledge and perfection (guide III, chapters 51-54) -- Paraphrase -- Analysis -- Conclusion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Moses Maimonides: The Man and His WorksAlfred L. IvryHerbert A. Davidson. Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Works. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. x + 567. Cloth, $45.00Herbert Davidson is a scholar of exceptional brilliance whose previous studies of medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy have been widely acclaimed. In the present work, he ventures beyond philosophical argument to encompass an analysis of every aspect of the (...) life and work of one of the most celebrated—and controversial—figures in Jewish history, Moses Maimonides (1138–1204). In so doing, Davidson discloses a formidable knowledge of Talmud and rabbinic literature, as well as of the history, science, astronomy, medicine and philosophy of Maimonides' day. Davidson offers elegant descriptions and often challenging evaluations of Maimonides' life, education, and work: the rabbinic oeuvre, philosophical and medical treatises, and miscellaneous epistles.Maimonides' accomplishments do not include a number of works commonly but mistakenly attributed to him, in Davidson's opinion. He offers persuasive reasons (though admittedly not always conclusive proof) for rejecting Maimonidean authorship of a "Treatise on Logic," and the Epistles "In Opposition to Astrology" and "On Religious Persecution." Davidson's rejection of the last named epistle abets his interpretation of the early period of Maimonides' life, according to which he was not compelled to convert or to dissimulate a faith in Islam, as many think. [End Page 484]It is a cardinal principle for Davidson, though he does not identify the term as such, that Maimonides never practiced dissimulation in any significant way, or as Davidson sees it, that he did not lie. Davidson's Maimonides, for all the personal failings he notes, is a figure of immense rectitude and religious sincerity, to be taken at his word.Davidson comes, then, to defend Maimonides against his past and present critics who see esoteric and heretical teachings lurking behind Maimonides' protestations of orthodox belief. Davidson is no simple apologist for Maimonides, however, and does not hesitate to identify places in Maimonides' writings where the Master nodded. Such places abound for Davidson in Maimonides' philosophical masterpiece (as it is commonly thought), the Guide for the Perplexed, raising the strong suspicion that Davidson hardly regards it as such (creation arguments apart). He is much more taken with Maimonides' rabbinic acumen and achievements than with his philosophical work, arguing that Maimonides did not, when writing the Guide, have the time and concentration he possessed when composing the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah.Davidson is assured by the strong and traditional affirmations of faith expressed in Maimonides' rabbinic writings that he maintained the same beliefs in his philosophy. The reconciliation of faith and reason is a theme that runs through all of Maimonides' writings. For Davidson this issues in a religious philosophy both radical and conservative: radical in that the Jewish God assumes an Aristotelian mien; conservative in that a "measure of personality" (365) is expressed through the act of creation and the performance of other miracles, notably the revelation at Sinai, prophecy, and resurrection. Problematic as he acknowledges the latter notion is for Maimonides, Davidson yet believes he held it.This is typical of Davidson's iconoclastic posture towards much of contemporary Maimonidean scholarship. Davidson does not believe Maimonides knew all that much philosophy and was not as careful with his writing as he claimed; that he did not have a first-hand knowledge of Aristotle, using Avicenna mostly instead; that his vaunted secret "Accounts of Creation and of the Chariot" were thinly disguised common notions of medieval physics and metaphysics; and that his entire claim to secret or esoteric teachings has none of the significance scholars in the past or present have given it.Here Davidson's bête noir is Leo Strauss, whom he regards as projecting his own dissimulating tactics upon Maimonides, turning him into an atheist (400). Davidson sees Shlomo Pines, adopting Strauss' methodology, as foisting an agnostic posture upon Maimonides. Davidson does not consider a Deistic alternative, probably assuming it incompatible with a creator God. Yet Maimonides' God functions dispassionately in His governance of the world, not knowing individuals directly, and offering them only a collective immaterial immortality.Maimonides exempts Moses and... (shrink)