The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is (...) ultimately derived from ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as the secondary, elusive character that Brentano attributes to inner perception. According to Brentano, we have an aspectual but transparent consciousness of transcendent objects, whereas our awareness of our own mental acts is always complete but incidental, and ultimately opaque. Reversing the relationship between intentionality and consciousness faces difficulties at the textual interpretative level, but also raises theoretical problems, for it risks treating Brentano’s theory of mind as a form of subjectivism and idealism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the debate between the so-called “presentists” – according to whom only the present is real – and the “eternalists”, according to whom past present and future are equally real, has no ontological significance. In particular, once we carefully distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, it is difficult to find a single ontological claim on which the two parties could disagree. Since the choice of using a tense or a tenseless language (...) is dictated by purely pragmatic reasons, we should abstain from bringing to bear pseudo-debates generated by the “tensed” or the “tenseless theories” of time on the question of understanding the philosophical implications of contemporary spacetime theories, or notions like becoming, change and persistence in time. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the role of dispositional properties in the most frequently discussed interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After offering some motivation for this project, I briefly characterize the distinction between non-dispositional and dispositional properties in the context of quantum mechanics by suggesting a necessary condition for dispositionality – namely contextuality – and, consequently, a sufficient condition for non-dispositionality, namely non-contextuality. Having made sure that the distinction is conceptually sound, I then analyze the plausibility of the widespread, monistic (...) ontological thesis about the reducibility of dispositional properties to categorical properties in the context of the philosophy of quantum mechanics. I conclude that with the exception of Bohmian mechanics, the other “minimally realist” views of quantum mechanics require essential dispositions, i.e., dispositions of a non-reducible kind. Interestingly, seen behind the lenses of dispositionalism, Bohr’s and Bohm’s interpretations of quantum mechanics are much closer than it is usually recognized, a fact that could teach us something about the way the quantum world is. (shrink)

La thèse de l’« inexistence intentionnelle » formulée par Brentano a été traditionnellement interprétée comme une théorie de la « relation intentionnelle », autrement dit de la relation entre l’acte mental et son « objet immanent » ou « intentionnel », c’est-à-dire interne à la conscience. Se fondant sur la lecture du fameux passage sur l’intentionnalité de la Psychologie du point de vue empirique , le présent article démontre que l’interprétation ontologique de la théorie de l’intentionnalité du premier Brentano est (...) insoutenable, toute dominante qu’elle est. Pour ce faire, nous partirons des sources de la pensée de Brentano, en particulier de la théorie de la perception et des relatifs d’Aristote, pour rejeter la conception de l’objet immanent ou intentionnel comme entité immanente à la conscience et mettre en évidence la continuité qui existe entre la première conception de Brentano de l’intentionnalité et la seconde, consécutive à ce qu’on définit comme le tournant réiste de sa pensée.Brentano’s thesis of “intentional inexistence” has been traditionally interpreted as a theory of “intentional relationships”, i.e., of the relation between a mental act and its “immanent” or “intentional object”, within consciousness. Starting from the famous passage on intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint , the present paper shows that the dominant ontological interpretation of Brentano’s former theory of intentionality is untenable. Proceeding from the sources of Brentano’s thought, in particular from Aristotle’s theory of perception and of relatives, the conception of the immanent or intentional object as an immanent entity to consciousness is rejected. Instead, the continuity between Brentano’s former conception of intentionality and the subsequent one, following the so-called reistic turning-point in his thought, is highlighted. (shrink)

399 a.C.: la città di Atene condanna a morte uno dei suoi figli più autorevoli, Socrate. Cosa è successo davvero nei mesi in cui si è svolta la vicenda giudiziaria? Si ripete spesso che si trattò di un processo politico mascherato, per colpire le simpatie oligarchiche dell'anziano filosofo. Ma forse il vero oggetto del contendere in questa vicenda fu proprio il pensiero di Socrate. Fino a che punto una comunità--ieri come oggi--può tollerare che i principi e i valori su cui (...) si fonda siano messi radicalmente in discussione? E davvero le ragioni della filosofia e quelle della città non sono compatibili? Una lettura originale di uno dei più celebri processi della storia. (shrink)

Franz Brentano was a leading philosopher and psychologist of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the impact of his scholarship was so great that he became synonymous with a school of thought and a new approach in scientific philosophy. The Brentano School stood against the Idealistic and post-Kantian German tradition and Brentano played a crucial role in the founding of Austrian philosophy. He had an enormous impact on the work of Husserl and Heidegger, as well as on Moore’s _Ethics_ and Stout and (...) Russell’s analysis of mind. In particular, situated between the phenomenology movement and the analytic tradition, the concept of intentionality was redefined by Brentano and has been—and remains—a key concept of twentieth- and twentieth-first century philosophy of mind. But Brentano not only reshaped philosophy of mind; he was also a remarkable and innovative thinker in several other fields of philosophy, and recent debate in metaethics, metaphysics, and the history of analytic philosophy shows a strong resurgence of interest in Brentano’s thought. Published to coincide with the centenary of Brentano’s death, this four-volume collection, a new title from Routledge Major Works, provides an essential intellectual tool for the exegetical evaluation of all aspects of Brentano’s work. Bringing together early reviews and reactions from his contemporaries—many of which have never before been translated into English—as well as the best critical assessments of Brentano’s work, this ‘mini library’ provides Brentano scholars, historians of philosophy and psychology, and phenomenologists, with a rigorous historical appraisal of Brentano’s thought and influence. Brentano’s relationships with Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenological tradition are examined in depth, alongside investigations of key themes from his work on Aristotle, medieval and modern philosophy, philosophy of mind, logic, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn is mostly known for his contributions to the philosophy of science. However, it was chiefly to investigations in philosophy of language that he dedicated the last part of his career. The aim of this paper is to present a systematic view of Kuhn’s main ideas on this subject. I start by describing his theory of concept, in particular what he says about kind terms. Such terms, acquired in blocks that form contrast sets or “taxonomies,” are learned through ostensible (...) definitions. Next, I analyze Kuhn’s concepts of “meaning” and “truth.” Finally, I discuss a second type of kinds terms, not fully investigated by him, which is learned together with scientific laws. Resumo Thomas Kuhn é conhecido principalmente por suas contribuições para a filosofia da ciência. No entanto, foi em grande medida à filosofia da linguagem que ele dedicou a última parte de sua carreira. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma visão sistemática das principais ideias de Kuhn sobre esse assunto. Começo descrevendo sua teoria do conceito, em particular o que ele diz sobre termos para espécie. Tais termos, aprendidos em blocos que formam conjuntos de contraste ou “taxonomias”, são aprendidos através de definições ostensivas. Em seguida, analiso as concepções de Kuhn de “significado” e “verdade”. Finalmente, discuto um segundo tipo de termo para espécies, não totalmente investigado por ele, que é aprendido junto com as leis científicas. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

This book covers the basic guidelines of Vittorio Benussi’s research during the period at Graz and at Padua. It does so in the light of a thorough study of his Nachlass. The book re-evaluates Benussi’s work as a historical piece, and shows how his work is still relevant today, especially in the areas of cognitive psychology and cognitive science. The volume deals with this original and ingenious - though largely ignored - scholar and discusses his work as a leading experimental (...) psychologist. Benussi’s contributions as discussed in this book were particularly relevant in the fields of visual and tactile perception, time perception, forensic psychology, hypnosis and suggestion, unconscious, and emotions. His classical papers are impressive in their originality, energy, range of approaches, experimental skill, the wealth of findings, and the quality of theoretical discussions. This book demonstrates that Benussi was ahead of his time and that his themes, experiments and research programmes are highly relevant to contemporary cognitive psychology. (shrink)

Summary The paper celebrates the person and work of Vittorio Benussi, a forgotten genius of psychology. In particular, it addresses the two most important scientific projects that Benussi developed during his time in Graz and Padua, respectively: the psychology of perception and the psychology of emotions and the unconscious. It highlights the originality and topicality of Benussi’s work and emphasizes its proximity to the latest trends in these research fields.

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

Mechanisms are a way of explaining how biological phenomena work rather than why single elements of biological systems are there. However, mechanisms are usually described as physiological entities, and little or no attention is paid to malfunction as an independent theoretical concept. On the other hand, malfunction is the main focus of interest of applied sciences such as medicine. In this paper I argue that malfunctions are parts of pathological mechanisms, which should be considered separate theoretical entities, conceptually having a (...) priority over physiological sequences. While pathological mechanisms can be described in terms of a Cummins-like mechanistic explanation, they show some unnoticed peculiarities when compared to physiological ones. Some features of pathological mechanisms are considered, such as outcome variability, ambivalence and dependence on a range. (shrink)

I aim to present a solution to the apparent paradox of the Tractatus by means of a minimalist reading grounded in the idea that the correct logical symbolism alone “finally solves” in essentials the philosophical problems. I argue that although the sentences of the Tractatus are nonsensical, rules presented in its symbolism are not. The symbolism itself expresses only a priori rules of logic through schematic variables that do not say anything. I argue that this reading correctly expresses the ladder (...) structure of the book, and that it can account for Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus in Some Remarks on Logical Form. (shrink)

In line with earlier works, this article argues for a “continuist” interpretation of Brentano’s conception of intentionality. It maintains that Brentano’s conception of intentionality rests on a complex set of notions, which are reduced to a minimal core or applied more fully depending on the complexity of the mental phenomenon under consideration and perspective from which it is analyzed. The article positions this conceptual structure in relation to theories of objects developed within the framework of late- and Neo-Scholastic philosophy where, (...) since the psychic act can relate to its object in different ways, the different types and roles of objects must be distinguished. This theory of objects enables Brentano to reinterpret Aristoteles’s idea of the intentionality of mental phenomena in light of the commentaries and interpretations of Thomas Aquinas while also giving space to other medieval texts. (shrink)