Jean Buridan developed his theory of consequence within a semantical framework compatible with what we now call token-based semantics. In his Treatise on Consequences and Sophismata, Buridan showed...

El denominado “problema de los términos teóricos” que inicialmente formuló Sneed surge de la interpretación que de los términos teóricos hace la concepción heredada. Esta lectura no se condice con la interpretación indirecta de los términos teóricos que Carnap realiza al utilizar postulados. Estos textos proponen una interpretación holística de las teorías científicas, sólo adecuadamente tratada en una semántica de mundos posibles. Andreas proporciona un tratamiento modal de los términos teóricos; nosotros presentamos estos resultados en términos de modelos de Kripke; (...) luego los extendemos con el fin de que sean capaces de distinguir entre axiomas y oraciones teóricas, generando un modelo capaz de tratarlos de manera diferenciada y que aporte nuevos resultados lógicos y filosóficos. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an intermediate position between the ‘bare mathematical results’ view and the ‘transmission’ view of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena (MEPPs). I argue that, in MEPPs, it is not enough to deduce the explanandum from the generalizations cited in the explanans. Rather, we must add information regarding why those generalizations obtain. However, I also argue that it is not necessary to provide explanatory proofs of the mathematical theorems that represent those generalizations. I illustrate this with the (...) bridges of Königsberg case. -/- . (shrink)

This article presents a republican interpretation of Michael Walzer’s theory of distributive justice and of his idea of complex equality. It demonstrates that Spheres of Justice is not only a defense of pluralism and equality, but also of liberty or freedom. Like Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, Walzer understands liberty as non-domination. For Walzer, a just distribution of all social goods leads to a “complex egalitarian society” in which every citizen is equally free from domination and tyranny. Against alternative interpretations, (...) this paper suggests that Walzer is indeed a political egalitarian and that complex equality should be interpreted as a simple equality of liberty or freedom. In the conclusion, the article argues that Walzer’s and Pettit’s versions of republicanism are complementary because they each illuminate the other’s blind spot and thus mutually fix each other’s particular shortcoming. (shrink)

I present an epistemological puzzle about perceptual knowledge and its relation to the evaluation of probabilities. It involves cases, concerning a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context, where apparently: S has perceptual knowledge of P; the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. If those two theses were true, the following very plausible epistemological principle would fail: If S knows P, then the epistemic justification S (...) has for believing Not-P is not greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. I offer a solution to the puzzle, which is compatible with basic intuitions and theses of orthodox Bayesianism. (shrink)

In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes explains several observable phenomena showing that they are caused by special arrangements of unobservable microparticles. Despite these microparticles being unobservable, many passages suggest that he was very confident that these explanations were correct. In other passages, however, Descartes points out that these explanations merely hold the status of “suppositions” or “conjectures” that could be wrong. My main goal in this chapter is to clarify this apparent conflict. I argue first that for Descartes it was (...) indeed possible to have knowledge of unobservable particles and structures, and that the possibility of natural explanations being wrong should be understood as these explanations not being absolutely certain, but only morally certain. I use the debate in contemporary philosophy of science between scientific realism and antirealism as a framework to understand how Cartesian explanations work. Especifically, I argue that Cartesian explanations rely on what Ernan McMullin calls retroduction, which is a mode of inference that justifies beliefs in concrete unobservable entities and processes, based on considerations such as simplicity, coherence, etc. This kind of justification is of common use among scientific realists. Thus, another goal of this chapter is to highlight the relevance of Descartes’ ideas about explanation in the contemporary debate on scientific realism. (shrink)

Up to now researchers have maintained that Nietzsche’s philosophy has no concept of social justice or have hardly noticed such a concept. On the contrary, this article argues that social justice plays an important role in Nietzsche’s political thinking. It shows that his conception of justice is modelled after Plato’s antique concept of political justice. The main thesis of the paper is that this conception is embodied in Nietzsche’s notion of a well-ordered state or society. An additional thesis concerns the (...) anthropological basis of what Nietzsche holds to be a just social order. This basis is constituted by his conviction that people are not only fundamentally unequal but also extremely different in worth and rank. (shrink)

“Structuralism, Fictionalism, and the Applicability of Mathematics in Science”. This article has two objectives. The first one is to review some of the most important questions in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics: What is the nature of mathematical objects? How do we acquire knowledge about these objects? Should mathematical statements be interpreted differently than ordinary ones? And, finally, how can we explain the applicability of mathematics in science? The debate that guides these reflections is the one between mathematical realism and (...) anti-realism. On the other hand, the second objective is to discuss the arguments that use the applicability of mathematics in science to justify mathematical realism, and show that none of them reaches its aim. To this end, we will distinguish three aspects of the problem of the applicability of mathematics: the utility of mathematics in science, the unexpected utility of some mathematical theories, and the apparent indispensability of mathematics in our best scientific theories - in particular, in our best scientific explanations. Finally, I argue that none of these aspects constitutes a reason to adopt mathematical realism. (shrink)

Composition as Identity claims that a composite object is identical to its parts taken collectively. This is often understood as reducing the identity of composite objects to the identity of their parts. The author argues that Composition as Identity is not such a reduction. His central claim is that an intensional notion of composition, which is sensitive to the arrangement of the composing objects, avoids criticisms based on an extensional understanding of composition. The key is to understand composition as an (...) intensional kind of identity relation, many-one identity. Eventually, the author suggests an arrangement condition for many-one identity that allows him to distinguish between composite objects, even if they have the same parts. (shrink)

Properly speaking, the corporation, considered as an entity distinct from its members, cannot be morally responsible for wrongful corporate acts. Setting aside (in this abstract) acts brought about through negligence or omissions, we may say that moral responsibility for an act attaches to that agent (or agents) in whom the act "originates" in this sense: (1) the agent formed the (mental) intention or plan to bring about that act (possibly with the help of others) and (2) the act was intentionally (...) brought about through bodily movements over which that agent had direct control (i.e. the kind of direct mental control that I have over the body I refer to as "my" body) and through which the agent carried out his (mental) intention or plan. Corporate acts do not thus originate in some corporate entity distinct from its members because the corporation has neither a mind to form intentions nor a body it directly controls: it lacks the proper mind/body unity. Instead, corporate acts originate in individual autonomous human beings who make up the corporation and who intentionally bring about corporate acts through their own bodily movements. Such human individuals, and not "the corporation," are morally responsible for corporate acts. Moreover, to say that an entity is "morally responsible" for a wrongful act is to say that the entity is liable to blame and punishment. But it is not possible to impose blame and punishment on a corporation without inflicting it on corporate members. Thus, to say that a corporation (as an entity distinct from its members) is "morally responsible" for a wrongful corporate act is to imply that a (possibly innocent) corporate member legitimately may be punished for something for which another entity was morally responsible. This violates the moral principles that underlie blame and punishment. To hold that the corporation can be morally responsible for its acts is to adopt a dangerous organicism. (shrink)

Many prominent accounts of free will and moral responsibility make use of the idea that agents can be responsive to reasons. Call such theories Reasons accounts. In what follows, I consider the tenability of Reasons accounts in light of situationist social psychology and, to a lesser extent, the automaticity literature. In the first half of this chapter, I argue that Reasons accounts are genuinely threatened by contemporary psychology. In the second half of the paper I consider whether such threats can (...) be met, and at what cost. Ultimately, I argue that Reasons accounts can abandon some familiar assumptions, and that doing so permits us to build a more empirically plausible picture of our agency. (shrink)

After presenting an overview of the research on Nietzsche’s political thought, this article discusses Robert C. Holub’s book Nietzsche’s Jewish Problem. While Holub talks about Nietzsche’s “eugenic calculations”, he does not mention his notion of a “great politics”, which aims at breeding superior humans. This notion is central for Hugo Drochon’s Nietzsche’s Great Politics and Gary Shapiro’s Nietzsche’s Earth. Great Events, Great Politics, which are critically examined in the article. Shapiro’s “postmodern” interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought neglects Zarathustra’s crucial statement that (...) “The Übermensch is the meaning of the earth”. Drochon uses Bernard Williams’s four criteria to define what a “coherent politics” is. Drochon’s arguments that Nietzsche is indeed a political thinker are persuasive. However, William’s criteria are not sufficient and need to be amended. (shrink)

This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness (...) of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility. (shrink)

This book is conceived as an introductory text into the theory of syntactic and semantic information, and information flow.

English summary: How Niccolo Machiavelli is to be understood is still passionately argued today. The many facets of his political thought correspond to the diversity of perspectives among his interpreters. The authors of this interdisciplinary volume analyze Machiavelli's works in connection with transformations of thought on policy, rule and morality from the beginning of the early modern period through to the present. In addition to the interpretation of Machiavelli through the lens of his time, effects of his writings and thought (...) in contemporary discourse are focused upon. Topics not only include Machiavelli's relationship to the modern concept of the state and his experimental morality, but also his demonological style of reading and his presence amongst contemporary republicans and liberals, amongst thinkers such as Max Horkheimer and Michel Foucault, as well as in the empire debate. Additionally, the volume takes into account thus far little-explored aspects, such as Machiavelli's thinking style and methodology, as well as the literary-rhetorical dimension of his writings. German text. German description: Bis heute wird leidenschaftlich darueber gestritten, wie Niccolo Machiavelli verstanden werden muss. Dem Facettenreichtum seines politischen Denkens entspricht die Vielfalt der Perspektiven und Urteile seiner Interpreten. Die Autoren des interdisziplinar angelegten Bandes analysieren Machiavellis Werke im Zusammenhang mit den spiegelbildlichen Wandlungen des Denkens ueber Ordnung, Herrschaft und Moral zu Beginn der Neuzeit und in der Gegenwart. Ausser der Interpretation Machiavellis aus dem Horizont seiner Zeit stehen auch seine Wirkungen in zeitgenossischen Diskursen im Mittelpunkt. Themen sind nicht bloss Machiavellis Verhaltnis zum modernen Staatsbegriff und seine experimentelle Moral, sondern auch seine damonologische Leseweise und seine Prasenz bei zeitgenossischen Republikanern und Liberalisten, bei Denkern wie Max Horkheimer und Michel Foucault sowie in der Empire-Debatte. Zudem beruecksichtigt der Band bislang wenig erforschte Aspekte wie Machiavellis Denkstil und Methode sowie die literarisch-rhetorische Dimension seiner Schriften. (shrink)

The author sets out a realist defense of the claim that in the absence of an international enforcement agency, multinational corporations operating in a competitive international environment cannot be said to have a moral obligation to contribute to the international common good, provided that interactions are nonrepetitive and provided effective signals of agent reliability are not possible. Examples of international common goods that meet these conditions are support of the global ozone layer and avoidance of the global greenhouse effect. Pointing (...) out that the conclusion that multinationals have no moral obligations in these areas is deplorable, the author urges the establishment of an international enforcement agency. (shrink)

This article aims to enhance social technology as a resource that induces education and well-being in maternal and child health, more specifically in contexts of social vulnerability. This is an action research, with social technology characteristics, developed between July/2022 and December/2023, with 17 women (pregnant and postpartum women) from a vulnerable community in the central region of Rio Grande do Sul. Based on education in health and in an interprofessional approach, the social technology developed and called “Endowing lives” is the (...) result of demands previously identified, discussed and implemented with the research participants and local health professionals. The social technology developed expanded interprofessional possibilities, promoted preventive health measures and contributed to the empowerment of pregnant and postpartum women in decision-making. (shrink)

As the 21st century breaks upon us, no ethical issues in business appear as significant as those being created by the rapidglobalization of business. Globalization has created numerous ethical problems for the manager of the multinational corporation. What does justice demand, for example, in the relations between a multinational and its host country, particularly when that country is less developed? Should human rights principles govern the relations between a multinational and the workers of a host country, and if so, which (...) principles are the correct ones? How should a multinational deal with a government in which corruption is rife? What are the ethical considerations involved in determining whether and how to transfer a risky technology to a country whose people may not be able to safely absorb that technology? What kind of labor and environmental standards should a multinational adopt when operating in a country whose government legislates only very low standards? (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the idea of human dignity has a precise and philosophically relevant sense. Following recent works,we can find some important clues in the long history of the term.Traditionally, dignity conveys the idea of a high and honourable position in a hierarchical order, either in society or in nature. At first glance, nothing may seem more contrary to the contemporary conception of human dignity, especially in regard to human rights.However,an account of dignity as high rank provides (...) an illuminating perspective on the role it plays in the egalitarian discourse of human rights. In order to preserve that relational sense regarding human dignity, we can use the notion of moral status, towhich somemoral philosophers have paid attention in recent years.I explore the possibilities of the idea of moral status to better understand the idea of human dignity and its close relationship with human rights. (shrink)

Multistability—the plurality of meanings of technological artifacts—is an emancipatory phenomenon insofar as it allows the user to freely appropriate the object according to his or her interests, even against the will of the designer. The objective of this article is to show how the trend to connect physical and digital artifacts to the Internet poses a danger to the freedom that there is in multistability. By reducing the traditional separation between the artifact and the designer, the connection of the artifact (...) to the Internet allows the designer to continually modify the software that governs or constitutes it, which involves a relative loss of power for the user to determine its meaning. This change, in favor of the designer in the correlation of power among the actors—designer, artifact, and user—from whose interplay the meaning of artifacts arises, favors concentric stabilities and hinders eccentric ones with respect to the will of the designer. Thus, we should rethink the truth value of the designer fallacy, that is, the claim that the meaning of artifacts is determined only by the designer. From a political point of view, the remote control of artifacts and their multistability is an effective pedagogical tool to educate human beings in a time in which texts, according to Sloterdijk, no longer serve this function. (shrink)