Ah, Hippothales, I said; what a noble and really perfect love you have found!

The Lysis is one of Plato's most engaging but also puzzling dialogues; it has often been regarded, in the modern period, as a philosophical failure. The full philosophical and literary exploration of the dialogue illustrates how it in fact provides a systematic and coherent, if incomplete, account of a special theory about, and special explanation of, human desire and action. Furthermore, it shows how that theory and explanation are fundamental to a whole range of other Platonic dialogues and indeed (...) to the understanding of the corpus as a whole. Part One offers an analysis of, or running commentary on, the dialogue. In Part Two Professors Penner and Rowe examine the philosophical and methodological implications of the argument uncovered by the analysis. The whole is rounded off by an epilogue of the relation between the Lysis and some other Platonic texts. (shrink)

Cicero, Lucullus 38: ‘…non potest animal ullum non adpetere id quod accommodatum ad naturam adpareat …’ From earliest childhood every man wants to possess something. One man collects horses. Another wants gold. Socrates has a passion for companions. He would rather have a good friend than a quail or a rooster. In this way, Socrates begins his interrogation of Menexenus. He then congratulates Menexenus and Lysis for each having what he himself still does not possess. How is it that (...) one gets a friend, Socrates asks? Since the nineteenth century many who have read these lines have found them repulsive. Scholars have damned the Lysis for its selfish egoism, for regarding persons as personal belongings. At the turn of the century some sought to discredit the dialogue as a forgery and a calumny. Others debated the dating of the dialogue as Socratic or Platonic, seeking whom to blame rather than whom to credit. And those who have regarded the dialogue as Platonic have tried to redeem it by detecting hints of Plato's theory of Forms. A few have attempted to salvage reputations by understanding the argument of the Lysis as a reductio of egoism, or else by invoking the loyalty of Socrates' friends and the history of Plato's friendship for Dion of Syracuse to speak up for their defence. Guthrie has condemned the dialogue as a failure of method and presentation , and Vlastos has pronounced it a failure of love: ‘The lover Socrates has in view seems positively incapable of loving others for their own sake, else why must he feel no affection for anyone whose good-producing qualities he did not happen to need?’ The Lysis appears to make no positive contribution to the Greek tradition on friendship when compared to the Symposium or the Phaedrus. And in the subsequent tradition, whatever Aristotle might have borrowed from the dialogue he uses for his own purposes. Aristotle too is quite critical of specific points raised in the Lysis. Now it might seem that Aristotle made a place for the selfish love of the Lysis in his own theory, as an inferior grade of utility love. But even this cannot be so, if we are to agree with recent studies of Aristotle's ethics. According to Aristotle, if a client is friendly to his benefactor because of the latter's usefulness, this utilitarian motive must accompany a genuine concern for the benefactor's own interest in that relation, if they are to be friends. Inferior and genuine friendship may differ in purpose but not in regard for the well-being of the beloved. This respect for the object of one's love has no parallel in the Lysis, according to the standard reading of the dialogue. (shrink)

Plato’s Lysis has generated a range of scholarly responses, both with respect to its philosophical content and whether its aporetic conclusion— that what is philon is “neither those who are loved nor those who love, nor those who are like nor those who are unlike, nor those who are good, nor those who are akin (oi oikeioi), nor any of the others we have gone through” (222e3-5)—is genuine or masks a doctrinal resolution available within the text. In a series (...) of papers on the Lysis, Francisco Gonzalez has presented an historically and philologically sophisticated interpretation which claims that in the Lysis, Socrates replaces traditional notions of “kinship” (or what is oikeion) with a philosophical kinship grounded in wisdom, one which ultimately undermines the filial bond between parents and children. I argue that Gonzalez’s interpretation cannot account for the numerous instances of non-philosophical friendships in the dialogue and thus succumbs to the danger of ascribing closure to a dialogue whose aporia is ultimately genuine. In my conclusion, I probe whether this critique poses problems for “Third Way” interpretations of Plato’s dialogues. (shrink)

Don Adams - Plato's Lysis - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 321-322 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Don Adams Central Connecticut State University Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe. Plato's Lysis. Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xiv + 366. Cloth, $60.00. Part I of this book is a running commentary on Plato's Lysis. Part II is an explanation (...) and defense of the authors' theory that the dialogue "provides a systematic and coherent, if incomplete, account of a special theory about, and special explanation of, human desire and action." The authors include their own translation of the dialogue that is quite good. This book is an important contribution to Plato scholarship and will.. (shrink)

In recent scientific and philosophical discussions the concept of Enlightenment has been often reconsidered. This reconsideration takes place in an era of a “universal apologizing” of all to everybody and for everything. In this atmosphere the meaning of the historical eras, such as Renaissance or Humanism is often forgotten. However, a rational reconstruction of these events is important in order to understand the present era. The original Enlightenment idea of progress dismissed the old orders for their not being able to (...) keep pace with knowing. Not even today the skepticism against rationality can be the solution. Seen from this point of view the situation today is different. The paper tries to show its specific character. (shrink)

An elegant book, with careful scholarly annotation, by two scholars who believe that Plato has a contribution to offer to the thought of modern Japan. It will be interesting to see what scholars in the field say as to how far, if at all, Plato's thought must be deflected toward or from Zen Buddhism by the overtones of the language in any Japanese translation. But the choice of these three dialogues for translation evidently reflects a central interest in Plato's analyses (...) of love and desire as an attempt at building a coherent, if somewhat discursive, bridge in a Western style between finite beings in time and their background in eternity. And the Western Platonist should feel that there could perhaps be no more propitious prologue to the Symposium than the Japanese philosophic tradition expressed in Bashö's poems, such as "The Milky Way" : A stormy sea--To Sado Isle reaches The River of Heaven. --R. S. B. (shrink)

Don Adams - Plato's Lysis - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 321-322 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Don Adams Central Connecticut State University Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe. Plato's Lysis. Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xiv + 366. Cloth, $60.00. Part I of this book is a running commentary on Plato's Lysis. Part II is an explanation (...) and defense of the authors' theory that the dialogue "provides a systematic and coherent, if incomplete, account of a special theory about, and special explanation of, human desire and action." The authors include their own translation of the dialogue that is quite good. This book is an important contribution to Plato scholarship and will.. (shrink)

In theLysisSocrates deals with the problem of what is a friend and what is friendship. After giving an introduction and a synopsis of theLysisin section one, I explain, in section two, Socrates’ view that a true friend is “what is akin” or “what is belonging to oneself” which is what is taken from oneself and discovered in another person. When this happens among two persons, they become friends to each other. The content of what is akin is either a good (...) characteristic or ways or form of the soul. Friendship is the desire for what is akin. In section three I show that Socrates remains inaporiawhile he faces several problems. Unless he is able to answer such problems, he will not be truly confident about what is a friend. In section four I deal with and refute Penner’s and Rowe’s view that a true friend means wisdom. In section five I examine the view of friendship which occurs among people who share common deficit. As a conclusion, in section six, I reflect on the significance of my interpretation and the role of theLysisin Plato’s philosophy. (shrink)

Cet article est une étude sur la lysis, la « libération » dionysiaque. On commence avec la suggestion que dans la description de la mania telestike dans le Phèdre 244d-245a, le meilleur candidat parmi les pratiques cultuelles dionysiaques à l’opération de soustraction résultante de la rhétorique socratique c’est la transe ménadique. Les références ménadiques accompagnent également les témoins sur Dionysos Lysios à Corinthe, Sicyone et Thèbes, mais ici les sources nous invitent à élargir l’horizon des pratiques cultuelles dionysiaques pour (...) regarder les cultes à mystère en l’honneur du dieu, notamment aux renseignements des lamelles d’or trouvées dans des sépultures des initiés. Puis, on entreprend de proposer une lecture exclusivement dionysiaque de la lamelle de Pélinna. Cette lecture prend appui sur: une analyse du texte de la lamelle ; une critique des interprétations qui mettent la lysis en rapport avec l’expiation du crime des Titans ; un examen du rôle de Perséphone ; la signification de lysis dans l’OF 350 Bernabé ; l’articulation des célèbres passages de la République où il est question des initiations avec les dynamiques de la punition différée dans les représentations grecques anciennes de la justice divine. Puis, l’article suggère que la lysis dionysiaque porte sur une délivrance non seulement après la mort, mais aussi pendant la vie des initiés. En conclusion, l’étude revient au Phèdre 245a pour mettre en contraste les transes ménadique et mystique. (shrink)

Plato’s Parmenides and Lysis have a surprising amount in common from a methodological standpoint. Both systematically employ a method that I call ‘exploring both sides’, a philosophical method for encouraging further inquiry and comprehensively understanding the truth. Both have also been held in suspicion by interpreters for containing what looks uncomfortably similar to sophistic methodology. I argue that the methodological connections across these and other dialogues relieve those suspicions and push back against a standard developmentalist story about Plato’s method. (...) This allows for a better understanding of why exploring both sides is explicitly recommended in the Parmenides and its role within Plato’s broader methodological repertoire. (shrink)

I defend the argument in Plato's Lysis that true love is requited. I state the argument, the main objections, and my replies. I begin with a synopsis of the dialogue.

This paper is a study of Dionysian _lysis_, “liberation”_._ We begin with the suggestion that in the description of the _mania telestike _in Plato’s _Phaedrus_ 244d-245a, the best candidate among Dionysian ritual practices abstracted by Socrates’ rhetoric is maenadic trance. The maenadic references also accompany the testimonies on Dionysos _Lysios_ in Corinth, Sicyon and Thebes, but here the evidence invites us to widen the scope of Dionysian cult practices and look at the god’s Mystery cults, notably at the evidence provided (...) by the golden leaves founded in initiated sepultures. We propose then an exclusively Dionysian reading of the Pelinna leave. This reading leans on: an analysis of the leaf’s text; a critique of the interpretations associating _lysis_ with the expiation of the Titans’ crime; an examination of Persephone’s role; the meaning of _lysis_ in OF 350 Bernabé; and the linking up of the famous passages of Plato’s _Republic_ dealing with initiations with the dynamics of postponed punishment in ancient Greek representations of divine justice. Finally, the article suggests that Dionysian _lysis_ is concerned with liberation not only after death, but also during the life of the initiated. In conclusion, it goes back to Plato’s _Phaedrus_ 245a, in order to contrast Dionysian maenadic and mystic trance. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY has always made use of its past. In doing so, it resembles literature more than it does the natural sciences, which generally regard the scientific concepts and systems of history as superseded, useless hulks drifting in the wake of empirical and conceptual progress. Literature, on the contrary, cherishes the monumental achievements of previous ages; they retain value and importance, and can be turned to for interest and for inspiration again and again. Philosophy has sometimes claimed to take a radical (...) turn which leaves the past behind, but in the long run the past returns to assert itself as living and useful. There are fashions in philosophy, of course, but it is never safe to regard any major philosophic system or approach as forever refuted and surpassed. As witness, we see how the current analytic movement is rediscovering pragmatism, once thought hopelessly old hat. (shrink)

This collection features Plato's writings on sex and love in the preeminent translations of Stanley Lombardo, Paul Woodruff and Alexander Nehamas, D. S. Hutchinson, and C. D. C. Reeve. Reeve's Introduction provides a wealth of historical information about Plato and Socrates, and the sexual norms of classical Athens. His introductory essay looks closely at the dialogues themselves and includes the following sections: Socrates and the Art of Love; Socrates and Athenian Paiderastia; Loving Socrates; Love and the Ascent to the Beautiful; (...) The Art and Psychology of Love Explained; and Writing about Love. (shrink)

Introduction -- The problem of Socrates : Kierkegaard and Nietzsche -- Kierkegaard : Socrates vs. the God -- Nietzsche : call for an artistic Socrates -- Plato's Socrates -- Love, generation, and political community (the Symposium) -- The prologue -- Phaedrus' praise of nobility -- Pausanias' praise of law -- Eryximachus' praise of art -- Aristophanic comedy -- Tragic victory -- Socrates' turn -- Socrates' prophetess and the daemonic -- Love as generative -- Alcibiades' dramatic entrance -- Alcibiades' images of (...) socrates -- Alcibiades' praise of Socrates' virtues -- Aftermath -- The incompleteness of the Symposium -- Self-knowledge, love, and rhetoric (Plato's Phaedrus) -- The setting -- Non-lovers (Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech) -- Souls and their fall -- Lovers and their ascent -- Prayer to love -- Contemporary rhetoric and politics -- A genuine art of rhetoric -- Writing -- Prayer to Pan -- Who is the friend? (the Lysis) -- Joining the group -- Getting acquainted -- Seeking a friend -- Are friends the ones loving, the ones loved, or both? -- Are likes friends? -- Are unlikes friends? -- Are those who are neither good nor bad friends to the good? -- Are the kindred friends? -- Who might friends be? -- Friendly communities -- Socratic philosophizing -- Socrates' youthful search for cause -- Socrates' second sailing and the ideas -- Piety, poetry, and friendship. (shrink)

It is shown that Plato’s Lysis is full of positive content between the lines. At the close of the dialogue Socrates says that he considers Lysis, Menexenus, and himself to be friends of one another. Following up on the questions which the dialogue leads us to ask yields an explanation ofwhy each of these instances of friendship is, in fact, an instance of friendship. In addition, the dialogue shows that there are five types of motivation for desiring something.

In the opening of Plato’s Lysis, Socrates criticizes the love-besotted Hippothales’ way of speaking to, and about, Hippothales’ yearned-for Lysis. Socrates subsequently proceeds to demonstrate (ἐπιδεῖξαι) how Hippothales should converse with Lysis (206c5–6). But how should we assess Socrates’ criticisms of, and demonstration to, Hippothales? Are they defensible by Socrates’ own standards, as well as independent criteria? In this note, I first articulate and assess Socrates’ criticisms of Hippothales. Second, I identify, examine, and respond to puzzles to (...) which Socrates’ demonstration to Hippothales gives rise. (shrink)

It is shown that Plato’s Lysis is full of positive content between the lines. At the close of the dialogue Socrates says that he considers Lysis, Menexenus, and himself to be friends of one another. Following up on the questions which the dialogue leads us to ask yields an explanation ofwhy each of these instances of friendship is, in fact, an instance of friendship. In addition, the dialogue shows that there are five types of motivation for desiring something.

John Kinsella is an important literary witness to the acknowledgement of native title in Australia, and Indigenous rights more generally. His writings also bear witness to continuing forces of resistance to those rights in Australian society. This paper traces Kinsella’s engagement with the Mabo case, the 1992 legal decision that recognised native title as part of Australian law, and rejected the fiction that Australia was terra nullius at the time of British colonisation. Focusing on “Graphology: Canto 5” and other texts, (...) it argues that Kinsella presents a sustained reflection on the implications and the limits of this decision, in law and in wider cultural understandings and practices, through poetic allusions, paratexts and personal commentary. His writing since the mid-1990s reveals an acute awareness of how imported concepts of property and law are concealed within Western poetic traditions such as pastoral. To counter the effects of this ideology, Kinsella interpolates and appropriates terms from the discourse of property law, juxtaposing them against other ways of understanding and living in the land. In several collections, but especially in Jam Tree Gully, he seeks to develop an ethically reflective account of ownership of land taken from others, critiquing the dominant idea of property and articulating an alternative way of living in the land based on co-existence. The rights of the dispossessed traditional owners are central to a new mode of “writing the land.”. (shrink)

While a great deal has been written on Plato's Lysis in philosophy and philology journals over the last thirty years, nothing has been published on Lysis in the major Anglo-American philosophy of education journals during that time. Nevertheless, this dialogue deserves attention from educators. In this essay, Mark Jonas argues that Lysis can serve as a model for educators who want to move their students beyond mere aporia, but also do not want to dictate answers to students. (...) Although the dialogue ends in Socrates's affirmation of aporia, his affirmation is actually meant to persuade his interlocutors to reflect on an epiphany they had previously experienced. In what follows, Jonas offers a close reading of relevant passages of Lysis, demonstrating the way that Socrates leads his interlocutors to an epiphany without forcing his answers upon them. (shrink)