This publication analyzes the issue of depersonalization in the field of constitutional substantiation of judicial resolutions, judgements, verdicts and rulings (hereinafter, judicial procedural decisions). Electronic databases are the primary source of information about judicial procedural resolutions for judges, reporters, as well as for the public-at-large. As for judicial practice, the data regarding parties of a case is depersonalised in these databases. Personal names are either replaced with initials, or a message “depersonalized data” is (...) included. The constitutional substantiation for such a ruling by a judicial council is sought by means of this publication. (shrink)

Background The ideal basis of age estimation is considered to be a combination of clinical, skeletal and dental examinations. It is not easy to determine how forensic physicians take account of evidence-based data obtained from medical journals in their medical decision-making. The question of what is an ethically acceptable probability that adolescents are incorrectly considered to be over 18 has not been answered. Methods In a retrospective study over 1 year (2007), 498 files (for 141 female subjects and 357 male (...) subjects) regarding age assessment requested by the public prosecutor's office for purposes of criminal or asylum proceedings were reviewed. Chronological age was estimated from a combination of physical examination, radiographic examination of the left hand and determination of dental status. Results Estimates of chronological age in 498 subjects claiming to be 9–14 years old were incompatible with the alleged age in 356 (71%) when made by the forensic physician but in only 17 (3%) when based on data from published studies on age estimation in adolescents. Conclusions The present study suggests that in most cases the forensic physician ignores the adolescent's word. Medical mission and ethics imply a need to listen to the claims of persons in custody, whatever the risk of false claims. This situation should prompt forensic physicians to keep up with published data on estimating the age of adolescents. (shrink)

"ACT Administrative Appeals Tribunal Decisions." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (200), pp. 42.

While defeasibility in legal reasoning has been the subject of recent scholarship, it has yet to be studied in the context of judicial opinion. Yet, being subject to appeal, judicial decisions can default for a variety of reasons. Prakken (2001) argued that the defeasibility affecting reasoning involved in adversarial legal argumentation is best analysed as procedural rather than logical. In this paper we argue that the defeasibility of ratio decendi is similarly best explained and modeled in (...) a procedural and dialectical framework. We propose that appeals are best understood as meta-dialogues about the reasoned dialogue occurring in the initial trial. (shrink)

An essay in normative jurisprudence where the author is concerned with delineating and evaluating legal decision procedures. The appeal to precedent and equity are critically examined and found to be deficient. Wasserstrom proposes as an improvement a two-level decision procedure, which is like precedent in appealing to a rule of law as a necessary condition for deciding a case, and like equity "in that considerations of justice are directly relevant to the justification of any decision." He frankly admits that this (...) decision procedure is an improvement at the "price of becoming imprecise at certain crucial points." The discussion is informed throughout with an appreciation of both legal and philosophical treatments of the issues.--S. M. W. (shrink)

Aulis Aarnio addresses the question of how legal interpretations should be justified. Aarnio considers a justification to be rational only if the justification process has been conducted in a rational way, and if the final result of this process is acceptable to the legal community. According to Aarnio, a theory concerning the justification of legal interpretations should contain a procedural component specifying the conditions of rationality for legal discussions, and a substantial component specifying the material conditions of acceptability for (...) the final result. The procedural component of Aarnio’s theory formulates rules for the rationality of legal discussions. The substantial component specifies when the result of a legal interpretation can be called acceptable. Aarnio considers such a result acceptable if it is acceptable to a particular legal community in which there is consensus with respect to certain norms and values. (shrink)

"The main argument of this paper is that there are reasons for judges not only to evaluate the substantive merit of legislation, but to advert to the fact that the place of elected legislatures in our scheme of government gives legislation a standing, an entitlement to consideration, that may go beyond judicial estimates of its intrinsic merit." [Is this just a statement of procedural legitimacy?] "To answer the question [of who assigns rights], courts must take a view as (...) to the proper role of courts vis-a-vis legislatures; they must take a view about the allocation of power in our legal/political system. In drawing this line, courts can take one of two approaches. First, they can make decisions solely on the basis of considerations internal to the relevant clauses of the Constitution, perhaps by giving them a moral reading. Second, they can include in their thinking institutional considerations regarding the role of popular decision-making bodies in our governmental structure." Claims that Dworkin advocates the first [which is false], and that we should accept the second, which is advocated by advocates of judicial restraint. It is appropriate for a judge to give weight to the fact that a decision was reached by a legislature. "Specifically, I think it appropriate that courts presume the constitutionality of such laws, understanding that their own role demands that they overturn them if they are not merely different from what the judges might have decided on their own, but are beyond acceptability." Reasons for the presumption of constitutionality: value of compromise, allocation of power ), appropriateness of humility, integrity and community. (shrink)

Many scholars believe that it is procedurally undemocratic for the judiciary to have an active role in shaping the law. These scholars believe either that such practices as judicial review and creative statutory interpretation are unjustified, or that they are justified only because they improve the law substantively. This Article argues instead that the judiciary can play an important procedurally democratic role in the development of the law. Majority rule by legislatures is not the only defining feature of democracy; (...) rather, a government is democratic to the extent to which it provides egalitarian forms of political participation. One such form of participation can be the opportunity to influence the law through the courts, either directly by participating in a case or indirectly by advocating litigation. Arguing from several examples, this Article shows that judicial decision-making allows different voices to be heard that may not necessarily have influence or power in majoritarian legislative structures or popular initiatives. Giving citizens the opportunity to change, to preserve, and to obtain authoritative clarification of the law through the courts can thus make a government procedurally more democratic. (shrink)

This paper argues that, according to a specific conception of the ideals of constitutional democracy - deliberative democratic constitutionalism - the proper function of constitutional review is to ensure that constitutional procedures are protected and followed in the ordinary democratic production of law, since the ultimate warrant for the legitimacy of democratic decisions can only be that they have been produced according to procedures that warrant the expectation of increased rationality and reasonability. It also contends that three desiderata for (...) the institutionalization of the function of constitutional review follow from this conception: structural independence, democratic sensitivity and the maintenance of legal integrity. Finally, evaluating three broadly different ways of institutionalizing constitutional review - solely in appellate courts, in deliberative constitutional juries of ordinary citizens and in a combined system of constitutional courts and civic constitutional amendment fora - it argues that the third arrangement would perform best at collectively fulfilling the sometimes antithetical desiderata. (shrink)

This article refers to the issues associated with the crucial significance of the interpretation of tax law provisions made by administrative courts in the course of the judicial inspection of tax decisions, within the context of protecting the subjective rights of taxpayers. The analysis in that regard has been prepared based on the provisions of art. 153 of the Act of 25 July 2002 on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, which expresses the important rule of binding the court and (...) the administrative authority, whose act was the subject of an appeal, with a legal assessment and instructions regarding the further proceedings described in the decision of the administrative court. As a result of this rule, a decision of an administrative court exerts the results exceeding the scope of judicial administrative proceedings, while its effect also covers the future tax proceedings. If the legal assessment made by the court refers to the regulations that affect the subjective rights of a taxpayer, it means that the administrative court imposes the effects of “its” interpretation of those provisions on a tax authority. In turn, the tax authority is obliged to respect those rights in accordance with the opinions of the court, which usually affects the final resolution of a tax case. It should be borne in mind that a taxpayer, by submitting an appeal against a tax decision to an administrative court, demands not only an inspection of the acts of tax administration, but also - which should be emphasized - demands the execution of its rights, including its subjective rights. Therefore, we should not forget the crucial role of the administrative courts in the protection of the substantive rights of taxpayers. The instrument that allows the administrative courts to guard the subjective rights of taxpayers, consists in the procedural regulations included in the provisions on proceedings before administrative courts, and in particular art. 153 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts in Poland. (shrink)

Many studies have highlighted a substantial "bureaucracy domination" in procedures relating to migrants’ access to territory. This form of domination is marked by highly discretionary and arbitrary practices, enacted by the administrative authorities of the state. Only minor attention, however, has been devoted to the arbitrariness of judicial decisions and to the judicial role in general in the numerous proceedings that increasingly affect the path of migrants. This path is the main object of this paper. The study (...) focuses on Italian case law in expulsion and detention proceedings of irregular third country national citizens and asylum seekers and presents qualitative empirical research on decisions issued by the competent national authorities. The results have been analysed using a selection of theoretical tools, all referable to the general concept of the rule of law. The judicial decisions on pre-removal detention proceedings in two case studies are examined: the jurisprudence on detention of irregular migrants, in different offices of the Justice of the Peace in Italy; and the case law on detention of asylum seekers in the Ordinary Tribunal of Rome. The assumption underlying the research is that various conceptions of the rule of law may have different explanatory power when it comes to explaining the empirical results. To verify this hypothesis, the study proposes an overview of the main rule of law doctrines in the Western tradition of political and legal thought and applies the method of historical-conceptual analysis. As a result, the explanatory power of six theoretical models of the rule of law was verified against the data with the view to highlight the virtues and vices of the respective explanatory frameworks. This article reaches a two-fold conclusion. First, as far as the explanatory frameworks are concerned: the results of the two case studies cannot be fully explained by any of the models considered in this study. This fact alone casts doubts on the explanatory power of these theories and calls for further research on judicial decision-making more generally. Secondly, a key finding of the study regarding the notions of discretion and arbitrariness is that the judicial approach which assures the highest protection of rights is also the one that is most easily influenced by arbitrariness. The author argues that this paradox can be easily dissolved by paying attention to the plural dimensions of arbitrariness. If we consider arbitrariness from a legal point of view, i.e. as an illegal decision, it is unsurprising that the authority that most uses its discretionary powers is also the one most at risk of abusing these discretionary powers and hence of exercising arbitrary power. However, if we consider arbitrariness from the point of view of philosophical-political theory, i.e. as a form of domination characterised by the absence of sufficient justification, it is unsurprising that the judicial approach which assures the highest protection of rights is also the one that takes its own role as guarantor of these rights and of the constitutional democratic legal order as such most seriously. This judicial approach thus most often risks exercising its power in criticisable ways, as compared to an authority much more in line with the requirements of law enforcement agencies. Keywords: migration, discretion, justice, arbitrariness, civil rights, Rechtsstaat, expulsion, mixed constitution. (shrink)

As far as the judicial system is concerned, the legal actions that can be brought before the Union courts, the Court of Justice, the General Court, and specialized courts, do not provide for a comprehensive system of procedural remedies. The main procedural remedy to address this problem is the preliminary ruling procedure, which enables all national courts, and obliges some of them, to suspend the main proceedings before it and refer questions concerning the interpretation and validity of (...) Union law to the Court of Justice for a binding ruling. According to Article 267(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Court of Justice have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: the interpretation of the treaties and the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union. A decision of the Court of Justice is given in the form of a judgment. (shrink)

The extent to which the legal doctrine addresses manifestations of constitutionalism has been constantly growing. However, the majority of research in constitutionalism focuses on the analysis of the power of the Constitution and the fundamental principles entrenched in it whereas ordinary branches of law, including civil procedure, affected by the constitutional law remains outside the scope of a deeper analysis. The author of the present paper is convinced that certain aspects of the impact of constitutional justice on such branches as, (...) in particular, civil procedure deserve deeper interest. The modest scope of the paper precludes an extensive analysis of the role of the Constitution as a fundamental binding Act and today’s abundant doctrine of Lithuania’s Constitutional Court in civil procedure. Therefore, the present paper is confined to an analysis of individual aspects of direct application of the Constitution and the doctrine of the Constitutional Court. The article analyses the power of the Constitution and its impact on the civil procedure as an Act laying down the fundamental principles binding the legislator in adopting procedural instruments and principles to be followed by courts and as a remedy for violations of rights or a tool to address loopholes and collisions of law. Courts of general jurisdiction perform the control of legitimacy of legal Acts by checking their compliance with the Constitution in individual cases and by applying to the Constitutional Court for repeal of anticonstitutional norms or by applying the Constitution as an Act of direct effect to eliminate loopholes, interpret statutes and deal with collisions of legal norms. The author believes that the fact that the courts of general jurisdiction frequently raise questions of incompliance of legal Acts with the Constitution and decisively apply to the Constitutional Court evidences a high level of legal culture and legal consciousness of the judges. That fact may also serve as a precondition for the growth of confidence in the judiciary as judicial procedures may contain no uncertainties as to the constitutionality of the statutes to be followed in litigation. (shrink)

In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of (...) judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision. (shrink)

Robert Alexy has argued that the democratic objection to judicial review of legislation can be successfully addressed by assuming that judges exercise a special form of argumentative representation. In this article we argue that Alexy does not explain (as he should) under what circumstances judicial review tends to produce better decisions than parliamentary procedure, nor does he explain how judicial review can have a greater intrinsic value than parliamentary procedure. Subsequently, we argue that the intrinsic value (...) of argumentative representation depends on the promotion of citizen deliberation, whereas its instrumental value depends on judges being committed to the rights of discrete and insular minorities in the face of hostile majorities. (shrink)

This paper discusses the nature of administrative judiciary through Decision No (10) of 2013 which stipulates considering administrative courts a part of regular courts and the effect of this decision on the scope of referral due to lack of jurisdiction, specifically, referral between civil courts and administrative courts. This paper found, through evaluating the decision of the constitutional court, that the considerations this decision was based on are invalid and according to the provisions of the constitution and the regular Court (...) Establishment Law, the administrative judiciary is merely a judicial entity independent from regular courts and could not be a part thereof. However, despite the necessity of abiding to the decision of the constitutional court, we concluded that it has no effect on deciding inadmissibility of referral due to lack of jurisdiction between regular and administrative courts. Although case law, prior to issuing the decision of the constitutional court, considered that the basis of inadmissibility is that the provision of Article (112) of the Civil Procedure Law is limited to regular courts, which administrative courts are not a part thereof; considering that there are other justifications to decide inadmissibility of referral between civil courts and administrative courts, most importantly the difference of judicial procedures followed before each of these courts. Thus, in this paper we provided several recommendations, most importantly, the necessity of interference of the constitutional legislator by explicitly stipulating to consider administrative judiciary as an independent judicial entity. As well, to amend the provision of Article (112) of the Civil Procedures Law by explicitly stipulating not to include referral due to lack of functional competence. (shrink)

Constitutional and judicial law-making is increasingly beginning to find its reflection not only in the Anglo-Saxon, but also in the Romano-Germanic legal family. However, the prerequisites for the use of this legal instrument are different, which determines the relevance of conducting a comparative analysis regarding the provision of such a mechanism in the USA and Kazakhstan. The purpose of the research is to identify common and distinctive features in the process of implementation of constitutional and judicial law-making in (...) countries belonging to different legal systems. The article uses the methods of analysis, synthesis, comparison, deduction and generalization. As a result, the specificity of ensuring the mechanism of constitutional law-making in the USA was expressed, taking into account various forms of law-making activity. It has been established that the development of constitutional provisions in the United States takes place with the help of the constitutional doctrines of the Supreme Court of the United States, which provide for the introduction of amendments to constitutional provisions without a formal procedure. As a result of the study of the experience of Kazakhstan, it was established that special priority was given to the role of precedent, in particular, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This is explained by the integrative nature of the Romano-Germanic legal system, which allows effective development of national legislation as a whole and its provisions. The obtained results can be used during the professional training of judges in the Republic of Kazakhstan. (shrink)

Courts are increasingly obliged to adjudicate upon challenges to allocative decisions in healthcare, but their involvement continues to be regarded with unease, imperilling the legitimacy of the judicial role in this context. A central reason for this is that judges are perceived to lack sufficient expertise to determine allocative questions. This article critically appraises the claim of lack of judicial expertise through an examination of the various components of a limit-setting decision. It is argued that the inexpertise (...) argument is weak when compared with other rationales for judicial restraint, such as the procedural unsuitability and lack of constitutional competence of courts. (shrink)

Legal systems must proceed in the face of two conceptions of procedural fairness. The first, embodied in the rule of law ideal, calls for clear rules, laid down in advance and susceptible to mechanical application in individual cases. The second calls for a high degree of individuation, on the theory that fairness requires particularized consideration of the whole person. Both conceptions can be found in judicial interpretation of the due process clause of the American Constitution, which sometimes requires (...) rule-bound decisions, and sometimes requires individuation. Both conceptions have a great deal of appeal in particular settings. The choice between the two depends largely on an investigation of the costs of decision and the costs of error. In addition, "planning costs" play a large role; where people need to be able to plan in advance, rule-bound judgments look fairer and much more attractive even if they produce significant unfairness and arbitrariness. (shrink)

Legal systems must proceed in the face of two conceptions of procedural fairness. The first, embodied in the rule of law ideal, calls for clear rules, laid down in advance and susceptible to mechanical application in individual cases. The second calls for a high degree of individuation, on the theory that fairness requires particularized consideration of the whole person. Both conceptions can be found in judicial interpretation of the due process clause of the American Constitution, which sometimes requires (...) rule-bound decisions, and sometimes requires individuation. Both conceptions have a great deal of appeal in particular settings. The choice between the two depends largely on an investigation of the costs of decision and the costs of error. In addition, "planning costs" play a large role; where people need to be able to plan in advance, rule-bound judgments look fairer and much more attractive even if they produce significant unfairness and arbitrariness. (shrink)

The argument I defend in this paper takes for granted that the proceduralist indictment against judicial review is at least partly justifiable, and that a complete theory of democratic legitimacy will therefore attempt to address it to the greatest possible degree. I examine how the indictment can be addressed via the practice of nonparty participation, whereby members of the general public may seek participatory involvement in a court proceeding despite not being directly implicated by the dispute at issue. Through (...) this practice, courts acquire a means to expose themselves to a cross-section of societal influences, which in turn can be said to improve the legitimacy of the decisions they render from a procedural perspective. Importantly, however, such legitimacy will not be transmitted spontaneously, as if the mere fact that courts allow nonparties to participate is all that is needed to address the proceduralist's concern. The crux of my argument is that only when the practice is conceived in a particular way, and is subjected to the appropriate conditions, does it have a genuine chance of realizing its legitimating promise. (shrink)

The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the (...) thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to supply a contribution to the semantics of “constitutive,” as confined to the scope of judicial reasoning. More precisely, the aim of the paper is to inquire what links the use of “constitutive” in three distinct (seemingly unrelated) issues on adjudication, namely: (a) the procedural classification of different sorts of judicial decisions, (b) the epistemological debate on the very nature of judicial decisions, and (c) a logical query on (...) the import constitutive rules might be taken to have in affecting the sort and/or the nature of judicial decisions in which they might occur as the legal premiss, grounding the solution of the case. The attempt to fix some markers towards the semantics of “constitutive” in judicial reasoning will have Alchourrón and Bulygin's analyses as a main point of reference. (shrink)

Balancing implies a comparison among goods, values, principles and rights that cannot be ranked on a single scale of measurement, ie there is no unequivocal measuring unit applicable to all of them. In such situations, it is common to state that one has to compare incommensurable things. Indeed, this issue has been mentioned by several authors as a strong reason in favour of abandoning balancing (and proportionality) as a rational form of judicial argumentation and decision-making. My article aims at (...) arguing that this objection is based on fallacious assumptions concerning the relations among three concepts: incommensurability, incomparability and balancing. Initially, what is at stake is the analysis of the connection between comparing values (or principles) and commensurability. The results of this initial analysis were then used to provide greater analytical strength to the specific debate on balancing and comparing rights in order to show that incommensurability does not imply incomparability and that rational decisions are possible even when incommensurable values are at stake. Since balancing (and proportionality) implies comparisons, and since constitutional principles are doubtlessly incommensurable (for there is no common metric to measure them), arguing for the comparability of incommensurable principles is an unavoidable step if one aims at demonstrating that balancing may be a rational procedure after all. (shrink)

The purpose of this investigation is to establish the interference of Artificial Intelligence in the legal field, with special attention to the legal decision. For this, a descriptive analysis of its use in judicial, administrative and legislative decisions is carried out addressing scenarios of substantive, procedural and probative law in order to solve the following legal question: Is artificial intelligence an instrument to adopt legal decisions or Is it a new entity that generates legal decisions? (...) This question is developed taking into account different sources of law, including judicial pronouncements, doctrine and legislation that develops the use of artificial intelligence, which are analyzed with government and state policies that have raised their incorporation into the field of law. (shrink)

This article will argue that there is a coherent and attractive middle way between common law constitutionalism and the procedural conception of democracy, the two dominant positions on the legitimacy of strong constitutional judicial review. I will explore an intriguing alternative that decouples the legitimizing principles and institutional claims of the two dominant positions and argues that (i) democratic decision-making cannot be legitimate if it violates substantive principles of morality; and (ii) the strong form of constitutional review is (...) problematic. This article will present four theses. First, I will argue that political liberalism, properly defined, can allow us to avoid both the tyranny of the majority and the rule of Platonic guardians. Secondly, even if we can deflect both dangers, there is still real tension between the liberal principle of legitimacy and the procedural conception of democracy. Thirdly, if we accept the liberal principle of legitimacy, we have to grant a pivotal role to the epistemic credentials of our institutions. Finally, I will contend that courts should not be authorized to invalidate statutes on the ground that they violate fundamental moral principles. (shrink)

The “somewhat vague, intuitive” notion from computability theory of an effective procedure (method) or algorithm can be fairly precisely defined even if it is not sufficiently formal and precise to belong to mathematics proper (in a narrow sense)—and even if (as many have asserted) for that reason the Church–Turing thesis is unprovable. It is proved logically that the class of effective procedures is not decidable, i.e., that no effective procedure is possible for ascertaining whether a given procedure is effective. This (...) undecidability result is proved directly from the notion itself of an effective procedure, without reliance on any (partly) mathematical lemma, conjecture, or thesis invoking recursiveness or Turing-computability. In fact, there is no reliance on anything very mathematical. The proof does not even appeal to a precise definition of ‘effective procedure’. Instead, it relies solely and entirely on a basic grasp of the intuitive notion of an effective procedure. Though the result that effectiveness is undecidable is not surprising, it is also not without significance. It has the consequence, for example, that the solution to a decision problem, if it is to be complete, must be accompanied by a separate argument that the proposed ascertainment procedure invariably terminates with the correct verdict. (shrink)

Democratic theorists often distinguish between two views of democratic procedures. ‘Outcomes theorists’ emphasize the instrumental nature of these procedures and argue that they are only valuable because they tend to produce good outcomes. In contrast, ‘proceduralists’ emphasize the intrinsic value of democratic procedures, for instance, on the grounds that they are fair. In this paper. I argue that we should reject pure versions of these two theories in favor of an understanding of the democratic ideal that recognizes a commitment to (...) both intrinsically valuable democratic procedures and democratic outcomes. In instances in which there is a conflict between these two commitments, I suggest they must be balanced. This balancing approach offers a justification of judicial review on the grounds that it potentially limits outcomes that undermine democracy. But judicial review is not justifiable in any instance in which a bad democratic outcome results from democratic procedures. When the loss that would result from overturning a democratic procedure is greater than the gain to democracy that would result from ensuring against an undemocratic outcome; judicial review is not justifiable. Loss or gain to democracy is defined by the negative or positive impact of each action on the core democratic values of equality and autonomy, aspects of the democratic ideal. Even when judicial review is justified, the fact that it overturns intrinsically valuable procedures suggests that such review is never ideal from the standpoint of democracy. (shrink)

Decision theory has had a long-standing history in the behavioural and social sciences as a tool for constructing good approximations of human behaviour. Yet as artificially intelligent systems (AIs) grow in intellectual capacity and eventually outpace humans, decision theory becomes evermore important as a model of AI behaviour. What sort of decision procedure might an AI employ? In this work, I propose that policy-based causal decision theory (PCDT), which places a primacy on the decision-relevance of predictors and simulations of agent (...) behaviour, may be such a procedure. I compare this account to the recently-developed functional decision theory (FDT), which is motivated by similar concerns. I also address potentially counterintuitive features of PCDT, such as its refusal to condition on observations made at certain times. (shrink)

Despite being fairly powerful, finite non-deterministic matrices are unable to characterize some logics of formal inconsistency, such as those found between mbCcl and Cila. In order to overcome this limitation, we propose here restricted non-deterministic matrices (in short, RNmatrices), which are non-deterministic algebras together with a subset of the set of valuations. This allows us to characterize not only mbCcl and Cila (which is equivalent, up to language, to da Costa's logic C_1) but the whole hierarchy of da Costa's calculi (...) C_n. This produces a novel decision procedure for these logics. Moreover, we show that the RNmatrix semantics proposed here induces naturally a labelled tableau system for each C_n, which constitutes another decision procedure for these logics. This new semantics allows us to conceive da Costa's hierarchy of C-systems as a family of (non deterministically) (n+2)-valued logics, where n is the number of "inconsistently true" truth-values and 2 is the number of "classical" or "consistent" truth-values, for every C_n. (shrink)

I argue that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative is best interpreted as a test or decision procedure of moral rightness and not as a criterion intended to explain the deontic status of actions. Rather, the Humanity formulation is best interpreted as a moral criterion. I also argue that because the role of a moral criterion is to explain, and thus specify what makes an action right or wrong, Kant's Humanity formulation yields a theory of relevant descriptions.

The present paper puts forward a first outline of a possible agonistic theory of adjudication, conceived of as an extension of Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic theory of democracy onto the domain of the juridical, and specifically, judicial decision-making. Mouffe’s concept of the political as the dimension of inherent and unalienable conflicts (antagonisms) which, nonetheless, need to be tamed for a pluralist democracy to function, creates an excellent vantage point for a critical theory of adjudication. The paper argues for perceiving all (...) judicial decisions as having a double nature—juridical and political. Cloaked in legal form, judgments nonetheless decide on individual instances of on-going collective conflicts, opposing workers to employers, consumers to traders, tenants to landlords, moral progressives to traditionalists, minorities to majorities and so forth. Judges, when handing down judgments, enjoy a ‘relative sovereignty’, being always already inscribed into the institutional imperatives of the juridical, on one hand, and ideological influences, on the other, but at the same time called upon to decide in the terrain of the undecidable and contingent (after all, law does not ‘apply itself’ on its own). Indeed the determinacy of legal decisions is only relative: in many cases judges can, by performing a sufficient amount of legal interpretive work, reach a conclusion which will be different from theprima facieinterpretation. The collective conflicts of a various nature (economic, ideological, socio-political), once they are juridified, become the object of judicial decisions which, in light of Mouffe’s theory, can be seen as temporary hegemonic fixations. The goal of critical legal scholarship is to destabilise such hegemonies in the name of justice. This can be done not only through an external critique of the law, but also through an internal one. The methodological approach advanced in the latter part of the paper emphasises the need for a critique of judicial decisions based on the consideration of all possible alternative decisions a court could have reached, and their evaluation in the light of conflicting interests and ideologies. (shrink)

Judges have a duty to decide judicial cases, however, judicial decision will vary and will have certain characteristics depending on the kind of case at hand: this article address three kinds of judicial cases: clear cases, borderline cases and pivotal cases. The purpose: discuss if relying on these classifications is useful or not in light of the unity in judicial adjudication principle.Resumen:Los jueces tienen el deber general de resolver los casos judiciales; sin embargo, la decisión (...) class='Hi'>judicial variará y tendrá ciertas características dependiendo del tipo de caso; son tres los tipos de casos judiciales que este artículo estudia: clear cases, borderline cases y pivotal cases. El objetivo: intentar descubrir si adoptar una de las tipologías señaladas vulnera o reafirma el principio de unidad propio de la aplicación judicial. (shrink)

This article focuses on strategic manoeuvring that takes place in Dutch administrative judi- cial decisions. These decisions may be seen as a distinct argumentative activity type. Starting from the char- acteristics that traditionally are per- tinent to this activity type, I will explore how implications of current discussions on the changing task of the administrative judge may be- come manifest in the judge’s strate- gic manoeuvring by means of the presentation of argumentation and the introduction of additional stand- (...) points. The case study of Dutch administrative law serves to demon- strate what consequences changing institutional demands may have for the starting points of the analysis of argumentation in judicial decisions. (shrink)

I argue that partialist critics of deontological theories make a mistake similar to one made by critics of utilitarianism: they fail to distinguish between a theory’s decision procedure and its standard of rightness. That is, they take these deontological theories to be offering a method for moral deliberation when they are in fact offering justificatory arguments for moral principles. And while deontologists, like utilitarians do incorporate impartiality into their justifications for basic principles, many do not require that agents utilize impartial (...) methods of moral deliberation. It follows that insofar as partialists reject impartiality in deliberation, their criticisms may miss their mark. If however, partialists are opposed to justifications for basic principles that rely upon impartiality, they are committed, I argue, to drastic revisions in moral theory that have worrisome implications. (shrink)

This paper describes a decision procedure for disjunctions of conjunctions of anti-prenex normal forms of pure first-order logic (FOLDNFs) that do not contain V within the scope of quantifiers. The disjuncts of these FOLDNFs are equivalent to prenex normal forms whose quantifier-free parts are conjunctions of atomic and negated atomic formulae (= Herbrand formulae). In contrast to the usual algorithms for Herbrand formulae, neither skolemization nor unification algorithms with function symbols are applied. Instead, a procedure is described that rests on (...) nothing but equivalence transformations within pure first-order logic (FOL). This procedure involves the application of a calculus for negative normal forms (the NNF-calculus) with A -||- A & A (= &I) as the sole rule that increases the complexity of given FOLDNFs. The described algorithm illustrates how, in the case of Herbrand formulae, decision problems can be solved through a systematic search for proofs that reduce the number of applications of the rule &I to a minimum in the NNF-calculus. In the case of Herbrand formulae, it is even possible to entirely abstain from applying &I. Finally, it is shown how the described procedure can be used within an optimized general search for proofs of contradiction and what kind of questions arise for a &I-minimal proof strategy in the case of a general search for proofs of contradiction. (shrink)

Let F be the set of functions from an infinite set, S, to an ordered ring, R.

This paper proves decidability of a range of weak relevant logics using decision procedures based on the Routley-Meyer semantics. Logics are categorized as F-logics, for those proved decidable using a filtration method, and U-logics, for those proved decidable using a direct (unfiltered) method. Both of these methods are set out as reductio methods, in the style of Hughes and Cresswell. We also examine some extensions of the U-logics where the method fails and infinite sequences of worlds can be generated.

Criticism of court decisions is a favored American pastime. Typically, such criticisms are grounded in extra-legal criteria such as common sense (or lack of it) and morality (or immorality). Thus Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (1978) in which the Supreme Court halted the construction of the nearly completed Tellico Dam because it endangered the habitat of the snail darter, an action forbidden by the Endangered Species Act, was said to confound common sense; and many have called immoral Roe v. (...) Wade (1973) which said the right to abortion, at least through the first trimester, was constitutionally guaranteed. 1 However, even if such criticisms are justified, they do not address the legal issue, which is whether the court got the law wrong. (shrink)

This paper investigates the phenomenon of judicial law-making in the practice of the highest courts dealing with criminal matters in Germany and Poland on the basis of 200 of their decisions. While German jurisprudence principally acknowledges the right of the judiciary to create new law, the Polish legal theory generally rejects this notion. Still, research indicates that, in practice, the differences in the frequency and intensity with which these courts pass creative rulings are not as substantial as the (...) discrepancy in the theoretical stance would suggest. Owing to circumstances, both the German Federal Court of Justice and the Polish Supreme Court are willing to create new legal norms, but the dimensions of judicial law-making presented by these bodies deviate from each other. In the research sample, the German Federal Court of Justice was more inclined to introduce legal institutions that were foreign to the statutes and rule against the will of the lawmaker explicitly stated in the preparatory works. On the other hand, the Polish Supreme Court used logical conclusions more often, but did not also refrain from passing rulings against the clear wording of the statutory law, and was just as willing to go beyond the wording of the law as was the German Federal Court of Justice. Notably, only the German apex court is willing to openly admit that it creates new legal norms, whereas the Polish Supreme Court does not concede in the reasons that its decisions are of a law-making nature, especially when it applies so-called “interpretation in the wider sense”—which is, in essence, a “concealed” way of creating new legal norms. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a decision procedure for evaluating arguments expressed in natural language. I think that other instructors of informal logic and critical thinking might find this decision procedure to be a useful addition to their teaching resources.

We consider several natural fragments of the alternating-time temporal logics ATL* and ATL with restrictions on the nesting between temporal operators and strategic quantifiers. We develop optimal decision procedures for satisfiability in these fragments, showing that they have much lower complexities than the full languages. In particular, we prove that the satisfiability problem for state formulae in the full `strategically flat' fragment of ATL* is PSPACE-complete, whereas the satisfiability problems in the flat fragments of ATL and ATL$^{+}$ are $\Sigma^P_3$-complete. We (...) note that the nesting hierarchies for fragments of ATL* collapse in terms of expressiveness above nesting depth 1, hence our results cover all such fragments with lower complexities. (shrink)