The essay examines the ancient Greek origin of philosophy relative to the concept of wisdom. The nature of the sage is first considered. The sage is one who is deemed wise in his or her performances. But what is ‘wise’ about such performances? The Socratic denial of sage status is considered in reference to this. Socrates concludes that he is not wise as the gods are wise, but that he is wise insofar as he knows that he is not wise. (...) The apparent contradiction is resolved through the distinction between human (finite) and divine (infinite) wisdom. The latter notion is further examined in the works of Aristotle who articulates the “classical paradigm” of philosophy in pursuit of infinite wisdom. The attributes of infinite wisdom are identified, and the essay concludes with a discussion of the sagely performance of infinite wisdom, Aristotle himself serving as the representative example. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...) of experience and from this the ground of the distinction between phenomenal and representational properties is identified. (shrink)

In his doctoral dissertation On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Arthur Schopenhauer there outlines a critique of Euclidean geometry on the basis of the changing nature of mathematics, and hence of demonstration, as a result of Kantian idealism. According to Schopenhauer, Euclid treats geometry synthetically, proceeding from the simple to the complex, from the known to the unknown, “synthesizing” later proofs on the basis of earlier ones. Such a method, although proving the case logically, nevertheless fails to attain the raison (...) d’être of the entity. In order to obtain this, a separate method is required, which Schopenhauer refers to as “analysis,” thus echoing a method already in practice among the early Greek geometers, with however some significant differences. In this essay, I here discuss Schopenhauer’s criticism of synthesis in Euclid’s Elements, and the nature and relevance of his own method of analysis. (shrink)

Since Descartes, the nature of doubt has played a central role in the development of metaphysics both positively and negatively. Despite this fact, there has been very little discussion centering round the specific nature of doubt which led, for example, to the Cartesian discovery of the cogito. Certainly, the role of doubt has been well recognized: through doubt Descartes arrives at his indubitable first principle. But what can it mean to doubt the existence of the sensible world? This would seem (...) to rest upon the assumption that we have clear and distinct knowledge of the precise nature of what it means to exist and indeed of what it means to be. As it stands, Descartes’ initiates his Meditations upon certain definite assumptions that demand more thorough interrogation. In this paper and presentation, I examine the possible assumptions inherent in the Cartesian method of doubt within the first and second meditation and the manner in which this leads to the discovery of the cogito. I consider a number of essential questions in light of this: What presuppositions lie at bottom to Cartesian doubt? What is the precise nature of metaphysical doubt? What can it mean to doubt the existence of the sensible world? (shrink)

Following the Kantian critique of metaphysics, the conscious subject is discovered to be an insurmountable obstacle with respect to knowledge of things themselves. For this reason, Kant concludes that metaphysics as the science of being as being is impossible. In this essay, the possibilities of metaphysics in light of the problem of subjectivity are reexamined. The nature and relationship between the conscious subject and the embodiment of the subject is first examined. Following this, the subject’s “encounter with being” within consciousness (...) is analyzed yielding two fundamental structures that are determined to hold with respect to being in relation to the conscious subject. Further examination of the act of reflection coupled with judgment reveals that these structures may in fact be transcended, from which an encounter with being as such follows. On the basis of reflection and judgment, metaphysics is thereby determined to be possible. (shrink)

A contentious feature in the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer is his account of the Platonic Ideas. This is no doubt evidenced by the scholarly literature where various difficulties have been identified in regards to this introduction, and often varying positions maintained. Within this essay, I offer a survey of the major debates surrounding this issue. Following this, I turn to a specific question related to Schopenhauer’s claim that his own account of the Platonic Ideas is authentic to the original views (...) of Plato himself. I show that, excepting minor points of similarity, Schopenhauer’s account is quite inauthentic to that of Plato. Still more, drawing upon his distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge, I offer an interpretation of the relationship between Genius and contemplation employing the concept of a “circle of signification”. Finally, I identify some difficulties in relation to Schopenhauer’s views. (shrink)

In this thesis, I examine the perceptibility of the Platonic Ideas in the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer. The work is divided into four chapters, each focusing and building upon a specific aspect related to this question. The first chapter (“"Plato and the Primacy of Intellect"”) deals with Schopenhauer’s interpretation specific to Platonic thought. I there address the question of why it is that Schopenhauer should consider Plato to have interpreted the Ideas as 'perceptible', particularly in view of evidence which seems (...) to testify to the contrary. Does Schopenhauer misinterpret Plato, or are there sufficient grounds for considering his interpretation consistent? This is important in light of Schopenhauer’s reinterpretation of the Platonic Idea on the basis of the primacy of the will in contradistinction to Plato’'s own emphasis upon the intelligible. In effect, for Schopenhauer, Plato confuses the nature of imperceptible concepts with the more perceptually grounded Ideas. In the second chapter (“"On the Direct Path to Knowledge"”), I explore Schopenhauer’'s methodological approach on the basis of the will. I there discuss the difference between Schopenhauer and Kant with respect to Transcendental Idealism, particularly in terms of their separate analysis and derivation of the thing-in-itself. From there, I turn to a consideration of Schopenhauer'’s discussion of the nature of formal and empirical intuitions, of abstraction and the nature of universal concepts, and finally of the intuitively grounded nature of mathematical demonstration which serves as an analogy for the manner in which Schopenhauer deals with knowledge of the Ideas. In the third chapter ("“The Perceptibility of the Ideas”"), I discuss the manner in which the Ideas become accessible as the manifestation of the Will, arising through the representation of perception. There a number of distinctions are made between Ideas and concepts, as well as the nature of contemplation through Genius. The Ideas are found to be perceptible as aesthetic intuitions which relate not only to the in-itself nature inherent to phenomena, but serve also as the essential basis and foundation for all genuine forms of art. In the fourth and final chapter (“"Critical Discussion of Schopenhauer’s Ideas"”), I consider and outline a number of potential problems with respect to Schopenhauer’s analysis. In particular, Schopenhauer encounters difficulties on the basis of the simultaneous immanence and transcendence of the Ideas; of the knowledge of the Ideas characterized as intuitive while yet having a strangely abstract basis; of the unity of the will in face of the plurality of Ideas and phenomena; and finally of the annihilation of the will which creates essential problems in terms of the desideratum of knowledge itself. I here also attempt to offer various solutions to these problems where relevant. The conclusion which I arrive at in this work is that any radical reorientation of ontology must bear an essential effect upon the character and methodology of knowledge itself. In other words, Schopenhauer’s interpretation of the perceptibility of the Ideas is a direct consequence of hi s analysis of the will as the metaphysical thing-in-itself. In fact, this essential change colors his entire epistemological approach, from science and mathematics, to logic and the Ideas—from the ground the up. (shrink)

In recent times, we have seen a resurgence of interest in the application of philosophy as a therapeutic for the purpose of alleviating the existential ills of human life. Within this paper, it is argued that not only can philosophy be applied as a therapeutic, but that the very act of doing philosophy is therapeutic. The paper begins with a discussion of human nature as bound to finitude and the suffering of existence. The necessity to labor along with the need (...) for relief from labor in the form of recreation and play is then discussed. Play is thereafter distinguished from leisure, and the concept of philosophical contemplation (theoria), following Aristotle, is introduced. It is argued that the activity of contemplation results in relief from the suffering of existence, and that its exercise may in consequence be considered a kind of therapeutic. (shrink)

In recent times, we have seen a resurgence of interest in the application of philosophy as a therapeutic for the purpose of alleviating the existential ills of human life. Within this paper, it is argued that not only can philosophy be applied as a therapeutic, but that the very act of doing philosophy is therapeutic. The paper begins with a discussion of human nature as bound to finitude and the suffering of existence. The necessity to labor along with the need (...) for relief from labor in the form of recreation and play is then discussed. Play is thereafter distinguished from leisure, and the concept of philosophical contemplation, following Aristotle, is introduced. It is argued that the activity of contemplation results in relief from the suffering of existence, and that its exercise may in consequence be considered a kind of therapeutic. (shrink)

This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...) and neighbouring fields, including those of mathematics, psychology, literature and film, and neuroscience. (shrink)