Se presenta en este trabajo la traducción comentada del primer capítulo del Kitâb al-Zahra de Ibn Dâwûd de Ispahán (m. 909), recopilación poética y teoría sobre la concepción amatoria del pensamiento neoplatónico bagdadí. El texto supone una adecuación a la tradición islámica de las teorías de origen aristotélico y platónico sobre el amor, aunque fundamentada en la tradición poética de los árabes y en la preceptiva moral atribuida a Mahoma. En él se aborda, desde un punto de vista ontológico, la (...) contemplación de la belleza como objeto de afectación sensual, que es el origen de la dolencia de amor. (shrink)

Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) was one of the towering figures of Islamic intellectual history, and among Sufis still bears the title of al-shaykh al-akbar, or "the greatest master." Ibn al-'Arabī and Islamic Intellectual Culturetraces the history of the concept of "oneness of being" (wahdat al-wujūd) in the school of Ibn al- 'Arabī, in order to explore the relationship between mysticism and philosophy in Islamic intellectual life. It examines how the conceptual language used by early mystical writers became increasingly engaged over (...) time with the broader Islamic intellectual culture, eventually becoming integrated with the latter's common philosophical and theological vocabulary. It focuses on four successive generations of thinkers (Sadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, Mu'ayyad al-Dīn al-Jandī, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, and Dāwūd al-Qaysarī), and examines how these "philosopher-mystics" refined and developed the ideas of Ibn al-'Arabī. Through a close analysis of texts, the book clearly traces the crystallization of an influential school of thought in Islamic history and its place in the broader intellectual culture. Offering an exploration of the development of Sufi expression and thought, this book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of Islamic thought, philosophy, and mysticism. (shrink)

The subject of general utterances (al-lafdh al-āmm) being certain or presumptive in their usage as an indication to all their members is controversial amongst the methodists. Ḥanafī methodists suggest that the indication of general utterances to all of their members as certain and unless they are specified with a certain evidence, they can’t be specified with a presumptive evidence. Like the ḥanafī methodists, the ẓāhirī methodists also suggest that the general utterance is certain indicant for all of its members and (...) can be specified only with another evidence in the same rank. The main difference between the two groups focuses on whether al-khabar al-wāhid (single prophetic narration) is a certain or a presumptive evidence in terms of certitude. According to ḥanafīs, al-khabar al-wāhid is a presumptive evidence and unless the general utterances in Qur’ān are specified initially with another certain evidence, they can’t be specified with al-khabar al-wāhid. However, al-khabar al-wāhid is a certain evidence according to ẓāhirīs and it can specify general utterances in Qur’ān. In this study, the comparison of the views of the methodists of two schools regarding the indication of general utterances in Quran and their specification (takhsīs) with al-akhbar al-wāhid is made and their influence on Islamic Law regulations is studied afterwards. In this study, the two sect’s approaches are compared over the provision of reading al-Fatehah during prayer, the number of milk sucking to establish the kinship, the rights of women divorced with bain talaq and the execution of the death penalty in the Harem region.Summary: The purpose of this study is to try to demonstrate that an assertion in the Ph.D. thesis, The History and Doctrine of Ẓāhirī Madhhab, completed by Amr Osman in 2010 is incorrect. It can be summarized that in his study, Amr Osman claims that the affiliation of the schools to ahl-al-hadith and ahl-al-ra’y in conventional classification is wrong. According to him, contrary to what is known, the School of Ẓāhiriyya is closer to School of Ḥanafiyya rather than schools coming out of ahl-al-hadith. In this study, one of the arguments that he relied on to support his claim is studied in order to prove that his claim was inaccurate. Osman claims that ẓāhirīs are closer to ḥanifīs, based on the view that in both schools the general utterances embrace all of their members in their usage and they are a certain indicant to all of their members. At this stage, although the views of both schools are common, the ḥanifīs don’t accept the idea that the general statements of Qur’ān can be established with al-khabar-al-wāhid, those which they acknowledge as presumptive as of certitude. However, according to the ẓāhirīs, the certitude of al-khabar al-wāhid is as precise as the narrated report, so it can specify the general statements of Qur’ān which are in equal power. The related dispute between the schools has been reflected on many Islamic law regulations. Some of them are:1. Ḥanafīs state that the correct Quranic prayer may be performed by reading any or a few verses of the Qur’ān in prayer, which is a practice based on the verse “Read what you can read from the Qur’ān now”. On the other hand, the ẓāhirīs have established the related order based on the report “There is no prayer without reading Umm Al-Quran (Surah al-Fatehah)” and it is obligatory (fardh) to read Surah al-Fatehah in prayers.2. Because that the terms milk-mother and milk sister are in general form in the verse “It is forbidden to you to marry these people...Your milk-mothers who nursed you, your milk-sisters who nursed you” the ḥanafīs clarify that it is sufficient for a child to breastfeed only one time in order to form a milk-kinship. They do not act in accordance with the solitary report (al-khabar-al-wāhids) which indicate that the milk kinship specifying the verse shall only be formed with at least three or five breastfeeding. However, one of the ẓāhirīs, Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, has specified the verse with the report indicating that the kinship shall not be formed with less than three breastfeeding by the child, and Ibn Ḥazm has specified it with Salim hadith which indicates that the kinship shall be formed with five breastfeeding.3. According to ḥanafīs, there is an alimony and inhabiting right of the widow woman to be procured by the husband within the period of delay who divorced her either with irreversible divorce (talāq al-bāin) or reversible divorce (talāq al-ric‘ī) according to the generalization of the verse “Give shelter to them (the women you have divorced) in some part of your household within your capacity.” They did not act with the report of Fātima binti Qays, who specified the generalization of the verse. On the other hand, the ẓāhirīs recognize the abovementioned rights only for the women who got divorced with irreversible divorce or the ones who are pregnant, specifying the verse with the report indicating that His Holiness the Prophet does not grant alimony and inhabiting to the woman who was divorced with reversible divorce.4. According to ḥanafīs, the criminal who committed a crime that would require a death penalty and took refuge in the Harem region could not be executed while in Ḥarem, according to the common statement of the verse, “Whoever enters there, will be safe.” Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, one of the ẓāhirīs has specified the verse with the report indicating that His Holiness the Prophet has authorized the execution of the sentence to Ibn Khattal in Ḥarem on the day of the conquering of Mecca and he states that the death sentence can be executed wherever the criminal is caught, even if it is inside the Harem. Ibn Ḥazm shares the same view with ḥanafīs regarding the provision of this issue. However, the reason for his opinion stems from the fact that the report about Ibn Khattal was an event specific to that day. As it is seen, even though the ḥanefīs and ẓāhirīs share the same opinion about the general utterances being a certain indicant to all their members, they have disagreements upon the argument about the general utterances of Quran being specified by al-khabar al-wāhid and many Islamic Law regulations have been issued by these schools based on such disagreements. According to us, in the final analysis, Amr Osman’s claim must be met with caution. (shrink)

As in every religious issue, the two main resources of Islām which are the Qur’ān and the Sunnah/ḥadīths are the first reference sources for deciding the things that are forbidden by Islam. There is no evidence in the Qur’ān that suggests specific types of animals are forbidden to eat except pork. Other than pork, only the animals which are slaughtered without the name of Allah, their blood and their carcass are forbidden to consume. Except these restricted ill-gotten meats, in the (...) Qur’ānic verses there are no other limitations referring to different animals. However, in Ḥadīth sources there are some narratives referring to the Prophet Muḥammad, implying that He named some other forbidden animals beside the ones specified in the Qur’ān. Collecting the narratives and evaluating them as a whole will contribute for a better understanding of the rules and principles of prohibitions that the Prophet Muḥammad imposed on this issue. Moreover, it will help to identify whether those rulings on some animals are unconditional and world-wide or cause-related and thus changeable according to the conditions. Furthermore, in this matter, although some animals‘ meat are not mentioned as forbidden in the Qur’ān, they are banned by the Prophet Muḥammad. This brings the need to highlight the importance of the capacity of the Prophet Muḥammad on deciding what is permissible (ḥalāl) and forbidden (ḥarām) in the religion.SummaryWhile the authority for determining what is ḥalāl (lawful) and what is ḥarām(forbidden) belongs essentially to Allah, the Prophet Muḥammad is also authorized to appoint what is ḥalāl-ḥarām by Allah.Authority of the Prophet Muḥammadrelated to the issue is not absolute and stems from the Qur’ān. Ḥalāland ḥarāmin the Qur’ān prescribed by Allah can be included in the concepts of maʿrūf (right) - munkar (wrong) andṭayyibāt (clean) - hkabāis (filthy). It is understood that the Prophet Muḥammadgrounded his commands in the concept of hkabāis.Prohibitions related to animal meats in the Qur’ānare limited to four: carcass, blood, pork and animals, which are not slaughtered in the name of Allah. However, in the Ḥadīth resources there are some narratives about the Prophet’s prohibition on consuming some types of animals other than the forbidden animals specified in the verses. These narratives can be classified in three titles:1. Animals, which are prohibited to be eaten 2. Animals, which are prohibited because of the way they are fed and slaughtered3. The matter of prohibition of the animals, which are commanded or forbidden to be slaughtered by the Prophet Muḥammad.At the end of the studies conducted based upon ḥadīth resources, in particular Kutūb al-Sittah (the well-known six ḥadīth books), it has been discovered that the animals, which are mentioned as not being permissible in the narratives, they are limited to domesticated donkey and the species of “predatory animals, predatory birds”, namely wolf, fox and cat. Even though the narratives about hyena imply as eatable, hyena is included in this article as it’s a predatory animal.The narratives regarding the prohibition of meat of domesticated donkey were transferred by approximately twenty Companions in respect to the time of the Battle of Khyber. This prohibition is generally stated in the ḥadīthresources as: “We were having dire hunger at the nights of Khyber. When the day for Khyber came, we encountered domesticated donkeys. We immediately slaughtered them. When we put the meat in the pot and started to boil it, crier of the Prophet Muḥammadcalled “Knock over the pots and don’t eat any of the donkey meat”. Regarding the issue there are such statements of some Companions like “we were banned from eating domesticated donkey”, “The Prophet banned the meat of domesticated donkey” among the narratives about the ban. In addition to a large number of narratives about the prohibition of domesticated donkey meat, there are two narratives related to permission of the Prophet for eating domesticated donkey and a narrative that Ibn ‘Abbās did not accept the ban. One of the said narratives is not among the narratives in the Kutūb al-Sittah while the other one is stated solely in the Sunanof Abū Dāwūd and thought to be acceptable by the traditionists. Even though this narrative’s authenticity is accepted, it is understood that there is an implication for the permission based on a necessity. According to the narrative, Ibn ʿAbbās referred to 145thverse of the surah al-An’am as a proof to his view saying “What ḥalālis what Allah allowed, what ḥaramis what Allah forbidden and the things about which there is no judgement of Allah are mubāḥ (permissible)”. As for us, the fact that Ibn ʿAbbās did not accepted the prohibition implies that he did not recognize the Prophet’s command related to the prohibition as an absolute prohibition. The conveyances of many Companions, which are consistent with each other, about the Prophet’s prohibition on eating domesticated donkey during the Battle of Khyber, proved that the prohibition was applied. Even though there is no dispute about prohibiting domesticated donkey, it is controversial whether the prohibition is absolute, constant or provisional based on certain reasons. It is more reasonable to accept that this prohibition was provisional and it was based on certain reasons. Because there are many narratives bearing information that this prohibition was due to several reasons and this is a situation which needs to be considered. Accordingly, there are three reasons, nearly all of which are attributed to judgement of the Companions. These were the facts that domesticated donkey was used in transportation; it used to eat filth and it was slaughtered/consumed without distributing booty/paying taxes. The seeking of the Companions for any reason for this prohibition indicates that they needed to comprehend this prohibition and that the prohibition is not absolute and constant.There is no explanation neither in the resources where the narratives are included nor in the annotation about when, where, why and in which context the prohibition regarding the predatory animals was realized. It is highly possible to assume that the Prophet prohibited these animal as they eat carcass. Another interesting issue within this regard is the fact that there are narratives and views indicating permissibility of eating hyena, which is a predatory, while predatory animals are forbidden in the narratives. Statements of the Prophet related to permissibility of eating hyena, which are considered authentic by traditionists and information about the Arabs who used to eat hyena and some of the Companions who praised eating hyena indicate that urf (custom) has a primary and decisive role about permissibility of eating meats. Regarding this matter about the hyenas, the narratives pointing out some Companions like ʿĀʾisha bint Abī Bakr and Ibn ‘Abbās who viewed prohibition of animals other than the prohibited animals in the Qur’an as inapplicable and other issues referring to the dispute indicate that prohibition of the Prophet Muḥammadfor predators can not be accepted as an absolute and unquestionable prohibition. Some of the prohibitions mentioned in ḥadīth narratives, except these animals, stem from the way of feeding and slaughtering of some animals. It is understood that consuming meat and milk of the animals that eat filth is prohibited in order to abstain from the things harming human health and mujassam (killing an animal with an arrow, etc. by fastening it as a target) is prohibited as carcass is banned and it is not permissible to torture and harm animals. Some of the prohibitions are related to the some animals, which were allowed and banned to slaughter by the Prophet. As the Prophet commanded some animals to be slaughtered and some animals not, meat of these animals was considered as forbidden. There is a dispute among the scholars, whilst there is not any statement of the Prophet about whether the animals included in this group can be eaten or not. It is seen that the Prophet ordered to slaughter some of the animals and prohibited to slaughter some other animals based on several reasons. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine several commentaries and glosses on the prolegomenon of Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī’s (d. 675/1276–77) Shamsiyya that relate to debates on the Aristotelian and Ibn Sīnān theory of science in the postclassical period. Chief among the commentaries of the Shamsiyya is Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 766/1365) Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya. This commentary, rather than the base text of the Shamsiyya, set the stage for later interpretations by Mirak al-Bukhārī (fl. 733/1332), Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Qāshānī (d. 755/1354), Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (...) (d. 792/1390), al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), Dāwūd al-Khwāfī (fl. 839/1465) and ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī (d. 945/1538). I focus on three issues that were raised in these interpreta­tions of the Shamsiyya’s prolegomenon: (1) the place of the elements of sciences in logical corpus, (2) the notion of the prolegomenon and its content, and (3) the real essence of a science. I attend to the particular debates and contentions on these issues to reveal the general idea of science at that time. (shrink)

The Islamic thought has experienced many ruptures in history. One of them is the Mihna period. The main argument of the mihna period, which started during the reign of the Abbasid Khalifa Me'mun, was the issue of the khalq al-Qur'an. The leading figures of the period were dictated to accept the idea that the Qur'an was created. Those who took an opposing stance were oppressed and tortured. In this period, people like Ahmed b. Hanbal, who did not bow to oppresion, (...) were made heroic by the people. This time, the reverse Mihna period started and those who spoke about the people of the Qur'an were criticized. Many of the muhaddith considered the approach to the issue of the khalq al-Qur'an as a bid'ah. This situation has created a field of criticism for people and segments who do not like each other. For this reason, unfair perceptions have been created about some people and their authorities in the society have been targeted with unfounded claims. Therefore, it is important to consider the approaches of Islamic scholars or sects to the subject objectively and to evaluate them in this context. In this study, the approaches of Dâwûd az-Zâhirî (d. 270/884), the founder of the Zâhirî sect, who were negatively affected by the situation in question, and other Zâhirî scholars to 'khalq al-Qur'an' were examined. In addition to the perception made about them, it is aimed to determine the accuracy of the discourses attributed to them. In this context, first of all, the views attributed to them are (i) The Qur'an in our hands, which consists of paper and ink, is not created, whereas the Qur'an in the preserved tablet is not created. (ii) The Qur'an is muhdes (created). (iii) The Qur'an is muhdes, and it is a creature in terms of its pronunciation. (iv) When the Qur'an is recited, the pronunciation that occurs as a result of the movements made by the servant to extract the letters has been classified as creature. These discourses attributed to them were compared with the information found in the works of Zâhirî scholars and it was determined whether they were consistent or not. As a result of the researches, Dâwûd az-Zâhirî, who was in Nishapur during the years when the mihna process continued, expressed some discourses about the creation of the Qur'an; however, with the end of the mihna, it was concluded that he gave up his discourses in question. Ibn Abi Asim (d. 287/900), Ibn Niftawayh (d. 323/935), Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), and Ibn al-Kaysarani (d. 507/1113), who are among the apparent scholars, have openly stated that the Qur'an is not a creature and they also blaspheme those who claim otherwise. In addition, it has been observed that the perception made independently of the correctness or falsity of the discourses attributed to them negatively affects the Zâhirî scholars in many ways. For example, it is because of this that Zâhirî scholars who are exposed to such perceptions lose value both in the eyes of the public and in the scientific assemblies. (shrink)

The Arabic philosophical fable _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _is a classic of medieval Islamic philosophy. Ibn Tufayl, the Andalusian philosopher, tells of a child raised by a doe on an equatorial island who grows up to discover the truth about the world and his own place in it, unaided—but also unimpeded—by society, language, or tradition. Hayy’s discoveries about God, nature, and man challenge the values of the culture in which the tale was written as well as those of every contemporary society. (...) Goodman’s commentary places _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _in its historical and philosophical context. The volume features a new preface and index, and an updated bibliography. “One of the most remarkable books of the Middle Ages.”—_Times Literary Supplement_ “An enchanting and puzzling story.... The book transcends all historical and cultural environments to settle upon the questions of human life that perpetually intrigue men.”—_Middle East__ Journal_ “Goodman has done a service to the modern English reader by providing a readable translation of a philosophically significant allegory.”—_Philosophy East and West_ “Add[s] bright new pieces to an Islamic mosaic whose general shape is already known.”—_American Historical Review_. (shrink)

Hadiths that have been discussed in this paper consist of narrations regarding divine attributes and having some problematic meanings between supporters of Bişr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī. These narrations were mostly accepted denounced (munkar) by Bişr al-Marīsī and his sopporters due to having an anthropormophist and corporealist content about God. They rejected divine attributes according to their understanding of God based on incomparability (tanzīh) which provided by Mutazilite approach towards divine attributes even though they conveyed some features of Ahl al-Ra’y. (...) They found contradicted of attributing human features to God based on their tanzīh understanding, therefore, they interpreted such this kind of narra-tions in terms of their approach or rejected at all. At the other hand, a hard Hadith scholar Uth-man al-Darimi believed that one should accept divine attributes as they are in the Qur’an and Sunna. According to his belief, he considered the explicit meanings of the narrations without interpretation of divine attributes, and based on his perpective he denied Bişr al-Marīsī and his supporters’ interpretations claiming they would cause divesting God of all attributes (ta‘tīl). He argues that these narrations should be taken into considerations based on their explicit mea-nings. The discussions on these hadiths are important due to showing different approaches of scholars from the schools of Ahl al-Ra’y and the ones from Ahl al-Hadith towards the hadith du-ring the period when the main Hadith works were collected. Discussions on the narrations stu-died in this paper reveal two schools’ understandings of divine issues, their approaches to divi-ne attributes, as well inform us their perspectives of hadith in general.Summary: The present paper examines the debates between ʿUthmān al-Dārimī (d. 280/894) and the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833) on the divine attributes mentioned in some hadiths in the period when the main hadith books were composed (i.e., III/IXth century). These debates that took place between the scholars of Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Ra’y concern the un-derstanding and interpretation of the hadiths in a certain way.It could be stated that the debates focus on how the hadiths should be understood, or whether it is the explicit meaning of the words or the possible methaphorical meanings beyond them that should be considered.It is worth briefly introducing the parties who discussed the hadiths studied here. The aforementioned discussions about some hadith narrations are between the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, one of the important figures of the Ahl al-Hadith who wrote a separate work on these hadiths. This work was written as a rejection of the views of Bishr al-Marīsī and his two students on the attributes of God and some issues regarding hadith.Bishr al-Marīsī was regarded as an important scholar of Kalam who received fiqh education from Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798). He is a scholar of Ahl al-Ra’y who made scientific dis-cussions with many scholars including Imam al-Shafiʿī (d. 204/820). He was on the council of the Caliph Al-Mamūn (d. 218/833) and had a significant role in the adoption of the idea of the createdness of the Qurʾān (khalq al-Qurʾān).Uthmān al-Dārimī,on the other hand, was a scholar of Ahl al-Hadith who learned ha-dith from the authorities of his era such as Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn (d. 233/847), ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī (d. 234/848), Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh (d. 237/851), and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). Having visited all the important cities for the training of hadith, he learned the hadiths and conveyed them.With the understanding of proving the divine attributes and the opposition of the misin-terpretation of the narratives related to them, the groups advocating the appropriation of these lines in accordance with the understanding of incomparability (tanzīh) have complied the works since the first period. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the rejection of the divine attributes by Mu'tazila was influential in the emergence of the criticism literature of the Ahl al-Hadith and many authors wrote works in this direction.Regarding a narration by Abū Hurayra, an opponent reports that this narration gives the impression that God has the eyes and ears as we know. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī reports that this hadith proves sight and hearing not the eyes and ear organs. He indicates that God has no like by no means. Therefore, it is slanderous to refer the claim that Allah is made of organs to the Ahl al-Hadith. Abū Dāwūd states that with this hadith the attributes of sight and hearing for God are proved and Jahmiyya’s denial of the divine attributes are rejected.The opponent also considered Abū Hurayra's narration referring to the Prophet: "Faith is from Yemen, wisdom is from Yemen! I feel the breath of your Lord from Yemen!" as denounced (munkar). Because, according to Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions, breath can only come from those with an abdominal cavity, and Allah is free from it. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the opponent misunderstood. What is meant here is the wind that blows from Yemen and comforts people. In the context of this narration, we see that supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī evaluate the narrative literally, while ʿUthmān al-Dārimī interpret the narrative.Regarding the narration, "You can not approach Allah with something more virtuous than what comes out of it (the Qur'ān)" Ibn al-Saljī reports that Mushabbiha understands this as one with an abdominal cavity and from whom speech comes out. This understanding is in-valid since God is "samad" in the sense that He has no void. With this hadith, it is meant that the Qur'ān comes out of Allah’s presence rather than Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the real aim of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny God's attribute of speech. There is no doubt that the Qur'ān comes from Him, and those who do not accept it merely deny His attribute of speech.Attributed to Ibn Abbas; The meaning of "yamīn Allah" (the right hand of Allah) in narration "Black Stone (al-ḥajar al-aswad) is the right hand of Allah on earth, handshakes with the people" is not the right hand that we know according to Ibn al-Saljī, it is blessing and grace of Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who acknowledges that Black Stone is not meant to be a hand, the purpose of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny the two hands mentioned in the verses and ha-diths about Allah with invalid interpretations.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who criticized that Ibn al-Saljī quoted from another narration which Ibn Abbās heard from the Prophet, says that such poor narrations should not be spread. In addition, he points out that Ibn al-Saljī's interpretation is ugly and he criticizes it. Because Allah who is mentioned in the narrative is depicted as a young man with curly hair in a green suit. Such a narration is also an untrustworthy narration as it contradicts the authentic narrations of the Prophet. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who made this assessment of the narration, rejects the com-ments that the opponent made about the narration. According to the opponent, the phrase "I have come to Allah" means "to come into the presence of Allah in the Garden of Eden." Accor-ding to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī’s understanding, such complicated hadiths should not be only narra-ted.About the narration that are based on the Prophet and he does not know the answer to what he has come to know of himself, then he feels the coolness of his fingers as he puts his hand on his back and learns everything, the opponent evaluates the following: He was not Allah who came to the Prophet, but a well-behaved angel who was being directed by Allah and he was the angel who put his hand. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī rejects this interpretation of that oppo-nent. This comment is also contrary to other authentic hadiths. After he refused to the com-ment of the opponent about relevant narration, ʿUthmān al-Dārimī stated that he could not trust this comment on the basis of the authentic narrations he mentioned.Salaf scholars have preferred to be silent in this regard, as it is seen among the most difficult subjects to talk about divine attributes. However, subsequent generations have held dif-ferent paths in this regard. The basic approaches to understanding the divine attributes can be summarized in three main titles: tafwīd, tashbīh, and ta’wīl. Tafwīd is the path adopted by the early salaf scholars and means to leaving the knowledge about Allah’s entity and attributes to His knowledge. Tashbīh means to compare Allah to the created or the created to Allah. Ta'wīl is to interpret the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths that give the impression that Allah is like the crea-tures with semantics and rational deduction. The ones who deny the adjectives are called as Muʿattila and those who prove their attributes are called as Sifatiyya. According to Ahl al-Ra’y, it is necessary to appropriately make interpretation (ta'wīl) of the attributes giving the impression of anthropomorphism in terms of the dictionary. In the divine attributes, Muʿtazila advoca-ted the incomparability (tanzīh), whereas Ashʿariyya and Māturīdiyya adopted interpretation in accordance with incomparability. Mushabbiha and the Wahhābī-Salafī understanding has also taken the expressions regarding divine attributes with their explicit meanings.The debate between the scholars who lived in the ages II/VIII and III/IX, when the most important works are composed in the science of hadith, is important in that it is the first turn. In addition to this, the debate also contains important information on the approach to the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths, in that it shows two basic approaches, one of which represents the school of Ahl al-Ra’y, and the other represents the school of Ahl al-Hadith.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī generally advocates adhering to the explicit meaning of the narra-tion, while Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions criticize the narration labeling it as denied (mun-kar) or making an interpretation. On rare occasions, the places where ʿUthmān al-Dārimī re-jects the narration and makes interpretation, or where Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions de-fend the narrative can be seen.Interpretations made by Bishr al-Marīsī on the problematic narratives have influenced on the next scholars. Alongside Muʿtazilite scholars such as al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916), Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024) and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), his interpretations have been quoted by Sunni scholars such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210).The fact that the truth can be put forward in the science of hadith, which is based on the narration, does not favor one of the "narration" and "ra’y", it should be kept in mind that both of these depend on the proper and balanced use of both. To reveal the truth, the narration is in need of the opinion and the opinion (ra’y) is in need of the narration. Narration and opinion sho-uld be seen as complementary elements, not each other's opponents. (shrink)

A translation of the Fons vitae of Solomon ibn Gabirol (born 1021/1022), who was the first Jewish philosopher in Spain. In the Fons vitae, Gabirol argues that there is a sensible and an intelligible world. These doctrines profoundly influenced medieval Christian thinkers. Because of the Fons vitae, Gabirol is today widely recognized as one of the greatest Jewish Neoplatonists.

Dâwûd al-Qarisî (Dâvûd al-Karsî) was a versatile and prolific 18th century Ottoman scholar who studied in İstanbul and Egypt and then taught for long years in various centers of learning like Egypt, Cyprus, Karaman, and İstanbul. He held high esteem for Mehmed Efendi of Birgi (Imâm Birgivî/Birgili, d.1573), out of respect for whom, towards the end of his life, Karsî, like Birgivî, occupied himself with teaching in the town of Birgi, where he died in 1756 and was buried next to (...) Birgivî. Better known for his following works on Arabic language and rhetoric and on the prophetic traditions (hadith): Sharḥu uṣûli’l-ḥadîth li’l-Birgivî; Sharḥu’l-Ḳaṣîdati’n-nûniyya (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Şarḥu’l-Emsileti’l-mukhtalifa fi’ṣ-ṣarf (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Sharḥu’l-Binâʾ; Sharḥu’l-ʿAvâmil; and Sharḥu İzhâri’l-asrâr, Karsî has actually composed textbooks in quite different fields. Hence the hundreds of manuscript copies of his works in world libraries. Many of his works were also recurrently printed in the Ottoman period. One of the neglected aspects of Karsî is his identity as a logician. Although he authored ambitious and potent works in the field of logic, this aspect of him has not been subject to modern studies. Even his bibliography has not been established so far (with scattered manuscript copies of his works and incomplete catalogue entries). This article primarily and in a long research based on manuscript copies and bibliographic sources, identifies twelve works on logic that Karsî has authored. We have clarified the works that are frequently mistaken for each other, and, especially, have definitively established his authorship of a voluminous commentary on al-Kâtibî’s al-Shamsiyya, of which commentary a second manuscript copy has been identified and described together with the other copy. Next is handled his most famous work of logic, the Sharhu Îsâghûcî, which constitutes an important and assertive ring in the tradition of commentaries on Îsâghûcî. We describe in detail the nine manuscript copies of this work that have been identified in various libraries. The critical text of Karsî’s Sharhu Îsâghûcî, whose composition was finished on 5 March 1745, has been prepared based on the following four manuscripts: (1) MS Kayseri Raşid Efendi Kütüphanesi, No. 857, ff.1v-3v, dated 1746, that is, only one year after the composition of the work; (2) MS Bursa İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, No.794B, ff.96v-114v, dated 1755; (3) MS Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri Efendi Arapça, No. 1752, ff.48v-58r, dated 1760; (4) MS Beyazıt Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt, No. 3129, ff.41v-55v, dated 8 March 1772. While preparing the critical text, we have applied the Center for Islamic Studies (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, İSAM)’s method of optional text choice. The critical text is preceded by a content analysis. Karsî is well aware of the preceding tradition of commentary on Îsâghûcî, and has composed his own commentary as a ‘simile’ or alternative to the commentary by Mollâ Fanârî which was famous and current in his own day. Karsî’s statement “the commentary in one day and one night” is a reference to Mollâ Fanârî who had stated that he started writing his commentary in the morning and finished it by the evening. Karsî, who spent long years in the Egyptian scholarly and cultural basin, adopted the religious-sciences-centered ‘instrumentalist’ understanding of logic that was dominant in the Egypt-Maghrib region. Therefore, no matter how famous they were, he criticized those theoretical, long, and detailed works of logic which mingled with philosophy; and defended and favored authoring functional and cogent logic texts that were beneficial, in terms of religious sciences, to the seekers of knowledge and the scholars. Therefore, in a manner not frequently encountered in other texts of its kind, he refers to the writings and views of Muhammad b. Yûsuf al-Sanûsî (d.1490), the great representative of this logical school in the Egyptian-Maghrib region. Where there is divergence between the views of the ‘earlier scholars’ (mutaqaddimûn) like Ibn Sînâ and his followers and the ‘later scholars’ (muta’akhkhirûn), i.e., post-Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî logicians, Karsî is careful to distance himself from partisanship, preferring sometimes the views of the earliers, other times those of the laters. For instance, on the eight conditions proposed for the realization of contradiction, he finds truth to be with al-Fârâbî, who proposed “unity in the predicative attribution” as the single condition for the realization of contradiction. Similarly, on the subject matter of Logic, he tried to reconcile the mutaqaddimûn’s notion of ‘second intelligibles’ with the muta’akhkhirûn’s notion of ‘apprehensional and declarational knowledge,’ suggesting that not much difference exists between the two, on the grounds that both notions are limited to the aspect of ‘known things that lead to the knowledge of unknown things.’ Karsî asserts that established and commonly used metaphors have, according to the verifying scholars, signification by correspondence (dalâlat al-mutâbaqah), adding also that it should not be ignored that such metaphors may change from society to society and from time to time. Karsî also endorses the earlier scholars’ position concerning the impossibility of quiddity (mâhiyya) being composed of two co-extensive parts, and emphasizes that credit should not be given to later scholars’ position who see it possible. According to the verifying scholars (muhaqqîqûn), it is possible to make definition (hadd) by mentioning only difference (fasl), in which case it becomes an imperfect definition (hadd nâqis). He is of the opinion that the definition of the proposition (qadiyya) in al-Taftâzânî’s Tahdhîb is clearer and more complete: “a proposition is an expression that bears the possibility of being true or false”. He states that in the division of proposition according to quantity what is taken into consideration is the subject (mawdû‘) in categorical propositions, and the temporal aspect of the antecedent (muqaddam) in hypothetical propositions. As for the unquantified, indefinite proposition (qadiyya muhmalah), Karsî assumes that if it is not about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a particular proposition (qadiyya juz’iyyah); but if it is about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyyah). This being the general rule about the ambiguous (muhmal) propositions, he nevertheless contends that, because its subject (mawdû‘) is negated, it is preferable to consider a negative ambiguous (sâliba muhmalah) proposition like “human (insân) is not standing” to be a virtually/potentially universal negative (sâliba kulliyyâh) proposition. He states that a disjunctive hypothetical proposition (shartiyya al-munfasila) that is composed of more than two parts/units is only seemingly so, and that in reality it cannot be composed of more than two units. Syllogism (qiyâs), according to Karsî, is the ultimate purpose (al-maqsad al-aqsâ) and the most valuable subject-matter of the science of Logic. For him, the entire range of topics that are handled before this one are only prolegomena to it. This approach of Karsî clearly reveals how much the ‘demonstration (burhân)-centered’ approach of the founding figures of the Muslim tradition of logic like al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ has changed. al-Abharî, in his Îsâghûjî makes no mention of ‘conversion by contradiction’ (‘aks al-naqîd). Therefore, Karsî, too, in his commentary, does not touch upon the issue. However, in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd Karsî does handle the conversion by contradiction and its rules. Following the method of Îsâghûjî, in his commentary Karsî shortly touches on the four figures (shakl) of conjuctive syllogism (qiyâs iqtirânî) and their conditions, after which he passes to the first figure (shakl), which is considered ‘the balance of the sciences’ (mi‘yâr al-‘ulûm), explaining the four moods (darb) of it. In his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd, however, Karsî handles all the four figures (shakl) with all their related moods (darb), where he speaks of fife moods (darb) of the fourth figure (shakl). The topic of ‘modal propositions’ (al-muwajjahât) and of ‘modal syllogism’ (al-mukhtalitât), both of which do not take place in the Îsâghûjî, are not mentioned by Karsî as well, either in his commentary on Îsâghûjî or in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd. Karsî proposes that the certainties (yaqîniyyât), of which demonstration (burhân) is made, have seven, not six, divisions. After mentioning (1) axioms/first principles (awwaliyyât), (2) observata/sensuals (mushâhadât), (3) experta/empiricals (mujarrabât), (4) acumenalia (hadthiyyât), (5) testata (mutawâtirât), and (6) instictives (fitriyyât), that is, all the ‘propositions accompanied by their demonstrations,’ Karsî states that these six divisions, which do not need research and reflection (nazar), are called badîhiyyât (self-evidents), and constitute the foundations (usûl) of certainties (yaqîniyyât). As the seventh division he mentions (7) the nazariyyât (theoreticals), which are known via the badîhiyyât, end up in them, and therefore convey certainty (yaqîn). For Karsî, the nazariyyât/theoreticals, which constitute the seventh division of yaqîniyyât/certainties, are too numerous, and constitute the branches (far‘) of yaqîniyyât. Every time the concept of ‘Mughâlata’ (sophistry) comes forth in the traditional sections on the five arts usually appended to logic works, Karsî often gives examples from what he sees as extreme sûfî sayings, lamenting that these expressions are so widespread and held in esteem. He sometimes criticizes these expressions. However, it is observed that he does not reject tasawwuf in toto, but excludes from his criticism the mystical views and approaches of the truth-abiding (ahl al-haqq), shârî‘â-observant (mutasharri‘) leading sufis who have reached to the highest level of karâmah. (shrink)

The Arabic philosophical fable _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _is a classic of medieval Islamic philosophy. Ibn Tufayl, the Andalusian philosopher, tells of a child raised by a doe on an equatorial island who grows up to discover the truth about the world and his own place in it, unaided—but also unimpeded—by society, language, or tradition. Hayy’s discoveries about God, nature, and man challenge the values of the culture in which the tale was written as well as those of every contemporary society. (...) Goodman’s commentary places _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _in its historical and philosophical context. The volume features a new preface and index, and an updated bibliography. “One of the most remarkable books of the Middle Ages.”—_Times Literary Supplement_ “An enchanting and puzzling story.... The book transcends all historical and cultural environments to settle upon the questions of human life that perpetually intrigue men.”—_Middle East__ Journal_ “Goodman has done a service to the modern English reader by providing a readable translation of a philosophically significant allegory.”—_Philosophy East and West_ “Add[s] bright new pieces to an Islamic mosaic whose general shape is already known.”—_American Historical Review_. (shrink)

Abū al-Ḥajj¿j Yūsuf b. Muḥammad Ibn Ṭumlūs (Alhagiag Bin Thalmus, d. 620/1223) was a philosopher, physician and direct disciple of Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198), who lived and practiced rational sciences in Alzira and Marrakesh, a quarter of a century after the demise of his teacher. Ibn Ṭumlūs was not Ibn Rushd's only student who engaged in work on logic, but one of dozens of disciples, suggesting that the supposed simultaneous death of the latter's philosophy is "grossly exaggerated". As a (...) valuable window into the practice of logic in 13th century al-Andalus and the Maghreb, Ibn Ṭumlūs' Compendium on Logic (Al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-manṭiq) covers all the parts of "the expanded Organon", as it was known since al-F¿r¿bī (d. 339/951). The present volume offers a complete critical Arabic edition of this work, with an English and Arabic introduction, notes and indices. (shrink)

Solomon Ibn Gabirol The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae) TRANSLATED BY Harry E. Wedeck WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY Theodore ...

Solomon Ibn Gabirol The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae) TRANSLATED BY Harry E. Wedeck WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY Theodore E. James L ...

Zahirites; Islamic philosophy; knowledge, theory of (Islam).

... as the source of life for the intellectually oriented Jews of the Western world. As such it suffered almost complete sterility right from the start. ...

First published in 2008. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The concept of science moulded by the Islamic world was shaped by the Koran and the Greek notion of science, transmitted through translations of Greek texts into Arabic. Ibn Hazm’s repre-sentation of science and philosophy is based on that very concept. He is the first Andalucian we find whose extant texts recognise the value of the sciences.

A critical edition of "Tahdhīb Al-Akhlāq", a treatise ascribed to the Jacobite theologian, logician, and translator in Abbasid period, Yahya ibn Adi.

Purpose Corporate social responsibility communication on corporate websites have become an emerging trend by firms. Similarly, corporate websites have been used to manage stakeholders’ impressions about the organization. Meanwhile, CSR by firms have been criticized for been a manipulative tactics used by firms. The purpose of this paper therefore is to ascertain how telecommunication companies operating in Ghana communicate CSR on their corporate websites. Design/methodology/approach This study used a qualitative content analysis technique. It also used Bolino et al.’s impression management (...) framework as the conceptual framework. Data were extracted from the websites of four telecommunication companies operating in Ghana. Data were analyzed using thematic analysis techniques. Findings The results show that the companies use impression management in communicating CSR on their corporate websites. Account, assertive impression management; blaring, boasting, defensive impression management; demonstrative impression management; exemplification, favor-rendering, illustrative impression management; ingratiation, other-enhancement, other-focused impression management; self-enhancement, self-focused impression management; and self-promotion tactics are tactics prevalent in the CSR communication of the companies. Actor-to-actor link impression management and other emotional appeal also emerged as some of the impression management tactics used by the companies. Originality/value This provides insights into how organizations use impression management in their CSR communication on their corporate websites. Studies of this nature are limited. Again, studies specifically adapting Bolino et al.’s impression management to study CSR communication on corporate websites are rare. (shrink)

Translation of the section on metaphysics in Sabzavari's "Sharh al-manzumah fi al-hikmah," a commentary on his poem "Ghurar al-fara'id," both originally written in Arabic.

Ibn Khaldûn is one of the outstanding thinkers about the nature of society and politics in the pre-modern Arab world. This volume presents the political writings of the 14th-century philosopher, stressing their enduring relevance and exploring how his theory fits our own times.

The narration of tashahhud being a conversation between Allah, the Prophet and the angels is quite common among people. This article examines the authenticity of this narration and questions whether it has an informative value. In this context, the research undertaken in Hadith, Siyar, Tafsīr and Fiqh sources resulted that the narration was not stated in the hadith books -with sanad (the chain of narrators) or without sanad. The first and only summary version of the script was included in the (...) commentary of Thaʿlebī (d. 427/1035), which has very problematic sanads. The first narration without sanad but having a full text (matn) was narrated by Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273). It appears that various commentators of hadith, fuqahāʾ (expert in Islamic jurisprudence), mufassirs (commentators on the Qur’ān) and historians followed Thaʿlabî and Qurṭubī by narrating from them. In fact, these group of scholars did not specify a sanad for the narration but they usually used tamrīd forms (a form which shows that the hadith is weak or deficient), which suggests that they also did not convinced that the narrarion was makbūl (accepted). On the other hand, the fact that this narration did not accompany authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) hadiths on the emergence of tashahhud narrated by hadith scholars, such as Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, Nasāʾī and Ibn Mājah, which also indicates another problem with this narration. Summary: The narration on the emergence of the prophetic prayer that is called tashahhud in the fiqh literature as it includes the word shahadah (testimony) and known as “al-tahiyyat” and “tahiyyat” is constantly transmitted among people. According to this narration, the Prophet (pbuh) praised Allāh by saying “al-taḥiyyātu lillāhi wa-al-salawātu wa-al-ṭayyibāt” on the night of Miʿrāj when he met Allāh. Our Lord responded to him by saying “al-salāmu ʿalayka ayyuhan-Nabiyyu wa-raḥmatullāhi wa-barakātuhu”. The honorable Prophet also included his ummah in this prayer by saying “al-salāmu ʿalayna wa-ʿalā ʿibād Allāh al-ṣāliḥīn” and the Gabriel (and/or angel community) who witnessed this greeting said “ashhadu an lā illāha illallāh wa-ashhadu anna Muḥammadan ʿabduhu wa-rasūluhu.”This article examines the authenticty of the narration and whether it has an informative value. The findings of the research undertaken in hadith, siyar, tafsir and fiqh sources suggests that the narration was not included in any hadith books with sanad or without sanad. The first and only narration with sanad is found in Thaʿlabī’s tafsīr titled al-Kasfh wa-al-bayān. However, it is a summary version of the narration and its sanads are very problematic. In this tafsīr, Thaʿlabī combines two different chains of narrators in one text. The sanads of these two narrations combined by Thaʿlabī as follows:1. Sanad: Zuhrī → Ibn Salimah b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān → Jābir b. ʿAbdullāh → Prophet (pbuh).2. Sanad: Suddī → Muḥammad b. al-Sāib → Bāzān → Ibn ʿAbbās → Prophet (pbuh).The identity of Ibn Salimah mentioned in the first sanad is disputed. The rijāl (literally; men, refers to knowledge of men/narrators) scholars, such as Ibn Abī Ḥātim stated that he is a man whose memory is corrupted in his old age. In the second sanad there are three dhaʽīf (weak) narrators, namely Suddī, Muḥammad b. al-Sāib and Bāzān. Ibn Abī Ḥātim stated that some parts of Kalbī’s (Muḥammad b. al-Sāib) narration with ṭarīkh (synonym of sanad) of Bāzān from Ibn ʿAbbās was fabricated. Moreover, Thaʿlabī who narrated these two sanads in his tafsīr was accused of being conveying fabricated narrations in his books.As far as we can ascertain, Qurṭubī narrated the first narration of this story without sanad and without referring to a source. However, he narrated the full version of the text. Similarly this narration was also transmitted by Suhaylī and ʿAlī al-Qārī without sanad and a reference but they transmitted it by seperating into two slightly different texts. According to Suhaylī’s text in al-Ravḍ al-Unuf, angels stated “al-salāmu ʿalayka ayyuhan-Nabiyyu wa-raḥmatallāhi wa-barakātuhu” not Allāh. According to ʿAlī al-Qārī’s text in Sharḥ al-Shifa, when Allāh Said “al-salāmu ʿalayka ayyuhan-Nabiyyu wa-raḥmatallāhi wa-barakātuhu”, the Prophet (pbuh) responded by saying: “Allāhumma anta al-Salām wa-minka al-Salām wa-ilayka yarjiuʿ al-Salām, al-Salām alaynā wa-alā ibād Allāh al-sālihīn.” It is clear that there are disputes about the contents of some sentences as well as their subjects in the text of Tashahhud’s narration.The full text and summary versions of this narrarion can be found in tafsīr books, such as Rāzī's Mafātiḥ al-ghayb, Samarqandī's Baḥr al-ʿulūm and Bursavī's Rūḥ al-bayān; in fiqh books, such as Bābartī's al-ʿInâyah, Ḥaddād's al-Javharah al-nayyirah, ʿAynī’s al-Bināyah, Molla Khusraw’s Durar al-ḥukkām, Jamal’s Futūḥāt al-Wahhāb and Bujayramī’s al-Tajrīd; and in various hadith commentaries and in some siyar books. The authors of these books did not mention sanads of their narrations and they usually used tamrīd forms. This suggests that they also did not consider this narration as authentic. On the other hand, the fact that all narrations transmitted in these books are not compatible with those authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) hadiths about the emergence of tashahhud, which were reported by muhaddiths, such as Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, Nasāī and Ibn Mājah. This also indicates another problem with this narration. The authentic hadiths on the issue as follows: 1. Bukhārī→Musaddad→Yaḥyā→Aʿmash→Shaqīq→Ibn Masʿūd: He said:When we prayed with the Messenger of Allāh (pbuh), we used to say: “Peace (al-Salām) be upon Allāh, peace be upon Jibrīl, peace be upon Mikāʿīl.” The Messenger of Allāh (pbuh) said: “Do not say: Peace (al-Salām) be upon Allāh, for Allāh is al-Salām.” Rather say: “al-taḥiyyātu lillāhi wa-al-salawātu wa-al-ṭayyibāt, al-salāmu ʿalayka ayyuhan-Nabiyyu wa-raḥmatallāhi wa-barakātuhu. Al-salāmu ʿalayna wa-ʿalā ʿibād Allāh al-ṣāliḥīn, ashhadu an lā ilāha illallāh wa-ashhadu anna Muḥammadan ʿabduhu wa-rasūluhu (Allāh compliments, prayers and pure words are due to Allāh. Peace be upon you, O Prophet, and the mercy of Allāh and his blessings. Peace be upon us and upon the righteous slaves of Allāh. I bear witness that none has the right to be worshipped except Allāh and I bear witness that Muḥammad is His slave and Messenger.”2. Bukhārī→Abū Nuaym→Sayf→Mucāhid→Abū Maʿmar ʿAbdullāh b. Saḥbarah→Ibn Masʿūd: He said:Allāh’s Messenger (pbuh) taught me Tashahhud as he taught me a sūrah (chapter) from the Qur’ān, while my hand was between his hands. (Tashahhud was): “All the best compliments and the prayers and the good things are for Allāh. Peace and Allāh’s Mercy and Blessings be on you, O Prophet! Peace be on us and on the pious slaves of Allāh, I testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allāh, and I also testify that Muhammad is Allāh’s slave and His Apostle.” (We used to recite this in the prayer) during the lifetime of the Prophet (pbuh), but when he had died, we used to say: “Peace be on the Prophet.”As a result, it is unlikely that the Prophet (pbuh) did not touch upon the relationship between the Miʿrāj and the Tashahhud while teaching it. It is also unlikely that his companions who narrated this occasion did not mention about this important detail although they had such knowledge. Indeed, hadith scholars did not include the narrations that associated tashahhud with the Miʿrāj but they reported two other aforementioned narrations on the emergence of the Tashahhud in their books, which raises doubts over the authenticity of the relevant narration in question. (shrink)