In this 1958 book, Professor Hanson turns to an equally important but comparatively neglected subject, the philosophical aspects of research and discovery.

We have been discussing some of the fundamental features of the classical calculus of probability. The equiprobability of rival events was seen to be a major assumption of the calculus. Moreover, it is an assumption which the pure mathematician need not bother to justify. He need only present his formal system as follows.

Originally published in 1963, The Concept of the Positron forms a detailed analysis of quantum theory. Whilst it is not as well known as Professor Hanson's previous book, Patterns of Discovery, the text has many interesting aspects. In many ways it goes further than Hanson's earlier work in approaching the problems of theory competition and the rationality of science, topics that have since become central to the philosophy of science. It is also notable for a rigorous and forthright defence of (...) the Copenhagen Interpretation. Taken together, the ideas presented in this book constitute a first-rate achievement in the history and philosophy of science. This paperback reissue comes with a new preface from Matthew Lund, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Rowan University. (shrink)

History of science and philosophy of science are not logically related: to claim that they are would be either to underestimate or to misunderstand the genetic fallacy. But one risk of inferring that there is no connection at all between the two is the risk that philosophers of science may not know what they are talking about. The philosopher of science who does not know intimately the history of the scientific problem with which he is exercised may be discussing no (...) genuine state of affairs. On the other hand, The historian and philosopher of science are both concerned with the structure of scientific ideas, And these concerns are fused into one when the scientific "argumentation" of the past is the issue. (staff). (shrink)

1. The philosophical version of the primary-secondary distinction concerns (a) the 'real' properties of matter, (b) the epistemology of sensation, and (c) a contrast challenged by Berkely as illusory. The scientific version of the primary-secondary distinction concerns (a') the physical properties of matter, (b') a contrast essential within the history of atomism, and (c') a contrast challenged by 20th century microphysics as de facto untenable. 2. The primary-secondary distinction within physics can be interpreted in two ways: a. it can refer (...) to content; e.g. 'Matter has the properties of mass, shape, density... etc. -- it only appears to have the properties of warmth, fragrance, etc.' Or, b. it can refer to form; e.g. 'Whatever properties our best theories accord to primary matter, e.g., electrons, these are by definition primary. All other properties of, e.g., macromatter, are derivative.' Concerning 2.a., this interpretation is simply false when 17th, 18th, or 19th century values for the property-variables are introduced. Concerning 2.b., this either uninformative or misleading. It is uninformative when it constitutes no more than a decision to use the word 'primary' as an umbrella-word for all the properties contemporary micro-physics accords to fundamental material particles, whatever these may be. It is misleading when it turns on an implicit contrast between certain properties particles may be said to have when 'harnessed' to a detector, and certain other properties these particles have when free and unharnessed to any detector. This contrast does not exist. Quantum-theoretic information is always about particles-and-their-detectors-in-combination. Dissolve this combination and you destroy any possible knowledge of the particle. Hence the notion of 'completely objectifiable properties of particles' is in principle unsound. (shrink)

The conceptual excitement of science often seems geared only to work in contemporary physics. Thus, philosophers regularly discuss current cosmology, relativity, or the foundations of microphysics. In these areas one's philosophy is stretched and strained far beyond what our ancestors might have anticipated. Historians of science have also focused attention on past events by remarking their analogies and similarities with perplexities in physics today. But there are statements, hypotheses and theories of the past which are rewarding in themselves, without having (...) to be referred to the agonies which now confound quantum theory and cosmology. Specifically, the First Law of Motion--the "Law of Inertia"--this has everything a logician of science could look for. Understanding the complexities and perplexities of this fundamental mechanical statement is in itself to gain insight into what theoretical physics in general really is. With this in view a study of the law is undertaken. (shrink)

Within the past decade there has grown an acute and highly articulate group of critics of the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory,--the so-called "Copenhagen Interpretation." The writings of people like Bopp, Janossy, and particularly Bohm and Feyerabend, must be taken very seriously indeed. The future of some important discussions in the philosophy and the logic of science rests with these individuals. But they have, in their own writings, occasionally matched the inelegancies of Bohr and Heisenberg with as many inelegancies of (...) their own. The present paper is meant to present a quintet of considerations which may possibly lead to a reassessment of the issues between Bohr, Heisenberg, and their critics, especially Bohm and Feyerabend. (shrink)

Is there such a thing as a ‘Logic of Discovery’? Do we even have a consistent idea of such a thing? The approved answer to this seems to be “No.” Thus Popper argues “The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it.” Again, “… there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process.” (...) Reichenbach writes that philosophy of science “… cannot be concerned with [reasons for suggesting hypotheses], but only with [reasons for accepting hypotheses].” Braithwaite elaborates: “The solution of these historical problems involves the individual psychology of thinking and the sociology of thought. None of these questions are our business here.”. (shrink)

I. In some celebrated passages, the Physics conveys to us that.

This third volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science contains papers which are based upon Colloquia from 1964 to 1966. In most cases, they have been substantially modified subsequent to presentation and discussion. Once again we publish work which goes beyond technical analysis of scientific theories and explanations in order to include philo sophical reflections upon the history of science and also upon the still problematic interactions between metaphysics and science. The philo sophical history of scientific ideas has (...) increasingly been recognized as part of the philosophy of science, and likewise the cultural context of the genesis of such ideas. There is no school or attitude to be taken as de fining the scope or criteria of our Colloquium, and so we seek to under stand both analytic and historical aspects of science. This volume, as the previous two, constitutes a substantial part of our final report to the U. S. National Science Foundation, which has continued its support of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science by a grant to Boston University. That report will be concluded by a subse quent volume of these Studies. It is a pleasure to record our thanks to the Foundation for its confidence and funds. We dedicate this book to the memory of Norwood Russell Hanson. During this academic year of 1966-67, this beloved and distinguished American philosopher participated in our Colloquium, and he did so before. (shrink)

That I shall never meet myself coming towards me is clearly true. It will never happen. But, Weiss notwithstanding, there is a real need to bother with a demonstration. For that he can say of the assertion above, that it is both absurd and material and that its denial is material and certain, significant and indubitable, this makes at least one of his readers feel unsure of the grounds for his claim. In one philosophical tradition Weiss would appear to have (...) mixed the logical levels of his predicates. And while the error may turn out to reside in that philosophical tradition and not in Weiss's argument, nothing less than a demonstration one way or the other will settle the matter. If what he says is true, then a demonstration of his point should offer no difficulties. But, it might be argued that if Weiss's claim is a material one, then it cannot be logically certain. If, on the other hand, it is indubitable, then it cannot be material. (shrink)

In thirty years the science of elementary particles has made few achievements compared with its unsuccessful essays. The recent works of Schwinger, Tomonaga, Feynman and Dyson, however, have had some success. We have here a hint that progress is being made on the formal side of the discipline—though even this work is profoundly disturbing in some of its purely mathematical aspects. There could be no better time to review the situation from a physical and philosophical standpoint, even if this proves (...) to be an over-ambitions undertaking. (shrink)