The author applies the methodology of scientific research programmes to the origins of relativity, showing how Eddington, Lorentz, Poincare, Planck and Weyl were driven by mathematical heuristics to make their various contributions to Einstein's programme.

Structural Realism (SSR), as embodied in the Ramsey-sentence H* of a theory H, is defended against the view that H* reduces to a trivial statement about the cardinality of the domain of H, a view which arises from ignoring the central role of observation within science. Putnam’s theses are examined and shown to support rather than undermine SSR. Finally: in view of its synthetic character, applied mathematics must enter into the formulation of H* and hence be shown to be finitely (...) axiomatisable; this is done in the Appendix, which is the most important part of the paper. (shrink)

The Ramsey-sentence H* of any hypothesis H is shown to be a synthetic proposition containing mathematics as a finite component. Far from being quasi-tautological, H* proves to have as much physical content as H itself.

Proofs and Refutations is essential reading for all those interested in the methodology, the philosophy and the history of mathematics. Much of the book takes the form of a discussion between a teacher and his students. They propose various solutions to some mathematical problems and investigate the strengths and weaknesses of these solutions. Their discussion raises some philosophical problems and some problems about the nature of mathematical discovery or creativity. Imre Lakatos is concerned throughout to combat the classical picture of (...) mathematical development as a steady accumulation of established truths. He shows that mathematics grows instead through a richer, more dramatic process of the successive improvement of creative hypotheses by attempts to 'prove' them and by criticism of these attempts: the logic of proofs and refutations. (shrink)

La conviction d’Elie Zahar est que le matérialisme et le platonisme sont non seulement compatibles, mais même nécessairement liés : pour un anti-idéaliste au moins, la matière n’est pas un pur chaos informe, elle est informée, et ces formes sont intrinsèquement mathématiques, ou « mathématisables ». Tout est matière, mais la matière est écrite en langage mathématique.Ce n’est donc pas simplement d’une « introduction à la philosophie des sciences » qu’il s’agit dans ce qui suit, mais d’une philosophie de la (...) connaissance ouvrant sur une théorie du sens, une théorie du sujet et une ontologie. (shrink)

Es wird die Frage nach dem Ursprung des Konventionalismus aufgeworfen und ein Versuch ihrer Beantwortung unternommen. Die Entstehung des Konventionalismus wird auf das Versagen der philosophischen Grundlegung befremdender, aber auch empirisch erfolgreicher wissenschaftlicher Hypothesen zurückgeführt. Auch verdankt der moderne Positivismus seinen Aufschwung zum Teil der Unvereinbarkeit solcher Hypothesen mit herrschenden metaphysischen, bzw. religiösen, Weltanschauungen. Dies führt zum Versuch, die ontologischen Voraussetzungen wissenschaftlicher Theorien auszuklammern, ohne dadurch ihren empirischen Gehalt zu verringern. Im letzten Abschnitt wird dargetan, daß sowohl der moderne Positivismus (...) wie auch der Realismus in verschiedenen Aspekten der Kantschen Transzendentalphilosophie wurzeln. (shrink)

La conviction d’Elie Zahar est que le matérialisme et le platonisme sont non seulement compatibles, mais même nécessairement liés : pour un anti-idéaliste au moins, la matière n’est pas un pur chaos informe, elle est informée, et ces formes sont intrinsèquement mathématiques, ou « mathématisables ». Tout est matière, mais la matière est écrite en langage mathématique.Ce n’est donc pas simplement d’une « introduction à la philosophie des sciences » qu’il s’agit dans ce qui suit, mais d’une philosophie de la (...) connaissance ouvrant sur une théorie du sens, une théorie du sujet et une ontologie. (shrink)

In this paper I try to explain why Lakatos’s (and Popper’s) conventionalist view must be replaced by a phenomenological conception of the empirical basis; for only in this way can one make sense of the theses that the hard core of an RP (Research Programme) can be shielded against refutations; that this metaphysical hard core can be turned into a set of guidelines or, alternatively, into a set of heuristic metaprinciples governing the development of an RP; and that a distinction (...) can legitimately be made between novel predictions and facts to which a theory might have been adjusted post hoc. Two basic metaprinciples are finally examined: the (conservative) Correspondence Principle and various (revolutionary) symmetry requirements; both of these heuristic devices illustrate the fundamental role which, according to Lakatos, mathematics plays in the progress of empirical science. (shrink)

No philosopher has argued as forcefully and as convincingly for the fallibility of human knowledge as Hans Albert has done in his classic Traktat über kritische Vernunft. He exposed all those who, through a process of immunization, make some chosen aspects of their knowledge impervious to all criticism.