The human fovea is known for its distinctive pit‐like appearance, which results from the displacement of retinal layers superficial to the photoreceptors cells. The photoreceptors are found at high density within the foveal region but not the surrounding retina. Efforts to elucidate the mechanisms responsible for these unique features have ruled out cell death as an explanation for pit formation and changes in cell proliferation as the cause of increased photoreceptor density. These findings have led to speculation that mechanical forces (...) acting within and on the retina during development underly the formation of foveal architecture. Here we review eye morphogenesis and retinal remodeling in human embryonic development. Our meta‐analysis of the literature suggests that fovea formation is a protracted process involving dynamic changes in ocular shape that start early and continue throughout most of human embryonic development. From these observations, we propose a new model for fovea development. (shrink)

If “perfectionism” in ethics refers to those normative theories that treat the fulfillment or realization of human nature as central to an account of both goodness and moral obligation, in what sense is “human flourishing” a perfectionist notion? How much of what we take “human flourishing” to signify is the result of our understanding of human nature? Is the content of this concept simply read off an examination of our nature? Is there no place for diversity and individuality? Is the (...) belief that the content of such a normative concept can be determined by an appeal to human nature merely the result of epistemological naiveté? What is the exact character of the connection between human flourishing and human nature? These questions are the ultimate concern of this essay, but to appreciate the answers that will be offered it is necessary to understand what is meant by “human flourishing.” “Human flourishing” is a relatively recent term in ethics. It seems to have developed in the last two decades because the traditional translation of the Greek term eudaimonia as “happiness” failed to communicate clearly that eudaimonia was an objective good, not merely a subjective good. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RECLAIMING LIBERALISM * DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN St. John's University Jamaica, New York Through the shift of emphasis from natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the individual, the ego, had become the center and origin of the moral world, since man-as distinguished from man's end-had become that center or origin. -Leo Strauss T:HE CONCEPTION of individuality that lies at the oundation of natural rights classical liberalism has been (...) a arget of criticism for some time. This is not news. What is news and what is becoming more apparent to those who examine the issue is that the alternatives Strauss presents in the above quotation are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, as I and my colleague, Douglas J. Den Uyl, have recently observed: Making the individual the moral center of the universe does not require that one accept nominalism, mechanism, or hedonism, nor does accepting essentialism, teleology, and eudaimonism... require rejecting individualism. It is possible for the fulfillment of the individual to be interpreted in terms of the requirements for human wellbeing. There can be a view of the ego or self that is neither otherwordly nor Hobbesian, but Aristotelian. Further, the achievement of man's natural end need not be interpreted along Platonic lines. There is no such thing as the flourishing of "man." There is only the flourishing of individual men. The human good neither exists apart from the chokes and actions of individual human beings nor independent of the particular " mix " of goods that the individual human being must determine as appropriate for his circumstances. *This essay is based on a paper presented at a meeting of the American Association for the Philosophic Study of Society, American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) convention, December 29, 1991 in New York City. This meeting was devoted to David L. Norton's book Democracy and Moral Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 109 110 DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN Strauss's dichotomy betrays a disturbing tendency, often found among proponents of natural right and natural law, to reify the concept " natural end " and make it some good that competes with the good of individual human beings.1 David L. Norton in his recent work, Democracy and Moral Development, has also noted the nonexclusivity of Strauss's alternatives. Conditioned as we are by modernity's conception of the individual, the question of replacing avarice as the thematic motivation in lives of persons is likely to leave us at a loss. What else could possibly serve? The purpose of this book is to propose the eudaimonistic answer, and that answer is love in the meaning of Eros. Thus understood, love is not exclusively or primarily interpersonal; it is first of all the right relationship of each person with himself or herself. The self to which love is in the first instance directed is the ideal self that is aspired to and by which random change is transformed into the directed development we term growth. When the ideal of the individual is rightly chosen, it realizes objective values that subsisted within the individual as innate potentialities, thereby achieving in the individual the self-identity that is termed "integrity" and that constitutes the foundation of other virtues.2 Norton desires to reconceptualize the individualism historically associated with classical liberalism so as both to retain the gains of classical liberalism and to overcome its moral minimalism. According to Norton, the crucial problem with the conception of individuality historically associated with classical liberalism is that it is "non-developmental," or rather, there is only development within a single stage, namely, for self-preservation. There is nothing more. There is no standard of self-perfection by which to distinguish satisfaction of desire from satisfaction of right desire -no way to distinguish Socrates's satisfaction from that of a fool's. Norton thus seeks to replace classical liberalism's non-developmental conception of individuality with a eudaimonistic conception of the individual. 1 Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uy!, Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991), pp. 2 Democracy and Moral Development, p. 40. 92-93. RECLAIMING LIBERALISM 111 By replacing classical liberalism's conception of individuality with a... (shrink)

How can we establish a political/legal order that in principle does not require the human flourishing of any person or group to be given structured preference over that of any other? Addressing this question as the central problem of political philosophy,_ Norms of Liberty_ offers a new conceptual foundation for political liberalism that takes protecting liberty, understood in terms of individual negative rights, as the primary aim of the political/legal order. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue for construing individual rights as (...) metanormative principles, directly tied to politics, that are used to establish the political/ legal conditions under which full moral conduct can take place. These they distinguish from normative principles, used to provide guidance for moral conduct within the ambit of normative ethics. This crucial distinction allows them to develop liberalism as a metanormative theory, not a guide for moral conduct. The moral universe need not be minimized or morality grounded in sentiment or contracts to support liberalism, they show. Rather, liberalism can be supported, and many of its internal tensions avoided, with an ethical framework of Aristotelian inspiration—one that understands human flourishing to be an objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, social, and self-directed activity. (shrink)

It is considered in some quarters that hypothesis‐driven methods are the only valuable, reliable or significant means of scientific advance. Data‐driven or ‘inductive’ advances in scientific knowledge are then seen as marginal, irrelevant, insecure or wrong‐headed, while the development of technology—which is not of itself ‘hypothesis‐led’ (beyond the recognition that such tools might be of value)—must be seen as equally irrelevant to the hypothetico‐deductive scientific agenda. We argue here that data‐ and technology‐driven programmes are not alternatives to hypothesis‐led studies in (...) scientific knowledge discovery but are complementary and iterative partners with them. Many fields are data‐rich but hypothesis‐poor. Here, computational methods of data analysis, which may be automated, provide the means of generating novel hypotheses, especially in the post‐genomic era. BioEssays 26:99–105, 2004. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Perceptual experience seems to involve distinct intentional and qualitative features. Inasmuch as one can visually perceive that there is a Coke can in front of one, perceptual experience must be intentional. But such experiences seem to differ from paradigmatic intentional states in having introspectible qualitative character. Peacocke argues that a perceptual experience’s qualitative character is determined by intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. But and also argues that perceptual experiences have nonconceptual representational content in addition to conceptual content and nonrepresentational sensational properties. He (...) thus distinguishes between conceptual, nonrepresentational, and nonconceptual but representational aspects of perceptual experience. I will argue that Peacocke posits too much. Contrary to his arguments, the sensational properties Peacocke claims are nonrepresentational are best construed as representational; they are best explained in terms of their relation to the perceptible properties they enable us to perceive. Since sensational properties are arguably nonconceptual, they are best construed as nonconceptual representational properties. I offer the Homomorphism View of sensory qualities, pioneered by Sellars , as a unified account of qualitative character and nonconceptual sensory representation. According to this view, a sensory quality represents a perceptible stimulus property in virtue of resembling and differing from other sensory qualities in ways parallel to the ways the stimulus property resembles and differs from other perceptible properties. (shrink)

Aristotle's way of thinking has normally been understood as hostile to any liberal, pluralistic, or commercial society. In Liberal Nature, Rasmussen and Den Uyl set out to show that the Aristotelian approach to ethics supports the natural rights which form the most secure basis for liberal principles. The authors lay the foundations for their thesis by rebutting the most prominent arguments against the Aristotelian approach; they then offer a new interpretation for Aristotelian ethics as a natural-end ethics in which human (...) flourishing is the ultimate moral standard. (shrink)

Physicians are expected to engage patients as partners in identifying the possible benefits and harms associated with treatment options and selecting from among medically appropriate treatment options, rather than simply dictating what treatments patients will and will not receive. This collaborative model reflects the recognition that citizens in multicultural societies have diverse values and are likely to have different views about whether the possible benefits of a medical intervention outweigh the possible harms. However, there are circumstances in which the collaborative (...) process breaks down due to irresolvable disagreement. Especially challenging are cases in which patients are expected to die if they do not receive a treatment and either the patients or their surrogates insist on the treatment despite the physician's belief that providing it is ill advised. The source of disagreement is often differing appraisals of the risks and potential benefits. In such cases, physicians generally judge that there is insufficient likelihood or magnitude of benefit to justify the burdens or expense of treatment, while patients or surrogates believe that the small chance of preventing the patient's death is sufficient to justify the costs and potential burdens to the patient.There is a perception that surgeons enjoy considerable discretion in deciding when the risks of a procedure outweigh the expected benefits. An important contrast can be drawn between surgeons and intensivists—physicians who specialize in the medical management of critically ill patients. We will argue that there are good reasons for subjecting the decisions of both surgeons and intensivists to some oversight. We begin by showing that, for many cases, major professional society guidelines for intensivists recommend oversight via a procedural mechanism rather than unilateral decision‐making by individual clinicians. Next, we present reasons for adopting a procedural approach to dispute resolution, and we argue that these reasons apply to situations in which intensivists believe that patients or surrogates are requesting inappropriate life support as well as to many disagreements between surgeons and surrogates. Finally, we present and respond to several objections. (shrink)

Douglas B. Rasmussen examines, in this revised and extended version of his 1990 address to the Ayn Rand Society, whether Rand's ethics are best interpreted as dependent on a "pre-moral" choice. He argues that such an interpretation undercuts Rand's claim to provide a rational foundation for ethics. He suggests an alternative, neo-Aristotelian interpretation of Rand's ethics, which treats "man's survival qua man" as the telos of human choice and takes the obligation to achieve this ultimate end as the result (...) of its being the good for human beings. (shrink)

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This essay presents a brief summary of the Sen/Nussbaum conception of liberalism, offers some main points of criticism, and contrasts their conception of human flourishing and politics with an alternative one. The ultimate aim will be to show that they do not advance the cause of liberalism properly understood but actually retreat from it. The “human capabilities argument,” “public reasoning,” “internalist essentialism,” and other key concepts are discussed. The paper concludes that Sen and Nussbaum fail to adequately defend the premises (...) of the human capabilities argument and that their argument invites a retreat from liberalism. Moreover, on their theory individuals have no basis upon which to erect borders for their resources or themselves and to say to any and all that some areas are off limits no matter who may benefit. Rather, there is only the relentless and enforced pursuit of capabilities. (shrink)

Benjamin Lipscomb (The Women Are Up to Something) and Clare Mac Cumhaill and Rachel Wiseman (Metaphysical Animals) have written books discussing the same four women philosophers—Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch—and their rise to prominence in the almost exclusively male-dominated academies of Oxford and Cambridge universities. This review focuses on these philosophers’ intellectual contributions, with special attention given to the Aristotelian character of their views in the face of an opposing philosophical regimen. We conclude with a brief (...) reflection on Ayn Rand’s moral philosophy in light of the contributions made by these four women philosophers. (shrink)

It is more than clear that in our previous works—Norms of Liberty and The Perfectionist Turn—we are opposing what is generally understood as egalitarianism in political philosophy. Our purpose here is to clarify our opposition by showing that our rejection of egalitarianism cannot be successfully accused of being inconsistent with morality itself. We believe that discussing what we call “two dogmas of egalitarianism” will go some distance in accomplishing that end. These “dogmas” can be stated as follows: (1) The burden (...) of proof for any deviation from equality in ethics rests upon the advocate of inequality; and (2) One's position on the natural equality (or inequality) of human beings requires a similar position in one’s ethical conclusions. (shrink)

This study examined the efficacy of corrected feedback for improving consent recall throughout the course of an ongoing longitudinal study. Participants were randomly assigned to either a corrected feedback or a no-feedback control condition. Participants completed a consent quiz 2 weeks after consenting to the host study and at months 1, 2, and 3. The corrected feedback group received corrections to erroneous responses and the no-feedback control group did not. The feedback group displayed significantly greater recall overall and in specific (...) content areas. Results support the use of corrected feedback for improving consent recall. (shrink)

On September 1, 2023, Texas made important revisions to it its decades‐old statute granting legal safe harbor immunity to physicians who withhold or withdraw life‐sustaining treatment over the objection of critically ill patients’ surrogate decision‐makers. However, lawmakers left untouched glaring flaws in a key safeguard for patients—the transfer option. The transfer option is ethically important because, when no hospital is willing to accept the patient in transfer, that fact is taken as strong evidence that the surrogates’ treatment requests fall outside (...) accepted medical practice. But there are serious shortcomings in how the transfer option is carried out in Texas and many other states, which undermines the ethical usefulness of the process. We identify these shortcomings and recommend revisions to state statutes and professional guidelines to overcome them. (shrink)

Collecting information that one expects to be useful is a powerful way to facilitate learning. However, relatively little is known about how people decide which information is worth sampling over the course of learning. We describe several alternative models of how people might decide to collect a piece of information inspired by “active learning” research in machine learning. We additionally provide a theoretical analysis demonstrating the situations under which these models are empirically distinguishable, and we report a novel empirical study (...) that exploits these insights. Our model-based analysis of participants' information gathering decisions reveals that people prefer to select items which resolve uncertainty between two possibilities at a time rather than items that have high uncertainty across all relevant possibilities simultaneously. Rather than adhering to strictly normative or confirmatory conceptions of information search, people appear to prefer a “local” sampling strategy, which may reflect cognitive constraints on the process of information gathering. (shrink)

A considerable number of areas of bioscience, including gene and drug discovery, metabolic engineering for the biotechnological improvement of organisms, and the processes of natural and directed evolution, are best viewed in terms of a ‘landscape’ representing a large search space of possible solutions or experiments populated by a considerably smaller number of actual solutions that then emerge. This is what makes these problems ‘hard’, but as such these are to be seen as combinatorial optimisation problems that are best attacked (...) by heuristic methods known from that field. Such landscapes, which may also represent or include multiple objectives, are effectively modelled in silico, with modern active learning algorithms such as those based on Darwinian evolution providing guidance, using existing knowledge, as to what is the ‘best’ experiment to do next. An awareness, and the application, of these methods can thereby enhance the scientific discovery process considerably. This analysis fits comfortably with an emerging epistemology that sees scientific reasoning, the search for solutions, and scientific discovery as Bayesian processes. (shrink)

There is nothing new or even faintly original in the neoconservative foreign policy vision. It simply recycles the old national security ideology for a post-Cold War era. Consistent with this ideological agenda, conservatives have also been advancing the case for the strong executive who operates above the law. In championing the principle of the strong executive, they are seeking to re-define the meaning of modern republicanism around this principle. During the 1960s Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau developed a broad critique (...) of the national security state and its ideology in their opposition to the Vietnam War. This essay examines their critique, and the alternative conception of republicanism they developed as part of this critique. (shrink)

The Theory of Multidimensional Reality is the latest development of this information theory of existence by the Author. The book applies the theory to explain what causes light, gravity, time, Planck's constant, and other phenomena found in physics. The Theory provides a foundation philosophy for all of science to explain some of the hardest phenomenon found.

This essay examines the relationship between human choice and Rand's ethical standard for moral goodness and obligation. It shows that the neo-Aristotclian interpretation of Rand's ethics—an interpretation that does not accept the doctrine of "premoral choice" but instead claims that flourishing as a rational animal is the telos of human life and choice—is crucial to the viability of her ethical theory. The defenders of premoral choice confuse the conceptual order with the real and, despite their intentions, make Rand's ethics into (...) a voluntarist ethics, that is, an ethics in which reason is subordinate to will. (shrink)

In response to Robert Hartford's criticisms of his Spring 2006 Journal of Ayn Rand Studies essay, "Regarding Choice and the Foundations of Morality," Rasmussen argues against "the official" interpretation of Rand's ethics as resting on a basic "choice to live." Drawing from his work with Douglas Den Uyl, Rasmussen argues that Rand's metaethics is best understood in "biocentric," neo-Aristotelian terms: that human choice does not set the context in which it operates and that "man's life qua man" is the (...) natural end of human life. (shrink)

In response to Robert Hartford's criticisms of his Spring 2006 Journal of Ayn Rand Studies essay, "Regarding Choice and the Foundations of Morality," Rasmussen argues against "the official" interpretation of Rand's ethics as resting on a basic "choice to live." Drawing from his work with Douglas Den Uyl, Rasmussen argues that Rand's metaethics is best understood in "biocentric," neo-Aristotelian terms: that human choice does not set the context in which it operates and that "man's life qua man" is the (...) natural end of human life. (shrink)