In Descartes's Meditations, one of the key texts of Western philosophy, the thinker rejects all his former beliefs in the quest for new certainties. Discovering his own existence as a thinking entity in the very exercise of doubt, he goes on to prove the existence of God, who guarantees his clear and distinct ideas as a means of access to the truth. He develops new conceptions of body and mind, capable of serving as foundations for the new science of nature. (...) Subsequent philosophy has grappled with Descartes's legacy, questioning many of its conclusions and even his basic approach, but his arguments set the agenda for many of the greatest philosophical thinkers, and their fascination endures.This new translation includes the Third and Fourth Objections and Replies in full, and a selection from the rest of Descartes's exchanges with contemporaries that helped to shape and expound his philosophy. (shrink)

Dans les Principia philosophiae, publies pour la premiere fois en latin en 1644, Descartes expose sous une forme synthetique ce que les analyses des Meditations et du Discours avaient mis a jour, a savoir l'articulation entre les principes generaux de la connaissance humaine, les principes des sciences et ses decouvertes sur la structure du monde physique. C'est dans la Lettre-preface a son traducteur francais, l'abbe Picot, qu'apparait aussi la celebre conception de la philosophie comme une arborescence, a partir des (...) racines metaphysiques, en un tronc de la physique puis trois branches principales que constituent la medecine, la mecanique et la morale. Filant la metaphore, Descartes vise le dernier degre de la sagesse comme le fruit ultime de cette croissance organique du savoir: Or comme ce n'est pas des racines, ni du tronc des arbres, qu'on cueille les fruits, mais seulement des extremites de leurs branches, ainsi la principale utilite de la philosophie depend de celles de ses parties qu'on ne peut apprendre que les dernieres. (shrink)

Écrites entre 1628 et 1629, avant le Discours de la Méthode, les Règles pour la Direction de l’Esprit sont le premier des grands ouvrages philosophiques de Descartes et sont donc, à plusieurs égards, un texte fondateur. Descartes y expose sa méthode par une énumération de règles qu’il convient de suivre pour guider l’esprit dans la recherche de la vérité. Ce texte, certes inachevé, permet déjà de saisir l’importance et la portée de la méthode de Descartes, qui dessine, en opposition à (...) la scolastique, une nouvelle conception de la science dans laquelle tout objet est traité selon l’ordre et la mesure. Cette science moderne sera définie comme la Mathématique Universelle, science une, fondée sur l’entendement, dont il importe de dégager précisément les procédés, induction et déduction.Cet ouvrage décisif, en posant les fondements de la méthode et de la philosophie de Descartes, permet de comprendre comment est pensée la science en sa modernité et de souligner le pouvoir conféré à l’entendement. Ce que cherche à montrer Descartes, c’est que la science doit être le fruit d’une pensée ordonnée, qui ne conserve rien qui ne soit clair et distinct, et que l’entendement doit pouvoir ne compter que sur lui seul. (shrink)

The Discourse on the Method for Reasoning Well and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences offers a concise presentation and defense of René Descartes' method of intellectual inquiry--a method that greatly influenced both philosophical and scientific reasoning in the early modern world. Descartes's timeless writing strikes an uncommon balance of novelty and familiarity, offering arguments concerning knowledge, science, and metaphysics (including the famous "I think, therefore I am") that are as compelling in the 21st century as they were in the (...) 17th. Ian Johnston's new translation of the original French text is modern, clear, and thoroughly annotated, ideal for readers unfamiliar with Descartes's intellectual context. An approachable introduction engages both the historical and the philosophical aspects of the text, helping the reader to understand the concepts and arguments contained therein. (shrink)

Dans les Principia philosophiae, publies pour la premiere fois en latin en 1644, Descartes expose sous une forme synthetique ce que les analyses des Meditations et du Discours avaient mis a jour, a savoir l'articulation entre les principes generaux de la connaissance humaine, les principes des sciences et ses decouvertes sur la structure du monde physique. C'est dans la Lettre-preface a son traducteur francais, l'abbe Picot, qu'apparait aussi la celebre conception de la philosophie comme une arborescence, a partir des (...) racines metaphysiques, en un tronc de la physique puis trois branches principales que constituent la medecine, la mecanique et la morale. Filant la metaphore, Descartes vise le dernier degre de la sagesse comme le fruit ultime de cette croissance organique du savoir: Or comme ce n'est pas des racines, ni du tronc des arbres, qu'on cueille les fruits, mais seulement des extremites de leurs branches, ainsi la principale utilite de la philosophie depend de celles de ses parties qu'on ne peut apprendre que les dernieres. (shrink)

In the Letter to the Faculty of Theology of the Sorbonne, Descartes makes a reference to Leo's X's encyclical Apostolici Regiminis (1513), which supports the Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of the soul as anima corporis forma According to Descartes' doctrine of the eternal truths, God's power is absolutely unlimited. One of the consequences of this doctrine is that God could join a rational (human) soul to any body, which implies that the union of soul and the body in the Cartesian system (...) is not substantial in the Scholastic sense of the word. In bringing in Leo's X's encyclical to support his conception of the soul, Descartes used a papal document for purposes contrary to those for which it had been designed. Dans la Lettre à la Faculté de théologie de la Sorbonne, Descartes fait référence à l'encyclique Apostolici Regiminis (1513), qui soutient la conception aristotélico-scolastique de l'âme en tant qu'anima corporis forma Or, selon la doctrine de la création des vérités éternelles, le pouvoir de Dieu est sans limites : une de ses conséquences en est que Dieu eût pu unir l'âme rationnelle (humaine) à n'importe quel corps, ce qui implique que l'union de l'âme et du corps dans la philosophie cartésienne ne soit pas substantielle — du moins au sens scolastique du terme. En citant l'encyclique Apostolici Regiminis au commencement des Meditations, Descartes a en fait utilisé le document pontifical à l'opposé du but pour lequel il avait été conçu. (shrink)

“나는 사유한다, 그러므로 나는 존재한다 ‘(cogito, ergo sum)가 데카르트 철학의 제일원리이라면, ‘사유’(cogitatio) 개념은 그의 철학의 가장 기본적이고 핵심적인 개념일 것이다. 나는 데카르트가 사유 개념을 다의적으로 사용했다는 생각한다. ‘사유실체 혹은 정신으로서 사유’, ‘정신의 본질로서 사유’, ‘사유 양태들로서 사유들’, 그리고 ‘넓은 의미의 관념들로서 사유들’이 그것이다. 정신과 본질로서 사유는 개념적으로만 구별된다는 점에서, 데카르트는 이 둘을 사실상 같은 것으로 간주한다. 그래서 이 글에서 나는 정신의 본질로서 사유를 제외하고 ‘양태들로서 사유들’과 ‘관념들로서 사유들’을 고찰하면서, 전자는 정신이 자기 안에서 직접적으로 의식하는 지성과 의지의 모든 작용들이고, 후자는 전자뿐만 (...) 아니라 욕구들, 감정들 그리고 좁은 의미의 관념들을 포함해 정신 안에 있는 모든 현상들이라는 것을 개진했다. (shrink)

In Chapter One I present an interpretation of Descartes' theory of distinction. I argue that the best understanding of the notion of separate existence at stake in the real distinction between mind and body is not that each can exist without the other existing, nor that each can exist without a real union with the other, but that each can exist without the attributes of the other. However, the only notion of separate existence which can provide an adequate acccount of (...) all three kinds of distinction--real, modal, and of reason--is that of one thing existing without a real union with another thing. ;In Chapter Two I examine Descartes' claims about the dependence of created substances on God and their independence from other creatures. The pure substances, those which are not composed of parts, can be caused to come into existence and go out of existence only by God, and they can perish only by annihilation. These substances include individual created minds and the extended universe considered as a whole. In contrast, bodies and human beings, which are composed of parts, can be caused to go out of existence by other creatures, and they can perish without being annihilated. Nevertheless, I argue that Descartes thinks bodies and human beings are full-fledged substances. ;In Chapter Three I discuss the union of mind and body. I argue that Descartes thinks the human soul is the only substantial form and that it inheres in the body as form inheres in matter. I defend his account of how two substances can form a unity by comparing it with medieval accounts of the unity of composites. ;Chapter Four examines Descartes' arguments for rejecting substantial forms and the so-called real qualities. I argue that his earliest series of arguments, those from perception and scientific explanation, is the most successful. ;Finally, in Chapter Five, I consider Descartes' positive account of the status of those so-called real qualities which he asserts are merely sensations, for example, color, sound, and heat. I argue that he is best understood as holding that they are modes of both thought and extension which are property ascribed to the composite of mind and body. (shrink)

This book introduces student to the three major figures of modern philosophy known as the rationalists. It is not for complete beginners, but it is an accessible account of their thought. By concerning itself with metaphysics, and in particular substance, the book relates an important historical debate largely neglected by the contemporary debates in the once again popular area of traditional metaphysics. in philosophy. (Do Not USE).

Although Descartes has often been portrayed as the father of the modern concept of mind, his approach to consciousness is notoriously problematic. What makes it particularly hard to assess his role in the development of the theories of consciousness is the difficulty of clarifying the kind of consciousness he might have in mind when using the associated Latin terms (conscius, cogitatio, conscium esse, etc.). In this article, I analyse Antoine Arnauld’s early interpretation of the passages in Descartes that refer to (...) the issue of consciousness. I argue for two separate but interconnected claims. Firstly, I show that when Arnauld sets out to make a case for Descartes’ concept of cogitatio, he reads the central passages in light of some scholastic theories of cognition, in particular, the concept of ‘reflexio virtualis’ which, far from being a Cartesian invention, comes from the late scholastic discourse. Secondly, I argue that by talking about virtual reflection Arnauld provides an interpretation of Descartes’ views in terms of the intrinsic structure of the first-order thought – a reading which is still plausible, even by our contemporary standards. (shrink)

Descartes is often accused of lacking a coherent conception of innate ideas. I argue that Descartes' remarks on innate ideas actually form a unified account. "Innate idea" is triply ambiguous, but its three meanings are interdependent. "Innate idea" can mean an act of perceiving; that which is perceived; or a faculty, capacity, or disposition to have certain ideas. An innate idea qua object of thought is some thing existing objectively , which we have a capacity to perceive, but which (...) we can only actually perceive through meditation. ;Descartes thinks that some innate ideas, such as the idea of thought itself, are implicit in the very process of thinking. Because they are relied on in thinking itself, we have implicit awareness of them. We also have implicit knowledge of other ideas contained in them. The actual perception of these innate ideas is, for Descartes, a matter of making them explicit, turning the intellect away from sense-perceptions and towards pure thought. ;Some innate truths, Descartes says, are perceived by the "natural light." I argue that such truths are made explicit through attending to how the concepts which those truths are about have been relied on in the process of thinking. I discuss the relationship between the natural light and the will, arguing that other accounts of Descartes' "natural light" in the secondary literature are unsatisfactory. I also explore how Descartes' use of the metaphor of light might have been informed by his scientific views about light. ;The innate ideas of corporeal nature and mathematics are also made explicit through attention and reflection, according to Descartes. Though many commentators read Descartes as holding that the innate idea of extension can be known without any use of the senses, I argue that it is discovered through reflection on our sense-perceptions. Once this idea is explicit, Descartes thinks, we can use it to generate explicit awareness of further innate ideas, such as ideas of shapes. Reflection on those further innate ideas, in turn, makes explicit various innate truths about those shapes. (shrink)

This is the first book to give an analysis of Descartes's pivotal concept that deals with all the functions of the mind, cognitive as well as volitional, ...

This essay offers an interpretation of Descartes’ treatment of the concepts of place and space in the Principles of Philosophy. On the basis of that interpretation, I argue that his understanding and application of the concept of space supports a pluralist interpretation of Descartes on extended substance. I survey the Scholastic evolution of issues in the Aristotelian theory of place and clarify elements of Descartes’ appropriation and transformation thereof: the relationship between internal and external place, the precise content of the (...) claim that space and body are really identical, and the way we conceptually distinguish space from body. Descartes applies his concept of space in ways that illuminate the metaphysical structure of extension. In particular, he uses the concept to specify the degree to which finite parts of matter are independent of each other. I argue that for Descartes, conceiving extension as indivisible is an artifact of conceiving it as a space. That is, pace the monistic reading of Cartesian extended substance, regarding extension as indivisible is an artifact of conceiving it in a way more removed from its real nature. (shrink)

Descartes's concept of the mind, as distinct from the body with which it forms a union, set the agenda for much of Western philosophy's subsequent reflection on human nature and thought. This is the first book to give an analysis of Descartes's pivotal concept that deals with all the functions of the mind, cognitive as well as volitional, theoretical as well as practical and moral. Focusing on Descartes's view of the mind as intimately united to and intermingled with the body, (...) and exploring its implications for his philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Lilli Alanen argues that the epistemological and methodological consequences of this view have been largely misconstrued in the modern debate. Informed by both the French tradition of Descartes scholarship and recent Anglo-American research, Alanen's book combines historical-contextual analysis with a philosophical problem-oriented approach. It seeks to relate Descartes's views on mind and intentionality both to contemporary debates and to the problems Descartes confronted in their historical context. By drawing out the historical antecedents and the intellectual evolution of Descartes's thinking about the mind, the book shows how his emphasis on the embodiment of the mind has implications far more complex and interesting than the usual dualist account suggests. (shrink)

Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance (...) dualism from an important objection. (shrink)

Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes' independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance (...) dualism from an important objection. (shrink)

A comparative discussion on "Spiritual Health", as one of the most imperative health fundamentals was initiated. This concept has recently been added to the previous health constituents including physical, psychological and social aspects by the World Health Organization. The words "spiritual" and "health" for many people are two separate and independent issues, while they are inextricably linked. Spirituality in health is not material in nature but belongs to the realm of ideas that have arisen in the minds of human beings, (...) particularly ennobling ideas. Considering the important role which spiritual health plays in our overall sense of happiness and fulfillment as well as the direct connection between spiritual wellness and physical health, the perspectives adopted by Rene Descartes, as the "father of philosophy and modern Humanism" and Allameh Tabatabaee, as the "representative of Islamic philosophy" were compared in the present study. Due to his humanistic perspective, Descartes holds that spiritual health is of an abstract nature and is solely connectedwith human's conscience and intellectual insight indication of a naturalistic (materialistic) interpretation of humans,but it is not concerned with humans' desires, behavior and ultra-humanistic realm. Tabatabaee believes that spiritual health depends on humans'ultra‐naturalistic realm and meaning‐seeking nature, i.e. the acceptance of absolute reality principle (God) as the meaning of life that aside from correcting humans' insight and outlook assigns direction to his behavior and attitude. (shrink)

This intelligent and often subtle introduction to rationalist metaphysics focuses on the development of the concept of substance in Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. After briefly reviewing the Aristotelian background in the introduction, Woolhouse spends the first three chapters presenting the broad outlines of each thinker’s account of substance. These are followed by three chapters devoted more specifically to the metaphysics of extended substance and to foundational issues in early modern physics. Next come two chapters on thinking substance and its relation (...) to extended substance, and finally a chapter on the relation between created and uncreated substance, which Woolhouse describes as "an organizing centre of the whole book". (shrink)

The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode (...) considered as a general property, and not as an instance of it, belongs to the essence of the substance, and as imagination (like sensation) arises from the mind-body union, then the problem arises of knowing to what extent a Cartesian embodied mind is separable from the body. (shrink)

First, I offer a solution to the metaphysical problem of the mind–body relation, drawing on the fact of its distinctness in kind. Secondly, I demonstrate how, contrary to what is denied, Descartes’ metaphysical commitments allow for the intellect's clear and distinct conception of the mind–body union. Central to my two-fold defence is a novel account of the metaphysics of Descartes’ Causal Principle: its neutrality, and the unanalysable, fundamental nature of causality. Without the presupposition, and uniqueness of the mind-body union (...) there can be no mind-body interaction; this throws new light on current concerns in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably strong. (...) On the other hand, if we take principal attributes to be tropes, then IC introduces challenges which undermine the argument. This is partly because the assumption of tropes makes it possible to distinguish several versions of substance dualism, versions which differ with respect to their degree of generality. I argue that taking principal attributes to be tropes makes it challenging to establish any of these versions by way of an IC-based separability argument. I conclude the paper by suggesting a way forward for the proponent of the separability argument. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe most prominent early modern argument against materialism is to be found in Descartes. Previously I had argued that this argument relies crucially on a robust conception of substance, according to which it has a single principal attribute of which all its other intrinsic qualities are modes. In the present paper I return to this claim. In Section 2, I address a question that is often raised about that conception of substance: its commitment to the idea that a (...) substance has a single such principal attribute. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and Daniel Garber have argued that this claim relies on Descartes's identification of substance with attribute. But I argue that it relies on his view that a substance has a single, unitary nature. In Section 3, I examine the role of this conception of substance in arguments found in Malebranche and Leibniz and compare these arguments with Descartes's. (shrink)

I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably strong. On (...) the other hand, if we take principal attributes to be tropes, then IC introduces challenges that undermine the argument. This is partly because the assumption of tropes makes it possible to distinguish several versions of substance dualism, versions that differ with respect to their degree of generality. I argue that taking principal attributes to be tropes makes it challenging to establish any of these versions by way of an IC-based separability argument. I conclude the paper by suggesting a way forward for the proponent of the separability argument. (shrink)

Nach der üblichen Interpretation löst der Rationalist Descartes empirische Fragen durch einen Rekurs auf die Evidenz der Vernunft, wobei er dieser den Vorzug gegenüber offensichtlich widersprechenden Erfahrungstatsachen einräumt. Dieser Aufsatz stellt 1. einige relevante Züge der Cartesischen Theorie des Subjekts des Erfahrungswissens dar; 2. untersucht er die Vielfalt der Bedeutungen, in denen Descartes das Wort expérience gebraucht, und 3. sucht er zu zeigen, daß die Texte, in denen Descartes behauptet, er ziehe die Vernunft der Erfahrung vor, in Übereinstimmung mit 1. (...) und 2. interpretiert werden können als eine Wahl zwischen zwei Arten von empirischer Evidenz und nicht als Zusammenstoß konkurrierender Vermögen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Descartes's Conception of Perfect Knowledge WILLIS DONEY IN THEFIFTHMEDITATION, after presenting his a priori argument for the existence of God, Descartes compares the certainty of his conclusion with the c~rtainty of conclusions of mathematical demonstrations. In stating the view that Descartes expresses here, I shall use letters: D for the conclusion of his a priori argument, ttamely, that there is a God, and R for an example that (...) he gives of a conclusion that he has reached in mathematics, that is, the proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Concerning the certainty of D and R, he maintains in the Fifth Meditation that he is as certain of D as of "anything else that seems most certain," implying that D is for him as cea-tain as R; and he goes on to make what is clearly intended to be a stronger claim: I also observe that the certainty of other things so depends on this that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known,x This claim is repeated, by way of a conclusion, in the next to the last sentence of the Meditation: And so I clearly see that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends on an apprehension of the true God, in such a fashion that, before I knew him, I could have no perfect knowledge of anything else.2 i AT VII, 69; HR I, 183. "AT" stands for the edition of Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Euvres de Descartes (Paris: L~.opold Cerf, 1897-1913); "'HR" for the English translation by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931). In quotations I have departed from HR to avoid infeficities or inaccuracies. The Latin locution translated "perfec0y known" is perfecte sciri; in the French translation, sfauoir parfaitement is used (AT IX, 55). This is the first occurrence of this locution in the Meditations. 2 AT VII, 71; HR I, 185. The Latin locution in the last clause is perfecte scire; the F~-ench is, again, s~auoir parfaitement (AT IX, 56). In HR there is vacillation in the translation of scientia. In these passages in the Fifth Meditation, scientia and cognitio are both rendered "knowledge"; whereas, in the Replies to the Second Set of Obj~cttons, vera scientia is "true science" (AT VII, 141; HR II, 39). For scientiae certitudinem & veritatem, I have used "certainty and truth of knowledge," and "apprehension of the true God" for veri dei cognitione. [3S7] 388 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY In these sentences, Descartes does not limit his claims about certainty and perfect knowledge to propositions Like R, and one of his contemporaries, taking him to be asserting that, unless a person has knowledge of God's existence, he cannot be certain of anything else, raised the objection that, earlier in the Meditations, Descartes claimed to be certain of his own existence as a thinking thing prior to having proved the existence of God) In his reply, Descartes accused his critic of misreading what he had written in the Fifth Meditation. The claim that he made there was not about all propositions---about principles and evident propositions, such as ego cogito, ergo sum and sum res eogitans, as well as propositions like Rmbut specificaUy and exclusively about propositions like R.* Whether, when confronted with his critic's objection, Descartes retracted or modified a view expressed in the Meditations is a question on which sides have been taken. In my paper I have something to say about this question, but I shall be concerned primarily with a problem of interpretation that arises whether or not we take Descartes at his word; that is, whether we take the claim that he makes in the Fifth Meditation to be exclusively about propositions like R or, contrary to Descartes's reply to his critic, to be about other propositions as well. The problem arises when we try to make sense of what he says in the Fifth Meditation in support of this claim. In the first part of my paper, I shall pose the problem, pointing out that, on a very tempting and prima facie... (shrink)

本論は、反復ないし取り返し（reprise）」という概念によって、デカルト哲学を再解釈する試みである。対話や討論の際に、相手の話や考えを「反復する＝取り返す」（reprendre、この仏語には「非難す る」、「咎める」という含意もある）ことには、いつも意味を取り間違える（mé-prendre）危険性がある。そもそも、あらゆる取り方（prise）は、精神が自分自身を取る（とらえる）仕方からの派生に過ぎ ない。したがって、他のもの（言葉、着想、テーマ、テーゼ等）を取り返す前に、自ら自身を正しく取り返す方法が必要になる。時間において自己自身を取り返す働きであるコギトの実践的な意義は、ここに現れると思われ る。 ましてや、取り返す働きは、何度も自己自身を再把握することであるからこそ、思考の連続性の内にある種の非連続性をもたらす。それは 、現象学で中心となった課題、すなわち自己の時間性や歴史性という方面を際立たせる働きである。この点で、J.ヴァールのデカルト解釈を踏まえつつそれを超えなければならないことが分る。実際、取り返しという現象 -態度の射程は、デカルト哲学の理解にとどまらず、メルロ=ポンティの思想にも不可欠なものである。.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’s Concept of MindJoanna ForstromLilli Alanen. Descartes’s Concept of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. pp. xv + 355. Cloth, $65.00.Descartes's Concept of Mind takes as its task that of redressing "the distortions of Descartes's concept of human mind and thinking caused by the Cartesian myth that Ryle justly sought to correct, but that his gripping caricature has helped keep alive" (x). Offering a close (...) reading of the text in its philosophical and historical context and examining its place in contemporary literature, Alanen develops Descartes's philosophy of mind, broadly construed, with a focus on the embodiment of the human mind.Alanen sees Descartes's philosophy of mind as "the result of an ongoing struggle to adjust some basic views about human nature, thought and agency rooted in experience and tradition to the new picture of the universe" (8). Taking this perspective reveals a greater continuity in his fundamental views. Changes, she suggests, are a matter of emphasis, subject matter, and perspective. She grants Descartes's dualism and his view of the mind-body union and chooses to focus instead on the mind as embodied.In developing the analysis Alanen takes a somewhat chronological approach in her seven chapters. Chapter one is a prehistory of Descartes's philosophy of mind focusing on his unpublished, early writings. She looks at his early intellectual ambitions and interests beginning with mathematics and a science of nature and then expanding into metaphysics. The distinctive views of his later work are formed, according to Alanen, during this time. In chapter two, three different perspectives about the nature of man are distinguished: man as an object of mechanistic physics, man as mind or intellect and so an epistemic subject, and man as a real union between the mind and body. She focuses on the third, as it is the real union that has been overlooked or misconstrued by most. How this union is to [End Page 115] be conceived, and the epistemological implications of it are explored. By highlighting the consequences of Descartes's distinction between the mind and the body in terms of knowledge, Alanen directly confronts Ryle and his legacy. In short, because we cannot expect to have knowledge of the mind—body union, we cannot conceive it—there is no category mistake to be made. She elaborates much more in the chapter.Chapters three, four and five, are centered on the writings from 1637-44. Here Alanen focuses on Descartes's notion of thinking and modes of thoughts. The way that thinking is defined, its intentional and representative nature, and the status of sensations as mental phenomena are carefully explored in light of discussions of these issues in contemporary literature and in the literature of Descartes's time. The issues are complex, but the writing is clear and easy to follow. Her discussions of representation, sense perception, and material falsity are particularly good in these chapters.Chapters six and seven reflect the issues that Princess Elisabeth raised: emotions, will, and related moral issues. These two chapters are perhaps the most significant in the book. Chapter six centers on The Passions. The passions depend on the union of the mind and body and do not consist in thought alone. Alanen sees them as a subclass of thoughts. She examines carefully the intentionality of emotions, the distinction between action and passions, and the functions attributed to the body and the soul. She raises a number of questions, some of which chapter seven begins to answer, and others which are left to challenge the reader. Chapter seven is about free will and virtue. Alanen places Descartes's conception of the will and agency in the context of the debate between the voluntarists and the intellectualists. She considers the ancient and medieval antecedents, with a focus on the Stoics as she develops her analysis. She also includes a good discussion of Descartes's contemporaries, and their reactions to his work. Her inclusion of secondary literature is well done. One is left with a better understanding of the complexities of Descartes's understanding of human nature and free will.Overall, Alanen's book is an excellent contribution to... (shrink)

이 글은 데카르트의 수동적 물체론과 운동학에서의 힘 개념을 웨스트폴과 하트필드의 대립적인 해석과 함께 논구해보고자 한다. 웨스트폴은 데카르트의 물체론에 동역학적인 요소가 있다고 보았으며, 그로 인해 데카르트의 물체론이 모순에 빠진다고 비판하였다. 이에 대해 하트필드는 데카르트의 물체론은 그의 형이상학과 함께 이해되어야 한다고 보았으며, 이러한 관점을 가지지 못한 웨스트폴을 비판하였다. 하트필드에 따르면, 웨스트폴은 데카르트의 형이상학보다 자연학과 운동 법칙 자체를 더 중점적으로 생각했고, 그럼으로써 데카르트의 물체론을 데카르트의 전체 체계 내에서 통합적으로 사유하지 못했다. 이 글은 하트필드의 입장을 지지하며 데카르트의 수동적 물체론이 내포한 형이상학적 기초를 확인함으로써, 데카르트의 (...) 물체론과 형이상학을 함께 사유하는 것의 의의를 확인하고자 한다. 이는 갈등론적 관점에서 한 이론에 대한 두 대립적인 해석이 빚는 갈등이 갖는 가치 또한 시사할 것이다. (shrink)

My aim is to call attention to two features of Descartes' presentation of his so-called criterion of truth in the third meditation. First, there is an explicit shift between "clear and distinct "perception"" and "clear and distinct "conception"." Second, in the two paragraphs which follow the presentation of the criterion, Descartes proceeds to highlight a correlative distinction. Roughly speaking, the distinction is between perceiving something and having "persuasive" conceptions of something. This distinction not only corresponds to the shift between (...) "perceive" and "conceive" but also to the claims about which Descartes is certain and doubtful, respectively, prior to the proofs about God's existence. Thus the verbal shift is not merely that; it also signals a substantive distinction central to the "Meditations". (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Descartes's earliest proclamation of his curious modal theory supports the conceptualist analysis of it, according to which the eternity of the eternal truths is a conceptual matter, not something more profound than that.

Dan Arbib | Résumé : Nous proposons ici une analyse du concept cartésien d’infini à partir de trois paradoxes : 1) du point de vue du corps cartésien, l’infini occupe deux places peu compatibles, à la fois fondateur de la rationalité et inséré en elle ; 2) du point de vue de l’histoire de l’histoire de la métaphysique, l’infini apparaît pour satisfaire l’exigence de la représentation et pour y déroger ; 3) du point de vue de l’histoire des noms divins, (...) les enjeux du nom de l’infini se trouvent par deux fois neutralisés, d’une part par le scotisme contre l’effort thomiste ou bonaventurien, d’autre part par les post-cartésiens contre les plus grandes audaces cartésiennes. — Ces trois paradoxes superposables questionnent la cohérence du dispositif cartésien dont l’infini constitue le coeur. |: I propose here an analysis of the Cartesian concept of infinity based on three paradoxes : 1) from a Cartesian viewpoint, infinity occupies two places which are potentially incompatible, both as founder of rationality and inserted in it ; 2) from the viewpoint of the history of metaphysics, infinity appears to satisfy the requirement of representation and to break it ; 3) from the viewpoint of the history the divine names, the stakes of the name of infinite are twice neutralized, first by scoticism against Thomas Aquinas or Bonaventure, then by post-Cartesian philosophers against Descartes’ boldness. — These three superposable paradoxes question the coherence of the Cartesian system of which infinity constitutes the centre. (shrink)

The article analyzes the meaning of the concept of res in Descartes? metaphysics. The basic meaning is that thing is an essence that could have even real existence. Through the analysis of Descartes? works that meaning has made more precise against the background of the rational distinction between essence and existence. The relations among the thing and the notions of reality, the degrees of reality and the modes of reality were shown. The special attention is dedicated to the relation between (...) the thing and the causality, i.e., to the problems how the things could cause and what is the cause of things. The problem of causality is connected with Descartes? teaching concerning the creation of eternal truths; that connection expresses the difference between his and scholastics? concept of thing, which is obvious in his concept of the causation of the degrees of reality. At the end the late, scholastics? notion of supertranscendental meaning of thing is shown in Descartes. (shrink)