Siendo Religión y política una unidad dialéctica, también lo serán la religión y la democracia política. Sin embargo, esto no ocurre en el caso de cualquier religión o cualquier forma de democracia y el presupuesto de la democracia occidental es históricamente el cristianismo. De ahí la fecunda dialéctica derivada de los “dos poderes” —entre la auctoritas y la potestas— que facilitó el desarrollo de la libertad política pues, precisamente porque ninguna religión auténtica es política, la religión siempre limita al poder. (...) Ahora bien, la democracia política transformada en democracia social se ha hecho omnipotente y, suprimiendo cualquier limitación, el poder democrático ha derivado, al menos en Europa, hacia una forma de religión de la política que excluye al cristianismo. El problema es si la democracia podrá sostenerse prescindiendo de sus supuestos. (shrink)

The integrated information theory (IIT) is an ambitious theory of consciousness that aims to provide both a neuroscientific and a metaphysical account of consciousness by identifying consciousness with integrated information. In the philosophical literature, IIT is often associated with a panpsychist worldview. In this paper, I show that IIT can be considered, instead, as a form of emergentism that is incompatible with panpsychism. First, I show that the panpsychist interpretation of IIT is based on two properties of integrated information: intrinsicality (...) and fundamentality. I show that the way IIT deals with these two properties, however, aligns better with emergentism than panpsychism. Then, after plugging some anti-panpsychist assumptions into IIT’s structure, I analyse different philosophical options for interpreting the formal result of causal emergence of integrated information in terms of dependence on and autonomy from its physical substrate. The upshot is that integrated information can be seen as dependent upon the fusion of the cause-effect powers of a physical substrate, and as autonomous in virtue of global-to-local determination. According to this interpretation, consciousness is the constraining power of the system as a whole upon itself, when this power emerges from the fusion on the cause-effect powers of the system’s components. (shrink)

Prized Attic honey is an often-neglected topic in studies of Athenian productions, despite the considerable spread of production, as attested by archaeological finds of terracotta beehives throughout the territory. Literary sources also frequently mention honey produced in Attica, especially the most famous and prized variety from Mount Hymettus. In this paper, after a mention of the peculiarity of the traditions about honey in the classical world, the importance and fame of the Attic product is emphasised. The sources that praise the (...) product are here classified in three groups, namely the authors who focus on its sweetness and fragrance, the ones who describe Attic honey generically in relation to its prestige and the sources which compares it to honey from other regions. Afterwards, my further goal is to assess the possible connection between honey and the funerary sphere in Attica. This relation is explored also through the reanalysis of some interpretations proposed for a fictile group of geometric Attic models. (shrink)

Consciousness vehicle externalism is the claim that the material machinery of a subject’s phenomenology partially leaks outside a subject’s brain, encompassing bodily and environmental structures. The DEUTS argument is the most prominent argument for CVE in the sensorimotor enactivists’ arsenal. In a recent series of publications, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein have deployed such an argument to claim that a prominent view of neural processing, namely predictive processing, is fully compatible with CVE. Indeed, in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s view, a proper understanding of (...) predictive processing mandates CVE. In this essay, we critically examine Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s argument. Our aim is to argue in favor of the following three points. First, that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on cultural practices lends no support to CVE: at best, it vindicates some form of content externalism about phenomenal content. Secondly, the criteria Kirchhoff and Kiverstein propose to identify a subject’s phenomenal machinery greatly overgeneralize, leaving them open to a “consciousness bloat” objection, which is an analog of the cognitive bloat objection against the extended mind. Lastly, we will argue that the “consciousness bloat” problem is inbuilt in the very argumentative structure of the DEUTS argument. We will thus conclude that, contrary to the philosophical mainstream, DEUTS is not the best argument for CVE in the sensorimotor enactivists’ argumentative arsenal. (shrink)

Assessing the scientific status of theories of consciousness is often a difficult task. In this paper, I explore the dialectic between the Integrated Information Theory, e1003588, 2014; Tononi et al. Nat Rev Neurosci, 17, 450-61, 2016) and a recently proposed criticism of that theory: the ‘unfolding argument’. I show that the phenomenology-first approach in consciousness research can lead to valid scientific theories of consciousness. I do this by highlighting the two reasons why the unfolding argument fails: first, phenomenology-first theories are (...) grounded, not circular. Second, falsificationism does not provide an adequate demarcation criterion in philosophy of science. I conclude that this specific debate has significance for how, in general, consciousness researchers test and criticize theories of consciousness, and how dismissing the phenomenology-first methodology in favour of a third person-based methodology means endorsing a position in philosophy of mind that has already been challenged. (shrink)

Traveling-wave solutions of the standard and compound form of Korteweg–de Vries–Burgers equations are found using factorizations of the corresponding reduced ordinary differential equations. The procedure leads to solutions of Bernoulli equations of non-linearity 3/2 and 2 (Riccati), respectively. Introducing the initial conditions through an imaginary phase in the traveling coordinate, we obtain all the solutions previously reported, some of them being corrected here, and showing, at the same time, the presence of interesting details of these solitary waves that have been (...) overlooked before this investigation. (shrink)

Proposition 5.122 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus has been the source of much puzzlement among interpreters, so much so that no fully satisfactory account is yet available. This is unfortunate, if only because the containment account of logical consequence has a venerable tradition behind it. Pasquale Frascolla’s interpretation of proposition 5.122 is based on a valid argument and one true premise. However, the argument explains sense containment only in an indirect way, leaving some crucial questions unanswered. Besides, Frascolla does not address the (...) issue of how to make sense containment notationally perspicuous, an essential theme in Wittgenstein’s reflections. In this paper, we elaborate on Frascolla’s account by looking at the issue through the Tractarian notion of logical space. Our analysis shows that, for containment to be fully appreciated, one should adopt a negative perspective on the notion of sense, in line with the exclusionary theory of conceptual content, as labelled by Ian Rumfitt. Besides this, we introduce and discuss two methods—one envisaged by Wittgenstein himself—for making sense containment notationally perspicuous. (shrink)

In consciousness science, theories often differ not only in the account of consciousness they arrive at, but also with respect to how they understand their starting point. Some approaches begin with experimentally gathered data, whereas others begin with phenomenologically gathered data. In this paper, I analyse how the most influential phenomenology-first approach, namely the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness, fits its phenomenologically gathered data with explanatory hypotheses. First, I show that experimentally driven approaches hit an explanatory roadblock, since we (...) cannot tell, at the present stage, which model of consciousness is best. Then, I show that IIT’s phenomenology-first approach implies a self-evidencing explanation according to which consciousness can be explained by starting from consciousness itself. I claim that IIT can take advantage of the virtuous circularity of this reasoning, but it also faces a data-fitting issue that is somehow similar to that faced by experiment-driven approaches: we are not given enough information to decide whether the explanatory hypotheses IIT employs to explain its phenomenological data are in fact best. I call this problem “the self-evidencing problem” for IIT, and after introducing it, I propose a possible way for IIT to solve it. (shrink)

Kenny’s book on Wittgenstein has been studied by hundreds of students. What happens when a student comes to the lecturer and says that Kenny’s formula for the number of truth-functions is wrong? You read the 2006 revised edition of the book and realise that the student is right and are ashamed at not having pointed this out to the class. Then you try to focus on which misunderstandings may lie behind the wrong formula. This is what we are trying to (...) do in these short remarks. (shrink)

Merker et al. argue that integrated information theory is not a theory of consciousness because the IIT formalism does not match phenomenology. I argue that the authors ultimately fail to articulate the problem of the inference of the postulates from the axioms. I suggest a different version of this problem, and argue that this can help rethink IIT's potential for consciousness science.