A large portion of mathematics education centers heavily around imitative reasoning and rote learning, raising concerns about students’ lack of deeper and conceptual understanding of mathematics. To address these concerns, there has been a growing focus on students learning and teachers teaching methods that aim to enhance conceptual understanding and problem-solving skills. One suggestion is allowing students to construct their own solution methods using creative mathematical reasoning, a method that in previous studies has been contrasted against (...) algorithmic reasoning with positive effects on test tasks. Although previous studies have evaluated the effects of CMR, they have ignored if and to what extent intrinsic cognitive motivation play a role. This study investigated the effects of intrinsic cognitive motivation to engage in cognitive strenuous mathematical tasks, operationalized through Need for Cognition, and working memory capacity. Two independent groups, consisting of upper secondary students, practiced non-routine mathematical problem solving with CMR and AR tasks and were tested 1 week later. An initial t-test confirmed that the CMR group outperformed the AR group. Structural equation modeling revealed that NFC was a significant predictor of math performance for the CMR group but not for the AR group. The results also showed that WMC was a strong predictor of math performance independent of group. These results are discussed in terms of allowing for time and opportunities for struggle with constructing own solution methods using CMR, thereby enhancing students conceptual understanding. (shrink)

In the field of mathematics education, one of the main questions remaining under debate is whether students’ development of mathematical reasoning and problem-solving is aided more by solving tasks with given instructions or by solving them without instructions. It has been argued, that providing little or no instruction for a mathematical task generates a mathematical struggle, which can facilitate learning. This view in contrast, tasks in which routine procedures can be applied can lead to mechanical repetition (...) with little or no conceptual understanding. This study contrasts Creative Mathematical Reasoning (CMR), in which students must construct the mathematical method, with Algorithmic Reasoning (AR), in which predetermined methods and procedures on how to solve the task are given. Moreover, measures of fluid intelligence and working memory capacity are included in the analyses alongside the students’ math tracks. The results show that practicing with CMR tasks was superior to practicing with AR tasks in terms of students’ performance onpracticed test tasksandtransfer test tasks. Cognitive proficiency was shown to have an effect on students’ learning for both CMR and AR learning conditions. However, math tracks (advanced versus a more basic level) showed no significant effect. It is argued that going beyond step-by-step textbook solutions is essential and that students need to be presented with mathematical activities involving a struggle. In the CMR approach, students must focus on the relevant information in order to solve the task, and the characteristics of CMR tasks can guide students to the structural features that are critical for aiding comprehension. (shrink)

: C.S. Peirce defines mathematics in two ways: first as "the science which draws necessary conclusions," and second as "the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things" (CP 4.227–244). Given the dual definition, Peirce notes, a question arises: Should we exclude the work of poietic hypothesis-making from the domain of pure mathematical reasoning? (CP 4.238). This paper examines Peirce's answer to the question. Some commentators hold that for Peirce the framing of mathematical hypotheses requires (...) poietic genius but is not scientific work. I propose, to the contrary, that although Peirce occasionally seems to exclude the poietic creation of hypotheses altogether from pure mathematical reasoning, Peirce's position is rather that the creation of mathematical hypotheses is poietic, but it is not merely poietic, and accordingly, that hypothesis-framing is part of mathematical reasoning that involves an element of poiesis but is not merely poietic either. Scientific considerations also inhere in the process of hypothesis-making, without excluding the poietic element. In the end, I propose that hypothesis-making in mathematics stands between artistic and scientific poietic creativity with respect to imaginative freedom from logical and actual constraints upon reasoning. (shrink)

2014 Reprint of 1954 American Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition, not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. This two volume classic comprises two titles: "Patterns of Plausible Inference" and "Induction and Analogy in Mathematics." This is a guide to the practical art of plausible reasoning, particularly in mathematics, but also in every field of human activity. Using mathematics as the example par excellence, Polya shows how even the most rigorous deductive discipline is heavily dependent on techniques of guessing, (...) inductive reasoning, and reasoning by analogy. In solving a problem, the answer must be guessed at before a proof can be given, and guesses are usually made from a knowledge of facts, experience, and hunches. The truly creative mathematician must be a good guesser first and a good prover afterward; many important theorems have been guessed but no proved until much later. In the same way, solutions to problems can be guessed, and a god guesser is much more likely to find a correct solution. This work might have been called "How to Become a Good Guesser."-From the Dust Jacket. (shrink)

In decision making quite often we face permanently changeable and potentially infinite databases when we cannot apply conventional algorithms for choosing a solution. A decision process on infinite databases is called troubleshooting. A decision on these databases is called creative reasoning. One of the first heuristic semi-logical means for creative decision making were proposed in the theory of inventive problem solving by Genrich Altshuller. In this paper, I show that his approach corresponds to the so-called content-generic logic (...) established by Soviet philosophers as an alternative to mathematical logic. The main assumption of content-genetic is that we cannot reduce our thinking to a mathematical combination of signs or to a language as such and our thought is ever cyclic and reflexive so that it contains ever a history. (shrink)

The published works of scientists often conceal the cognitive processes that led to their results. Scholars of mathematical practice must therefore seek out less obvious sources. This article analyzes a widely circulated mathematical joke, comprising a list of spurious proof types. An account is proposed in terms of argumentation schemes: stereotypical patterns of reasoning, which may be accompanied by critical questions itemizing possible lines of defeat. It is argued that humor is associated with risky forms of inference, (...) which are essential to creative mathematics. The components of the joke are explicated by argumentation schemes devised for application to topic-neutral reasoning. These in turn are classified under seven headings: retroduction, citation, intuition, meta-argument, closure, generalization, and definition. Finally, the wider significance of this account for the cognitive science of mathematics is discussed. (shrink)

The role of mathematics in scientific practice is too readily relegated to that of formulating equations that model or describe what is being investigated, and then finding solutions to those equations. I survey the role of mathematics in: 1. Exact solutions of differential equations, especially conformal mapping; and 2. Simulations of solutions to differential equations via numerical methods and via agent-based models; and 3. The use of experimental models to solve equations (a) via physical analogies based on similarity of the (...) form of the equations, such as Prandtl’s soap-film method, and (b) the method of physically similar systems. Two major themes emerge: First, the role of mathematics in science is not well described by deduction from axioms, although it generally involves deductive reasoning. Creative leaps, the integration of experimental or observational evidence, synthesis of ideas from different areas of mathematics, and insight regarding analogous forms are required to find solutions to equations. Second, methods that involve mappings or transformations are in use in disparate contexts, from the purely mathematical context of conformal mapping where it is mathematical objects that are mapped, to the use of concrete physical experimental models, where one concrete thing is shown to correspond to another. (shrink)

Integrative systems biology is among the most innovative fields of contemporary science, bringing together scientists from a range of diverse backgrounds and disciplines to tackle biological complexity through computational and mathematical modeling. The result is a plethora of problem-solving techniques, theoretical perspectives, lab-structures and organizations, and identity labels that have made it difficult for commentators to pin down precisely what systems biology is, philosophically or sociologically. In this paper, through the ethnographic investigation of two ISB laboratories, we explore the (...) particular structural features of ISB thinking and organization and its relations to other disciplines that necessitate cognitive innovation at all levels from lab PI’s to individual researchers. We find that systems biologists face numerous constraints that make the production of models far from straight-forward, while at the same time they inhabit largely unstructured task environments in comparison to other fields. We refer to these environments as adaptive problem spaces. These environments they handle by relying substantially on the flexibility and affordances of model-based reasoning to integrate these various constraints and find novel adaptive solutions. Ultimately what is driving this innovation is a determination to construct new cognitive niches in the form of functional model building frameworks that integrate systems biology within the biological sciences. The result is an industry of diverse and different innovative practices and solutions to the problem of modeling complex, large-scale biological systems. (shrink)

It is a common thought that mathematics can be not only true but also beautiful, and many of the greatest mathematicians have attached central importance to the aesthetic merit of their theorems, proofs and theories. But how, exactly, should we conceive of the character of beauty in mathematics? In this paper I suggest that Kant's philosophy provides the resources for a compelling answer to this question. Focusing on §62 of the ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’, I argue against the common view (...) that Kant's aesthetics leaves no room for beauty in mathematics. More specifically, I show that on the Kantian account beauty in mathematics is a non-conceptual response felt in light of our own creative activities involved in the process of mathematical reasoning. The Kantian proposal I thus develop provides a promising alternative to Platonist accounts of beauty widespread among mathematicians. While on the Platonist conception the experience of mathematical beauty consists in an intellectual insight into the fundamental structures of the universe, according to the Kantian proposal the experience of beauty in mathematics is grounded in our felt awareness of the imaginative processes that lead to mathematical knowledge. The Kantian account I develop thus offers to elucidate the connection between aesthetic reflection, creative imagination and mathematical cognition. (shrink)

If artificial neural networks are ever to form the foundation for higher level cognitive behaviors in machines or to realize their full potential as explanatory devices for human cognition, they must show signs of autonomy, multifunction operation, and intersystem integration that are absent in most existing models. This model begins to address these issues by integrating predictive learning, sequence interleaving, and sequence creation components to simulate a spectrum of higher-order cognitive behaviors which have eluded the grasp of simpler systems. Its (...) capabilities are described based on simulations calling for increasing levels of functionality and are used to show how the model can progress from fundamental sequence learning and recall tasks to sophisticated behaviors such as an ability to solve simple mathematical expressions and a creative capacity for the formation and application of inductive rules. (shrink)

Both in Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental and in his very recent Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental, John Sallis enacts a reconfiguration of the relationship of geometry to elementology, which might be regarded more generally as a rethinking of the relation of mathematics to philosophy. The paper will trace this reconfiguration in two ways: as it lies present but concealed in the history of philosophy, for example, in Descartes’ so-called “dualism” and in Kant’s pure (...) productive imagination, and in its present creative evolution in fractal geometry, as Sallis interprets it. Sallis draws together the mathematical affinity with a fundamental aesthetic drive, likening mathematical patterns to choreographic ones. I conclude by following this strain as it points to specific dance companies, and to my own sense of aesthetic homecoming as presented in my Imagination in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between informal reasoning, creativity in mathematics, and problem solving. It underscores the importance of environments that promote interaction, hypothesis generation, examination, refutation, derivation of new solutions, drawing conclusions, and reasoning with others, as key factors in enhancing mathematical creativity. Drawing on argumentation logic, the paper proposes a novel approach to uncover specific characteristics in the development of formalized proving using “proof-events.” Argumentation logic can offer reasoning mechanisms that facilitate these environments. This (...) paper proposes how argumentation can be implemented to discover certain characteristics in the development of formalized proving with “proof-events”. The concept of a proof-event was introduced by Goguen who described mathematical proof as a multi-agent social event involving not only “classical” formal proofs, but also other informal proving actions such as deficient or alleged proofs. Argumentation is an integral component of the discovery process for a mathematical proof since a proof necessitates a dialogue between provers and interpreters to clarify and resolve gaps or assumptions. By formalizing proof-events through argumentation, this paper demonstrates how informal reasoning and conflicts arising during the proving process can be effectively simulated. The paper presents an extended version of the proof-events calculus, rooted in argumentation theories, and highlights the intricate relationships among proof, human reasoning, cognitive processes, creativity, and mathematical arguments. (shrink)

This article discusses the history of the concepts of potential infinity and actual infinity in the context of Christian theology, mathematical thinking and metaphysical reasoning. It shows that the structure of Ancient Greek rationality could not go beyond the concept of potential infinity, which is highlighted in Aristotle's metaphysics. The limitations of the metaphysical mind of ancient Greece were overcome through Christian theology and its concept of the infinite God, as formulated in Gregory of Nyssa's theology. That is (...) how the concept of actual infinity emerged. However, Gregory of Nyssa's understanding of human rationality went still further. He said that access to the infinity of God was to be found only in an asymptotic ascension, as expressed in apophatic theology, and this view endangered the rationality of theology. Deeply influenced by the apophatic tradition, Nicholas of Cusa avoided this danger by showing that infinity could be accessed by symbolic representation and asymptotic mathematical reasoning. Thus, he made an immense contribution in making infinity rationally accessible. This endeavor was finally realized by Georg Cantor. This rational accessibility revealed discernible structures of infinity, such as the continuum hypothesis, and the cardinal numbers. However, the probable logical inconsistency of Georg Cantor's all-encompassing Absolute Infinity points to an intuitive understanding of infinity that goes beyond its rational structures – as in apophatic theology. (shrink)

Peirce’s architectonics, far from rigid, is bended by many plastic transformations, deriving from the cenopythagorean categories, the pragmaticist (modal) maxim, the logic of abduction, the synechistic hypotheses and the triadic classification of sciences, among many other tools capable of molding knowledge. Plasticity, in turn, points to interlacements between mathematics and art, and shapes some associated conceptual forces in the boundary of the disciplines: variation, modulation and invariance; transformability, continuity and discreteness; creative emergence. In this article we focus on this (...) third aspect, through bounded, well defined case studies in the Logic Notebook. The first section describes the manuscript and its interest for a study of creativity, leading to a short speculation on “creative reason” and “plastic imagination” in Peirce. The second section studies five precise cases of creative emergence in the Logic Notebook: differential relatives, existential graphs, sequence diagrams, triadic logic, translatability. Some major surprises occur in those detailed studies. (shrink)

Presents the latest research on how reasoning with analogies, metaphors, metonymies, and images can facilitate mathematical understanding. For math education, educational psychology, and cognitive science scholars.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.1 (2003) 1-12 [Access article in PDF] Art and Mathematics in Education Richard Hickman and Peter Huckstep We begin by asking a simple question: To what extent can art education be related to mathematics education? One reason for asking this is that there is, on the one hand, a significant body of claims that assert that mathematics is an art, and, on the other, (...) work in art that has a mathematical basis. Observations of these kinds are not trivial. They have significant implications for the teaching of these areas of the curriculum in at least two ways. First, there is the methodological issue of the extent to which we should teach mathematics and art separately, and second, the teleological question of why they appear in the curriculum at all. So the relationship between the nature of mathematics and art, perceived or real, bears down on questions of the individuation and the justification of these disciplines, or, in other words, upon pedagogy and purpose. Although in principle both the pedagogy and the purpose of any discipline are distinct, there are important connections between them, as we shall draw out.As far as mathematics goes, it has been stressed that the purposes of even rudimentary aspects of mathematics such as counting do need to be made explicit to pupils. 1 What have been seen as errors in understanding are internally linked with pupils' ideas of the purposes of counting. Anna Sierpinska discusses a similar situation within the broader aspect of what she calls "theory" in higher mathematics. 2 More generally, John Passmore, in his analysis of pupils' understanding includes the case where a pupil sees no need to understand since he or she cannot understand the point of learning the subject. 3 If the purposes of art and mathematics are strikingly similar then there is reason to suppose that certain pedagogical approaches that [End Page 1] follow from this will improve understanding of both mathematics and art, and therefore understanding of reasons for engaging in math-based and art-based activities.In schools we see what appears to be some evidence of connections between art and mathematics in cross-curricular work, such as that described in Jacqueline Cossentino and David Schaffer. 4 Apart from providing much-needed motivation, an important value of this approach toward mathematics is that it can illuminate pupils' understanding of some of its purpose by, at the very least, allowing them to recognize instances of mathematics at work, often in unsuspecting contexts. In particular, by facilitating some transference of knowledge pupils can appreciate the so-called "power" of mathematics in its widespread application to the world of artefacts produced by themselves and others.Can we go further than displaying connections between these disciplines? Can we treat mathematics itself as art? In particular, can we suppose that pupils can make mathematics just as they can make artefacts? Some writers seem to imply this by invoking the notion of creativity as a common property between the two disciplines. 5 Leaving aside the ironic sense of creativity in, for example, the case of "creative accountancy" pupils must indeed "make" sense of mathematics and they must originate mathematical assertions of their own that have not been directly taught. In both respects mathematics is similar to the learning of a language. Further than this, we value pupils' inventiveness in their approaches to areas of mathematics, calculations for example.The linking of mathematics and art via creativity has its most persuasive force in the change of attitude toward axiomatic foundations. 6 The story is familiar: for centuries Euclidean geometry was (wrongly) supposed to offer truths of the actual space in which we lived, since its axioms were thought to be confirmed by our intuitions of space. However, when it was found that consistent and useful axiomatic systems could be constructed by making certain alterations to these axioms, it became clear that mathematics was not simply discovered. It involved a significant measure of creativity. Yet one thing is clear: the sense that children make of mathematics, the original utterances they make... (shrink)

Evolution produced many species whose members are pre-programmed with almost all the competences and knowledge they will ever need. Others appear to start with very little and learn what they need, but appearances can deceive. I conjecture that evolution produced powerful innate meta-knowledge about a class of environments containing 3- D structures and processes involving materials of many kinds. In humans and several other species these innate learning mechanisms seem initially to use exploration techniques to capture a variety of useful (...) generalisations after which there is a "phase transition" in which learnt generalisations are displaced by a new generative architecture that allows novel situations and problems to be dealt with by reasoning -- a pre-cursor to explicit mathematical theorem proving in topology, geometry, arithmetic, and kinematics. This process seems to occur in some non-human animals and in preverbal human toddlers, but is clearest in the switch from pattern-based to syntax-based language use. The discovery of non-linguistic toddler theorems has largely gone unnoticed, though Piaget investigated some of the phenomena, and creative problem solving in some other animals also provides clues. A later evolutionary development seems to have enabled humans to cope with domains that involve both regularities and exceptions, explaining "U-shaped" language learning. Only humans appear to be able to develop meta-meta-competences needed for teaching learnt "theorems" and their proofs. I'll sketch a speculative theory, present examples, and propose a research programme, reducing the 'G' in AGI, while promising increased power in return. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.1 (2003) 1-12 [Access article in PDF] Art and Mathematics in Education Richard Hickman and Peter Huckstep We begin by asking a simple question: To what extent can art education be related to mathematics education? One reason for asking this is that there is, on the one hand, a significant body of claims that assert that mathematics is an art, and, on the other, (...) work in art that has a mathematical basis. Observations of these kinds are not trivial. They have significant implications for the teaching of these areas of the curriculum in at least two ways. First, there is the methodological issue of the extent to which we should teach mathematics and art separately, and second, the teleological question of why they appear in the curriculum at all. So the relationship between the nature of mathematics and art, perceived or real, bears down on questions of the individuation and the justification of these disciplines, or, in other words, upon pedagogy and purpose. Although in principle both the pedagogy and the purpose of any discipline are distinct, there are important connections between them, as we shall draw out.As far as mathematics goes, it has been stressed that the purposes of even rudimentary aspects of mathematics such as counting do need to be made explicit to pupils. 1 What have been seen as errors in understanding are internally linked with pupils' ideas of the purposes of counting. Anna Sierpinska discusses a similar situation within the broader aspect of what she calls "theory" in higher mathematics. 2 More generally, John Passmore, in his analysis of pupils' understanding includes the case where a pupil sees no need to understand since he or she cannot understand the point of learning the subject. 3 If the purposes of art and mathematics are strikingly similar then there is reason to suppose that certain pedagogical approaches that [End Page 1] follow from this will improve understanding of both mathematics and art, and therefore understanding of reasons for engaging in math-based and art-based activities.In schools we see what appears to be some evidence of connections between art and mathematics in cross-curricular work, such as that described in Jacqueline Cossentino and David Schaffer. 4 Apart from providing much-needed motivation, an important value of this approach toward mathematics is that it can illuminate pupils' understanding of some of its purpose by, at the very least, allowing them to recognize instances of mathematics at work, often in unsuspecting contexts. In particular, by facilitating some transference of knowledge pupils can appreciate the so-called "power" of mathematics in its widespread application to the world of artefacts produced by themselves and others.Can we go further than displaying connections between these disciplines? Can we treat mathematics itself as art? In particular, can we suppose that pupils can make mathematics just as they can make artefacts? Some writers seem to imply this by invoking the notion of creativity as a common property between the two disciplines. 5 Leaving aside the ironic sense of creativity in, for example, the case of "creative accountancy" pupils must indeed "make" sense of mathematics and they must originate mathematical assertions of their own that have not been directly taught. In both respects mathematics is similar to the learning of a language. Further than this, we value pupils' inventiveness in their approaches to areas of mathematics, calculations for example.The linking of mathematics and art via creativity has its most persuasive force in the change of attitude toward axiomatic foundations. 6 The story is familiar: for centuries Euclidean geometry was (wrongly) supposed to offer truths of the actual space in which we lived, since its axioms were thought to be confirmed by our intuitions of space. However, when it was found that consistent and useful axiomatic systems could be constructed by making certain alterations to these axioms, it became clear that mathematics was not simply discovered. It involved a significant measure of creativity. Yet one thing is clear: the sense that children make of mathematics, the original utterances they make... (shrink)

After showing by means of several examples the significant role that standard abduction plays both in observational and in theoretical natural sciences, I introduce in this paper preduction as a deductive discovery strategy. I argue that deductive reasoning can be extended to the context of discovery of theoretical natural sciences, such as mathematical physics, and I use the term theoretical preduction to denote the way of reasoning that consists in the implementation of deductive reasoning in scientific (...) creativity. Moreover, standard abduction is not always sufficient to provide best explanations in science. It is widely known that during the 1960s, abduction was identified as a form of inference to the best explanation. But when the explanation of many natural phenomena requires more than spontaneous acts of creativity, such as those that one might imagine in the cases of Kepler, Darwin or Wegener, much mathematical work has to be done in addition in order to advance justified theoretical explanations. In those cases, the explanation takes place more preductivo. I term sophisticated abduction the corresponding form of inference to the best explanation. (shrink)

This study looks at the relation between mathematical discovery and semiosis, focusing on the famous Fibonacci sequence. The serendipitous discovery of this sequence as the answer to a puzzle designed by Italian mathematician Leonardo Fibonacci to illustrate the efficiency of the decimal number system is one of those episodes in human history which show how serendipity, semiosis, and discovery are intertwined. As such, the sequence has significant implications for the study of creative semiosis, since it suggests that symbols (...) are hardly arbitrary products of human reason, but rather unconscious probes of reality. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of papers on philosophy of mathematics which deal with a series of questions quite different from those which occupied the minds of the proponents of the three classic schools: logicism, formalism, and intuitionism. The questions of the volume are not to do with justification in the traditional sense, but with a variety of other topics. Some are concerned with discovery and the growth of mathematics. How does the semantics of mathematics change as the subject develops? (...) What heuristics are involved in mathematical discovery, and do such heuristics constitute a logic of mathematical discovery? What new problems have been introduced by the development of mathematics since the 1930s? Other questions are concerned with the applications of mathematics both to physics and to the new field of computer science. Then there is the new question of whether the axiomatic method is really so essential to mathematics as is often supposed, and the question, which goes back to Wittgenstein, of the sense in which mathematical proofs are compelling. Taking these questions together they give part of an emerging agenda which is likely to carry philosophy of mathematics forward into the twenty first century. (shrink)

This study looks at the relation between mathematical discovery and semiosis, focusing on the famous Fibonacci sequence. The serendipitous discovery of this sequence as the answer to a puzzle designed by Italian mathematician Leonardo Fibonacci to illustrate the efficiency of the decimal number system is one of those episodes in human history which show how serendipity, semiosis, and discovery are intertwined. As such, the sequence has significant implications for the study of creative semiosis, since it suggests that symbols (...) are hardly arbitrary products of human reason, but rather unconscious probes of reality. (shrink)

In the section of the Antinomy of pure Reason Kant presents three notions of infinity. By investigating these concepts of infinity, this paper highlights important ‘building blocks’ of the structure of the mathematical antinomies, such as the ability of reason of producing ascending and descending series, as well as the notions of given and givable series. These structural features are discussed in order to clarify Ernst Zermelo’s reading of Kant’s antinomy, according to which the latter is deeply rooted in (...) the tendency of the mind of producing “creative progress” and “inclusive closure”. The aim of this paper is to explain in which sense and why Kant’s treatment of the antinomies attracts the attention of Zermelo in the early 1900s and which aspects of his second axiomatic system have been inspired by Kant’s philosophy. Thus, by reading Kant’s antinomy ‘through Zermelo’s eyes’—with emphasis on the concept of regressive series in indefinitum and on that of regressive series ad infinitum – this paper identifies the echoes of Kant’s work in the making of the ZFC set theory. (shrink)

Upshot: We consider that elementary students’ situated activities with geometric transformations and animation contain the seeds of complex, and eventually, mathematically generalizable and abstract reasoning. Further studies can explore such technologically-based activities’ potential as building blocks for flexible, creative, and formalized knowledge.

Modern fundamental science tends to avoid the principle of physical causality and realism, replacing it with heuristically postulated and separated mathematical constructions that impose their own rules before being adjusted to measurement results. While it is officially accepted as the single possible kind of rigorous knowledge, we argue that another, explicitly extended kind of science can provide the causally complete picture of reality avoiding the glaring gaps, growing problems and persisting stagnation of the artificially reduced knowledge paradigm. The logic (...) of science development and especially its current state call for the urgently needed transition to the extended, causally complete kind of knowledge and related sustainable progress at superior creativity levels of self-aware, reason-based society. (shrink)

Several hundred thousand intellectually talented 12-to 13-year-olds have been tested nationwide over the past 16 years with the mathematics and verbal sections of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). Although no sex differences in verbal ability have been found, there have been consistent sex differences favoring males in mathematical reasoning ability, as measured by the mathematics section of the SAT (SAT-M). These differences are most pronounced at the highest levels of mathematical reasoning, they are stable over time, (...) and they are observed in other countries as well. The sex difference in mathematical reasoning ability can predict subsequent sex differences in achievement in mathematics and science and is therefore of practical importance. To date a primarily environmental explanation for the difference in ability has not received support from the numerous studies conducted over many years by the staff of Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth (SMPY) and others. We have studied some of the classical environmental hypotheses: attitudes toward mathematics, perceived usefulness of mathematics, confidence, expectations/ encouragement from parents and others, sex-typing, and differential course-taking. In addition, several physiological correlates of extremely high mathematical reasoning ability have been identified (left-handedness, allergies, myopia, and perhaps bilateral representation of cognitive functions and prenatal hormonal exposure). It is therefore proposed that the sex difference in SAT-M scores among intellectually talented students, which may be related to greater male variability, results from both environmental and biological factors. (shrink)

Mathematics used to be portrayed as a deductive science. Stemming from Polya, however, is a philosophical movement which broadens the concept of mathematical reasoning to include inductive or quasi-empirical methods. Interest in inductive methods is a welcome turn from foundationalism toward a philosophy grounded in mathematical practice. Regrettably, though, the conception of mathematical reasoning embraced by quasi-empiricists is still too narrow to include the sort of thought-experiment which Mueller describes as traditional mathematical proof and (...) which Lakatos examines in Proofs and refutations. This paper extends the concept of mathematical reasoning along two further dimensions to accommodate thought-experiment.Keywords: Thought-experiment; Informal proof; Mathematical reasoning. (shrink)

The cultures here in question are those of mathematics and of physics that I shall interpret with the goal of exploring different modes of creativity. As case studies I will consider two scientists who were exemplars of these cultures, the mathematician Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) and the physicist Albert Einstein (1879-1955). The modes of creativity that I will compare and contrast are their notions of aesthetics and intuition. In order to accomplish this we begin by studying their introspections.

This paper proposes an account of mathematical reasoning as parallel in structure: the arguments which mathematicians use to persuade each other of their results comprise the argumentational structure; the inferential structure is composed of derivations which offer a formal counterpart to these arguments. Some conflicts about the foundations of mathematics correspond to disagreements over which steps should be admissible in the inferential structure. Similarly, disagreements over the admissibility of steps in the argumentational structure correspond to different views about (...) mathematical practice. The latter steps may be analysed in terms of argumentation schemes. Three broad types of scheme are distinguished, a distinction which is then used to characterize and evaluate four contrasting approaches to mathematical practice. (shrink)

The vicissitudes of mathematical reason in the 20th century Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9556-y Authors Thomas Mormann, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country UPV/EPU, Donostia-San Sebastian, Spain, Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

There is a greater need in today‘s society, to understand and critically discuss how the limited resources of our planet are allocated. Often, mathematical models are used in connection with resource allocation problems, and a common view is that mathematics in itself is neutral. In this article, we challenge this view of mathematics as a neutral practice through an analysis of possible solutions to a sharing task. The tasks come from a research project aiming to study how mathematics can (...) support ethical reasoning and ethical arguments can support different mathematical solutions when sharing a resource. In ethical reasoning, three components are addressed: Information, Coherence, and Engagement. We show that ethical reasoning is part of mathematical reasoning in all the solutions to the task, independent of whether the dividend is treated as indivisible or divisible. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the comparison of two types of proofs in mathematical practice, the methodological differences of which go back to the difference in the understanding of the nature of mathematics by Descartes and Leibniz. In modern philosophy of mathematics, we talk about conceptual and formal proofs in connection with the so-called Hilbert Thesis, according to which every proof can be transformed into a logical conclusion in a suitable formal system. The analysis of the arguments of the (...) proponents and opponents of the Thesis, “conceptualists” and “formalists”, is presented respectively by the two main antagonists – Y. Rav and J. Azzouni. The focus is on the possibility of reproducing the proof of “interesting” mathematical theorems in the form of a strict logical conclusion, in principle feasible by a mechanical procedure. The argument of conceptualists is based on pointing out the importance of other aspects of the proof besides the logical conclusion, namely, in introducing new concepts, methods, and establishing connections between different sections of meaningful mathematics, which is often illustrated by the case of proving Fermat’s Last Theorem (Y. Rav). Formalists say that a conceptual proof “points” to the formal logical structure of the proof (J. Azzouni). The article shows that the disagreement is based on the assumption of asymmetry of mutual translation of syntactic and semantic structures of the language, as a result of which the formal proof loses important semantic factors of proof. In favor of a formal proof, the program of univalent foundations of mathematics In. Vojevodski, according to which the future of mathematical proofs is associated with the availability of computer verification programs. In favor of conceptual proofs, it is stated (A. Pelc) that the number of steps in the supposed formal logical conclusion when proving an “interesting” theorem exceeds the cognitive abilities of a person. The latter circumstance leads the controversy beyond the actual topic of mathematical proof into the epistemological sphere of discussions of “mentalists” and “mechanists” on the question of the supposed superiority of human intelligence over the machine, initiated by R. Penrose in his interpretation of the Second Theorem of Goedel, among whose supporters, as it turned out, was Goedel himself. (shrink)

Philosophers have usually offered a number of ways of describing hypotheses generation, but all aim at demonstrating that the activity of generating hypotheses is paradoxical, illusory or obscure, and then not analysable. Those descriptions are often so far from Peircian pragmatic prescription and so abstract to result completely unknowable and obscure. The “computational turn” gives us a new way to understand creative processes in a strictly pragmatic sense. In fact, by exploiting artificial intelligence and cognitive science tools, computational philosophy (...) allows us to test concepts and ideas previously conceived only in abstract terms. It is in the perspective of these actual computational models that I find the central role of abduction in the explanation of creative reasoning in science. Creativity and discovery are no more seen as a mysterious irrational process, but, thanks to constructive accounts, as a complex relationship among different inferential steps that can be clearly analysed and identified. I maintain that the computational philosophy analysis of model-based and manipulative abduction and of external and epistemic mediators is important not only to delineate the actual practice of abduction, but also to further enhance the development of programs computationally adequate in rediscovering, or discovering for the first time, for example, scientific hypotheses or mathematical theorems. (shrink)

In this contribution we propose an agent architecture for theorem proving which we intend to investigate in depth in the future. The work reported in this paper is in an early state, and by no means finished. We present and discuss our proposal in order to get feedback from the Calculemus community.