This article explores the properties of formulations in a corpus of Hebrew radio phone-ins by juxtaposing two theoretical frameworks: conversation analysis and dialogic syntax. This combination of frameworks is applied towards explaining an anomalous interaction in the collection – a caller’s marked, unexpected rejection of a formulation of gist produced by the radio phone-in’s host. Our analysis shows that whereas previous CA studies of formulations account for many instances throughout the corpus, understanding this particular formulation in CA terms does not (...) explain its drastic rejection by the caller. We therefore turn to an in-depth examination of strategies for lexical and syntactic resonance as a stance-taking device throughout the interaction. In so doing, we not only shed light on the anomalous interaction, but also offer an answer to a provocative question previously put forward by Haddington concerning which of the two – stances or actions – have more meaningful consequences for the description of the organization of interaction. In the particular interaction analyzed here, stances play the more significant role. We propose that the intersubjective stance-taking of participants may be viewed as a meta-action employed among participants as they move across actions, sequences, and activities in talk. (shrink)

This study investigates employment of two elements having a lexical source involving comparison -, `like') which have greatly proliferated over the last decade or so in Israel, Hebrew Kaze and ke'ilu. Here I focus particularly on kaze and compare it to ke'ilu, which was investigated at length in Maschler. The data come from audio-recordings of casual conversations of college-educated Israelis with their friends and relatives. A qualitative analysis of talk-in-interaction reveals three functions for kaze: comparative demonstrative, hedge and quotative. (...) A quantitative perspective on the distribution of these functions is presented, and these qualitative and quantitative analyses lead to an examination of the functional itinerary of this word in Hebrew. The recent proliferation of kaze and ke'ilu in Israeli Hebrew discourse is then tied to the change from a culture in which dugri speech is central to one in which this speaking style is in decline. (shrink)

Previous studies of Hebrew nu investigate this discourse marker in casual conversation. The current study explores nu on Israeli political phone-in radio programs and broadens our knowledge both about the functions and grammaticization processes of discourse markers and about some particularities of Israeli political talk radio. The comparison to casual talk reveals both qualitative and quantitative differences. In casual talk, the main function of nu is a sequential one – urging further development of an ongoing topic. In the radiophonic data, (...) the most common role of nu is as a keying token, functioning in the affective realm. Furthermore, the talk-radio data show a wider variety of keys constructed by nu – which range from joking to sheer contempt – clustering closer towards the latter, in contrast to the case of casual talk, manifesting mostly the joking key. Structurally, whereas sequential functions are generally accomplished by stand-alone nu, affective tokens are accompanied by same-speaker talk. The analysis sheds new light on how a sequential token might come to function in the affective realm. (shrink)

In this article, we investigate the functional itinerary followed by Hebrew be'emet, through a close exploration of its synchronic uses in the contemporary spoken language. Since this utterance, derived from the noun 'emet, is so profoundly tied in with the speaker's beliefs and attitudes towards his or her discourse, we consider issues of metalanguage, modality, evidentiality, and stance. Be'emet is traditionally classified as `adverb', but in our corpus of naturally occurring Hebrew conversation, only 22 percent of all tokens function in (...) this role. Whereas these tokens function referentially, the great majority of tokens function in the interpersonal realm of discourse, manifesting properties of discourse markers: 44.5 percent of all tokens function as full-fledged discourse markers serving mirative, reprimanding, or negating any doubt roles; 22.5 percent function to ratify a previous stance; and three percent function to latch onto a new topic, requesting its elaboration. An intermediate category is composed of tokens functioning both referentially and interpersonally, mid-way between an adverb and a discourse marker, in a way that is particularly illuminating for understanding the changes undergone by be'emet as a result of its employment in discourse. The study thus lends support to previous studies of subjectification and intersubjectification in the process of grammaticization of discourse markers. (shrink)

Three values for non-transferable utility games -- the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler--Owen consistent NTU-value -- are compared in a simple example.

The ancient problems of bankruptcy, contested garment, and rights arbitration have generated many studies, debates, and controversy. The objective of this paper is to show that the Shapley value from game theory, measuring the power of each player in a game, may be consistently applied for getting the general one-step solution of all these three problems viewed as -person games. The decision making is based on the same tool, namely the game theory logic based on the use of the Shapley (...) value, but the specific games involved are slightly different in each problem. The kind of claims of the players, the relationship between the given claims and the given resources available, and the particular way of calculating the generalized characteristic function of the game determine the specific type of game which has to be solved in each of the three ancient problems mentioned. The iterative use of the Shapley value may also justify the well-known Aumann-Maschler step-by-step procedure for solving the bankruptcy problem. (shrink)

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance. Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

“Randomized dictatorship,” one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works as follows: a fair coin toss determines the “dictator”—the player to be given his first-best payoff. The two major bargaining solutions, that of Nash and that of Kalai and Smorodinsky, Pareto-dominate this process. However, whereas the existing literature offers axiomatizations of the Nash solution in which this ex ante domination plays a central role, it does not provide an analogous result for Kalai–Smorodinsky. This paper fills in this gap: (...) a characterization of the latter is obtained by combining the aforementioned domination with three additional axioms: Pareto optimality, individual monotonicity, and a weakened version of the Perles–Maschler super additivity axiom. (shrink)

The Shapley value is a well-known solution concept for TU games. The Maschler–Owen value and the NTU Shapley value are two well-known extensions of the Shapley value to NTU games. A hyperplane game is an NTU game in which the feasible set for each coalition is a hyperplane. On the domain of monotonic hyperplane games, the Maschler–Owen value is axiomatized. Although the domain of hyperplane game is a very interesting class of games to study, unfortunately, on this domain, (...) the NTU Shapley value is not well-defined, namely, it assigns an empty set to some hyperplane games. A prize game is an NTU game that can be obtained by “truncating” a hyperplane game. As such, a prize game describes essentially the same situation as the corresponding hyperplane game. It turns out that, on the domain of monotonic prize games, the NTU Shapley value is well-defined. Thus, one can define a value which is well-defined on the domain of monotonic hyperplane games as follows: given a monotonic hyperplane game, first, transform it into a prize game, and then apply the NTU Shapley value to it. We refer to the resulting value as the “generalized Shapley value” and compare the axiomatic properties of it with those of the Maschler–Owen value on the union of the class of monotonic hyperplane games and that of monotonic prize games. We also provide axiomatizations of the Maschler–Owen value and the generalized Shapley value on that domain. (shrink)