Aphoristic work, with translation and commentary on Vedanta philosophy.

"Nimbarka's commentary on the Brahma-Sutras known as the Vedanta-Parijata-Saurabha, and that of his immediate disciple Srinivasa styled the Vendanta-Kaustubha are the chief works of the school of philosophy associated with the name of Nimbarka. The latter ".

Exegesis on Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya and Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja, 1017-1137, commentaries on the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, basic work of the Vedanta school in Hindu philosophy.

The Path of Compassion: The Bodhisattva Precepts. The Chinese Brahma’s Net Sutra. Introduced and translated by Batchelor, pp. xi + 128. US$19.95. ISBN 0 7591 0517 0.

This is the first of a proposed fifty volumes of the Brahma-Mïmämsä, inquiry into the Vedas and the highest reality, Brahman. The author is a follower of the last great innovator in Indian philosophy, Madhva. Thus his inquiry into Brahman is an exposition of the philosophy of Madhva, but since Madhva sought to present and reject the views of the previous commentators, Raghavendrachar's work treats the other two great Vedanta commentators, Samkara and Ramanuja. Samkara's view is considered generally to (...) be nondualistic; Rämänuja's a qualified nondualism; and Madhva's, a dualism. However, this Indian Professor seeks to show that Madhva is not a dualist but a monist, for though Madhva accepted both Brahman and the world as real, only Brahman is an independent reality. The world is a dependent reality. Rigorously rejecting Samkara's view that the world is a product of an illusory, baseless ignorance, Madhva establishes the world as a reality dependent on Brahman because it is a product of Brahman. Madhva's work is a commentary on the Brahma-Sutras of Bädaräyana which are an exposition of the contents of the Vedas and Upanisads. This volume presents Madhva's commentary on the first section of the Brahma-Sutras, called the Brahma-Sutra-Bhäsya, and three other short works by Madhva on the same section, his Anu-Vyäkyäna, Nyäya-Vivarana, and Anu-Bhäsya. The commentaries of Jayatïrtha are given throughout. All texts are given in transliterated Sanskrit with translation and extensive commentary by the translator. The author sees Indian philosophy as a unity culminating in Madhva, and his conviction is evident throughout the book. This volume is strictly limited to students of Indian philosophy who are accustomed to dealing with Sanskrit terminology, for very frequently the Sanskrit terms are given without translation. Also, because Raghavendrachar concords with Madhva's view that inquiry into Brahman is endless and that the purpose of endless inquiry is to saturate oneself in the independent reality of Visnu, only those students of Indian philosophy who are interested in such saturation could keep with the book cover to cover. The book is especially suited for someone who wants to concentrate on Madhva and who is interested in reading the Sanskrit texts; from that viewpoint he can appreciate the lengthy discussion of terms.--P. J. H. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, by comparing certain passages from the early Buddhist sūtras and the Mahābhārata , we can find evidence of a late- to post-Vedic “Brahmanical synthesis,” centered on the conception of Brahmā as both supreme Creator God and ultimate goal for transcending saṃsāra , that for the most part did not become a part of the Brahmanical synthesis or syntheses that came to constitute classical Hinduism. By comparing the Buddhist response to this early conception of Brahmā (...) with the way in which Brahmā is treated in certain sectarian portions of the Mahābhārata , I then argue further that the Buddhist critique of Brahmā as supreme deity was in part conceded by the Brahmanical tradition, and sectarian accounts of supreme godhead sought to reconcile pravṛtti and nivṛtti values more subtly than the crude juxtaposition offered by the earlier Brahmanical synthesis offered by Brahmā. The result was that Brahmā was relegated to an inferior position as a fully saṃsāric demiurge, a narrative found first in certain parts of the Mahābhārata and then continued throughout most of the Purāṇas. (shrink)

The Book Presents The Practical Side Of Hindu Philosophy As Manifested In The Different Religiouns Systems Of The Hindus. It Shows The Essential Connection Between Theory And Practice, And To Point Out The True Significance Of The Course Of Discipline Prescribed By The Different Religious Systems For The Attainment Of Spiritual Realisation. A Highly Inteteresting And Important Work To The Literature Of Hindu Thought And Religion. Condition Good.

Ovaj članak predstavlja tragove ranoga vedāntskog tumačenja Maitreyī-brāhmane, jednog od najpoznatijih dijelova Brhadāranyaka-upanišadi u Brahma-sūtrama, temeljnom tekstu filozofske škole vedānte. Predmet diskusije je egzegeza Maitreyī-brāhmane prema trima starodrevnim komentatorima Āśmarathyi, Audulomiu i Kāśakrtsni. Cilj je ovog rada pokazati kakve se metode tumačenja upanišadskih tekstova koriste u različitim vedāntskim školama. Također možemo vidjeti tehnike tumačenja preuzete iz pūrva-mīmāmse, škole tumačenja vedskih tekstova, koje su preoblikovane za tumačenje upanišadi. Članak također pokazuje kako filozofsko stajalište o odnosu sopstva i apsoluta služi egzegetskoj (...) svrsi pomirenja različitih upanišadskih učenja. Učenje BS i starodrevnih komentatora je bhedābhedavāda, istodobna različitost i nerazličitost sopstva i apsoluta. Śankara tumači sūtre kao da poučavaju monistički iluzionizam. On na dvije razine istine razlikuje niži brahman i najviši brahman. Na ovaj je način mogao pomiriti sva upanišadska učenja, bilo da naginjuteizmu ili monizmu. Važna je i hermeneutička rasprava Śankarina s bhedābhedavādinom Bhartrprapañcom o prirodi znanja i djelovanja, odnosno prvenstvu upanišadi koje se bave znanjem brahmana nad brāhmanama koje se bave obrednim djelovanjem.This article presents some traces of early vedāntic interpretations of Maitreyī-brāhmana, one of the most famous parts of Brhadāranyaka-upanishad, in the Brahma-sūtras, the fundamental work of the philosophical school vedānta. Topic under discussion conveys the exegesis of Maitreyī-brāhmana according to three ancient commentators, Āśmarathya, Audulomi and Kāśakrtsna. The purpose of this article is to show the methods of interpretation of upanishadic passages in different vedāntic schools. Also, we can see some techniques of interpretation taken from pūrva-mīmāmsa, the school of vedic interpretation, and adapted for upanishadic interpretation. The article shows how the main philosophical standpoint on the relation of the self and the absolute serves the exegetical purposes. So the standpoint of the BS and the ancient commentators is bhedābhedavāda, teaching of both the difference and non-difference between the self and the absolute, like sparks and fire. Śankara interprets the sūtras as teaching monistic illusionism. He also differentiates between the two levels of truth and accordingly the lower brahman and the highest brahman. In this way he was able to reconcile all upanishadic passages, whether they inclined to theism or monism. There is also an important hermeneutical discussion of Śankara with bhedābhedavādin Bhartrprapañca on the nature of knowledge and action and priority of the upanishads, part of sacred canon dealing with knowledge of brahman over the brāhmanas, which are dealing with ritual action. (shrink)

In the opening sections of his Brahma-sutra-bhasya , Ramanuja makes a very forceful assault on Sankara's Advaita theory. This assault anticipates in a striking way modern western attacks on metaphysical religious positions, attacks which stem from Hume and are associated today with names like A. J. Ayer and Antony Flew. In this paper I wish to argue that certain aspects of Sankara's position, as enunciated in his Brahma-sutra-bhasya , suggest that Ramanunja's assault, and therefore by implication (...) a modern western attack on Sankara also, depends for its success on a misinterpretation of Sankara's views. I wish then to suggest a possible alternative interpretation of Sankara's Advaita in terms viable for today, drawing, though indirectly, on such writers as R. B. Braithwaite and R. M. Hare. An incidental implication of this paper is that these two philosophers of religion would meet less opposition from the religious if they were Hindu rather than Christian! A more important implication is that light could be thrown on the present religious controversy in the west by a study of Indian philosophy of religion, if only we were more disposed to treat it as a living tradition which might teach us something, rather than as an antique. (shrink)

This book represents a comparison of the critique of Buddhism as set forth in the interpretations of Sankara, Madhva, and Ramanuja to the sutras of the second section (adhyaya) of the Brahma-sutras concerned with the refutation of Buddhism, ...

Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)

This paper discusses the reliability of the criteria for determining Śaṅkara’s authorship established by Paul Hacker. His analysis of terminological peculiarities is based on only one of Śaṅkara’s works—the commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras. Therefore, doubt arises as to whether these criteria also apply to other works that we can claim to be authentic. First, it will be argued that the commentaries on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka- and Taittirīya-Upaniṣad are works that can be—with reasonable certainty—considered authentic. When applied to these two works, (...) Hacker’s criteria work remarkably well, and the commentaries on the Taittirīya- and Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad share the same terminological and conceptual features with the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya. Moreover, in most cases, it is possible to distinguish the usage of some terms and concepts from Sureśvara and Padmapāda. On the other hand, Sureśvara and Padmapāda use some of these terms in a quite similar way as Śaṅkara, but differently than the later Advaitins, indicating that a sharp line between Śaṅkara on the one hand and Sureśvara and Padmapāda on the other cannot be drawn in many cases. Also, the writings of these authors—especially Padmapāda—represent a transitional phase in the development of certain Advaita Vedānta concepts although the outlines of some peculiarities by which the later Advaita Vedānta differs from Śaṅkara can already be found sketched by Śaṅkara himself. (shrink)

The competent and detailed introduction to this book traces out the origin and rudiments of religions, their essential nature and the causes of their conflicts. It emphasises the truth that all religions are trying to say the same thing in different ways. Religions are meant to bring out the spiritual in man and to make him live a full and virtuous life. Despite the rapid progress in science and medicine, the mysteries of life and death remain as unknown as before. (...) Religions try, in their myriad ways, to explain these and to venture into the unknowable. They bring comfort to human beings in their suffering, and consolation in their bereavement. The author's belief is that if, while following their own religion, men respected the faiths of others too, much of the religious conflicts and bloodshed which debases mankind would be avoided. The fundamental concepts of Hindu religion and philosophy have exhaustively been narrated in a clear manner. This is followed by selected passages from the main scriptures and philosophical books of the Hindu religion-the Vedas, Puranas, Upanisheads, brahma-sutras, Bhagavadgita, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana of Tulsidasa. In each case there is a synopsis of the book giving its subject matter and a reading list consisting of the main texts and criticisms which will be invaluable to those who wish to know more about it. The passages have been selected to provide interesting reading, particularly connected with the problems and conditions of our own times. The book aims at providing a mine of information about Hinduism and is also an in-depth study of religion in general. It has been written in down-to-earth language and is of interest to all those who are wish to know about matters vital to life and living. (shrink)

Not only in philosophy but in religion as well, concepts such as God, World and Man are discussed quite considerably. Nevertheless, an understanding of these concepts requires careful, detailed and systematic analyses. One of the methods of achieving the same is to use a comparative framework. Within Islam, Wahdatul-Wujud is an important mystical and philosophical perspective that has witnessed a tumultuous journey. It has however played a dominant role in Islamic thought. Within Indian philosophy, Vedānta has played a very influential (...) role. Visistādvaita as a school of thought has also played a great role to interpret core philosophical concepts of Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita and Brahma Sutras. In this research paper, we attempt to provide a comparative analysis of Visistādvaita and Wahdatul-Wujud marking out the aspects of similarity and departures. What stands out as relevant and insightful as an implication of the comparative method is an understanding of these two approaches. Wahdatul-Wujud is redefined as a panentheistic philosophy which believes that God exists inside of everything, but is at the same time, transcendent of everything. In this type ofbelief, God is seen as an eternal spark of all things, the Prime Mover. Quite similarly, Visistādvaita, on the other hand is conceived as a Qualified Non- dualistic philosophy which believes in subsuming every diverse phenomena and experience under an underlying unity. (shrink)

Vedānta has two meanings. The first is the literal sense – “End of Vedas” – and refers to the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads—the latter part of the Vedas. The second sense of “Vedanta” is a scholastic one, and refers to a philosophical orientation that attempts to explain the cryptic Vedānta Sūtra (Brahma Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa, which aims at being a summary of the End of the Vedas. In the previous module, I review the ethics of the End of the Vedas (...) and explicate the Moral Irrealism of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta, which is articulated as a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra. In this module, I compare Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta) and Madhva's (Dvaita Vedānta) account of the Vedānta Sūtra. Both are moral realists. They differ on the room for freedom given the necessity of moral considerations. One value of the Vedānta approach to ethics is that it provides a non-speciesist framework to think about ethics. It allows us to understand ourselves (ātmā) and our interest in Development (Brahman) as conceptually distinct, though identical in some manner. The Advaita view is that this identity is strict. The Dvaita approach is that Development realises the results of choices of individuals, but only some, owing to their good character, are capable of taking advantage of this for their betterment. The Viśiṣṭādvaita approach of Rāmānuja suggests in contrast that each self is a microcosm of reality. Reality is Development – the genus of individual selves. Each self has Development as an essential trait, but owing to past choices (karma), this is poorly understood. Things change when the individual self understands Brahman to be its true self, for then an individual can re-direct their efforts from procuring results to self-governance by treating the personal essence of the Development (the Lord) as the explanation for improvement. (shrink)

This and the following lessons cover the topic of Vedānta and ethics. Vedānta has two meanings. The first is the literal sense – “End of Vedas” – and refers to the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads—the latter part of the Vedas. The second sense of “Vedanta” is a scholastic one, and refers to a philosophical orientation that attempts to explain the cryptic Vedānta Sūtra (Brahma Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa, which aims at being a summary of the End of the Vedas. We shall (...) pursue the question of ethics in both senses of Vedānta. In this module we shall examine the ethical theory of Deontology found in the Upaniṣads. Having explored the implications of this model for moral philosophy, we can reflect upon the three commentarial approaches. In this lesson, we will examine Śaṅkara’s Advaita approach. Advaita Vedānta, especially in Śaṅkara's form, presents a version of moral scepticism, or more strongly, moral irrealism. In this account, there is nothing objective about ethics: it mediates our desires-oriented psychology, and should be dispensed with along with the desire-oriented psychology. Śaṅkara seems to come close to doing the impossible: saying insightful things about what he takes to be a fiction, which is the individual self, for which ethics is essential. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:God and the World's Arrangement: Readings from Vedānta and Nyāya Philosophy of Religion by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen PhillipsSwami Narasimhananda (bio)God and the World's Arrangement: Readings from Vedānta and Nyāya Philosophy of Religion. Translated, with Introduction and Explanatory Notes, by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen Phillips. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2021. Pp. xx + 91. Paperback $19.00, isbn 978-1-62466-957-6.The scarcity of accessible English translations of Sanskrit texts (...) that retain the philosophical rigor of the original has been a great challenge in Indian philosophy. God and the World's Arrangement, a translation with introduction and explanatory notes by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen Phillips, is an example of how this scarcity could be addressed without straying away from present-day idioms and context. This book discusses the perspectives on God and the arrangement of the world according to Nyāya, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, and Buddhist philosophies. This book is divided into two parts, followed by two appendices, and a bibliography. Each part has study questions at the end and there is an impressive reading list. The first part is a translation and analysis of Śaṅkara's theistic argument in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra 2.2.1–10. The translators also include the subcommentary by Vācaspati Miśra. The second part contains the translation and analysis of Vācaspati Miśra's theistic argument in his commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra 4.1.19–21. All translations are followed by explanations that elaborate the contexts of the arguments. The translations in this book are elegant and use modern English idioms.The seeds of this book were sown by a guest lecture by Nirmalya Guha to a philosophy course at the University of Texas at Austin. The other two authors joined hands with Guha and worked on texts from Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vedānta, and Buddhist schools of thought. Scholars around the world are now interested in having a pan-global view of philosophy. However, such an understanding requires an informed engagement with the various contexts and mores of thought. This deceptively slim volume addresses this problem by succinctly providing the required background context and clarifying many commonly held misconceptions about Indian philosophy, particularly Advaita Vedānta. For a long time, there have not been many serious readings of Advaita Vedānta texts. This book comes as a relief and explains the basic concepts of Advaita Vedānta with readings from relevant portions of texts like the Brahma-sūtra. This book is a step to fill the gap [End Page 1] of texts that properly voice the perspectives of scholars from within the traditions following Advaita Vedānta.It is heartening to read a contemporary text that acknowledges the unbiased masterly exegetical work of Vācaspati Miśra that earned him the epithet sarva-tantra-svatantra, "one who is equally proficient in all the disciplines of knowledge." The translators and editors of this book have a noble goal of "coupling Vācaspati's works on Vedānta and on Nyāya" to make "it possible for a wide swath of his work to be pondered, little of which is currently accessible despite Vācaspati's importance for the whole of classical Indian philosophical thought" (p. xi). The editors lose no time in clarifying the approach of the texts explained in the book from Vedānta and Nyāya philosophies. They explain in some detail one of the means of knowledge, pramāṇa s, used by the Indian philosophies that adhere to the Vedās, the means of anumāṇa or inference. An interesting aspect of this book is the contemporary examples that the translators give, like those of a politician and automobile manufacturers. For instance, the translators explain different ways in which arguments given through an example can fail. The translators explain the error of an example not having the property to be proved in this manner:Yet another type of failure occurs when the property to be proved is not actually present in the example. Should one argue that "People who purchase Japanese vehicles... (shrink)

본고는 우파니샤드 중 가장 초기 우파니샤드 중의 하나인 『브리하다란야카 우파니샤드』에 대한 샹카라의 주석서인 『브리하다란야카 우파니샤드 주석서』(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya, 약칭 BUBh)를 연구한 것이다. BUBh는 비록 그의 『브라흐마 수트라 주석서』(Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya)에 비해 연구가 덜 이루어졌으나, 그 사료적 중요성과 베단타 전통 내의 중요성으로 보아 독립 대상으로서 연구할 가치가 높다. BUBh를 철학적, 신학적으로 접근한 두 선행 연구들과 달리 이 연구는 교육법에 초점을 두고, 이 교육법은 텍스트를 통독할 때 드러나게 된다고 주장한다. 독자는 의식하든 의식하지 않든 발췌독, 정독, 통독을 교차적으로 하게 되지만, 특히 BUBh는 (...) 발췌독, 정독과 함께 텍스트 전체를 통독해야 이 텍스트가 초급에서 고급으로 발전하는 단계를 고려한 교과서의 기능을 하고 있음을 알 수 있다. 그래서 본고는 BUBh를 앞에서부터 뒤로 순서대로 읽어야 이 텍스트를 더 바르게 이해할 수 있고, 더불어 교사 샹카라의 구체적 모습을 알고 느낄 수 있다고 주장한다. (shrink)