This critical edition of Albert of Saxony's _25 Questions on Logic_ treats issues such as the imposition, distribution, signification, and supposition of terms, and the truth and falsity, conversion, contradictoriness and kinds of propositions, together with problems concerning negotiations.

Diese Ausgabe bietet erstmals den vollständigen lateinischen Text des ersten Buches des Kommentars zum Liber de causis in kritischer Edition mit deutscher Übersetzung. Sie entstand als ein Gemeinschaftswerk aller Editoren und Mitarbeiter an der in Progreß befindlichen Editio Coloniensis, der kritischen Gesamtausgabe der Alberti Magni Opera Omnia. Albertus Magnus - der Beiname "der Große" ist seit dem 14. Jahrhundert belegt, nachdem ihm schon die Zeitgenossen den Ehrentitel "doctor universalis" verliehen hatten - wird in den Annalen der Philosophiegeschichte zwar stets (...) respektvoll genannt; aber der Schatten seines großen Schülers, Thomas von Aquin, legte sich lange Zeit so sehr über sein Werk, daß die herausragende Stellung, die Albert für die Grundlegung und Ausgestaltung der Metaphysik in der Philosophie des Mittelalters einnimmt, erst neuerlich wieder in das Zentrum der Forschung gerückt ist. (shrink)

Excerpt from Albertus Magnus: Beitrge zu Seiner Wrdigung Eine hiervon wesentlich verschiedene Richtung verfolgt der kleine Aufsatz an dritter Stelle. Es ist darin der Versuch gemacht, aus den Aussprchen Alberts den Standpunkt zu rekonstruieren, welchen die Scholastik in ihrer Betrachtung der Welt und in ihren Versuchen der Naturerklrung einnahm, und war ich namentlich bestrebt, die Probleme heraustreten zu lassen, welche den manch mal sehr abstrakt und fremdartig klingenden Errterungen zu grunde liegen. Mehr noch als in den beiden voranstehenden, war (...) leider bei dieser letzten Untersuchung die Beschrnkung auf das engste Ma geboten. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Aristotelian commenters have long noted an apparent contradiction between what Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics I.2 and Physics I.1 about how we obtain first principles of a science. At Posterior 71b35–72a6, Aristotle states that what is most universal (καθόλου) is better-known by nature and initially less-known to us, while the particular (καθ’ ἕκαστον) is initially better-known to us, but less-known by nature. At Physics 184a21-30, however, Aristotle states that we move from what is better-known to us, which is universal (καθόλου), (...) to what is better-known absolutely, which is particular (καθ’ ἕκαστον). This paper turns to two of Aristotle’s most notable medieval commentators—Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas—to resolve this apparent contradiction. The key to Thomas and Albert’s solutions, we will argue, is a twofold distinction between a sense-perceptive and scientific universal, and the particulars as sensed individuals and as differentiating attributes. Our Synthetic treatment of these distinctions contributes to the ongoing scholarly effort to understand the Stagyrite’s complex theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Gedachtnis und Erinnerung sind grundlegende Phanomene unseres geistigen Lebens, mit denen sich das abendlandische Denken seit der Antike intensiv auseinander gesetzt hat, von Platon uber Augustinus bis zu gegenwartigen Forschungen in der empirischen Psychologie und Neurophysiologie. Bei Albertus Magnus finden sich uber sein ganzes Werk verteilt immer wieder intensive Reflexionen zu dieser Thematik; sie zeigen, dass er den Fragen, wie und woran man sich (wieder-)erinnert, eine grundlegende anthropologische Bedeutung zugemessen hat. Eine Schlusselstellung fur das Verstandnis in Alberts Oeuvre besitzt (...) dabei sein Kommentar zur aristotelischen Schrift "Uber Gedachtnis und Wiedererinnerung" (De memoria et reminiscentia), dessen kritische Edition zeitgleich in der "Editio Coloniensis" erscheint. Die von Jorn Muller vorgelegte philosophische Lekture dieser Schrift weist nach, dass Albert auf der Basis arabischer Deutungen eine auaerst originelle Interpretation der aristotelischen Gedachtnislehre prasentiert, deren problemgeschichtliche Stellung in der Forschung bisher weitgehend verkannt worden ist. Albert begreift Gedachtnis und Erinnern im Wesentlichen akthaft, also von ihren Vollzugen aus, und zwar als eine Ruckkehr zu der vergangenen Sache, insofern sie vergangen ist. Damit der Leserschaft uber die vorgelegte Interpretation hinaus die Moglichkeit gegeben wird, diese Konzeption selbst Schritt fur Schritt nachzuvollziehen, ist dem Text als Anhang die erste vollstandige Ubersetzung von Alberts Kommentar ins Deutsche beigegeben. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.4 (2001) 491-533 [Access article in PDF] Worthy Constraints in Albertus Magnus's Theory of Action Colleen McCluskey Many medieval accounts of action focus upon the interaction between intellect and will in order to explain how human action comes about. What moves agents to act are their desires for certain goals, their deliberations about their goals, and what it will take to accomplish (...) those goals and satisfy their desires. Thus, many medieval philosophers explain human action by referring to the operations of intellect or reason, which accounts for the deliberative aspect, and the will, which accounts for the desiderative aspect. This is not to say that medieval accounts ignored other influences on action such as passions or sensory desires, but that they tended to focus on the intellect and the will. The account of action developed by Albert the Great early in his career is a notable variation on this basic model. 1 Albert examined the nature of action in a number of texts written over the course of his long career, including De homine, De anima, and his commentaries on the Sentences and Nicomachean Ethics. In De homine, which is an early work, he agrees that intellect and will play important roles in the execution of action, but he argues that both the performance of an action and its freedom involve a third capacity that he calls "liberum arbitrium." Albert modified his views of action significantly in his later works, but I shall argue that this early view retains something of philosophical interest and importance.In the medieval philosophical tradition of the Latin West, beginning with Augustine in the fourth and fifth centuries and continuing well into the thirteenth century, philosophers used the term "liberum arbitrium," often translated [End Page 491] as "free choice" or "free decision," as a technical term for that power or capacity in virtue of which human beings act freely. 2 In the first half of the thirteenth century, many philosophers identified liberum arbitrium either with the will, or with both intellect and will. In De homine, Albert insists that it is a separate capacity. According to his account, liberum arbitrium is the human capacity for choice and also helps to explain the freedom of those choices. Although Albert ultimately characterizes an act of choosing as an inclination in favor of a particular course of action, a certain cognitive ability plays an important role in his account. Part of what makes human freedom possible is the ability to judge secundum rationem honesti. Literally this phrase means "in accordance with the concept of what has worth." I shall argue that this capacity consists of the ability to evaluate choices in light of one's immediate, intermediate, or ultimate objectives and to forgo lesser goods for the sake of a greater good. It would appear that an ability of this sort is a function of the intellect, since judgments about how to accomplish one's goals and which goods are the better ones require the exercise of certain abstract cognitive skills. But Albert holds that the intellect is determined and concludes that while the intellect is a necessary condition for free action, the constraints placed upon it prevent it from contributing substantially to the freedom of an action. Since the ability to judge secundum rationem honesti plays an integral role in bringing about a free action, Albert cannot argue that this ability is a function of the intellect. Although the will has the requisite freedom, it is an appetitive capacity, not a cognitive one. Therefore, it too is unable to fulfill this role. Given these commitments, it would seem natural for Albert to locate this ability in an independent power.As natural as it may appear, this position is bound to strike many philosophers as implausible and unnecessary. One could argue that the constraints placed upon the intellect need not restrict it in any significant way. I do not plan to defend Albert's account against this objection. Rather, first, I shall [End Page 492] examine Albert's view of... (shrink)

The German philosophical culture of the Middle Ages is inextricable linked to the thought of Albert the Great. This volume brings together 14 papers, which deal with Albert's influence from the points of view of mysticism, philosophy, and the history of universities.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ALBERTUS MAGNUS AND THE NOTION OF SYLLOGISTIC MIDDLE TERM J. M. HUBBARD College of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota ABERT THE GREAT is recognized as one of the great scientific minds of the Middle A:ges, both for his commentaries on Aristotle's scientific works and for his own contributions to the study of nature. His contributions to the science of logic go largely unnoticed, however. This is probably due (...) to the ascendency of the Summulae tradition in medieval logic a.bout the time of Albert's death, for the Summulae traidition is quite different from the one represented in his commentaries on the logical writings of Aristotle. I should like to remedy this a bit by looking at how he understands the concept of middle term in Aristotle's Prior Analytics. There are two points with which we can begin this study. First, Albert insists that Ar.istotle's remark that second and third figure syllogisms are imperfect when compared to those of the first figure does not mean that they somehow lack the necessity cha.racteristic of syHogisms of the first figure. On the contra;ry, all syllogisms, in whatever figure, conclude necessa,rily. This is what it is to be a syllogism. First figure syllogisms are perfect with respect to us, for in them the necessity of consequence, which is the very na;bure of the syllogism, is manifest to us in a way that it is not in syllogisms of the second and third figures. Hence, the marks perfect and imperfeot refer not to the syllogisms in themselves but to the syUogisms in relation to us.1 1 Albertus Magnus, Oommentares CYn the Prior Analytics, Bk. I, Tr. 1, Ch. 8, pp. 469-71. See also Tr. 1, Ch. 6, p. 467, and Tr. 1, Chs. 5 and 6. Page 115 116 J. M. HUBBARD Seoond, the notion of syllogism is coextensive with the notion of middle term, for the middle term is the root and cause of the necessity that characterizes the syllogism. This is why some other kinds of argument, induction and example for instance, are not syllogisms strictly speaking, but only in a loose and improper sense; they lack a true middle term.2 What is it, then, to be a middle term of a syllogism on Albert's reading of Aristotle? Is the middle term middle in some quantitative sense, then? Although Albert uses the expressions scope, breadth, contain, etc., he is quite explicit that the notions of figure and term are transferred " metaphorically " from quantity to properly logical considerations.8 For logic deails not with quantity and its relations, but with relations that exist between things as conceived by the mind, the most fundamental of which is the relation of predica.bility. To be predicable is to be sayable of many things, and although a predicable can be considered a whole in relation to the things of which it is said (its parts then), such talk is metaphorical and not literal. A predicable (whole) is sayable of many things but is not constituted by them. Dog, for instance, is sayable of Fido and Rover, but being a dog is not being Fido and Rover. A whole in the ordinary sense, on the other hand, is not sayable of its parts and is composed of them. One could not say that a wall is a house, but a house is composed, among other things, of a wall. The notions of figure and term, and therefore of middle term, are taken from the quantitative aspects of things and trans£erred to properly logical things. This being so, the notion of middle term cannot be reduced to something quantatative, spatial organization for example. From these remarks one can anticipate how Albert would respond to the suggestion that the middle term is the one that is middle in universality with respect to the other two. This references will be to Oommentaria in Prioru.m A.nalytiooru.m in Opera Omnia, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vives, 1890), Vol. 1. 2 Bk. II, Tr. 7, Ch. 4, p. 794. a Bk. I, Tr. I, Ch. 2, pp. 460-61. ALBERTUS MAGNUS AND THE MIDDLE TERM 117 would... (shrink)

Is our science of the physical world a matter of theoretical description with predictive value, or is it instead a search for the productive causes of observed phenomena? Ancient astronomers such as Ptolemy maintained the former; ancient cosmologists such as Aristotle the latter. This debate is a central theme in Albert Magnus’s thirteenth-century Aristotelian commentaries. This paper shows how Albert defended the possibility of empirical science aimed at demonstrating the causes of observed phenomena. In the course of his (...) defense, Albert identifies a specific error committed by Ptolemy concerning the subject of physical theory. The identification and correction of this error provides the basis upon which a proper metaphysical foundation for the empirical sciences can be laid. This foundation is nothing other than the recovery of the Aristotelian notion of form as the immanent intelligibility of physical natures. (shrink)

One of Albert the Great’s dearest concerns throughout his career was the question of the good; the good which humans naturally desire and which culminates in ultimate happiness. In his earliest work, tellingly entitled De natura boni, Albert’s interest principally concerns epistemological and practical questions: How can we know wherein the good consists? How can we acquire it? Under what circumstances may we lose it and what is necessary to reacquire it? In this initial context, Albert relies (...) on the Augustinian conception that the desired good lies in the “Good of all goods” and that its attainment in this contingent world takes place almost exclusively through moral conduct. With the inception of appropriating Aristotle’s complete Nicomachean Ethics, however, Albert’s conception of the good undergoes a fundamental shift. Based on an intellectualist anthropology according to which the human being is “solely intellect”, Albert advances the intellectual virtues as necessary condition for a... (shrink)

Although Aristotle's zoological works were known in antiquity and during the early medieval period, the scientific research program discussed and exemplified therein disappeared after Theophrastus. After some fifteen hundred years, it reappears in the work of Albert the Great who extensively explains Aristotle's conception of a scientific research program and extends Aristotle's zoological researches. Evidence of Albert's Aristotelian commentaries shows that he clearly understood animals to represent a self-contained subject-genus, that the study of this subject-genus constitutes theoretical knowledge (...) in an Aristotelian sense, that natural finality and suppositional necessity provide principles of zoological science, and that research into animals must be conducted according to a two-staged methodology of division and demonstration. (shrink)

In his commentary of Dionysius the Areopagite’s Mystical Theology Albert the Great outlines the allegorical exegesis of Moses’ ascent of the mount as a way to the unknown God. Step by step Moses has to purify himself, to leave behind his natural knowledge. Separated from all human beings he alone proceeds to the cloud of unknown. At last the infusion of divine light lets him know God through negations. The normal, human way of knowing God is limited, so the (...) mind should attain the paradox of knowing in unknowing. Albert claims that all we cannot properly predicate by names obtained from things known to us, is best indicated by negations. The peak described by Dionysius as union, Albert shows to be intellectual perfection. Guided by divine illumination man contemplates the Trinitarian God. Thus contemplation supports any theological investigation. Descending the mountain, as Albert says in his Summa, Moses spoke to the people. Likewise after contemplation the theologian has to illumine others about what he... (shrink)

Albert and the career of virtue theory -- Modern virtue theory as foreground to Albert's moral philosophy -- Albert's ethical treatises -- The significance of Albert's moral treatises in early-thirteenth-century moral philosophy -- Approaching the moral order -- Meta-ethical reflections on "moral science" and its procedures -- The metaphysics of the good -- The architecture of moral goodness -- The genesis of virtue : intrinsic causes -- The genesis of virtue : extrinsic causes -- The concept (...) of virtue -- The organization of the virtues -- The passions -- Morality, obligation, and law -- Natural law -- Virtue's rewards -- Friendship -- Last ends and happiness -- Conclusion: Albertus redux. (shrink)

Edizione con introduzione delle nove questioni anonime sugli Elenchi Sofistici conservate nel ms Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3523, ff. 70rb-72rb . Nell'introduzione l'A. esamina le convergenze fra queste e le questioni sugli Elenchi conservate nel ms. Praha, Méstska Lidova Knihovna, L. 76 . L'ed. affronta anche il problema, irrisolto, di riferimenti interni ad autori, verosimilmente maestri, non identificati: Albertus , Robertus e Antonius. Su quest'ultimo si concentra l'attenzione dell'ed., per il quale Antonius commentò gli Elenchi attorno al 1260, probabilmente a (...) Parigi. Antunius e Albertus sono ricordati anche in due scholia nella copia dei Sophistici Elenchi in Wien, ÖNB, 2377, f. 49r. (shrink)

Examines the controversy of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome respecting the nature of scientific demonstration of the highest kind. Shows that the position of Giles, making the definition of the attribute the middle term in demonnstratio potissima, agrees with that of Albert the Great, but is opposed to Thomas's, which makes the definition of the subject the middle term.

Albertus Magnus' logic and philosophy of logic have drawn little attention so far, partly due to his reputation among some historians of the discipline as a somewhat confused and muddleheaded thinker. This article looks at his teachings on the necessity and nature of the logical art, and more precisely the epistemological and psychological background that serves as their basis. This examination brings to the fore Albert's effort and success in bringing together ideas from different traditions in order to (...) reach a unified and coherent view on the question. Albert's analysis of the actualization of the human intellect, presentation of the inherent fallibility that accompanies rational discourse, and identification of the available means for correcting that weakness are some of the elements of that general doctrine which are addressed in the present article. Such considerations lead Albert to conceive logic as a science whose subject is used as an instrument within each part of philosophy and whose scientific consideration of that subject can therefore be used as rules for the other sciences as they build and use their instrument, thus making the science of logic an art in the broad sense of the word. (shrink)

In Alberts zweiten Kommentar zur Nikomachischen Ethik findet sich vor der Kommentierung des Aristoteles-Textes ein eigenständiger Traktat zum allgemeinen Begriff des Guten, der im Rahmen des Artikels erstmals in kritischer Edition zugänglich gemacht wird. In doktrinaler Sicht handelt es sich um einen Text von fundamentaler Bedeutung, insofern Albert verschiedene Definitionen und Bestimmungen des Guten in ihrer inhaltlichen Vereinbarkeit und Konvergenz aufweist. In nuce entwickelt Albert hier die für sein ganzes Werk maßgebliche Metaphysik des Guten, in welche sowohl die (...) Transzendentalienlehre als auch die Grundmotive einer teleologischen Strebensethik aristotelischen Zuschnitts integriert werden. Der ethisch relevante Begriff des Guten findet dadurch seine ontotheologische Fundierung im höchsten Guten, also in Gott. Der vorliegende Artikel rekonstruiert im Anschluss an die kritische Edition die zentralen Argumente des Traktats und verortet diese durch Abgleich mit anderen Schriften in Alberts gesamten Oeuvre und Denken.Albert‘s second commentary on Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics is preceded by an independent treatise dealing with the general concept of the good, which is made accessible in a critical edition in this article for the first time. Regarding its doctrinal contents this treatise proves to be of fundamental importance because Albert demonstrates the compatibility and even the convergence of several different definitions and descriptions of the good, e.g. by Aristotle, Avicenna, Ps.-Dionysius and Boethius. Albert develops in a nutshell his metaphysics of goodness which is of overarching importance for his whole work and which integrates the theory of the transcendentals as well as the basic ideas of an ethical teleology in an Aristotelian vein. Thereby, the concept of the moral good finds its ultimate foundation in the highest good, i.e. in God. Drawing on the text of the presented critical edition the article retraces the central arguments of this treatise and compares them with other writings in order to show their place in Albert’s complete work and thought. (shrink)

Albert the Great extracts the best contributions of Neo-Platonism and Aristotelism. He examines the Aristotelian doctrine on the desire for truth present in human nature and the science of Metaphysics, which allows for an inkling of the source of such desire, but this desire is examined more in-depth by the Pseudo-Dionysius, being Theology the science that grants more answers and the most universal because it enables for greater perfection, not just intellectual but of the whole person.

Wie sich die Augen der Nachteule zum Tageslicht verhalten, so die Vernunft unserer Seele zu dem was, seiner Natur nach am offenbarsten ist. Dieser Vergleich des Aristoteles am Anfang der Metaphysik (II, 993b9-11) hat in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie Anlass gegeben zu verschiedenen Interpretationen. Was hier zur Diskussion steht, ist die Frage, ob dem Menschen eine Erkenntnis dessen moglich ist, was sich der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung entzieht. Kann der Geist, der mit dem Korper verbunden ist, die substantiae separatae erkennen, die ersten Ursachen (...) dieser Welt, die selbst diese physische Ordnung uberschreiten. Es ist die scholastische Version der modernen Frage nach der Moglichkeit der Metaphysik. In dieser Lectio Albertina untersucht Carlos Steel am Beispiel der Interpretation des Nachtvogel-Gleichnisses, wie unterschiedlich Thomas und Albert die Frage nach der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlage der Metaphysik beantwortet haben. Die Differenz zwischen beide Positionen wird auch die spatere Diskussion bis in die Renaissance kennzeichen. (shrink)

"Diese Untersuchung ist aus meinem Seminar des Wintersemesters 1916/17 an der Wiener Universitat hervorgewachsen, in dem ich die methodischen Grundsatze einer: Einfuhrung in das scholastische Quellen- und Handschriftenstudium" eben an der Autorfrage der Philosophia pauperum veranschaulichte. Ein Nebenergebnis dieser Studie ist ein Einblick in den philosophischen Unterricht an den deutschen Universitaten und besonders Stadtschulen des ausgehenden Mittelalters." Der Verlag der Wissenschaften verlegt historische Literatur bekannter und unbekannter wissenschaftlicher Autoren. Dem interessierten Leser werden so teilweise langst nicht mehr verlegte Werke wieder (...) zugangig gemacht. Dieses Buch uber die Philosophia Pauperum und ihren Verfasser Albert von Orlamunde stellt einen Beitrag zur Geschichte des philosophischen Unterrichtes an den deutschen Stadtschulen des ausgehenden Mittelalters dar und ist ein unveranderter, hochwertiger Nachdruck der Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1918.". (shrink)

This study contextualizes Konrad of Megenberg’s “Book of Natural Things” within the natural philosophy practiced by the Faculty of Arts in the 14th century. Albert the Great and texts of ps.-Albert emerge as significant in this interpretation.

The renewal of interest in Albert Magnus' works which has taken place in the last one hundred years or so has in fact produced a multilingual body of studies whose size and diversity are making it more and more difficult for the scholar to identify and to know precisely and with certainty what has been written about this very important philosopher. The partial bibliographies which have been published throughout the 20th century were of some use, but none can compare, (...) in terms of completeness, to the new, selectively annotated bibliography composed by I. M. Resnick and K. F. Kitchell. After briefly analyzing this impressive piece of scholarship and identifying some of the mistakes it inevitably contains, the present paper provides a list of approximately 350 items which are missing from Resnick and Kitchell's bibliography and which for the most part were written before 2001. (shrink)

Der Begriff der „Mystik“ wird vorrangig ais eine religiose Kategorie verwendet, deren Sinngehalt im gelaufigen Sprachgebrauch nicht nur unscharf, sondern auch unklar ist. Die Versu- che, den Begriff philosophiehistorisch und interdisziplinar vor dem Hintergrund der Human- und Naturwissenschaften enger zu fassen, potenzieren und polarisieren seine Vieldeutigkeit. Im Gegenteil dazu scheint es, dass die theologischen Reflexionen auf die besonderen Formen der Religiositat, welche unter dem Begriff der Mystik subsumiert werden, am ehesten ein adäquates Verständnis der Frage und der Strategien der Einheit (...) des Menschen mit Gott zu vermitteln imstande sind. Zu den Voraussetzungen eines vertieften Verständnisses gehoren jedoch die Vertrautheit mit den philosophischen und religiösen Traditionen, welche die theoretische Basis und gleichsam das Werkzeug für die mystische Spekulation bereitstellen, sowie die Kenntnis der Modelle einer unio mystica. Die fur das Begriffsverständnis der Mystik maßgeblichen Voraussetzungen sind Gegenstand dieses Beitrags, der sich auf eine Skizze diesbezüglicher Ansichten des Albertus Magnus beschränkt. Dieser, als Begründer der deutschen Dominikanerschule angesehene Universalgelehrte, gilt als der Wegbereiter der rheinischen Mystik, zu deren Exponenten u. a. Dietrich von Freiberg, Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse gerechnet werden. Eine getreue Wiedergabe der Ansichten des Albertus Magnus ist das Ziel dieser Prasentation, die zugleich eine Stimme in der Diskussion sein will, die u. a. von Alois M. Haas, Kurt Ruh, Werner Beierwaltes, Ruedi Imbach, Burkhard Mojsisch, Alain de Libera, Kurt Flasch und Loris Sturlese zum Begriff der dominikanischen Mystik teilweise kontrovers geführt wird. (shrink)

The 'Perutilis logica' is both by its content and its didactic value the most paradigmatic logical compendium of the 14th century. The study presented here tries to show on the basis of an interpretative analysis of the second treatise that the doctrine of the properties of terms is stated in a unusually developed form in the 'Perutilis logica' and that suggestions that it lacks originality must be revised.

Albertus Magnus is known for his rational approach to explaining various phenomena; a method that would be acquired and applied by his pupil Thomas Aquinas as well. In this paper, I focus on the concept of freedom, i. e., on the question of what it is that constitutes the freedom of free will in the account of Albert the Great. I investigate this question from the perspective of natural philosophy, a field that Albert was particularly interested in. (...) In the first part of the paper, I study Albert’s definition of free will and its implications as they are tackled in De homine, De anima, and Ethica. Albert regards free will as a capacity of the rational soul, capable of choosing from opposites. Albert confronts the definitions of free will presented by Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Anselm of Canterbury, and in each of these cases he advances his argument from the perspective of psychology. In the second part of the paper, I identify the topics in which the general definition of free will is applied in a naturalistic context. Those are the debates on fate and free will, on the question whether animals have free will and, finally, on natural circumstances such as age or gender, limiting the freedom of free will. Subsequently, I aim at expounding Albert’s balanced, yet not tension-free position in the debate between determinism and free action. Although several extensive studies on fate in Albert have been produced, the problem of free choice in Albert’s works remains surprisingly understudied. The present paper intends to open a path for further research and debates on this relevant topic. (shrink)

Die Autographe Alberts des Grossen, von H. Ostlender.--Das Uppsalenser Albertusautograph, von F. Stegmüller.--Albertus-Magnus-Fragmente in Schweden, von T. Schmid.--Das zeitliche Verhältnis der Summa de incarnatione zu dem dritten Buche des Sentenzenkommentars Alberts des Grossen, von I. Backes.--Der Geist als höherer Teil der Seele nach Albert dem Grossen, von A. J. Backes.--Bemerkungen zur Ehelehre des hl. Albertus Magnus, von H. Doms.--Die Behandlung der Tugend der Keuschheit im Schrifttum Alberts des Grossen, von C. Feckes.--Um die Quaestiones de animalibus Alberts des (...) Grossen, von E. Filthaut.--Principium Biblicum Alberti Magni, ed. A. Fries.--En marge de l'explication du "Credo" par Saint Albert le Grand, par J. de Ghellinck.--Zur Frage der anfangslosen und zeitlichen Schöpfung bei Albert dem Grossen, von J. Hansen.--Die ursprüngliche Einteilung des Sentenzenkommentars Alberts des Grossen, von A. Hiedl. (shrink)

Here the philosopher and physicist David Z Albert argues, among other things, that the difference between past and future can be understood as a mechanical phenomenon of nature and that quantum mechanics makes it impossible to present the entirety of what can be said about the world as a narrative of “befores” and “afters.”.

This study tries to identify the core elements of the teaching of Albert the Great on the possibility of a natural knowledge of God and its sources in the negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite.

An analysis of ms Vat. Lat. 781 reveals ratio and limppiditas as two key notions in Albert the Great's teaching on the possibility of knowing God.

English summary: The philosophy of play during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance has been largely neglected by scholars, despite the fact that influential thinkers, such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, perceived recreational play to be a vital part of a philosopher's life. By exploring a heterogeneous collection of diverse philosophical approaches to ludic practices, this innovative study provides the first in-depth discussion of the complexity of medieval and early-modern ludic philosophy. Particular attention is devoted to the relationship (...) between play and philosophy, which the influential Aristotelian discourse on play, initiated by Albert and Thomas, conceptualized as a contradictory dichotomy. By focusing on the manifold epistemic transformations which occurred during the Renaissance, this study analyses how philosophers in various contexts developed alternative or complementary theories of the connection between ludus and philosophia. German description: Die philosophische Geschichte des Spielens nach der Antike lasst man in der Regel mit Friedrich Schillers von Kant inspirierten Briefen Uber die asthetische Erziehung des Menschen beginnen, ohne die ihnen vorausgehende Vielfalt philosophischer Auseinandersetzung mit ludischen Praktiken naher zu betrachten. Vorliegende Studie versteht sich als erster Beitrag zur Erschliessung dieser bislang vernachlassigten spielphilosophischen Ansatze zwischen Mittelalter und Fruher Neuzeit. Dabei wird insbesondere das Verhaltnis von Spielen und Philosophieren in den Blick genommen, das schon bei scholastischen Autoren im Zentrum ludischer Reflexionen stand. So etablierten Gelehrte wie Albertus Magnus oder Thomas von Aquin bereits im 13. Jahrhundert eine strenge Trennung zwischen dem als Rekreation konzipierten Spielen und dem Ernst des Philosophierens, indem sie ludische Erholung mit Ruckgriff auf Aristoteles zum notwendigen Gegenstuck der Kontemplation erklarten. Die Arbeit zeigt, wie Philosophen zwischen Spatmittelalter und Fruher Neuzeit im Zuge vielfaltiger epistemischer Transformationen das Verhaltnis von philosophia und ludus komplementar oder alternativ zu diesem einflussreichen aristotelischen Deutungsschema bestimmten. Unter diesen heterogenen Ansatzen finden sich ein allegorisches Globusspiel des Nikolaus von Kues, die erste philosophischen Therapie ubermassiger Spielleidenschaft und eine naturphilosophische Beschreibung des Tennisspiels am rinascimentalen Hof von Ferrara. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce is generally regarded as the founder of pragmatism, and one of the greatest ever American philosophers. Peirce is also widely known for his work on truth, his foundational work in mathematical logic, and an influential theory of signs, or semiotics. Albert Atkin introduces the full spectrum of Peirce’s thought for those coming to his work for the first time. The book begins with an overview of Peirce’s life and work, considering his early and long-standing interest in (...) logic and science, and highlighting important views on the structure of philosophical thought. Atkin then explains Peirce’s accounts of pragmatism and truth examining important later developments to these theories. He then introduces Peirce’s full accounts of semiotics, examines his foundational work on formal and graphical logic, and introduces Peirce’s account of metaphysics, the least understood aspect of his philosophy. The final chapter considers Peirce’s legacy and influence on the thought of philosophers such as John Dewey and Richard Rorty, as well as highlighting areas where Peirce’s ideas could still provide important insights for contemporary philosophers. Including chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading and a glossary, this invaluable introduction and guide to Peirce’s philosophy is essential reading for those new to his work. (shrink)

Resumo: No capítulo 5 do Livro III De anima (430a10-19) Aristóteles distingue entre o νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus agens (intelecto agente), e νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus passivus, ou seja, intellectus possibilis (intelecto possível), termos técnicos e filosóficos mais comuns. O capítulo 5 é de grande importância não só para a filosofia antiga e para os comentadores das obras de Aristóteles, como os comentários de Teofrasto, de Alexander de Afrodisias, de Simplício e Themístius (...) entre outros, mas também para a filosofia do mundo árabe e da Europa latina. Sabe-se que Aristóteles não escreveu um tratado próprio sobre o intelecto, embora possam ser encontradas várias observações acerca do intelecto em suas obras. Os tratados do Intelecto começam com Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicena e sobretudo Averróis, e se refletem, num sentido crítico e afirmativo, (nos debates) dos tratados latinos, por exemplo, nos tratados de Alberto Magno, de Tomás de Aquino, de Sigério de Brabant entre outros. Este artigo apresenta observações preliminares e preparatórias ao projeto de traduções bilíngue (Latim-Português) dos tratados medievais sobre o intelecto ‘Teorias do Intelecto na Idade Média’ que está em desenvovlimento no Centro Internacional de Estudos Medievais da UFU. Palavras-chaves: Unidade do intelecto; Imaginação; Intencionalidade; Luz intelectual e cognição. Theories of the Intellect in the Latin Middle Ages. De anima III, cap. 5 of Aristotle and his Medieval Tradition Abstract: In the chapter 5 of the III. Book of De anima (430a10-19) Aristotle distinguishes between the νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós) called by the Latins intellectus agens (agent intellect) and the νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós) called by the Latins intellectus passivus, or intellectus possibilis (possible intellect), most common technical and philosophical terms. The chapter 5 is of great importance not only to ancient philosophy and to the commentators of Aristotle’s works such as the commentaries of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, of Simplicius, and Themistius among others, but also to the philosophy of the Arabic World and the Latin Europe. One knows well that Aristotle does not have written a proper treatise on intellect; although there are several observations about the intellect in his works. Separate treatises begin with Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and especially Averroes, which Latin treatises as of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant among others reflect in a critical as well as an affirmative sense. This article can be read as preliminary and preparatory observations to a bilingual (Latin-Portuguese) translation project of treatises corresponding to ‘Theories of Intellect in the Middle Ages’ which is ongoing at the International Center for Medieval Studies at UFU. Key-words: Unity of the Intellect; Imagination; Intentionality; Intellectual Light; and Cognition. Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter. De anima III, 5 des Aristoteles und seine mittelalterliche Tradition Zusammenfassung: Im 5. Kapitel des III. Buchs von De anima (430a10-19) unterscheidet Aristoteles zwischen dem νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), von den Lateinern intellectus agens (tätiger Intellekt) genannt und dem νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), von den Lateinern intellectus passivus oder auch intellectus possibilis (möglicher Intellekt) genannt, gemeinhin bekannte technische und philosophische Begriffe. Dieses 5. Kapitel ist von grösster Bedeutung nicht nur für die antike Philosophie und die Kommentatoren der Werke des Aristoteles wie die Kommentare des Theophrastus, des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Simplicius und Themistius unter anderen, sondern auch für die Philosophie der arabischen Welt und des lateinischen Europas. Bekanntlich hat Aristoteles keinen eigenen Traktat über den Intellekt geschrieben, obgleich sich viele Beobachtungen zum Intellekt in seinem Werk antreffen. Selbständige Traktate über den Intellekt beginnen mit Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna und besonders Averroes, die sich in den lateinischen Traktaten, z.B. des Albertus Magnus, Thomas von Aquin, Siger von Brabant und anderen zustimmend wie kritisch widerspiegeln. Dieser Artikel kann als vorläufige und vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einem zweisprachigen (lateinisch-portugiesischen) Übersetzungsprojekt von Texten gelesen werden, welche „Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter“ betreffen. Dieses Projekt ist am Internationalen Zentrum für Mittelalterstudien der UFU in Arbeit genommen worden. Schlüsselwörter: Verstand; Vernunft; Intentionalität; Anschauung und Erkenntnis. Data de registro: 12/03/2020 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020. (shrink)

Translated by Anthony Bower With an Introduction by Oliver Todd 'A conscience with style' V.S. Pritchett The Rebel (1951) is Camus's 'attempt to understand the time I live in' and a brilliant essay on the nature of human revolt. Here he makes a daring critique of communism - how it had gone wrong behind the Iron Curtain and the resulting totalitarian regimes. And he questions two events held sacred by the left wing - the French Revolution of 1789 and the (...) Russian Revolution of 1917 - that had resulted, he believed, in the use of terrorism as a political instrument. In this towering intellectual document, Camus argues that hope for the future lies in revolt with revolution - a chance to achieve change without losing our freedom. 'The last French intellectual to take the side of humanity and talk its language... a figure of immense moral stature' Sunday Times Winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature. (shrink)