This article is devoted to examine two theories on the origin of cognition. The first of them is a neurobiological theory by de authors V. Mountcastle and J. Hawkins working separately. The second one is a theory from the Cognitive Psychology by D. Gentner. It is interesting to check that exists a strong congruence between both of them despite they have absolutely different methodologies. Two different ways lead to postulate the analogy and their mechanisms as the main element of (...) cognition. The present article gives reasons for embracing the analogy as being the main cause of the origin of knowledge in the infant. Besides, it explains why language is the main cause of adult human intelligence and it also denies the need of existence of any innate lexicon or vocabulary. (shrink)

(2013). Beyond mechanical markets – asset price swings, risk and the role of the state. Journal of Economic Methodology: Vol. 20, Methodology, Systemic Risk, and the Economics Profession, pp. 69-75. doi: 10.1080/1350178X.2013.774856.

Many studies of the labour market spatial mismatch rely on the deductivenomological model of causation to test the theory that low-skilled, inner-city residents have been isolated from the knowledge of job opportunities by the suburbanization of jobs. The logic of this approach follows the deductivenomological model of explanation which establishes causation by measuring the constant conjunctions between ‘causes’ and ‘effects’. As an alternative, I have used a realist approach to the study of the labour market spatial mismatch that (...) uses a ‘causal-explanatory’ method. This approach entails the qualitative description of the causal mechanism in order to discover and conceptualize its causal properties. The results suggest that the spatial mismatch theory could be refined in order to accommodate the finding that workers in excluded ghettos do not necessarily rely solely on local social networks to find out about job vacancies. Instead, workers with employment experience have strong workplace-based social networks. Since employers recruit workers by relying on referrals from trusted workers, these workplacebased social networks can put job seekers at the front of the hiring queue, regardless of where they live. (shrink)

The authors use the theoretical notion of anomie to examine the impact of top management's control mechanisms on the environment of the marketing function. Based on a literature review and in-depth field interviews with marketing managers in diverse industries, a conceptual model is proposed that incorporates the two managerial control mechanisms, viz. output and process control, and relates their distinctive influence to anomie in the marketing function. Three contingency variables, i.e., resource scarcity, power, and ethics codification, are proposed (...) to moderate the relationship between control mechanisms and anomie. The authors also argue for the link between anomic environments and the propensity of unethical marketing practices to occur. Theoretical and managerial implications of the proposed conceptual model are discussed. (shrink)

This paper questions the dominance of market-based mechanisms (MBMs) as the primary means of climate change mitigation. It argues that, not only they are unsuccessful on their own terms, but also they actually make the task more difficult by the unintended consequence of normalising the act of polluting and crowding out alternatives. The theoretical contribution of the paper is to draw a link between two bodies of literature. The first is the business ethics literature on the dominance of (...) market-based rather than direct regulation, and the second is the literature on market ethics, particularly the work of Michael Sandel on how MBMs crowd out non-market norms. The empirical contribution is to use the international maritime transport sector to illustrate the way market-based regulation renders alternatives such as direct regulation and supply-side approaches invisible. (shrink)

Based on the stratified ontology of critical realism, this paper identifies four decisive, lasting diachronic and synchronic deep structures in a traditional European seafood value chain and seafood market. Realist philosophy constitutes a platform from which to explore strategies and possible new mechanisms to overcome export barriers that Norwegian producers face, and to adjust the current causal deep structures in the value chain for salted cod between Norway and Spain. The paper is based on a thorough empirical study (...) that investigates possible strategies by which Norwegian producers can create an interaction between production knowledge and market knowledge in order to sell products at a reasonable profit. This paper is an example of how research projects can be ontologically and methodologically based on critical realism, and how critical realism can support the search for an emancipatory strategy for a resource periphery. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper examines some of the ways that machines, mechanisms, and the new mechanics were treated in post-World War I discourse. Spengler's 1919Decline of the Westand Hessen's 1931 study of Newton have usually been tied closely to Weimar culture in Germany, and Soviet politics. Linking them also to the writings of Rathenau, Simmel, Chase, Mumford, Hayek, and others, as well as to Dada and film studies of the city will indicate central features of a wide-ranging, international discourse on the (...) machine and mechanization. I argue that machines were so thoroughly integrated into social and economic experience that we can treat this as a distinctive new phase in the cultural history of mechanics, what some contemporaries called the “machine age”: a period in which rather than the hand mill or steam engine, the city stands as an appropriate realization (and sometimes symbol) of the significance but also ambiguities and tensions of mechanical life; and concepts of mechanization were extended to encompass the economy and market mechanisms. (shrink)

Can we conceive of a market economy that fulfils the ideals of socialism? In this book, David Miller provides a comprehensive examination, from the standpoint of political theory, of an economy in which market mechanisms retain a central role, but in which capitalist patterns of ownership have been superseded.

Corporate social responsibility is a force to “pull” customers to the organizational mission and values, and influence them to contribute to the organization. The primary purpose of the research is to assess how CSR contributes to customer value co-creation. The research also seeks evidence on the moderation mechanisms of servant leadership and relationship marketing orientation for the effect of CSR on customer value co-creation behavior. The data were collected from 873 employees and 873 customers in software industry in Vietnam (...) context. The data analysis supported the positive effect of CSR on customer value co-creation behavior. Servant leadership and relationship marketing orientation were also found to play moderating roles for the CSR–customer value co-creation linkage. (shrink)

It is now widely accepted that the market is superior to the state as a means of organising economic activity. But there remain a number of significant problems about the proper scope of the market domain, about the range of activities which are appropriately governed by market mechanisms and their associated forms of commercial organisation. Whilst many would agree that the market is an admirable device, provided it is ‘kept in its place’, there is much (...) less agreement about the precise location of that place, about where and on what grounds the boundaries of the market should be established. (shrink)

Why and how have supply chain codes of conduct diffused among lead firms around the globe? Prior research has drawn on both institutional and stakeholder theories to explain the adoption of codes, but no study has modeled adoption as a temporally dynamic process of diffusion. We propose that the drivers of adoption shift over time, from exclusively nonmarket to eventually market-based mechanisms as well. In an analysis of an original data set of more than 1,800 firms between the (...) years 2006 and 2015, we find that strong nonmarket labor institutions in a firm’s home country are critical to initiating and sustaining the diffusion process. Market mechanisms, such as investor scrutiny and brand risk, emerge as important later. Contrary to prior research, we did not find a significant effect from nongovernmental organization (NGO) pressure. We conclude that markets for corporate social responsibility can and do arise, but only after they are effectuated by nonmarket institutions. (shrink)

Since market scoring rules have become popular as a form of market maker, it seems worth reviewing just what such mechanisms are intended to do. The main function performed by most market makers is to serve as an intermediary between people who prefer to trade at different times. Traders who have the same favorite times to trade can show up together to an ordinary continuous double auction, and then make and accept offers to trade. But when (...) traders have different favorite times, a market maker can help them by first making offers that some of them will accept, and then later making opposite offers which others will accept. By adjusting prices in his favor, a market maker can even profit from providing this service. By making offers, however, a market maker opens himself up to the risk of losing to informed traders who know more than he about asset values. It is a complex and difficult task to choose the price and duration of offers in order to profit the most from intermediary trades while suffering the least from informed trades. This task requires subtle judgments about the relative fraction of informed and intermediary trades at different times, prices, quantities, and trading histories. No simple algorithm could reasonably claim to do this task optimally. Very active markets have little need for market makers, as anyone can trade at anytime. In markets with large but sporadic trades, a human will likely find it profitable to apply their considerable intelligence to the complex task of market making. The question is what to do for smaller less-active markets, which cannot afford such human attention. Trading may simply not happen there if no intermediary can be found to make such markets. A computer program with less than human intelligence that attempts to make markets runs the risk of being out-smarted by human traders. Humans might even figure out how to turn that program into a money pump, giving up cash each time it is run through some cycle of trades.. (shrink)

Markets have led a shadowy existence in economics. The ruling paradigm, neoclassical economics, for which markets are a central institution, has mainly been concerned with the determination of market prices. Until recently, sociological investigations of modern markets focused on production, as did anthropological work that ascertained how each culture made a living. The major debate among anthropologists to date has been about whether the economic rationality of the maximizing individual is to be found in all societies or whether substantive (...) economies are always embedded in a cultural matrix that determines its logics and forms of transaction. A new feature of financial markets is that they are based upon scopic systems – electronic and informational mechanisms of observing and contextualizing market reality and of back-projecting this reality onto the computer screens of globally operating traders. When such a mechanism is in place, coordination and activities respond to the reflected, represented reality rather than to pre-reflexive occurrences. This form of coordination contrasts with network forms of coordination that are pre-reflexive in character. In network markets, participants rely on their relationships to determine ‘where the market is’. In a market based on scopic systems, the market is fully visible on screen – as a set of tradable, comprehensively contextualized, quickly moving prices for various trading instruments. In this situation, a level of global inter-subjectivity emerges that derives from the character of these markets as reflexively observed by participants on their computer screens in temporal continuity, synchronicity, and immediacy. As a consequence, these markets are communities of time. As temporalized systems, financial markets project a form of coordination adapted to a global world that leaves behind the patterns of traditional producer and exchange markets. (shrink)

In the debates surrounding the ethical dimensions of interventions in the human genome, much attention is paid to determining whether—and if so, how—market access to these technologies ought to be managed in order to maximize social benefit. There are those who advocate a “laissez-faire” free-market approach to the development and use of genetic and genomic interventions. We are sympathetic to this view insofar as we understand the workings of the market stimulus effect. We use the term “ (...) class='Hi'>market stimulus effect” to refer to the outcome of a set of mechanisms whereby early adoption of a new technology by wealthy consumers promotes the development of versions of this product that are cheaper to produce, or are simply .. (shrink)

Boyer & Petersen lay out a compelling theory for folk-economic beliefs, focusing on beliefs about markets. However, societies also allocate resources through mechanisms involving power and group decision-making, through the political economy. We encourage future work to keep folkpoliticaleconomic beliefs in mind, and sketch an example involving pollution and climate change mitigation policy.

Many mechanisms now exist forconsumers to express progressive values inpurchasing decisions. Although demand for suchgoods has grown, these goods remain the purviewof small niche markets. Focusing on the marketfor agricultural goods (and the choice betweenthe paradigms of industrialized versussustainable agriculture), this paper discussesthree major reasons (market failures, entrybarriers, and biased policies) why it isdifficult for consumers to express their valuesfor a more sustainable system in this way, andwhy policy change is needed to create a fairerplaying field. The current (...) policy, voluntarylabeling, is inadequate. A new set of policies,including taxes and subsidies to correct marketfailures, is needed to create opportunities forconsumers to support values such as health,community, and stewardship. (shrink)

Objectives of socially responsible investment (SRI) are discussed with reference to the two main mechanisms of the SRI ‘movement’: shareholder advocacy and managed investments. We argue that in their current forms, both mechanisms lack the power to create significant corporate change. Shareholder advocacy has been largely unsuccessful to date. Even if resolutions were successful, shareholder advocacy may still be ineffective if underlying economic opportunities remain. Marketing material and investment prospectuses issued by socially responsible mutual funds (SRI funds) commonly (...) contain the claim that, by affecting corporations' access to capital funding, SRI funds can change corporate practices. This paper makes a contribution by presenting the market share of SRI funds in the regions where they are most developed, being Europe, the U.S. and Australia, to show that this claim is unlikely to eventuate. SRI funds also commonly claim that they will outperform conventional active mutual funds. That the economic performances of both are similar might be explained by their similar portfolio compositions. The paper makes an innovation in the SRI literature by adopting a legitimacy framework to explain the continued presence of SRI funds. To achieve desired social and environmental outcomes, SRI funds are urged to address issues at a more systemic level. A suggested mechanism is the collective lobbying of corporations and, especially, governments. (shrink)

After workshops on the topics “Handcraft and Spiritual Craftsmanship” and “Cure and Spiritual Healing,” the third and final interdisciplinary working conference of the German Research Foundation project “Markets of Singularities—Hybrid Religious Networks in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania” took place on March 22 and 23, 2019, at the University of Rostock under the title “Ecology–Community–Spirituality: Holistic Lifestyles on the ‘Markets of Singularities.’” For two days, a diverse group of scholars and leaders from the field attempted not only to define the organic sector and (...) the holistic approach that often seems to underlie it but also to better understand the market and market mechanisms for ecological products... (shrink)

The Kyoto Protocol and its implementation brought forward issues of climate change and its mitigation strategy by national measures through the creation of market mechanisms in carbon trading. The trading of emission certificates has become an important trade commodity worldwide, and its markets have diversified. While this opportunity has created new markets for entrepreneurs and actors that range from farmers to brokers, unequal involvement in most developing countries is noted. This has been mostly observed in those countries where (...) entrepreneurship is often regarded as the cornerstone of economic growth and social improvement. South Africa has spearheaded other African countries in its implementation of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects leading to carbon trading. Based on our research on South African entrepreneurship and its involvement in the carbon market, we conclude that albeit a number of opportunities, the biggest challenge for entrepreneurial participation in the carbon market remains in the nature and processes of CDM project implementation, the lack of a clear supportive system, limited access to financing and—more importantly—general ignorance of the trading opportunities by entrepreneurs. The complex nature of CDM projects themselves limits participation due to lack of the necessary skills on the national level leading to uneven distribution of CDM projects on provincial levels in South Africa. Recommendations are provided to overcome the obstacles and to promote entrepreneurial activity in the carbon market. (shrink)

Where economists previously viewed the market as arising from a ‘spontaneous order’, antithetical to design, they now design markets to achieve specific purposes. This paper reconstructs how this change in what markets are and can do came about and considers some consequences. Two decisive developments in economic theory are identified: first, Hurwicz’s view of institutions as mechanisms, which should be designed to align incentives with social goals; and second, the notion of marketplaces – consisting of infrastructure and algorithms (...) – which should be designed to exhibit stable properties. These developments have empowered economists to create marketplaces for specific purposes, by designing appropriate algorithms. I argue that this power to create marketplaces requires a shift in ethical reasoning, from whether markets should reach into certain spheres of life, to how market algorithms should be designed. I exemplify this shift, focusing on bias, and arguing that transparency should become a goal of market design. (shrink)

Clinical trials are essential to establish the safety and efficacy of investigational products, contributing to risk/benefit assessments that ultimately determine whether these products meet the criteria for market authorisation. Clinical trials are also an important source of revenue and expertise generation for countries in which they are conducted. In developing countries, they represent substantial foreign direct investment. In spite of the substantial capital input that clinical trials require, the issue of funding post-trial access to beneficial therapies remains contentious, especially (...) in resource-limited settings. In this article, we explore this situation and propose mechanisms to establish ‘win-win’ situations where both patients and clinical trial sponsors derive benefit from post-trial access programmes in low- and middle-income countries. (shrink)

This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated.Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes (...) the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization--firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus--are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance.Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing.Written by one of the leading economic theorists of our time, The Mechanisms of Governance is sure to be an important work for years to come. It will be of interest to scholars and students of economics, organization, management, and law. (shrink)

This article examines a thesis of interest to social epistemology and some articulations of First Amendment legal theory: that a free market in speech is an optimal institution for promoting true belief. Under our interpretation, the market-for-speech thesis claims that more total truth possession will be achieved if speech is regulatedonlyby free market mechanisms; that is, both government regulation and private sector nonmarket regulation are held to have information-fostering properties that are inferior to the free (...) class='Hi'>market. After discussing possible counterexamples to the thesis, the article explores the actual implications of economic theory for the emergence of truth in a free market for speech. When confusions are removed about what is maximized by perfectly competitive markets, and when adequate attention is paid to market imperfections, the failure of the market-for-speech thesis becomes clear. The article closes by comparing the properties of a free market in speech with an adversarial system of discourse. (shrink)

The article is based on the argument that labour market segregation is an important factor contributing to women’s inequality in the labour market. Therefore, any equal opportunities policy has to be combined with a policy to reduce segregation. But up to now segregation has been extremely persistent, as is shown in a short empirical overview of segregation in the Austrian labour market. It is argued that the roots of this phenomenon lie in the assignment of men and (...) women to the market area and the reproduction area according to the breadwinner model. Labour market segregation by sex can be seen as a transformation and continuation of the asymmetrical gender relation in the family to the labour market. Most of the mechanisms and processes that occur every day in the labour market work together to preserve sex segregation. Strategies to reduce segregation should look at these historical roots of segregation and at the connection with the overall gender division of labour. Different perspectives on a reduction of labour market segregation are presented. (shrink)

This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated.Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes (...) the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization--firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus--are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance.Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing.Written by one of the leading economic theorists of our time, The Mechanisms of Governance is sure to be an important work for years to come. It will be of interest to scholars and students of economics, organization, management, and law. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to this journal, Arjaliès (J Bus Ethics 92:57—78, 2010) suggests that the emergence of socially responsible investment (SRI) in France can be best described as a social movement with a collective identity that aimed to challenge the dominant logic of the financial market. Such an account is at odds with a body of empirical studies that approaches SRI in the French context as a process of market creation led by loosely coordinated actors with contradictory (...) and conflicting interests and values, who have mainly complied with—rather than opposed—the existing dominant financial logic of the asset-management field. In this comment, we build on this prior research to contest Arjaliès' perspective on both theoretical and empirical grounds, with the aim of highlighting the shortcomings of conflating social movements and other forms of collective actions in understanding the building of new markets in organization theory and SRI studies. We contend that in mistaking for social movement forms of collective actions that underpin the emergence of markets, scholars of organization theory may confuse distinct mechanisms in their explanation of SRI emergence across countries, overlook the complex dynamics and interactions of markets and social movements, and, most importantly, fail to evaluate the real political significance of SRI as an empirical phenomenon. We propose that future research on SRI distinguishes carefully "social-movement research as a theoretical framework" from "social movement as an empirical phenomenon" in order to avoid such drawbacks while benefiting from recent advances in social-movement research. (shrink)

The quest to foretell the future is omnipresent in human affairs. A potential solution to this epistemological conundrum has emerged through mass collaboration. Motored by the Internet, prediction markets allow a multitude of individuals to assume a stake in a security whose value is tied to a future event. The resulting prices offer a continuously updated probability estimate of the event actually taking place. This paper gives a survey of prediction markets, their history, mechanics, uses, and theoretical foundation. We also (...) review the literature surrounding their efficacy. Though there are shortcomings with prediction markets, as well as practical constraints, they hold out the prospect of improving the quality of organizational decisions and increasing the level of participation in the deliberative process. We also note that lessons can be drawn from these markets to guide the epistemological practices of disciplines and inquiries in which empirical methods are difficult to apply. (shrink)

Previous accounting ethics research berates auditors for ethical lapses that contribute to the failure of Andersen (e.g., Duska, R.: 2005, Journal of Business Ethics 57, 17–29; Staubus, G.: 2005, Journal of Business Ethics 57, 5–15; however, some of the blame must also fall on regulatory and professional bodies that exist to mitigate auditors’ ethical lapses. In this paper, we consider the ethical and economic context that existed and facilitated Andersen’s failure. Our analysis is grounded in Akerlof’s (1970, Quarterly Journal of (...) Economics August, 488–500) Theory of the Market for Lemons and we characterize the market for audit reports as a market for lemons. Consistent with Akerlof’s model, we consider the appropriateness of the countervailing mechanisms that existed at the time of Andersen’s demise that appeared to have effectively failed in counteracting Andersen’s ethical shortcomings. Finally, we assess the appropriateness of the remedies proposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA) to ensure that similar ethical lapses will not occur in the future. Our analysis indicates that the SOA regulatory reforms should counteract some of the necessary conditions of the Lemons Model, and thereby mitigate the likelihood of audit failures. However, we contend that the effectiveness of the SOA critically depends upon the focus and attention of the␣Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) towards assessing the ethical climates of public accounting firms. Assessments by the PCAOB of public accounting firm’s ethical climate are needed to sufficiently ensure that public accounting firms effectively promote and maintain audit quality in situations where unconscious bias or economic incentives may erode the public accounting firm’s independence. (shrink)

The proposed European Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) is the first attempt to elaborate a general legal framework for AI carried out by any major global economy. As such, the AIA is likely to become a point of reference in the larger discourse on how AI systems can (and should) be regulated. In this article, we describe and discuss the two primary enforcement mechanisms proposed in the AIA: the _conformity assessments_ that providers of high-risk AI systems are expected to conduct, (...) and the _post-market monitoring plans_ that providers must establish to document the performance of high-risk AI systems throughout their lifetimes. We argue that the AIA can be interpreted as a proposal to establish a Europe-wide ecosystem for conducting AI auditing, albeit in other words. Our analysis offers two main contributions. First, by describing the enforcement mechanisms included in the AIA in terminology borrowed from existing literature on AI auditing, we help providers of AI systems understand how they can prove adherence to the requirements set out in the AIA in practice. Second, by examining the AIA from an auditing perspective, we seek to provide transferable lessons from previous research about how to refine further the regulatory approach outlined in the AIA. We conclude by highlighting seven aspects of the AIA where amendments (or simply clarifications) would be helpful. These include, above all, the need to translate vague concepts into verifiable criteria and to strengthen the institutional safeguards concerning conformity assessments based on internal checks. (shrink)

If there is a duty of justice to contribute to society, which asks individuals to produce a specific amount of goods and services that can be redistributed, we need a decision-procedure to know when we have done our part. This paper analyses and critically assesses the commonly suggested decision-procedure of relying on market prices to measure the value of one’s contribution. It is usually assumed that a high salary indicates that one’s talents are put to good use, but this (...) presupposes both that market prices of labour are correct reflections of supply and demand, and that market prices are correct reflections of social value. I criticise both assumptions and argue that the social value of a contribution cannot simply be a function of its market value, but is also influenced by the principles of justice that support the duty to contribute. Further, the market solution is incapable of valuing contributions that lack market prices, like non-marketised care labour. The market solution thus fails as a decision-procedure under other than special circumstances. This does not mean, however, that we need to give up the idea of a duty to contribute. (shrink)

I argue that capitalism presents a threat to “democratic contestation”: the egalitarian, socially distributed capacity to affect how, why, and whether power is used. Markets are not susceptible to mechanisms of accountability, nor are they bearers of intentions in the way that political power-holders are. This makes them resistant to the kind of rational, intentional oversight that constitutes one of democracy’s social virtues. I identify four social costs associated with this problem: the vulnerability of citizens to arbitrary interference, the (...) insensitivity of markets to relevant interests, failures of trust in the market system, and the inhibition of social deliberation about matters of public concern. I make general two suggestions about how we might ameliorate these problems: First, as a way of introducing some measure of intentionality to large-scale patterns of business activity, the reconceptualization of such activity as participation in larger group actions; second, the development of deliberative bodies that bring together business actors, policy experts, and diverse citizens in an effort to better characterize and transmit the public values that business should serve. (shrink)

Upon what kind of moral order does capitalism rest? Conversely, does the market give rise to a distinctive set of beliefs, habits, and social bonds? These questions are certainly as old as social science itself. In this review, we evaluate how today's scholarship approaches the relationship between markets and the moral order. We begin with Hirschman's characterization of the three rival views of the market as civilizing, destructive, or feeble in its effects on society. We review recent work (...) at the intersection of sociology, economics, and political economy and show that these views persist both as theories of market society and moral arguments about it. We then argue that a fourth view, which we call moralized markets, has become increasingly prominent in economic sociology. This line of research sees markets as cultural phenomena and moral projects in their own right, and seeks to study the mechanisms and techniques by which such projects are realized in practice. (shrink)

This paper uses the evolutionary frame provided by the Victorian jurist Henry Sumner Maine to describe the process by which trust can be seen as the product of a gradual development that starts with small-scale communities and later allows market exchanges to develop themselves. I also argue, using the work of Elinor Ostrom (1990), that trust emerges first within small-scale communities, where first- and second-degree collective action problems need to be resolved. The development of a social disposition to trust (...) is closely linked with an institutional context that encourages individuals to take the externalities of their actions into account. This is made possible by customary mechanisms, as the development of social trust at this stage cannot rely on a mighty “Leviathan”. Therefore, this paper questions the claim that social trust is the product of market exchanges. Market exchanges might favor the further growth of social trust, hands in hands with the right institutional frame. However, this growth is not just the transposition of a previously acquired disposition to trust. The work of Henry Sumner Maine interestingly underlines the importance of the co-development of institutions and trust, from its origin in small communities to its expansion to market exchanges. Both Ostrom’s and Maine’s perspectives underline the fact that trust and trustworthiness are complementary and question a-rational perspectives on trust. This paper also elaborates on the claim, coming from the literature on contract law, that focusing on sanctioning mechanisms can be highly counterproductive. (shrink)

This open access book looks at how a democracy can devolve into a post-factual state. The media is being flooded by populist narratives, fake news, conspiracy theories and make-believe. Misinformation is turning into a challenge for all of us, whether politicians, journalists, or citizens. In the age of information, attention is a prime asset and may be converted into money, power, and influence – sometimes at the cost of facts. The point is to obtain exposure on the air and in (...) print media, and to generate traffic on social media platforms. With information in abundance and attention scarce, the competition is ever fiercer with truth all too often becoming the first victim. Reality Lost: Markets of Attention, Misinformation and Manipulation is an analysis by philosophers Vincent F. Hendricks and Mads Vestergaard of the nuts and bolts of the information market, the attention economy and media eco-system which may pave way to postfactual democracy. Here misleading narratives become the basis for political opinion formation, debate, and legislation. To curb this development and the threat it poses to democratic deliberation, political self-determination and freedom, it is necessary that we first grasp the mechanisms and structural conditions that cause it. (shrink)

The question I wish to take up in this paper is whether competitive markets, as mechanisms that initiate the distribution of scarce goods, allocate those goods in accordance with what participants in those markets deserve. I want to argue that in general people do not in fact deserve what they get from market interactions, when “what they get” is determined by the competitive forces coming to bear on the market. This more general claim is meant to apply (...) to all participants in the market. However, my strategy here is to focus on the particular case of the role of entrepreneurs, as I will define them, and whether they deserve the profits they reap in a competitive capitalist market. In particular, I will argue that the claim that entrepreneurs deserve their profits, when spelled out precisely, is indeed not plausible. Generalizing from this claim, I want to suggest how moral desert is inappropriate as a justification of market shares whenever competition determines the magnitude of those shares. I should stress, though, the particularity of my central claim: it is that “ entrepreneurs do not deserve their profits.” This is not to say that, for other reasons, people should not receive the rewards doled out by a market. My claim is only that desert has nothing directly to do with it. I am deviating significantly here from the usual strategy for denying the relevance of desert claims to principles of distributive justice. (shrink)

In many Western capitalist economies, private indebtedness is pervasive, but it has received little attention from political philosophers. Economic theory emphasizes the liberating potential of debt contracts, but its picture is based on assumptions that do not always hold, especially when there is a background of structural injustice. Private debt contracts are likely to miss their liberating potential if there is deception or lack of information, if there is insufficient access to (regular forms of) credit, or if credit is overly (...) expensive. Markets for private debt can be mechanisms of structural injustice: rather than playing a neutral role, they reinforce injustices, because the failures of debt to be liberating disproportionately hit individuals in disadvantaged positions. By individualizing what are in fact structural problems, private debt can contribute to stigmatization, social exclusion and oppression. What is at stake, from a perspective of structural justice, is not only the distribution of income, but also the distribution of risk. The problems of private debt markets therefore require political attention. In addition to fighting the structural injustices that form the background condititions of private debt, it is also worth addressing private debt markets themselves. (shrink)

Why do people buy particular products? Which are the antecedents that lead to the decision in favour of or against the purchase? Knowledge of the underlying semiotic and perceptual mechanisms is of key importance for understanding marketing processes. There are different psychological approaches that help to explain the effects of advertisements and product design. Analysing the sign processes of marketing clarifies the strategies applied. By identifying the manipulative functions of advertising, this book supports the consumers' critical discourse.

The theory of causal Bayes nets [15, 19] is, from an empirical point of view, currently one of the most promising approaches to causation on the market. There are, however, counterexamples to its core axiom, the causal Markov condition. Probably the most serious of these counterexamples are EPR/B experiments in quantum mechanics (cf. [13, 23]). However, these are also the only counterexamples yet known from the quantum realm. One might therefore wonder whether they are the only phenomena in the (...) quantum realm that create problems for causal Bayes nets. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that not only the phenomenon of quantum correlations in EPR/B experiments create problems for causal Bayes nets, but also the temporal evolution of quantum systems, which is described as dualistic by quantum mechanics. For this purpose, it is shown that single photon experiments in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) violate the causal Markov condition as well. It is then argued, however, that the Markov violation does not occur under the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility strategy hinges largely on the CEO characteristics in the context of an emerging market. Based on a sample of 16,144 firm-year observations obtained from 1,370 unique Chinese-listed firms, which whether voluntarily issue CSR reports over the period 2008–2019, this paper empirically examined the impact of CEO characteristics on the likelihood of issuing CSR reports. We find that CEO age, MBA education, international experience and political ideology consciousness are positively associated with the possibility of issuing CSR reports, (...) while a newly appointed CEO will decrease the likelihood of issuing CSR reports. Moreover, we consider a contingent factor, namely CEO power over the board, can significantly enhance the relationship between CEO age, political ideology consciousness, and the likelihood of issuing CSR reports. Furthermore, there’s no significant evidence indicating that CEO power can moderate the relationship between MBA education, international experience, and the likelihood of issuing CSR reports. Nonetheless, CEO power moderates the negative relationship between a newly appointed CEO and CSR reporting initiatives. This study attaches understandings to the extant literature that how top management characteristics can shape firm CSR strategies. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAlthough a growing stream of research investigates the role of government in corporate social responsibility, little is known about how governmental CSR interventions interact in financial markets. This article addresses this gap through a longitudinal study of the socially responsible investment market in France. Building on the “CSR and government” and “regulative capitalism” literatures, we identify three modes of governmental CSR intervention—regulatory steering, delegated rowing, and microsteering—and show how they interact through the two mechanisms of layering and catalyzing. (...) Our findings: 1) challenge the notion that, in the neoliberal order, governments are confined to steering market actors—leading and guiding their behavior—while private actors are in charge of rowing—providing products and services; 2) show how governmental CSR interventions interact and are orchestrated; and 3) provide evidence that governments can mobilize financial markets to promote CSR. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the conception and use of machine-learning algorithms for marketing. In the last years, specialized service providers as well as in-house data scientists have been increasingly using machine learning to predict consumer behavior for large companies. Predictive marketing thus revives the old dream of one-to-one, perfectly adjusted selling techniques, now at an unprecedented scale. How do predictive marketing devices change the way corporations know and model their customers? Drawing from STS and the sociology of quantification, I propose (...) to study the original ambivalence that characterizes the promise of a mass personalization, i.e. algorithmic processes in which the precise adjustment of prediction to unique individuals involves the computation of massive datasets. By studying algorithms in practice, I show how the active embedding of local preexisting consumer knowledge and punctual de-personalization mechanisms are keys to the epistemic and organizational success of predictive marketing. This paper argues for the study of algorithms in their contexts and suggests new perspectives on algorithmic objectivity. (shrink)

Markets allow for the processing of decentralized information through the price mechanism. But in addition, many markets rely on other mechanisms in markets, or non-market institutions, that provide and manage other forms of knowledge. Within national economies, these institutions form an ‘epistemic infrastructure’ for markets. In global markets, in contrast, this epistemic infrastructure is very patchy, undermining the preconditions for morally responsible agency. New technologies might help to improve the epistemic infrastructure of global markets, but they require conceptualizing (...) knowledge not only as a tradable good, but also as a precondition of morally responsible agency. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI)-based virtual influencers are now frequently used by brands in various categories to engage customers. However, little is known about who the followers of these AI-based virtual influencers are and more importantly, what drives the followers to use AI-based virtual influencers. The results from a survey support the notion that compensatory mechanisms and the need to belong play important roles in affecting usage intentions of AI-based virtual influencers. Specifically, the study finds that usage intentions are mediated and (...) moderated by compensatory mechanisms that arise from the perception of AI-based virtual influencers’ functional benefits and existential threats to human identity. Furthermore, the need for belonging moderates the effects of the following status (following versus non-following) on perceived personalization benefits of AI-based virtual influencers and behavioral intentions to use AI-based virtual influencers. This study provides important implications for academia delving into the social, cultural, and philosophical implications of AI-based virtual influencers for human societies as well as for brands that plan to use AI-based virtual influencers and gain a better understanding of their customers in AI-driven digital marketing. (shrink)

Poor working conditions remain a serious problem in supplier facilities in developing countries. While previous research has explored this from the developed buyers’ side, we examine this phenomenon from the perspective of developing countries’ suppliers and subcontractors. Utilizing qualitative data from a major knitwear exporting cluster in India and a stakeholder management lens, we develop a framework that shows how the assumptions of conventional, buyer-driven voluntary governance break down in the dilution of buyer power and in the web of factors (...) rooted in suppliers’ traditions, beliefs, local demands and resource dependency. We reveal out how success in governing collaborative global supply chains often falls short within the subcontracting stage, where a stakeholder management mindset is elusive to most participants. We suggest that success in governing collaborative global supply chains is dependent on concepts of stakeholder utility and the presence of shared value that is often at odds with the realities of power, information asymmetry and compliance/reward systems inherent in the non-market coordination of global supply chains. Our findings offer important insights for delineating the concepts of value creation from CSR concepts and practices, and for modifying the basic assumptions of conventional supply chain governance. (shrink)

Micro Credit programs lend money to poor borrowers using innovative mechanisms such as group lending under joint liability while successfully accounting forthe presence of asymmetric information in underdeveloped financial markets. MC Programs have achieved what the conventional financial institutions and the government have not been able to: lend to the poor, recuperate loans and have a positive impact in poverty reduction. While loan recuperation is high (95% for our focus group ALSOL Chiapas), administrative costs also remain high. Social Responsible (...) Savers and Donors play a key role in providing continuous funding to Micro Credit Programs. (shrink)

Corruption devours profits, people, and the planet. Ethical leaders promote ethical behaviors. We develop a first-stage moderated mediation theoretical model, explore the intricate relationships between ethical leadership and employee ethical behaviors, and treat ethical climate and organizational justice as dual mediators and leaders’ moral attentiveness as a moderator. We investigate leadership from two perspectives—leaders’ self-evaluation of moral attentiveness and members’ perceptions of ethical leadership. We theorize: These dual mediation mechanisms are more robust for high moral leaders than low moral (...) leaders. Our three-wave data collected from multiple sources, 236 members and 98 immediate supervisors in the Republic of Iraq, support our theory. Specifically, ethical leadership robustly impacts organizational justice’s intensity and magnitude, leading to high employee ethical behaviors when leaders’ moral attentiveness is high than low. However, ethical leadership only influences the ethical climate’s intensity but has no impact on the magnitude when leaders’ moral attentiveness is high than low. Therefore, organizational justice is a more robust mediator than the ethical climate in the omnibus context of leader moral attentiveness. Our findings support Western theory and constructs, demonstrating a new theory for Muslims in Arabic’s emerging markets. Individual decision-makers apply their values as a lens to frame their concerns in the immediate and omnibus contexts to maximize their expected utility and ultimate serenity-happiness. Ethical leadership trickles down to employee ethical behaviors, providing practical implications for improving the ethical environment, corporate social responsibility, leader-member exchange, business ethics, and economic potentials in the global competitive markets. (shrink)

James Madison wrote, 'Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob'. The contributors to this volume discuss and for the most part challenge this claim by considering conditions under which many minds can be wiser than one. With backgrounds in economics, cognitive science, political science, law and history, the authors consider information markets, the internet, jury debates, democratic deliberation and the use of diversity as mechanisms for improving collective decisions. At the (...) same time, they consider voter irrationality and paradoxes of aggregation as possibly undermining the wisdom of groups. Implicitly or explicitly, the volume also offers guidance and warnings to institutional designers. (shrink)

Leading digital platform providers such as Google and Uber construct marketplaces in which algorithms set prices. The efficiency-maximising free market credentials of this approach are touted by the companies involved and by legislators, policy makers and marketers. They have also taken root in the public imagination. In this article we challenge this understanding of algorithmically constructed marketplaces. We do so by returning to Hayek’s (1945) classic defence of the price mechanism, and by arguing that algorithmically-mediated price mechanisms do (...) not, and probably cannot, accumulate and signal that same kinds of knowledge that Hayek felt were essential to effective market governance. Indeed, we argue that algorithmically-constructed marketplaces are closer to, though distinct from, the central planning model that Hayek critiqued. Regardless of how you feel about Hayek’s argument, this has important consequences for how we respond to the rise of algorithmic governance tools in both markets and elsewhere. (shrink)

The mechanisms/abilities of agents compared to the emergent outcomes in three different scenarios from my past work is summarised: the El Farol Game; an Artificial Stock Market; and the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Within each of these, the presence or absence of some different agent abilities was examined, the results being summarised here – some turning out to be necessary, some not. The ability in terms of the recognition of other agents, either by characteristics or by name is a (...) recurring theme. Some of the difficulties in reaching a systematic understanding of these connections is briefly discussed. (shrink)