One fundamental thesis within the rapidly growing literature on deliberative democracy is that the stability and quality of a democracy depend not only on formal institutions such as the electoral system or the structure of parliamentary representation. They depend also on certain democratic competences of the citizens, especially their capacity for democratic communication. According to this thesis, above all the capacity for democratic deliberation, i.e., for argumentation, evaluation and for a balanced decision between policy alternatives, belongs to the central competences (...) relevant to maintaining and developing a democracy. (shrink)

Can collectives be wise? The thesis that they can has recently received a lot of attention. It has been argued that, in many judgmental or decision-making tasks, suitably organized groups can outperform their individual members. In this paper, I discuss the lessons we can learn about collective wisdom from the emerging theory of judgment aggregation, as distinct from the literature on Condorcet’s jury theorem.

On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...) different roles in rational agency. In two classic papers (Lewis 1988, 1996), David Lewis discusses several challenges to this Humean picture, but ultimately rejects them. We think that his discussion of a central anti-Humean alternative – the desire-as-belief thesis – is in need of refinnement. On this thesis, the desire for proposition p is given by the belief that p is desirable. Lewis claims that ‘[e]xcept in trivial cases, [this thesis] collapses into contradiction’(Lewis 1996, p. 308). The problem, he argues, is that the thesis is inconsistent with the purportedly plausible requirement that one’s desire for a proposition should not change upon learning that the proposition is true; call this the invariance requirement. In this paper, we revisit Lewis’s argument. We show that, if one carefully distinguishes between non-evaluative and evaluative propositions, the desire-asbelief thesis can be rendered consistent with the invariance requirement. Lewis’s conclusion holds only under certain conditions: the desire-as-belief thesis conflicts with the invariance requirement if and only if there are certain correlations between non-evaluative and evaluative propositions. But when there are such correlations, we suggest, the invariance requirement loses its plausibility. Thus Lewis’s argument against the desire-as-belief thesis appears to be valid only in cases in which it is unsound. (shrink)

This is the third in a series of essays on the seminal role of the paradigms of essence-function and interpenetration in East Asian religious and philosophical thought. The first article, entitled "The Composition of Self-Transformation Thought in Classical East Asian Philosophy and Religion"[1] was a general introduction to these paradigms over the broad expanse of indigenous East Asian thought religious/philosophical thought. The second article, entitled "Essence-Function (t'i-yung): Early Chinese Origins and Manifestations,"[2] examined the earliest precursors of these notions in classics (...) such as the Book of Changes, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean , paying special attention to the unique role played by the concept of "sincerity" in manifesting and mediating presence of essencefunction and interpenetration. In this essay, we look at the role essence-function and interpenetration play in the Analects (Lunyu ). (shrink)

According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions (...) play a role in shaping the agentís preferences. Any change in these "motivationally salient" dimensions can change the agent's preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics. (shrink)

The ability to appropriately sequence a list of discrete items is an important facet in performing routine cognitive tasks and may play a significant role in the acquisition of early communication skills. Though the serial learning abilities of some species, such as chimpanzees and rhesus macaques are well documented, there is virtually no information on the extent of these skills with gorillas. In this study, a young female western lowland gorilla has demonstrated the ability to learn a list of (...) seven Arabic numerals by selecting them on a monitor behind an infrared touchframe. As list length increased, Rollie required fewer trials to reach the criterion, suggesting an acquisition of skills associated with serial learning. Rollie was most likely to correctly select the first item in the sequence and least likely to select the penultimate item in the sequence. Her performance suggests serial learning abilities in the range of other non-verbal species and provides preliminary evidence that supports the assertion that gorillas can succeed at this form of serial learning task. (shrink)

Previous experiments have shown a serial-position effect (SPE) in paired-associate (PA) learning where the pairs contained stimuli pre- viously learned in serial order. The present experiment extended the number of pairs from 10 to 14. Pairs containing stimuli from terminal serial positions were learned with significantly fewer errors than pairs whose stimuli derived from central positions. The latter produced a dip in the PA error distribution suggesting the presence of sequential associations in SL between items occupying central positions.

Objective: Mindfulness-based intervention has been proposed to alleviate loneliness and improve social connectedness. Several randomized controlled trials have been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of MBI. This study aimed to critically evaluate and determine the effectiveness and safety of MBI in alleviating the feeling of loneliness.Methods: We searched Medline, Embase, PsycInfo, Cochrane CENTRAL, and AMED for publications from inception to May 2020. We included RCTs with human subjects who were enrolled in MBI with loneliness as an outcome. The quality of (...) evidence was assessed using Cochrane's Risk of Bias tool and Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation. A random-effects model was used for meta-analysis.Results: Out of 92 articles identified, eight studies involving 815 participants were included in this study. Most trials conducted a minimum of 8 weeks of MBI. Most of the trials used UCLA-Loneliness Scale. A pooled analysis combining three trials and compared with wait-list showed significant improvement in loneliness score reduction using the UCLA-R scale with MD of −6.33 [95% confidence interval : −9.39, −3.26]. Subgroup analysis with only two Cognitively-Based Compassion Training trials also showed similar MD of −6.05. The overall quality of evidence was low.Conclusions: Mindfulness intervention with an average length of 8-week duration significantly improved the population's loneliness level with no mental health issue. However, this evidence had a low GRADE level. (shrink)

By around the age of 5½, many children in the United States judge that numbers never end, and that it is always possible to add 1 to a set. These same children also generally perform well when asked to label the quantity of a set after one object is added (e.g., judging that a set labeled “five” should now be “six”). These findings suggest that children have implicit knowledge of the “successor function”: Every natural number, n, has a successor, n (...) + 1. Here, we explored how children discover this recursive function, and whether it might be related to discovering productive morphological rules that govern language‐specific counting routines (e.g., the rules in English that represent base‐10 structure). We tested 4‐ and 5‐year‐old children’s knowledge of counting with three tasks, which we then related to (a) children’s belief that 1 can always be added to any number (the successor function) and (b) their belief that numbers never end (infinity). Children who exhibited knowledge of a productive counting rule were significantly more likely to believe that numbers are infinite (i.e., there is no largest number), though such counting knowledge was not directly linked to knowledge of the successor function, per se. Also, our findings suggest that children as young as 4 years of age are able to implement rules defined over their verbal count list to generate number words beyond their spontaneous counting range, an insight which may support reasoning over their acquired verbal count sequence to infer that numbers never end. (shrink)

Supraspan verbal list-learning tests, such as the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT), are classic neuropsychological tests for assessing verbal memory. In this study, we investigated the impact of the meaning of the words to be learned on 3 memory stages (short-term recall, learning, and delayed recall) in a cohort of 447 healthy adults. First, we compared scores obtained from the RAVLT (word condition) to those of an alternative version of this test using phonologically similar but meaningless (...) items (pseudoword condition) and observed how each score varied as a function of age and sex. Then, we collected the participants’ self-reported strategies to retain the word and pseudoword lists and examined if these strategies mediated the age and sex effects on memory scores. The word condition resulted in higher memory scores than pseudoword condition at each memory stage and even canceled out, for the learning stage, the detrimental effect of age that was observed for the short-term and delayed recall. When taking sex into account, the word advantage was observed only in women for short-term recall. The self-reported strategies, which were similar for words and pseudowords, were based on the position of the item on the list (word: 53 %, pseudoword: 37%) or the meaning of the item (word: 64%, pseudoword: 58%) and were used alone or in combination. The best memory performance was associated with the meaning strategy in the word condition and with the combination of the meaning and position strategies in the pseudoword condition. Finally, we found that the word advantage observed in women for short-term recall was mediated by the use of the meaning strategy. The RAVLT scores were thus highly dependent on word meaning, notably because it allowed efficient semantic knowledge-based strategies. Within the framework of Tulving’s declarative memory model, these results are at odds with the depiction of the RAVLT as a verbal episodic memory test as it is increasingly referred to in the literature. (shrink)