Is Pāṇini’s grammar prescriptive or descriptive, or perhaps both at the same time? The answer determines, among many other things, how we should render vā and vibhāṣā in his optional rules. If the grammar is prescriptive, these terms can mean “preferably” and “marginally”. If it is purely descriptive, then only “frequently” and “rarely” are appropriate translations. In Pāṇini as a Variationist (henceforth PV )I suggested that both translations are equally valid, on the grounds that the Aṣṭādhyāyī is at the same (...) time a faithful record of the usage of a community of śiṣṭas, and part of a project to canonize that usage as correct, meant to be binding on all users of the language. Devasthali (1983), however, objected that the idea of “better” or “worse” usage is “foreign to the ancient Sanskrit grammatical works and grammarians”, because they do not deal with incorrect apaśabdas, only with sādhusabdas – the correct words of the divine language. (shrink)

Pāṇini's fourth century BC Sanskrit grammar uses rewrite rules utilizing an explicit formal language defined through a semi-formal metalanguage. The grammar is generative, meaning that it is capable of expressing a potential infinity of well-formed Sanskrit sentences starting from a finite symbolic inventory. The grammar's operational rules involve extensive use of auxiliary markers, in the form of Sanskrit phonemes, to control grammatical derivations. Pāṇini's rules often utilize a generic context-sensitive format to identify terms used in replacement, modification or deletion operations. (...) The context-sensitive rule format is itself defined using Pāṇini's more general method of auxiliary markers, the latter used to define many dozens of linguistic categories and rules controlling derivations of Sanskrit sentences through the manipulation of ‘non-terminal’ and ‘terminal’ symbols. This technique for controlling formal derivations was rediscovered by Emil Post in the 1920s and later shown by him to be ca... (shrink)

The following principles are seen to operate in the rules Pānini provides for Sanskrit grammar. (1) The obvious principle that the introduction of affixes and augments which condition sound replacements necessarily precede the latter. (2) Bracketing, whereby an operation whose condition is internal relative to a condition causing another operation applies prior to the latter. (3) The derivational prehistory of a form is pertinent to the operations which apply to it. (4) Blocking: a rule R2 is said to block an (...) R1 if, in a given domain, R1 tentatively applies (and would apply in the absence of R2) wherever R2 can apply, while R2 would be vacuous if R1 applied. (4a) Limited blocking, which obtains where R1 and R2 overlap but also have independent domains of application. These principles account for correct derivations in cases where post-Paninian grammarians invoked rule order: where two rules conflict, that one takes precedence which is stated later in the grammar. This principle is not generally tenable, since some derivations require that a rule stated previously in the grammar take precedence. Hence, the grammarians who invoke such rule ordering in cases of conflict must admit that only a knowledge of the correct results to be obtained by applying the rules allows one to correctly apply the rules in the first place. It is argued that Pānini avoided this weakness. (shrink)

In Pninis grammar of Sanskrit one finds the ivastras, a table which defines the natural classes of phonological segments in Sanskrit by intervals. We present a formal argument which shows that, using his representation method, Pninis way of ordering the phonological segments to represent the natural classes is optimal. The argument is based on a strictly set-theoretical point of view depending only on the set of natural classes and does not explicitly take into account the phonological features of the segments, (...) which are, however, implicitly given in the way a language clusters its phonological inventory. The key idea is to link the graph of the Hasse-diagram of the set of natural classes closed under intersection to ivastra-style representations of the classes. Moreover, the argument is so general that it allows one to decide for each set of sets whether it can be represented with Pninis method. Actually, Pnini had to modify the set of natural classes to define it by the ivastras (the segment h plays a special role). We show that this modification was necessary and, in fact, the best possible modification. We discuss how every set of classes can be modified in such a way that it can be defined in a ivastra-style representation.1. (shrink)

In the preceding we have argued that brevity in the form of Generalizing Brevity is an important theoretical principle underlying Panini's grammar. It applies blindly at the metalevel, when the grammar is being chosen. Generalization is a concern at one remove: A device for the metalanguage is only chosen such that its use in accord with the maximum brevity leads to some generalization. Many potential brevity increasing devices are not chosen for this reason. But at the metalanguage level brevity (...) is paramount. To prove this we have shown that Panini maximizes brevity in many cases at the cost of other possible theoretical principles. We have also shown that many features of the grammar flow from the brevity criterion. We have concluded that logical organization, generality, and other aspects of explanation largely follow from brevity and that this can be regarded as a substantial aspect of the explanatory power of the theory behind the grammar. Generalization should follow on the heels of maximum brevity. And, considering Panini's domain of data this is a perfectly reasonable expectation. (shrink)