_Empirical Logic and Public Debate_ supplies a large number of previously unpublished papers that together make up a survey of recent developments in the field of empirical logic. It contains theoretical contributions, some of a more formal and some of an informal nature, as well as numerous contemporary and historical case studies. The book will therefore be attractive both to those who wish to focus upon the theory and practice of discussion, debate, arguing, and argument, as well (...) as to those readers who are primarily interested in applications to a particular field, such as ethics, political philosophy, feminist philosophy, or the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Logic and philosophy of science share a long history, though contacts have gone through ups and downs. This paper is a brief survey of some major themes in logical studies of empirical theories, including links to computer science and current studies of rational agency. The survey has no new results: we just try to make some things into common knowledge.

K. R. Popper distinguished between two main uses of logic, the demonstrational one, in mathematical proofs, and the derivational one, in the empirical sciences. These two uses are governed by the following methodological constraints: in mathematical proofs one ought to use minimal logical means (logical minimalism), while in the empirical sciences one ought to use the strongest available logic (logical maximalism). In this paper I discuss whether Popper’s critical rationalism is compatible with a revision of (...) class='Hi'>logic in the empirical sciences, given the condition of logical maximalism. Apparently, if one ought to use the strongest logic in the empirical sciences, logic would remain immune to criticism and, thus, non-revisable. I will show that critical rationalism is theoretically compatible with a revision of logic in the empirical sciences. However, a question that remains to be clarified by the critical rationalists is what kind of evidence would lead them to revise the system of logic that underlies a physical theory, such as quantum mechanics? Popper’s falsificationist methodology will be compared with the recently advocated extension of the abductive methodology from the empirical sciences to logic by T. Williamson, since both of them arrive at the same conclusion concerning the status of classical logic. (shrink)

The philosophical debate about quantum logic between the late 1960s and the early 1980s was generated mainly by Putnam's claims that quantum mechanics empirically motivates introducing a new form of logic, that such an empirically founded quantum logic is the `true' logic, and that adopting quantum logic would resolve all the paradoxes of quantum mechanics. Most of that debate focussed on the latter claim, reaching the conclusion that it was mistaken. This chapter will attempt to (...) clarify the possible misunderstandings surrounding the more radical claims about the revision of logic, assessing them in particular both in the context of more general quantum-like theories (in the framework of von Neumann algebras), and against the background of the current state of play in the philosophy and interpretation of quantum mechanics. Characteristically, the conclusions that might be drawn depend crucially on which of the currently proposed solutions to the measurement problem is adopted. (shrink)

In this paper, I present two ampliative adaptive logics: LA and LAk. LA is an adaptive logic for abduction that enables one to generate explanatory hypotheses from a set of observational statements and a set of background assumptions. LAk is based on LA and has the peculiar property that it selects those explanatory hypotheses that are empirically most successful. The aim of LAk is to capture the notion of empirical progress as studied by Theo Kuipers.

The laws of classical logic are taken to be logical truths, which in turn are taken to hold objectively. However, we might question our faith in these truths: why are they true? One general approach, proposed by Putnam [8] and more recently Dickson [3] or Maddy [5], is to adopt empiricism about logic. On this view, logical truths are true because they are true of the world alone – this gives logical truths an air of objectivity. Putnam and (...) Dickson both take logical truths to be true in virtue of the world’s structure, given by our best empirical theory, quantum mechanics. This assumes a determinate logical structure of the world given by quantum mechanics. Here, I argue that this assumption is false, and that the world’s logical structure, and hence the related ‘true’ logic, is underdetermined. This leads to what I call empirical conventionalism. (shrink)

Logic and philosophy of science share a long history, though contacts have gone through ups and downs. This paper is a brief survey of some major themes in logical studies of empirical theories, including links to computer science and current studies of rational agency. The survey has no new results: we just try to make some things into common knowledge.

In this paper I will investigate the possibility of completing a Positivist style account of demarcation. One reason for pursuing this project is that standard criticisms of Positivism do not have the bite against the demarcation project that they are often assumed to have. To argue this will be the burden of the first part of this paper. The other reason is that new research in logic has provided machinery not available to the Positivists; machinery that shows promise for (...) solving some of the technical problems faced by Positivists' account of demarcation. To argue this will be the burden of the second part of this paper. (shrink)

This paper considers the rediscovery of Hegel currently taking place in the analytic philosophy. Going back to the Hegelian texts themselves, I will try to show how they can help to decisively solve some problems of contemporary philosophy. I will concentrate on the theme of knowledge, and especially mathematical knowledge, in relation to Hegelian dialectical logic.

The following well-known problem motivated my handling more general problems. As we surely know, our pupils and even students are confronted with much more trouble when learning mathematics (and even physics) than when they learn ‘empirical’ sciences like biology, mineralogy etc. There are many factors that can at least partially explain this phenomenon. I would however mention one factor that is not too frequently adduced: mathematics, logic, and much of physics use concepts that are abstract while the (...) class='Hi'>empirical sciences seem to support understanding by using expressions concerning (denoting? expressing?) concrete objects. Therefore the first topic to be explained (or explicated) is: Abstract vs. concrete. The second point will consist of applying the first point to explanation of the trouble with learning mathematics. The third point will ask Logical Analysis of Natural Language how to tell abstract expressions from concrete ones. The fourth point will confront the concept described in the foregoing point with conceptions trying to abandon the distinction between analytic and empirical expressions. Here it will be shown that the empiricism representing this latter conception deprives semantics as applied to Natural language of important features of expressivity. (shrink)

CONSIDER A NON EMPTY BUT OTHERWISE ARBITRARY SET OF\nPROPERTIES CALLED OBSERVATION-PROPERTIES (O-PROPERTIES).\nCALL A PROPERTY P A MEANINGFUL PROPERTY (M-PROPERTY) IF IT\nIS EQUIVALENT TO A (FINITE OR INFINITE) DISJUNCTION OF\nO-PROPERTIES--I.E., A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION\nFOR P IS THAT AT LEAST ONE OBSERVATION-PROPERTY IN A\nCERTAIN SET O(P) BE TRUE. OBVIOUSLY THE CONJUNCTION AND\nDISJUNCTION OF TWO M-PROPERTIES IS AN M-PROPERTY; IN\nGENERAL THE NEGATION OF AN M-PROPERTY IS NOT AN M-PROPERTY.\nHOWEVER WE CAN DEFINE THE PSEUDO NEGATION OF AN M-PROPERTY\nP AS THE POSSESSION OF SOME (...) O-PROPERTY INCOMPATIBLE WITH P.\nTHE ALGEBRA OF DISJUNCTION, CONJUNCTION AND PSEUDO NEGATION\nOF M-PROPERTIES TURNS OUT TO START IN THE SAME RELATION TO\nBOOLEAN ALGEBRA AS INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC (NOT 3-VALUED\nLOGIC) DOES TO CLASSICAL LOGIC, AND SUGGESTS THEREFORE THAT\nINTUITIONISTIC RATHER THAN 3-VALUED LOGIC IS THE\nAPPROPRIATE FORMALISM TO DEAL WITH THE PARADOXES OF THE\nBALD MAN, THE HEAP, ETC. (shrink)

Exact philosophy consists of various disciplines scattered and separated. Formal semantics and philosophy of science are good examples of two such disciplines. The aim of this paper is to show that there is possible to find some integrating bridge topics between the two fields, and to show how insights from the one are illuminating and suggestive in the other.

I distinguish a priori knowledge from a priori truths or statements. A priori knowledge either is evident or is derived from evident premisses by means of correct reasoning. An a priori statement is one that reflects features of the conceptual framework within which it is placed. The statement either describes semantic relations between concepts of the framework or it characterizes the application of the framework to experience and the world. An a priori statement is not necessarily part of anyone’s a (...) priori knowledge. I also distinguish empirical knowledge from empirical statements. Both statements and theories are empirical if they are designed to characterize features of experience and the world. Knowledge is empirical if it fits experience; thus, one must check to see whether it fits. We do not obtain knowledge of logical systems by rational insight of evident truths and careful deductions from evident truths. Adequate logical systems are developed by trial and error. Logical knowledge is empirical knowledge that is not generally a priori. It is empirical knowledge of a priori truths and principles of our conceptual systems. Logical systems are empirical theories of these truths and principles. (shrink)

칸트 철학에서 시간 개념은 항상 중요하게 거론되지만 쉽게 논의의 대상으로 흡수되지 못해왔다. 본 연구는 경험적·주관적 측면에서의 시간 현상을 칸트의 시간론에 근거하여 분석한다. 구체적으로 본 논문은 칸트의 비경험적, 불연속적 시간 즉 “논리적 구성물로서”의 시간의 의미를 시적 반추를 통해 재해석한다. 첫째, ‘시간은 경험의 소여인가’라는 물음에서 출발한다. 만약 시간이 경험의 인과적 연속물이라면, 지난 과거의 경험내용에 대한 재의미화는 없다. 이러한 점에 의문을 제기한 롱펠로우의 시는, 시간이 결과로서의 경험으로부터 왜 구분되는지를 반증한다. 두 번째 물음은 시간에서 경험적 의미가 사라진다면, 시간은 무엇으로 구성되는가이다. 칸트와 마찬가지로 헤세는 자신의 (...) 시 〈한탄〉에서 시간을 ‘틀’이라고 지칭한다. 심지어 그는 시간에 그 어떤 도덕적 가치나 의미가 부여될 수 없다고 암시한다. 스톨베르크의 시는 다름 아닌 그 이유를 제공해주는 단초가 된다. 셋째, 한스 마이어호프의 경험적 시간에 대한 해명으로부터 본 연구는 칸트의 ‘경험’과 ‘현상’의 관계를 설정하고, 이로써 논리적이고 구성적인 시간의 의미가 시의 시간 개념에 내재해 있음을 밝힌다. 넷째, 본 논문은 쉼보르스카의 시를 통해 내면에 변화하고 상상되고 사라지는 시간의 모습들이 선형 구조로만 이해될 수 없음을 규명한다. 요컨대, 칸트의 시간론으로 분석한 시 속에 시간은 경험에 예속된 현상이 아니라, 경험적 사건 및 이야기와 생각들이 새롭게 기술되고 재해석될 수 있는 사유의 무한 지평이다. 시간은 경험의 근원적 조건이자 현상하는 모든 것의 가능 조건이다. (shrink)

CONTENTS: 1 Introductory Remark; 2 Formalism of Empirical Theories; 3 Semantics of Formalized Languages; 4 Interpretation of Empirical Theories; 5 Interpretation of Observational Terms; 6 Interpretation of Theoretical Terms; 7 Main Types of Meaning Postulates for Theoretical Terms; 8 Some Other Kinds of Meaning Postulates for Theoretical Terms; 9 Main Types of Statements in an Empirical Theory; 10 Towards a More Realistic Account; 11 Concluding Remarks; 12 Bibliographical Note.

This essay offers a new interpretation of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s landmark work of critical social theory Empire. It develops an account of the politics of exile by situating this political strategy in terms of Hardt and Negri’s claim that it is no longer feasible to confront capitalist power head-on. It attends closely to Hardt and Negri’s account of Empire’s pyramidal structure, and the problems that this structure creates for the multitude’s passage from virtuality to actuality. It criticizes the (...) authors’ assertion that, under Empire, the institutions associated with modernity have become indistinguishable from one another in ‘society of control.’ This essay concludes by theorizing the historicity and power of the university, in an attempt to specify what the democratic self-organization of the multitude, together with its exodus from Empire, might look like. Accordingly, it contends that the production of knowledge and higher education depend upon an idea of absolute value which outstrips the commodity-form, and in so doing, provides an intimation of the multitude passing to the exterior of Empire. (shrink)

Subintuitionistic (propositional) logics are those in a standard intuitionistic language that result by weakening the frame conditions of the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic. In this paper we consider two negation expansions of subintuitionistic logic, one by classical negation and the other by what has been dubbed “empirical” negation. We provide an axiomatization of each expansion and show them sound and strongly complete. We conclude with some final remarks, including avenues for future research.

In this paper, I propose a comparison between some widely accepted Quinian views and Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on the logical and the empirical in On Certainty. While Quine's perspective and Wittgenstein's aare not thorougly dissimilar (so that the question of which influence Wittgenstein's thought might have had on the thought of some contemporary philosopher like Quine is both interesting and relevant), there is at least one important difference between them. I submit that Wittgenstein's view on this crucial distinction are (...) more general but ultimately more plausible than the nowadays popular Quinian view. (shrink)

Inductive logic generalizes the idea of logical entailment and provides standards for the evaluation of non-conclusive arguments. A main application of inductive logic is the generalization of observational data to theoretical models. In the empirical sciences, the mathematical theory of statistics addresses the same problem. This paper argues that there is no separable purely logical aspect of statistical inference in a variety of complex problems. Instead, statistical practice is often motivated by decision-theoretic considerations and resembles empirical (...) science. (shrink)

There is a certain dominant tradition, school, ambiance or intellectual community in contemporary philosophy of science which can conveniently be labelled logical empiricism. Now a curious and (I believe) hitherto unremarked change occurred in the accepted methodology of logical empiricism shortly after the end of World War II. Before then accepted forms of argument for philosophical theses about the logic, analysis, or rational reconstruction of science fell into two main categories. Some arguments appealed to familiar or historically attestable facts (...) about the development of science, the declared aims of scientists, etc. in certain areas. Others appealed to criteria of generality, clarity, accuracy, consistency, simplicity, and similar considerations of a systematic nature in the construction of philosophical analyses. Appeals were rarely, if ever, made at that time to intuition. If an intuitive idea was mentioned at all, it was mentioned as something that might suggest a starting-point of enquiry but could not be relied upon, even presumptively, as the ground for a conclusion. But this situation changed markedly from the late '40's onwards. Many arguments came to be rested, quite explicitly, on the alleged intuitive acceptability of certain premisses. In the Carnapian school, for example, the guiding objective of an inductive logician seems no longer to be the rational reconstruction of scientific reasoning but rather the axiomatisation of his own intuitions by the most sophisticated methods available. (shrink)