Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

Episteme 6 (3):269-279 (2009)
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Abstract

Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one's evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005).

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10.3366/e1742360009000707

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Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida

Citations of this work

Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Evidentialism: essays in epistemology.Earl Brink Conee - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman.

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