Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating?

Social Epistemology 29 (2):145-159 (2015)

Abstract

Conciliatory views of disagreement are an intuitive class of views on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Such views claim that making conciliation is often required upon discovering that another disagrees with you. One of the chief objections to these views of the epistemic significance of disagreement is that they are self-defeating. Since, there are disagreements about the epistemic significance of disagreement, such views can be turned on themselves, and this has been thought to be problematic. In this paper, I examine several different incarnations of this objection and defend conciliatory views of disagreement from each of them, while making a modification regarding how such views should be understood

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,805

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-08-29

Downloads
133 (#90,412)

6 months
3 (#197,842)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

How to Endorse Conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.
Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations