Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018)

Authors
Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida
Bryan Frances
United Arab Emirates University
Abstract
This article examines the central epistemological issues tied to the recognition of disagreement.
Keywords Epistemic Peer  Equal Weight  Total Evidence  Justificationist View
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.

View all 149 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Endorse Conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.
Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Disagreement, Equal Weight and Commutativity.Alastair Wilson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):321 - 326.
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Questionable Peers and Spinelessness.Sherman Benjamin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.
Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330.
A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.
A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Alan Millar Adrian Haddock & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.

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