Peer disagreement and higher order evidence

In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217 (2011)
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Abstract

My aim in this paper is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer disagreement. Suppose that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments that bear on some proposition: there is no relevant consideration which is available to you but not to me, or vice versa. For the sake of concreteness, we might picture

Other Versions

original Kelly, Thomas (2010) "Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence". In Feldman, Richard, Warfield, Ted A., Disagreement, pp. : Oxford University Press (2010)

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Thomas Kelly
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.
Epistemic Trespassing.Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):367-395.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.

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