Oxford Handbooks Online (2015)

Authors
Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida
Abstract
An introduction to the debate of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. This article examines the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. It pursues the following questions: (1) How does discovering that an epistemic equal disagrees with you affect your epistemic justification for holding that belief? (e.g., does the evidence of it give you a defeater for you belief?) and (2) Can you rationally maintain your belief in the face of such disagreement? This article explains and motivates each of the central positions, including steadfast views and conciliatory views of peer disagreement, while at the same time raising challenges for each of them. It concludes by speculating about new directions that the debate will take.
Keywords Disagreement  Defeat  Peer
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.13
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,979
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Endorse Conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.
The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Distant Peers.Mark Vorobej - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):708-722.
Possible Disagreements and Defeat.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
Who is an Epistemic Peer?Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.
Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism.Andrew Rotondo - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):251-271.
XI—Literature and Disagreement.Eileen John - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):239-260.
Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors.Bryan Frances - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1 - 21.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-08-10

Total views
267 ( #40,464 of 2,505,137 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #60,150 of 2,505,137 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes