Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):153-184 (2021)

Authors
Ali Hossein Khani
Iranian Institute of Philosophy (IRIP)
Abstract
Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the “Externalist Explanation”. I will argue that not only are these explanations of self-knowledge implausible, but Davidson himself has already rejected them. Thus, neither can be attributed to Davidson as his suggested account of self-knowledge. I will then introduce and support what I take to be Davidson’s official and independent account of self-knowledge, that is, his “Transcendental Explanation”. I will defend this view against certain potential objections and finally against the objections made by William Child.
Keywords Philosophy of language  Epistemology  Self-Knowledge  First-Person Authority  Donald Davidson  Disquotational Explanation  Externalist Explanation  Transcendental Explanation  Crispin Wright  William Child  Radical Interpretation
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DOI 10.1111/sjp.12402
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.

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