Ali Hossein Khani
Iranian Institute of Philosophy (IRIP)
I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. I then explain how this account can help deal with various perplexities in Davidson's later view of meaning and mental content.
Keywords Intentional Action  Pure Intending  Meaning  All-Out Judgements  Judgement-Dependence  Optimal Conditions  Donald Davidson  Crispin Wright  Non-Reductionism  Factualism  Triangulation
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