ABSTRACT The phenomenological vision, particularly, Husserl’s idea of critique as an infinite vocational theoria and Patočka’s as an enduring programme, view Platonic logic and Socratic act as the paradigms for a normative justification of the idea of universal science and philosophy. In light of that, the Thrasymachus-Socrates debate is interpreted as a case to testify the critical power of philosophy successfully exercised over sophistic tyrannical non-philosophy. This paper criticizes the phenomenological idealization of the Socratic victory as an ethico-teleologically anticipated success (...) of philosophy and rewrites the defeat of Thrasymachus as a political failure in warring with philosophy during which Thrasymachus questions the legitimacy of the act of philosophizing to decide its legitimacy and thereby exposes the politics played out in that act. (shrink)

The conviction that Plato manipulated Thrasymachus’ views is today accepted by the scholarly opinion. Given the absence of testimonies regarding the political and moral views held by the historical Thrasymachus, the degree of this manipulation can be gauged only by assessing the degree of incoherence and ambiguity in the views of the Platonic Thrasymachus. This perspective, of necessity a self-referential one, is overcome by the hypothesis presented in the following article, namely, that Plato manipulates not as much the views of (...) the historical Thrasymachus as the extremely concise and ambiguous thesis which he has ascribed to him; and that the goal of this manipulation is to mock Thrasymachus’ style and rhetorical posture – both confirmed by testimonies outside the Platonic text – as ill suited to the philosophical reflection on the content of this thesis. (shrink)

In Book I of the Republic, or so I shall argue, Plato gives us a glimpse of sheer horror. In the character, beliefs, and desires of Thrasymachus, Plato aims to personify some of the most diabolical dangers that lurk in human nature. In this way, the role that Thrasymachus plays for Plato is akin to the role that for Hobbes is played by the bellum omnium contra omnes, the war of all against all, which would allegedly be the inevitable result (...) of a "state of nature", where human beings have no government to terrorize them into obedience. It is also akin to the role that for Kant is played by the "radical evil" that is allegedly an indelible feature of human nature itself. As I shall try to show, the desires that characterize Thrasymachus are of the kind that are described in Book IX as "lawless" desires, desire of the wild insane kind that dominate the tyrannical soul; and his beliefs systematically reflect these desires, in a way that has its own hideously coherent logic. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Thrasymachus’ Inmoralism, that is to say, of the set of judgements concerning the superior value of injustice in comparison with justice, issued by him in book I of Plato’s Republic. It is argued that both the argument in support of these judgements and its implicit resource to the concept of πλεονεξία cannot be interpreted descriptively, if they are to serve to justify the immoralists judgements. It is also argued that a particularly important subgroup of (...) such judgements is supported by a peculiar conception of practical reason based on the concept of πλεονεξία. Finally, the comparison is made between this ‘pleonexic’ conception of practical rationality and the one that Plato advocates in the Republic. (shrink)

In defending the view that justice is the advantage of the stronger, Thrasymachus puzzlingly claims that rulers never err and that any practitioner of a skill or expertise (τέχνη) is infallible. In what follows, Socrates offers a number of arguments directed against Thrasymachus’ views concerning the nature of skill, ruling, and justice. Commentators typically take a dim view of both Thrasymachus’ claims about skill (which are dismissed as an ungrounded and purely ad hoc response to Socrates’ initial criticisms) and Socrates’ (...) latter arguments (which are deemed extremely weak). In this paper, I clarify Thrasymachus’ views (and those of several other ancients) concerning qua locutions and the nature of skill and ability and I reconstruct Socrates’ arguments against Thrasymachus’ views concerning skill and justice. I argue that Thrasymachus’ views are not ungrounded or ad hoc and that Socrates’ arguments are rather different (and significantly stronger) than often supposed. (shrink)

RESUMO: Ao associar governo à téchne, Trasímaco estabelece que o governo também exige um conhecimento específico. Esse saber permitiria que o governante pudesse beneficiar-se dos governados, tirando proveito deles. Em sua definição de governo, ele aproximará essa téchne do governo ao governante injusto, mais especificamente o tirano. Neste trabalho, pretende-se analisar a relevância dos argumentos de Trasímaco para a filosofia política. ABSTRACT: By associating government with téchne, Thrasymachus states that government requires specific knowledge. This knowledge allows the ruler to benefit (...) from the governed and to take advantage of them. In his definition of government, he equates this téchne with government by an unjust ruler, specifically that of a tyrant. This article aims to analyze the relevance of Thrasymachus' arguments for political philosophy. (shrink)

RESUMO Em nosso artigo, pretendemos verificar as teses de Trasímaco sobre a justiça e se estas são consistentes entre si. Para isso, há de se observar a relação da justiça com o governo e a força que a determina. O intuito é reavivar as discussões hodiernas sobre as teses de Trasímaco dentro da filosofia platônica, assim como demonstrar sua importância para o âmbito da filosofia política. ABSTRACT This article aims to verify Thrasymachus' theses on justice and whether they are consistent (...) with one another. As such, it is necessary to observe the relation between justice and government, as well as the force which determines it. The objective is to revive in actual times the discussions about Thrasymachus' theses within Plato's philosophy, and to demonstrate its importance in the scope of political philosophy. (shrink)

A discussão entre Trasímaco e Sócrates no Livro I da República de Platão dá vigor à questão da justiça iniciada com Céfalo. Trasímaco é um personagem importante da obra, pois vai relacionar a justiça ao governo da cidade. Isso faz com que a justiça saia da esfera individual e entre na esfera pública. Em nosso artigo, pretendemos verificar as teses de Trasímaco sobre a justiça e se estas são consistentes entre si. O problema da consistência das teses é antigo entre (...) os comentadores e apresenta diferentes soluções. Nosso intuito é propor uma solução para o problema e relacionar isto à arte do governo proposta por Trasímaco. Isso nos permite verificar a maneira pela qual Sócrates e Trasímaco diferem entre si em suas propostas de governo e dos tipos de governante. Desse modo, nosso trabalho pretende contribuir com a literatura platonista sobre o papel ocupado por Trasímaco dentro da obra de Platão. (shrink)

La présente étude vise à tirer du témoignage platonicien la plus large information positive sur le maître de rhétorique Thrasymaque de Chalcédoine. Il s’agit en particulier d’établir la cohérence entre le propos tenu sur Thrasymaque dans le contexte de la présentation de l’histoire de la rhétorique dans le Phèdre et les propos prêtés au personnage de Thrasymaque au premier livre de la République. On avance que les thèses politiques du personnage fictif reflètent une conception de l’art oratoire fondée sur la (...) production d’affections chez l’auditeur, en particulier de la pitié : la description des situations politiques doit faire apparaître en toute circonstance la position peu enviable du dominé, afin de justifier la plainte. Ce résultat est confirmé par la confrontation aux fragments restants de l’œuvre de Thrasymaque. On en tire dès lors une conclusion sur l’influence du Thrasymaque historique sur Platon : si le philosophe abandonne la rhétorique émotionnelle de l’orateur, il en conserve et en amplifie le pessimisme. (shrink)

This is an earlier version of a chapter from my book "Plato's Republic as a Philosophical Drama on Doing Well" (2014). The book analyses Plato’s Politeia (= Republic) as a philosophical drama in which the participants turn out to be models of various types of psychic constitution, and nothing is said by them which may be considered to be an opinion of Plato himself (with all that that entails for Platonism). The debate in Book I between Socrates and Thrasymachus serves (...) as a test case for the assumptions that the Socratic method involves searching for truth or examining the opinions of interlocutors and that Socrates is the mouthpiece of Plato. Socrates and Thrasymachus are usually assumed to be arguing about justice. In fact, they are going through the motions of an eristic debate, where the aim is not to discover the truth about the matter under discussion but to defeat the opponent by fair means or foul, but especially foul. The outrageous wordplay used by both men is not so obvious in translation, and in any case tends to be ignored or explained away by scholars who assume that Plato the philosopher was writing a philosophical treatise (an exposition of philosophical ideas) and not a philosophical drama (a presentation of philosophically interesting models, to be compared and contrasted by the reader). (shrink)

Nemali broj interpretatora Platonove Države smatra kako Sokratova argumentacija protiv Trasimaha u prvoj knjizi Države nije zadovoljavajuća, valjana i uverljiva. U ovom radu autorka nastoji da pokaže u čemu leže smisao, snaga i validnost Sokratovih argumenata protiv imoralističkog stanovišta o prirodi pravednosti. Njegovi argumenti nemaju samo elenktičku, pobijajuću vrednost, nego nam daju i uvid u neka načelna pitanja, poput prirode umeća, pleoneksije, funkcije, vrline, eudajmonije, te pružaju putokaz u kojem pravcu će se kretati dalja rasprava u Državi.

We share our world with many people who ignore the principles of justice and who regularly take advantage of others by breaching trust or breaking agreements. This dissertation is about the irrationality of the actions of these covenant-breakers. A covenant-breaker typically believes that unjust behavior is to his advantage and that only a fool would act in any other way. Would it not be disturbing if this were true? My central claim will be that adherence to the precepts of justice (...) is a rational strategy for a self-interested actor. I intend to demonstrate that con men and covenant-breakers do not act rationally when violating an agreement. I will trace the concept of justice as it evolves through philosophical history and show that, while the concept of justice changes as the underlying concept of human nature and psychology changes, the argument in favor of the rationality of just behavior remains coherent throughout. Each historical interpretation will advance some form of the claim that the consistent observance of cooperative agreements is a rational strategy, and at each point an interlocutor will object. I will show that these interlocutors are mistaken. My motivating goal is to show that justice, understood as the consistent observance of cooperative agreements, is rational. I want to respond to the clandestine cheaters and other skeptics who believe that just behavior is for suckers, because, if the skeptics are right, and justice is indeed irrational, then those among us who are acting in a just manner are paying an unnecessary cost. (shrink)