This is an earlier version of a chapter from my book "Plato's Republic as a Philosophical Drama on Doing Well" (2014). The book analyses Plato’s Politeia (= Republic) as a philosophical drama in which the participants turn out to be models of various types of psychic constitution, and nothing is said by them which may be considered to be an opinion of Plato himself (with all that that entails for Platonism). The debate in Book I between Socrates and Thrasymachus serves (...) as a test case for the assumptions that the Socratic method involves searching for truth or examining the opinions of interlocutors and that Socrates is the mouthpiece of Plato. Socrates and Thrasymachus are usually assumed to be arguing about justice. In fact, they are going through the motions of an eristic debate, where the aim is not to discover the truth about the matter under discussion but to defeat the opponent by fair means or foul, but especially foul. The outrageous wordplay used by both men is not so obvious in translation, and in any case tends to be ignored or explained away by scholars who assume that Plato the philosopher was writing a philosophical treatise (an exposition of philosophical ideas) and not a philosophical drama (a presentation of philosophically interesting models, to be compared and contrasted by the reader). (shrink)

The Republic is widely recognized to be Plato’s masterpiece, but for centuries it has been the subject of much debate. Is it about the ideal state, or the soul, or art, or education, or something else altogether? Interpretations have been many and various, for two main reasons: studies have tended to concentrate on parts of this very long dialogue to the exclusion of other parts; and some of the opinions expressed in the dialogue are routinely regarded as being those of (...) Plato himself. This analysis treats the dialogue as a dialogue, a conversation between the characters presented in it, and examines the dialogue in its entirety. The result is a holistic interpretation making sense not only of the dialogue as a whole, but also its parts. Each character is a paradigm representing an aspect of the central theme of the dialogue (apparent good), and it is because of what they represent that the conversation takes the course that it does. (shrink)

Many instances of "horismos" in Aristotle's Topics and Alexander's commentary have been altered to "horos" in the transmission of the texts. Philological and philosophical reasons are provided to substantiate this claim and to explain the phenomenon.

This strange dialogue becomes intelligible when Socrates is treated as a model of the good man who appears to the Many to be bad talking with a Hippias who is a model of the bad man who appears to the Many to be good. The good and apparently good are dramatized through these models. The good is revealed to be the fitting, while the fine/beautiful (kalon) is revealed to be the apparently fitting (hence the many confusions between the two concepts). (...) Fittingness may be perceived through the senses, but this immediate aesthetic fittingness is confused by the Many with pragmatic fittingness which can actually only be perceived over time and with rational thought. Many associated themes are condensed into this short but brilliant philosophical drama. (shrink)

The reasons for assuming an established orthodox Stoic school with scholarchs are considered and refuted. The traditional line of Stoics is a diadochic device to link Panaetius, and later, Posidonius, back to Zeno of Citium, using a chain of teachers and pupils. These Stoics were independent teachers sharing a general worldview but differing to a greater or lesser extent in the details.

A response to Sider's review of my Hippias Major: An Interpretation.