Echte Freiheit läßt sich nach Leibniz nicht auf die Möglichkeit reduzieren, so zu handeln, wie man handeln will. Vielmehr muß echte Freiheit mit dem moralischen Verdienst in Verbindung gebracht werden. In diesem Zusammenhang erweist sich die Idee der logischen Kontingenz von besonderer Wichtigkeit. Eine Person hat kein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie blindlings durch das Gute geleitet wird. Sie hat allein dann ein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie das Schlechte zurückweist und bewußt das Gute wählt, das sich vom Schlechten abhebt. Insofern ist (...) derjenige, der moralisch richtig handelt, sich anderer Möglichkeiten bewußt. Leibniz trägt dieser Erfahrungstatsache durch den Gedanken Rechnung, daß eine freie Handlung logisch kontingent ist. Diesem Gedanken verleiht Leibniz einen metaphysischen Status: die möglichen Welten haben einen objektiven Gehalt. (shrink)

Avant tout l'auteur marque la place qu'occupe le christianisme dans l'évolution de la pensée philosophique et relève en même temps l'universalité de la révélation chrétienne relativement aux principes de la connaissance. L'idée de Dieu et la notion de la totalité sont considérées dans leurs rapports intimes et l'auteur fait ressortir comment le pluralisme conduit nécessairement au monisme pour aboutir au trinitarisme. Il envisage ensuite la doctrine chrétienne de la création et de la rédemption dans son acceptation la plus rationnelle en (...) accentuant surtout l'idée de la motilité divine. La transcendance, l'immanence et la glorification de l'ingérence divine dans la toute-contingence sont les trois aspects qui contiennent toutes les considérations possibles. Il met en évidence l'état de l'homme-dieu et du dieu-homme en rapport avec les principes de la régénération et de l'évolution ainsi qu'avec les indications de Nietzsche. Il montre la valeur des notions de Sujet et de Substance et indique comment les principes philosophiques du christianisme sont pas seulement par la méthode déductive, mais encore comment ils sont affirmés et sanctionnés par la méthode inductive en relation avec les principes de l'activité et de l'idéalité. (shrink)

Depuis les années 2000, l’histoire des émotions, champ de recherche particulièrement fécond, tente de renouer des liens entre l’histoire et la psychologie, dont le divorce semblait jusque-là prononcé. Les émotions, longtemps considérées comme fugaces, irrationnelles, voire incommunicables, semblent à présent susceptibles d’être étudiées par l’historien. Aussi bien dans ses méthodes que dans les processus de légitimation auquel elle se confronte, elle entretient des liens étroits avec l’histoire des idées, qu’elle recoupe en partie. Cet article propose de dégager quelques enjeux épistémologiques (...) et méthodologiques communs à ces deux champs historiographiques. (shrink)

A promise to do some action seems to create a binding obligation to do that action. And yet, paradoxically, an obligation seems not to be a fact that we can create or bring into existence; we can create an obligation only by creating or bringing into existence something else. The only way to avoid the paradox is to show that the act of promising creates something other than an obligation, which nonetheless binds us to perform the action in question. After (...) considering and rejecting various options such as the promisee's expectation and the promisor's resolve, Prichard locates the bindingness of a promise in a prior general promise, which allows the noises we make when promising to generate an obligation to perform the promised action. (shrink)

Methoden. Im obigen Artikel ist die „Phylogenie des Stammbaumes” untersucht worden. Beginnend mitHaeckel werden 26 Typen phylogenetischer Symbole kritisch besprochen, d.h. nicht die Resultate, sondern nur die Methoden, z.B. bezüglich Systematik und Phylogenie, lebender und ausgestorbener Organismen, geologischer Perioden, Stufen und homologer Variationen, geographischer Verbreitung, Diversität, etwaiger Bedeutung der Einzelheiten, Mono-, Bi- und Polyrheithrie , usw. Der Faktor Zeit wird dabei für phylogenetische Systeme als der wesentlichste betrachtet. Der Autor hat daher in seinen- neuen Darstellungen die Begriffe „Zeit-Stufen” oder „Zeit-Globen-Oberflächen” (...) eingeführt; diese stehen senkrecht zum „Zeit-Radius”. Auf diesem Grunde wird ein neues Kriterium zur Unterscheidung systematischer und phylogenetischer Vorstellungen denjenigen anderer Autoren hinzugefügt. Erläuterungen. Nach einer Übersicht über die besprochenen Schemen im 1. Teil werden die Verhältnisse zwischen systematischen und phylogenetischen Darstellungen sowie die Verbindung ihrer Symbole untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass viele Einzelheiten solcher Konstruktionen oft, wissentlich oder unwissentlich, keine bestimmte Bedeutung haben. Der Verfasser hat versucht zu zeigen, dass es erwünscht wäre, möglichst mit allen Einzelheiten einer symbolischen Darstellung irgendeine Bedeutung zu verbinden: Linien und Entfernungen in der Ebene, Winkel in räumlichen Schemen. Die letztgenannten werden besonders für solche Arten von phylogenetischen Systemen empfohlen, bei denen der Faktor Zeit stets eine der Dimensionen bildet. Dieser Grundsatz wird mit der Evolution systematischer Einzelheiten in Verbindung gebracht, und Merkmals-Phyletik, homologe Variationen, Stufen, Polyrheithrie, Analogie und Homologie, Konvergenz und Verwandtschaft, etc. werden kurz im Lichte der Vererbungslehre besprochen. Es istHayata's extrem dynamischen Ansichten zu verdanken, dass das Statische in den systematischen und phylogenetischen Darstellungen aufgelockert worden ist. Méthodes. Dans l'article inséré ci-dessus il s'agit de ce qu'on pourrait appeler „la phylogénie de l'arbre généalogique”. En commençant parHaeckel , l'auteur discute 26 types divers de symboles phylogénétiques, c.à.d. seulement les méthodes , par exemple en ce qui concerne la taxonomie et la phylogénie, les organismes récents et éteints, les périodes géologiques, les niveaux et les variations homologues, la distribution géographique, la diversité, la signification éventuelle des détails, la mono-, bi- et polyrheithrie , etc. Le Temps est considéré comme l'élément le plus essentiel dans tout système phylogénétique. Par conséquence, l'auteur a introduit dans ses nouvelles représentations les idées de „Niveaux” ou de „Surfaces des Sphères du Temps” qui sont imaginés perpendiculaires au Radius-Temps. Dans l'ordre de ces idées un nouveau critère est ajouté à ceux donnés par d'autres auteurs pour la distinction des systèmes taxonomiques et des représentations phylogénétiques. Justifications. Après une récapitulation des systèmes, énumérés dans la première partie, les relations des constructions taxonomiques et phylogénétiques, ainsi que les connections de leurs symboles sont discutées. Souvent plusieurs détails sont, sciemment ou insciemment, dépourvus de toutes signification. L'auteur a essayé de démontrer qu'il serait désirable d'attribuer autant que possible de significations définies au détails d'une représentation symbolique de la nature décrite: aux lignes et aux distances dans le plan, aux angles dans l'espace. Les constructions tridimensionales sont particulièrement recommandées pour plusieurs systèmes phylogénétiques; dans de tels systèmes le Temps devrait toujours remplir la fonction d'une des dimensions. Ce principe est mis en rapport avec l'évolution des unités taxonomiques; phylogénie des charactères, variations homologues, niveaux, polyrheithrie, analogie et homologie, convergence et relations héréditaires, tous ces sujets sont brièvement discutés dans leurs rapports avec la Génétique. Selon l'opinion de l'auteur, c'est aux idées ultra-dynamiques d'Hayata que la taxonomie et la phylogénie doivent la pénétration féconde du dynamisme dans leurs systèmes trop souvent statiques. (shrink)

Die griechische Weltauffassung unterscheidet sich van der modernen durch den Gedanken der Begrenztheit des Weltalls, das sich dem spekulativen Blick seinem Wesen nach erschliesst. Die inPlaton's Timaios gipfelnde Kosmologie bestimmt das Weltall nach den Wesensgesichtspunkten der Endlichkeit, der Einzigkeit, der Lebendigkeit und der Vollkommenheit.Platon's Holismus bezieht die leblose und die lebende Natur unter die Idee des Lebens des Kosmos, dessen „Teile” die in der Erfahrung gegebenen Lebenserscheinungen sind. Sein von innen her und intuitiv aufgebautes Weltbild, das die Erscheinungen von oben (...) herab hierarchisch ordnet, tritt dem AtomismusDemokrits gegenüber, der in umgekehrtem Verfahren die höheren Strukturen auf den einen Baustoff aller Dinge reduziert. Der Gegensatz zum Holismus offenbart sich in allen Bestimmungen: fürDemokrit sind der Kosmoi unbegrenzt viele, es gibt nur Ansammlungen von Atomen, es fehlen Einzigkeit und Vollkommenheit, sowie ein Begriff des Lebens als des zentralen Geschehens.Die neuzeitliche Forschung verzichtet auf die spekulativen Bestimmungen des Ganzen, aber der bei den Griechen dogmatische Gegensatz holistischer und atomistischer Betrachtungsweise lebt fort als Gegensatz geistiger Einstellung. Der neuzeitliche Holismus ist ein empirischer, beschränkter, aber bei ihm liegt dieselbe Intuition des sich organisch gestaltenden Gesamtlebens zu Grunde wei beiPlaton. Nur wäre es, unrichtig, diesen Holismus als synthetisch zu bezeichnen. Synthetisches Denken erhebt sich immer auf analytischem Boden. Jede Synthese hat eine offene Grenze. Die Art aber, wie der Holismus die vereinzelten Lebenserscheinungen auf umfassendere Ganzheiten bezieht, ist eine intuitive. Das Band der Erscheinungen wird nicht durch äusseres Beziehen gestiftet, sondern geschaut nach Analogie einer inneren Erfahrung.Im Gegensatz zum Atomismus, der als real nur die Atome und deren Verhältnisse gelten lässt, erkennt der Holismus stufenartig aufgebaute Einheitsarten an, in denen die höheren die niedrigeren beherrschen, ohne sie zu Elementen herabzudrücken. Die Metaphysik, auf der Suche nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen dem Menschenleben und der Natur ist an der empirischen Aufweisung das Einzelne übersteigender Lebensverbände wie sie der Holismus zu Tage fordert aufs Höchste interessiert.The conception of the world with Greek thinkers generally differs from contemporary thought in the idea of the limitation of the world whose essence manifests itself to speculative thinking. The cosmology which culminates inPlato's Timaios attributes to the whole of being the properties of finiteness, uniqueness, life and perfection.Plato's holism subsumes inanimate and living nature under the idea of cosmic life, the “parts” of which are constituted by life-phenomena given in experience. His world-conception, constructed from within and intuitively, which ranges phenomena in descending order, is opposed to the atomism ofDemocritos which reduces the higher structures to the one equal material of all things. This opposition manifests itself in all essential points: toDemocritos there are worlds in infinite number, only accumulations of atoms are real, uniqueness and perfection are lacking as well as the idea of Life as a central reality.Modern research foregoes the attempt to determine the whole speculatively, but holistic and atomistic ways of thinking, after having been dogmatically applied by the Greeks, continue to exist as opposed types of mental attitude. Contemporary holism may be empirical and limited in application, but it is directed by the same intuition of life articulating itself organically as wasPlato's. It would be incorrect, however, to characterize holism as synthetical, since all synthetics is based upon analysis. The bounds of synthesis are never fixed ones, nor does it ever determine essence. Holism's way of subsuming single life-phenomena under more comprehensive wholes is an intuitional one, the connections which it creates between phenomena are not external ones, but apprehended intuitively in analogy to inner experience.—In distinction to atomism, which only admits as real atoms and their mutual relations, holism poses groups of unities, classified in grades, the higher of which dominate the lower, without debasing them to elements. As metaphysics is concerned to discover a connection between Nature and human life, it must be highly interested in the empirical demonstration, such as holism offers, of connections of life, surpassing individual being. (shrink)

Bonhoeffer dira plus tard qu’il a « découvert » la Bible en donnant ce cours sur « Création et chute » en 1932-33. Il a voulu faire un « exercice » d’« exégèse théologique », comprise comme relecture de toute l’écriture à partir de la fin de la création dans le Christ. Les allusions au nazisme qui vient de prendre le pouvoir en Allemagne montrent Bonhoeffer soucieux de lui opposer une anthropologie théologique qui soit la prise en compte, dans l’écriture, (...) de toute la réalité humaine dévoilée à la lumière du monde nouveau.Notons quelques idées maîtresses de cette anthropologie : la résurrection du Christ est ce qui révèle l’acte créateur comme appel à l’être ; la Parole créatrice donne forme au réel ; l’appartenance commune des hommes à la terre fonde leur co-humanité, chacun advenant à la liberté par sa relation à l’autre ; la limite est grâce et le refus de la limite, l’origine du mal ; l’union de l’homme et de la femme dans la différence signifie et l’acceptation de la limite et l’accueil de la grâce, que chacun est pour l’autre ; l’église se fonde et se signifie dans cette communauté humaine différenciée et réconciliée.Later in his life Bonhoeffer will say that he “discovered” the Bible in giving his course on “Creation and Fall” in 1932-33. He had wanted to make it an “exercise” of “theological exegesis”, taken as a rereading of all Scripture in terms of the end of creation in Christ. The allusions to Nazism that came to power in Germany show Bonhoeffer’s concern to oppose it with a theological anthropology. It would take into account, in Scripture, all human reality unveiled in the light of a new world.Let us note some key ideas of this anthropology : Christ’s resurrection is that which reveals the creative act as a call to being ; the creative Word gives form to the real ; the common appartenance of men to the earth establishes their co-humanity, each approaching freedom by his relation to the other ; grace is the limit and refusal of the limit is the origin of evil ; the union of man and woman in their differences signifies both the acceptance of the limit and the reception of grace, what each one is for the other ; the Church establishes and gives itself meaning in this human community that is differentiated and reconciled. (shrink)

To the question ‘What does it mean to act or to do something?’, replies that it is not easy to identify a common character in actions. Begins by examining the position of Cook Wilson, who maintains that ‘to do something’ means to originate, cause, or bring into existence, either directly or indirectly, some not yet existing state either in oneself or some other body. Although Prichard agrees that usually action involves causing something, he observes that causing a change is not (...) itself an activity. In moving one's hand, one performs that indefinable mental activity of willing some change. The movement of the hand is the effect of the action, not the action itself, a fact overlooked by thinkers like Locke. Turning to the nature of the desire behind one's willing, Prichard rejects the view that this desire is actually a desire for the change willed. Despite forceful objections, Prichard maintains that this desire is the desire for the willing of that change. (shrink)

Le débat engagé dans le Phèdre à la suite des trois discours, constitue une enquête dialectique qui ne se limite pas, comme dans le Gorgias, aux seuls genres étudiés par les rhéteurs et sophistes, à savoir l'éloquence du barreau et de la tribune politique. Il examine toute la rhétorique en tant qu'art de conduire ou de provoquer l'âme. Tout discours, à quelque genre qu'il appartienne, est sujet à contradiction : en rhétorique comme en dialectique celui-là est le meilleur qui voit (...) la vérité, parce que, connaissant le pour et le contre, le vrai et le semblant de vérité, il saura défendre l'une et l'autre thèse. C'est là une doctrine reçue dans l'Académie. Pour la mettre en évidence Platon a recours à l'exemple des trois discours. Celui de Lysias, faute d'avoir établi une définition qui en soit le principe ou commencement, manque de suite et „nage à rebours". Les deux discours de Socrate posent un principe. Dans le premier une définition conventionnelle de l'amour le conduit à blâmer celui-ci, à juste titre. Vrai en lui-même, ce discours devient faux du moment qu'on lève la convention : or, dans le cas présent, il faut la lever, parce qu'elle méconnaît le divin. Sur l'intervention du „ signe" avertisseur, Socrate le corrige et le complète par le second discours, dont le principe n'est plus conventionnel et hypothétique, mais absolu : l'âme, principe moteur de tout. Nous avons ici l'antilogie parfaite qui repose sur l'unité de formes opposées, „l'un qui s'épand en multiplicité". Platon a choisi comme sujet l'amour parce que c'est lui qui, en tant qu'intermédiaire, unissant l'humain et le divin, réalise éminemment cette unité-multiplicité. L'exposé de la méthode diérétique contient bien des éléments que nous retrouverons dans les dialogues métaphysiques, mais nous aurions tort de la confondre avec celle du Sophiste, qui opère sur des notions „humaines" et a comme but de définir la forme indivisible en la cernant par une chaîne de divisions dichotomiques. Ici, grâce au mythe, il opère la jonction avec le trancendant, et il prouve que, par son caractère antilogique, le discours complet correspond à la structure de l'être un et multiple en affirmant l'unité et la contrariété des formes non-homonymes qui la constituent. Ce ne sont donc pas des exercices de dialectique formelle opérant sur de purs concepts. L'unité en question est réalisée dans l'ordre transcendant des Idées et c'est la réminiscence qui nous permet de la saisir et de reconnaître ainsi les rapports logiques et ontologiques à la fois entre les choses perçues. Cette méthode, nous devons la suivre „ pour être à même de parler et de penser". En fondant la rhétorique sur la dialectique, Platon entend reléguer au second plan les facteurs émotionnels que, sous l'influence du théâtre, la rhétorique attique d'inspiration Gorgienne avait mis en évidence comme constituant l'essence de la rhétorique. Après avoir, ici, revendiqué pour la dialectique la place qui lui revient, Socrate nous dira dans la suite ce que valent ces moyens et quel parti on peut en tirer. Il importe de bien distinguer ces deux thèses, comme Platon a eu soin de le faire. La première nous renvoie à la dialectique, la seconde à la philosophie de la nature. (shrink)

Cet article consiste en une étude des différentes occurrences de l’expression « philosophie première » dans le corpus aristotélicien. Une interprétation devenue courante, soutenue en particulier par A. Mansion, veut que « philosophie première » renvoie toujours à la science théologique de Métaphysique E 1. On cherche au contraire à montrer que l’expression couvre en réalité une grande partie des objets traités par l’ensemble de la Métaphysique, parmi lesquels, par exemple, l’étude de la forme comme substance première, l’examen des axiomes, (...) la réfutation des Idées. Pour ce faire, on s’intéresse à la fonction argumentative de l’expression dans ses contextes d’apparition, en montrant qu’elle sert quasi systématiquement à indiquer les limites de la physique. L’expression « philosophie première » a ainsi un sens architectonique et une fonction de démarcation. La pluralité des objets qu’elle recouvre, cependant, n’entraîne pas sa dispersion entre plusieurs sciences mais en fait un concept englobant. Il est donc légitime de se servir de l’expression pour poser la question de l’unité de la science recherchée par Aristote. (shrink)

Prichard's concern here is whether a person's obligation depends either on features of his or her situation or on features of his or her thoughts about that situation. Related to this contrast between the objective view and the subjective view is the issue of whether an obligation is an obligation to do some action. To the latter issue, Prichard responds that an obligation is not an obligation to do something, but an obligation to set ourselves to do something; as a (...) consequence, it is necessary to modify the terms of Prichard's primary concern. This modification diminishes the force of the objective view and does nothing to eliminate the central difficulty in the subjective view, namely, that the obligation to do some action is said to depend not on the character that the action would have, but on our belief that it would have that character. The belief that some general character picks out obligations derives from the mistaken habit of regarding the terms ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as equivalent to ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’. Having highlighted this mistake, Prichard holds that in instances where we have considered the circumstances fully, our thoughts about the situation decide whether we ought to perform a given activity. (shrink)

Maintaining that the existence of Moral Philosophy, as it is usually understood, rests on a mistake, Prichard undertakes to formulate our true attitude towards moral obligations. The right action does not depend upon either our own good or what is good. Obligations are underivative, immediate, and self‐evident, and therefore, we do not come to appreciate them through argument or a process of non‐moral thinking. The mistake on which Moral Philosophy rests, which links obligation to virtue or desire, parallels the mistake (...) underpinning the Theory of Knowledge. Like moral obligation, knowledge is immediate; it need not be vindicated or improved by additional knowledge. (shrink)

The act of exchanging one thing for another seems to involve a promise. The confidence needed to relinquish something one has on the understanding that one will receive what another has in exchange can be expressed in terms of resolve. In binding oneself, one thinks that if the other binds himself or herself to perform a given action, then he or she will do that action. In cases in which one person's action does not precede the other's, one's promise involves (...) thinking that if the other binds himself or herself, then he or she will carry out the promised action. (shrink)

SummaryEinstein frequently used the historical narrative form to express his philosophical and even scientific ideas. Analysis of his historical writings reveals that he employed a distinctive historical method which may be designated an “intuitive archeology”, following one of his examples. It will be shown that his historical method was consistently directed toward the goal of freeing ongoing scientific research from arbitrary restrictions. He regarded these arbitrary restrictions, in turn, to be the result of a loss of recollection of the origins (...) of scientific concepts. Finally, Einstein's position that the reality of the historical process of science itself validated his approach to writing history will be discussed.RésuméEinstein a souvent utilisé la forme d'une narration historique pour exprimer ses idés philosophiques ou même scientifiques. L'analyse de ses écrits historiques révèle qu'il employait une méthode historique particulière qui peut être appelée »archeologie intuitive« selon I'un de ses exemples. L'auteur montre que sa méthode historique avait constéuemment pour but de libérer la recherche actuelle de restrictions arbitraires. II considérait ces restrictions arbitraires elles‐mêmes comme résultant d'un oubli des origines des concepts scientifiques. Enfin, I'auteur discute la position d'Einstein selon laquelle la réalité historique que constitue la science elle‐même justifiait sa manière d'écrire I'histoire.ZusammenfassungEinstein verwendet häufig die historisch erzählende Form, um seine philosophischen und ge‐legentlich sogar urn seine wissenschaftlichen Gedanken zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Eine Untersu‐chung seiner historischen Schriften verrät, dass er eine besondere historische Methode angewen‐det hat, die einem seiner eigenen Beispiele gemass als »intuitive Archaologie« bezeichnet werden kann. Es wird gezeigt, dass seine historische Methode immer darauf ausgerichtet ist, die fortschreitende Forschung von willkürlichen Einschräkungen zu befreien. Solche willkürlichen Beschränkungen betrachtete er als das Ergebnis einer Miss‐achtung des Ursprungs der wissenschaftlichen Begriffe. Es wird schliesslich Einsteins Anspruch diskutiert, wonach der wirkliche Entwicklungsprozess der Wissenschaft seine Art, Geschichte zu schreiben, rechtfertigt. (shrink)

In his general account of moral thought, Prichard holds that to regard a given action as right, we must imagine ourselves to be in a certain set of circumstances. In doing so, we conceive of ourselves as bound by those circumstances to perform that action. Since we have various general convictions about moral obligation, no single characteristic leads us to regard right acts as right. When two general convictions conflict, we are not in a position to know what our duty (...) is. Being ignorant of some relevant circumstances, we cannot answer the question ‘What ought we to do?’ This follows from the fact that no common characteristic renders actions into duties. (shrink)

Concerning the nature of desires that pertain to actions, considers the view that we cannot desire something unless we know or think, first, that it does not exist, and second, that it does not exist now. Finds a core of truth in this, but modifies the formula to claim that ‘we can only desire the existence of that of the existence of which in the past, present, or future, as the case may be, we are uncertain.’ Put more simply, a (...) desire is not a desire for the existence of something, but rather a desire for something to be. It follows from this view that we cannot desire something to be the case when we think that, without a doubt, it will be the case. (shrink)

Examines four principle questions about moral obligation raised by key philosophers: Plato asks in The Republic ‘Will a man be better off for doing his duty?’; Plato then asks ‘Ought man to do his duty?’; we may also ask ‘What is the criterion of a duty?’; and we may ask ‘What is moral obligation?’ Rejecting the last question as unreal, Prichard then argues against the connection between duty and happiness or duty and personal or general advantage. After critiquing both teleological (...) and quasi‐teleological theories of obligation, he ends by contrasting goodness and obligation. (shrink)

To the many moral theorists who have sought to establish a necessary connection between duty and interest, Prichard replies that their project ought not to be undertaken as it commits us to the view that our only duty is to do what is to our advantage. In discussing the attempts of Plato, Butler, and Green to link duty and interest, Prichard, like Kant, maintains that the rightness of action does not depend either upon our own good or upon our belief (...) that it depends upon our own good. Similarly, Prichard dismisses the view that our desire for our own good is our only motive. (shrink)

Analyses Green's rather obscure treatment of two important questions: ‘Why does a subject have the duty to obey the ruler or sovereign?’; and ‘Why is the receipt of an order backed by a threat sufficient to establish this duty when the order comes from a ruler?’ Prichard considers Green's position regarding the grounds and justification for obedience to law to be part of a larger theory of moral obligation that is inconsistent with our ordinary moral ideas. To Green's seeming denial (...) of the existence of any natural rights or duties, Prichard responds that Green in fact has failed to state a sense in which there really are natural rights and obligations. Moreover, Green's denial that we can answer the question ‘Why ought we to obey the government?’ can be formulated only by maintaining the existence of an obligation independent of our government's commands. The core of truth in Green's position, according to Prichard, lies in his recognition that a factor necessary to secure obedience is the subject's unselfish interest in the welfare of other members of her community. (shrink)

Discusses central aspects of Kant's work on the nature of morality and the basis of moral obligation. In examining the categorical imperative and the hypothetical imperative, emphasizes the real nature of the distinction between these principles: whereas the former is binding upon every one, the latter is binding only upon some individuals, namely those individuals who want the end for which a prescribed action is a means. Also considers the nature of the will, Kant's criterion of the rightness of a (...) right action, and two criticisms of Kant's view of morality that arise from his attempt to offer a general answer to the question ‘Why ought an action be performed?’ Then turns to Kant's proof of freedom, which it is claimed just barely misses making the right point that action is only possible under the idea of freedom. Concludes by examining Kant's proof of immortality and the existence of God. (shrink)

Prichard's topic here is the nature of ‘ought’. If we were to take ‘I ought to will x’ to be equivalent to ‘my willing x ought to exist’, then it is true that ‘If I were to will a certain change x, my willing x would be something that ought to exist.’ For this to hold, either my willing x would itself be something good or my willing x would cause something good. Prichard, however, rejects this view on the grounds (...) that one cannot know, in willing x to exist, whether one's willing x is something that ought to exist. One can only know that if one were to will x, one would be willing something that one thought ought to exist. (shrink)

Endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, this term seems to mean simply ‘that being desired’ or a person's ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim. In other contexts, αγαθον takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as a good. Prichard argues that by αγαθον Aristotle actually means ‘conducive to happiness’, and holds (...) that when a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to be happy. Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of our ultimate aim. (shrink)

Often an action causes both evil and benefit for the agent. No general account can be given for what happens when one considers in light of this evil and benefit whether to undertake the action in question. Prichard maintains that in willing a movement, there are two acts of will. First, there is the willing to think more of what one shall gain in willing x, which results from the desire to will x. Second, there is the willing of the (...) change x. (shrink)

To ascertain the truth about the main problems of moral philosophy, Prichard begins by dismissing as unreal the question ‘What is moral obligation?’ Being sui generis, ‘moral obligation’ cannot be defined in terms of other things. We are left with the question ‘What makes right acts right?’, to which Prichard replies there is no general answer. We are also left with the question ‘What, if anything, ought we to do in life?’ After contrasting the moral and the non‐moral senses of (...) ought, Prichard replies to Sidgwick's utilitarian treatment of this question, which involves dividing the question into two: ‘What ought I to do?’ and ‘What ought I to aim at?’ Dismissing the latter formulation, Prichard defends an intuitionist account of how we come to know what we ought to do. He concludes by distinguishing between the right and the good. (shrink)

In discussing the fact that it takes time to perform an action, distinguishes statements such as ‘I shall do x’ from statements such as ‘I shall be under an obligation to do x’ and ‘I was doing x’ from ‘I was under an obligation to do x’. The truth of the ‘ought’ statements is independent of whether the action is done, as it is not necessary that one not do the action at the time required in order to be under (...) an obligation to do it at that time. For some contrasts between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ statements, the obligation, such as the obligation to go to bed, refers to the future. The statement ‘I am under an obligation to go to bed’ is equivalent to ‘from now on I shall be under an obligation to go to bed’, and does not require either that I shall not do the action or that I have not done the action for it to be true. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:212 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY with Gassendi and his studies on atomism. Yet Papi gives us very little which is not already generally known. There is but a mere hint of how atomistic philosophy was handled by the Aristotelians and to what extent they actually absorbed some of that tradition themselves. Nothing in detail is said of the process whereby atomistic and Platonic motives became coupled, not only by Bruno, (...) but by Ficino before and by Cudworth afterwards. On the credit side, however, the author does call attention to the commentary and paraphrase of Lucretius by Girolamo Frachetta of Rovigo (printed 1589), a work of some interest, which has been but little studied. Such rays of light are all too infrequent in this section and Papi is usually content to follow the conventional beaten path. For one to write a book on Bruno which breaks new ground is now difficult, for the field has been so thoroughly worked over. This one takes up a number of interesting themes found in Bruno's writings and sheds some light on them, but it seldom if ever says anything very different from the well-established tradition of Bruno scholarship in Italy which has produced so many mediocre books over the years. The specialist on Bruno and the sixteenth century will find little to detain him; the more casual reader could be ~rected to a number of superior treatments of various aspects of the Nolan's thought. In short, this study adds but little to what is already known. CHAm~V_SB. ScH~rrr University of Leeds Sir Walter Ralegh dcrivain, l'~uvre et les iddes. By Pierre Lefranc. (Qutbec: Les Presses de l'Universit~ Laval, 1968. Pp. 733. $19.50) This excellent study, the fruit of more than a dozen years of research, throws much light on Ralegh's thought and literary achievement. Lefranc has examined the manuscript sources, and unearthed quite a few new ones, and has patiently, carefully, and with much detective work, established what is no doubt the best available hypothesis of what is authentic among Ralegh's purported prose and poetic writings, and the date and circumstances of their composition. He has analyzed them in the context of Ralegh's carver, and has developed an exciting and rich interpretation of his political, philosophical and religious ideas. Ralegh's role in intellectual history derives mainly from his reputation as a Machiavellian, as an atheist, and from his mammoth, "pious," much-read providential History of the World (written during his years as a prisoner in the Tower of London). Lefranc deftly sorts and weighs the evidence for the various views and attitudes attributed to Ralegh in his own day and by interpreters ever since, and emerges from this examination with a fresh and striking picture of one of the liveliest bridge figures between the Elizabethan Renaissance and the modern world. The establishment of the canon leads to discarding as not by Ralegh many writings that have previously been used in interpreting the courtier's views. Three philosophical works which have played a role in twentieth-century interpretation, "A Treatise of the Soule," "The Prince, or Maxims of State" and "The Sceptick" are shown to be doubtful to a greater or lesser degree. "The Sceptick," which Strathmann (Sir Walter Ralegh,,4 Study in Elizabethan Skepticism, New York, 1951) had used to interpret Ralegh as a sceptical-Christian fideist, had been questioned earlier by Lefranc, Sprott, and myself. It is just a translation of portions of Book I of Sextus F_znpiricus' Outlinea of Pyrrhonism, and contains no connection with Ralegh, except that it was BOOK REVIEWS 213 published in his literary remains in 1651. Lefranc now, examining the evidence of the four manuscripts that have been discovered, concludes that it was a part of Ralegh's documentation when he was doing his research, but that 'Tattribution de 'The Sceptick' Ralegh lui-m~me ne repose sur rien" (p. 67). With the canon shorn of the dubious items, Lefranc proceeds to unfold a picture of Ralegh's intellectual world. As a practical statesman, buccaneer and explorer, Ralegh had a view of the role England should play vis-,'t-vis Spain and the New World that contained... (shrink)

A brilliant work which shows a thorough command of the relevant literature. His phenomenological method leads Krohn to irreducible norms which possess a certain coercive power, pointing thus to a transempirical other in which they are rooted and which justifies our belief in them. The argument is introduced by a discussion of ethical negativism, naturalism, and subjectivism and develops through a consideration of classical ethics and its deepening through Christian and phenomenological insights. --K. H.

What role does the wild duck play in Ibsen's famous drama? I argue that, besides mirroring the fate of the human cast members, the duck is acting as animal subject in a quasi-experiment, conducted in a private setting. Analysed from this perspective, the play allows us to discern the epistemological and ethical dimensions of the new scientific animal practice (systematic observation of animal behaviour under artificial conditions) emerging precesely at that time. Ibsen's play stages the clash between a scientific and (...) a romantic understanding of animals that still constitutes the backdrop of most contemporary debates over animals in research. Whereas the scientific understanding reduces the animal's behaviour, as well as its environment, to discrete and modifiable elements, the romantic view regards animals as being at one with (or violently disconnected from) their natural surroundings. (shrink)

Speeches of the author on theory of knowledge in the context of Islamic philosophy.

Lorsqu'on cherche à comprendre l'enjeu des discussions actuelles entre les philosophes anglophones de l'histoire, l'on est fatalement conduit, à un moment ou l'autre, à étudier les vues de R.G. Collingwood. Depuis la publication en 1946 de son livre posthumeL'Idée de l'histoire, les idées de Collingwood ont été à la fois un stimulant et une source de problèmes constants pour ceux qui se préoccupent de définir l'histoire comme mode d'investigation rationnelle. Au cours des trois dernières décennies, la littérature aussi bien critique (...) qu'exégétique consacrée à son œuvre s'est développée à un point tel qu'il est devenu difficile d'ignorer ses idées. (shrink)

Probably to most students of Moral Philosophy there comes a time when they feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction with the whole subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather than to diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still more the arguments, of particular thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure. "What," it is asked, "are we really going to learn by Moral (...) Philosophy?" "What are books on Moral Philosophy really trying to show, and when their aim is clear, why are they so unconvincing and artificial?" And again: "Why is it so difficult to substitute anything better?" Personally, I have been led by growing dissatisfaction of this kind to wonder whether the reason may not be that the subject, at any rate as usually understood, consists in the attempt to answer an improper question. And in this article, I shall venture to contend that the existence of the whole subject, as usually understood, rests on a mistake, and on a mistake parallel to that on which rests, as I think, the subject usually called the Theory of Knowledge. (shrink)

On Sikh doctrines inunciated by Guru Nanak.